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Editor's Preface 
One of the most important aspects of globalization is the intensification of 
international capital flows. The rapid development of information technology and 
decreasing transaction costs created an international environment characterized by 
an increasing volatility of financial transactions. For developing countries, which are 
in urgent need of external financing, capital volatility poses problems, as the 
probability of financial crisis rises. It has been shown that Foreign Direct Investment 
is a less volatile source of external financing. Therefore, the attraction of Foreign 
Direct Investment is a viable option for developing countries that want to ensure 
external capital flows. Moreover, this kind of financing is connected with the transfer 
of technology, with an improved acces to foreign markets and (possibly) with positive 
external effects on the domestic economy. Foreign Direct Investment decisions, in 
turn, depend to a large extent on the decisions of multinational enterprises. Besides 
other factors political risks like expropriation, political instabilities, riots and so on 
influence these decisions to a large degree. 
This volume empirically analyzes the impact of political risk on Foreign Direct 
Investment flows to Latin America. Additional evidence is given by an in-depth case 
study on Mexico. As a theoretical basis the author presents a macroeconomic model 
with microecomic foundations that explains the reaction of investors to the 
emergence of political risk. Furthermore, the book offers a theoretical foundation and 
classification of political risk factors. The empirical analysis shows that governance is 
the most important political risk while catastrophic risk factors as the risk of turmoil 
are of lesser importance. These results highlight the importance of good governance 
in developing countries which are eager to actively participate in the process of 
globalization. The author shows that political institutions "matter" for economic 
outcomes and highlights the importance of institutional reform to further strenghten 
the attractiveness of Latin America for foreign investors. With these theoretical and 
empirical results, Dr. Stosberg provides a valuable contribution to the literature on 
political risks of Latin America. 
Hermann Sautter 
Gottingen, September 2004 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The problem 
But 'tis the very point in question, whether every thing must 
have a cause or not; and therefore, according to all just 
reasoning, it ought never to be taken for granted. 
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 
Most of the day-to-day activities of people deal with the planning of future de-
velopments. As dealing with the future by definition generates uncertainty 
decisions makers are almost everywhere confronted with this phenomenon. If 
you enrol in university to study engineering because you are convinced that 
this will offer you the possibility of earning your living you can never be sure 
that you will really succeed in doing so. Maybe you will face an economic 
downturn at the end of your studies so that you cannot find a suitable job. 
Maybe you will not succeed in the necessary exams to enter the labor market 
as an engineer. All you can do ex ante is to make an analysis of possible 
future developments based on the current available information about your 
personal capabilities and the environment. 
Firms planning investments are essentially in the same situation. They will 
engage in a project when they have the opportunity to make an investment 
which is expected to be profitable. However, as most of the earnings that are 
generated by the project will be received in the future, investors can never be 
sure that their profits are really evolving as it was planned before. Instead they 
have to face the possibility that the expected revenue stream of the investment 
is altered. Reasons for these alteration are various. It can be a general 
economic downturn that renders the investment disadvantageous or it may be 
technical progress that changes the competitivity of the product or a major 
change in consumer taste that unfolds its negative impact on the profitability of 
the project. For firms engaged in cross-border activities the problem is usually 
more severe. They are not familiar with the institutional structure and the 
political environment of the host country and their information and under-
standing of the history and the culture of the host country often remains 
limited. 
Hence, for international corporations or those that are intending to go abroad 
the topic of international risk management is essential. It is straightforward to 
see that the scope of possible risks for foreign investors is wide. The wish to 
offer a complete assessment of all possible risks for foreign investors would 
therefore be too ambitious. Instead, this volume focuses on risks that are 
caused by the political and institutional environment of a host country. In other 
words, this volume deals with a phenomenon that is referred to as Political 
Risk or Country Risk in publications on international finance and investment. 
Thinking of expropriations by host governments all over the world one can 
easily understand how national politics influence the business environment for 
international investors in a given country. Although outright expropriations of 
multinational corporations or catastrophic events like wars and revolutions are 
most likely the events that cause the biggest attention among observers and 
analysts, more often the actions of governments influence the revenue stream 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
of investors in a more subtle way. Discriminatory taxation or regulation, 
extensive labor protection, massive corruption or bureaucratic inefficiencies 
are real wortd examples for national policies that may adversely affect the 
profits of foreign investors. Although no outright expropriation these national 
policies affect the political and economic conditions of every day firm 
operations implying a direct influence on their profits. In addition to direct 
governmental action, revolutions, strikes, riots or other forms of civil unrest 
may endanger the assets of foreign firms or bring production to a halt. 
Only citing these few examples it is straightforward to see that national politics 
establish a basic framework for the business activities of investors. The 
existing political system and current politics as well as their likely evolution in 
the future influence the expected profits of investors and affect their incentives 
to invest in foreign markets. If investors cannot be sure of reaping the full 
benefits of their projects, incentives to invest are decreasing despite of 
potentially high future returns. This is in particular the case for investments 
with long pay-off periods, as it is hardly surprising that investors in those 
sectors are more severely affected by uncertainty over future developments 
than investors in footloose industries. Governments that cannot credibly 
commit not to opportunistically interfere in the investor's business are shaping 
incentive structures that are not favorable for investment. The same holds for 
governments that do not succeed in property providing basic public goods that 
are essential for successful business operations as for example public 
security, property rights protection or legal certainty. 
Political risk however, is not a topic that is only relevant for a few multinational 
corporations. Instead it becomes one of the most relevant problems for 
developing countries that are eagerly seeking to ensure the external financing 
of their economic development. As figure 1.1 impressively highlights public 
capital transfers to developing countries, such as development aid and other 
transfers, are stagnating while private capital flows approximately increased by 
factor six during the 90s indicating that relying on public capital transfers is by 
no means sufficient for developing countries. 
The dynamic evolution of private international capital movements rather 
suggests that the future development perspectives of developing nations will to 
an enormous extent depend on their ability to attract private foreign investors. 
However, more than their public counterparts private foreign investors are 
averse to risks that may endanger their future profits. Despite of the vast 
increase of international capital flows to developing countries several emerging 
market crises during the 90s impressively underlined the volatility of 
international capital flows. International investors quickly react to potential 
political risks as for example unstable macroeconomic environments or risks of 
expropriation as wells as riots or other forms of social unrest by quickly pulling 
out their capital. In turn, investors that have been seriously hit by losses due to 
political risk will hesitate the next time to engage in investment projects in the 
developing world. 
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Figure 1.1: Evolution of Public and Private Capital Transfers to 
Developing Countries (in billions of US$) 
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Source: Own figure, public capital transfers contain Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other 
public inflows. Private capital transfers contain FOi flows, portfolio flows and bank loans and other 
flows. Source: World Bank (2002): Global Development Finance. 
Therefore high levels of political risks may seriously endanger successful 
economic development as current investors may pull out and future invest-
ments are deterred. 1 Hence, poor policies and weak institutional frameworks 
are extremely costly in terms of foregone FOi flows. Consequently developing 
countries which are in urgent need of foreign investments should make 
political risk prevention and management one of the priorities of national 
economic policy. 
Despite of many economic problems during the last two decades the countries 
of Latin America are still interesting markets with a large potential for Mure 
growth. During the 90s liberal economic policies increased investor confidence 
and stimulated private capital flows to the region. However, while writing these 
lines it seems as if many countries of the region experience serious fallbacks 
into the past. Recent events in Argentina, that abandoned the dollar parity and 
witnessed violent social unrest following a severe economic crisis, indicate the 
importance of political risk analysis for foreign investment projects. Economic 
and political crisis in Venezuela resulting in large upheavals of opposition 
groups against the rule of president Chavez paralyzing the entire economy 
and the continuing presence of large guerilla groups in Colombia are other 
examples for the need of careful and detailed political risk evaluations. 
However, it is not always clear what international investors are looking for and 
what in turn should be the domestic policy preconditions to encourage FOi. Of 
particular importance are the following questions. Is political risk a major 
determinant of investment decision by foreign investors? And if yes, to what 
extent and which political risk factors are decisive for the decisions of 
• Diamonte/Liew/Stevens (1998) show that changes in political risk have a higher impact on 
returns in emerging markets than in developed countries indicating that emerging market 
investors are more risk averse. 
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multinational companies? How do political risks emerge ? How can political 
risks be measured and quantified ? And eventually, how can political risks be 
successfully and efficiently mitigated ? The following chapters analyze all 
these questions by quantitative research on a sample of Latin American 
countries and a qualitative case study on Mexico . 
Concerning the analysis of political risks, Mexico is a country of particular 
interest in the region. The moratorium on international debt in 1982 followed by 
the deep economic crisis of the 80s resulted in extremely high levels of country 
risk. However, in a quick economic transformation Mexico managed to 
become a country with low to moderate country risk ratings during the second 
half of the 90s. This comparatively rapid gain in investor confidence makes 
Mexico an interesting and challenging case for studying the extent and the 
determinants of political risks. The process of radical change from an economy 
based on import substitution and high protection with low investor confidence 
to an open economy that successfully attracts large amounts of FOi makes 
Mexico a fascinating case study to determine the political risk variables that 
matter the most for foreign investors. Although considered as a raw model for 
successful economic reform in the beginning of the 90s, the "Tequila-Crisis" in 
late 1994 preceded by the armed uprising in Chiapas and the assassination of 
the presidential candidate Colossio are good examples to illustrate that the 
climate for foreign investors in Mexico still is far from being ideal. But there is 
more than just that to the Mexican case. Simultaneously to its economic 
reform program the country embarked on an ambitious political reform 
program. The dismantling of the semi-authoritarian system established by the 
ruling revolutionary party and the continuing process of democratization 
coincide with the economic reform program. It is interesting to analyze if the 
process of democratization that culminated in the election of Vincente Fox, the 
first president since 71 years that is not a member of the PRI, affects the level 
of political risk and the attractiveness for foreign investors. The case study in 
Chapter 5 pictures the evolution of political risks for foreign investors in Mexico 
for the period between 1982 and 2003 and identifies the major risks that inter-
national investors presently face in the country. It furthermore analyzes how 
Mexico succeeded in quickly mitigating high levels of risks and regaining the 
confidence of international investors. 
1.2 Concept and Methodology 
The second chapter starts with a brief overview of basic concepts in 
investment theory. Then a brief overview over the modeling of investment 
decisions under certainty and uncertainty is given where the main focus is on 
models where investment projects are assumed to be irreversible and firms 
have the possibility to delay investment decisions. The chapter continues with 
a brief review of the theory of international capital flows. This part provides 
definitions and a brief review of the theoretical and empirical evidence on 
potential determinants of FOi. Furthermore the chapter reviews existing 
models of political risk and draws conclusion from the models of investment 
under uncertainty. It closes with a synthesis of the presented models and a 
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summary of the main hypotheses. Chapter 3 turns to an analysis of the factors 
that create political risks in host countries and discusses the determinants of 
risk for foreign investors. At the same time it offers a basic theoretical frame-
work for the analysis of political risk by referring to the theoretical contributions 
of New Institutional Economics. The second part of Chapter 3 deals with the 
problem of empirical measurement of political risk and analyzes different 
potential risk mitigating strategies for host countries. Chapter 4 presents an 
econometric analysis of FOi flows to Latin American countries. The influence 
of different political risk factors on FDI is assessed by using a panel of Latin 
American countries for the period 1982-1997. Chapter 5 analyzes political risk 
in Mexico for the period between 1984 and 2003 and gives additional 
qualitative evidence on the relevance of political risk for Latin American 
countries. Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings of the study, and presents 
a conclusion as well as an outlook for Latin American countries. 
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2. Risk in the Theory of Investment 
2.1 General Theory of Investment 
2.1.1 Basic Theory of Investment 
2.1.1.1 Definition and Categories of Investment 
As economic actors make investments practically every day investing is a core 
economic activity. Firms build new production facilities, acquire better 
machines or try to enhance the capabilities of their staff by paying for 
seminars. In doing so they try to achieve future goals of the company by 
spending money or resources at present. Investment decisions deeply 
influence the profitability of firms in the future because they are a decisive 
determinant of the future competitive position. Therefore, staying in the market 
and making profits requires a careful planning of the investment program. 
Although the term investment is ubiquitously used in economic theory, its 
precise meaning often remains unclear. The etymological root of the word 
"Investment" lies in the Latin word "investire" which means to dress up. 
Modern economic theory offers various definitions of the term investment 
which cannot be completely discussed here.1 In microeconomics one can refer 
to an action as an investment when an economic actor spends money at 
present with the expectation to receive future returns which are supposed to 
be higher than the amount that has originally been spent. Investments usually 
imply the purchase of material or immaterial assets serving the interest of the 
investor. Economic theory claims that rational investors only invest in projects 
that help to attain the goals of the investor implying that investments will only 
be made, if they increase the profits of private firms. 
Usually the price of an investment is known to the investor when planning a 
project. The benefits of investment projects, however, are normally uncertain. 
Investors may plan the expected cash flows from a given project but can never 
be sure that unforeseen events in the future will not alter this expected 
revenue stream. Essentially investments are a bet on returns that depend on 
uncertain future developments that cannot be completely foreseen ex ante. 
This is of particular importance, if the investment has a long pay off period. For 
example, an investment in a power plant requires huge payments for 
construction and operation. The benefits that are generated every year by the 
consumers' payments are rather small compared to the initial cost implying 
that the break even point of the investor lies in the far future. It is straightfor-
ward to see that when investors plan future revenues for a long period, the risk 
that unforeseen events occur is higher. Corporate planning and strategic 
management of enterprises, however, involve many situations where the plans 
of the deciding actors extent to many periods. These characteristics imply that 
investment decisions are complex processes being the result of individual 
decisions based on current expectations about the future. Therefore, economic 
theory suggests that investment behavior is not only influenced by the volatility 
of the environment but also by the personal characteristics of the deciding 
actors. In sum, their information, their attitude towards risk and their personal 
1 For an overview see Perridon/Steiner (1995), p.25. 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
8 RISK IN THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT 
expectations about the future all become decisive determinants of investment 
behavior. 
Macroeconomics defines investments as payments that augment the physical 
capital stock of the economy. Aggregate investment and capital accumulation 
are decisive determinants of the economic performance of countries. In the 
neoclassical growth model the accumulation of physical capital can explain 
differences in per capita income. More recent contributions in growth theory 
consider investments in human capital and technological progress as decisive 
determinants of growth.2 Therefore, investment decisions of firms and private 
actors are highly relevant for national growth. Moreover, aggregate investment 
is a decisive component of the demand side in national economies implying 
that modeling in macroeconomics requires the study of the determinants of 
aggregate investment. 
Economic theory identifies different categories or classes of investments. 
Although they cannot be completely discussed here, figure 2.1 depicts some 
basic classifications that are useful for a better understanding of the 
characteristics of investment projects.3 Financial investments may be made in 
stocks or bonds or other financial products. One can distinguish financial 
investments with fixed rates of return as for example government bonds from 
investments where investors mainly have speculative objectives. 
Figure 2.1: Categories of Investments by Object 
INVESTMENTS 
FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS REAL ASSET INVESTMENTS 
INVESTMENTS W 1TH 
FIXED RETURNS 
INVESTMENTS W 1TH 
SPECULATIVE 
08.JECTIVES 
Source: Own figure with reference to Gotze/Bloech (1993). 
INVESTMENTS IN 
TANGIBLE ASSETS 
INVESTMENTS IN 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
The latter motive is relevant for investments in stocks or financial derivatives. 
Investments in non-financial assets in turn, can be either tangible or intangible. 
If a physical economic good is purchased one could speak of an investment in 
a tangible asset. If, in turn, a firm invests in the further qualification of the staff 
one may speak of an investment in intangible assets. 
2 For an overview of growth theory see Barro/Sala-I-Martin (1995). 
3 For an overview see Adam ( 1994 ). 
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2.1.1.2 Opportunity Costs, Time Preference and Net Present Value 
Approach 
The previous paragraph showed that investments entail a payment for the 
acquisition of an asset, may it be tangible or intangible. Therefore, investing 
means a loss of liquidity, as financial capital of the investor is bound in 
acquired assets reducing the possible returns that economic actors could 
obtain by simply depositing their money in a bank. Hence, every individual has 
to consider these opportunity costs of investing by integrating foregone interest 
payments into his calculus since to be advantageous an investment has to 
offer higher returns than these opportunity costs. Moreover, as future profits do 
not have the same value as present payments, future cash flows have to be 
discounted with the current interest rate in order to make payments in different 
periods comparable and to allow for the calculation of a measure indicating the 
profitability of an investment. Assuming that firms can raise and deposit capital 
at the same level of interest, the interest rate becomes the best indicator for 
the opportunity costs of investment. In this framework the interest rate does 
not only cover the opportunity cost but also time preference. The so-called Net 
Present Value (NPV) is a measure capable of deciding whether investments 
should be undertaken or not. In economic models opportunity costs are usually 
modeled by using this approach. The NPV, however, assumes the existence 
of a perfect capital market meaning that financial capital is always available 
and that shortages in the supply of capital as credit rationing are absent. 
Moreover, a perfect capital market has a unique interest rate which is 
supposed to be valid for both investing and raising capital. These assumptions 
allow to analyze the profitability of investments apart from their financing as it 
is proposed in the Fisher-Separation-Theorem.4 Using these assumptions one 
can apply the following formula to calculate the profitability of a project: 
where I is the initial payment for an investment and the second term on the 
right hand side the sum of the expected periodical cash flows CF discounted 
with the assumed interest rate i. If the NPV exceeds o, the investor should 
make the investment because its profitability is higher than the opportunity 
cost, that is, by investing in this project the actor is better off than by investing 
money at the current interest rate i. If, in turn, the NPV is below 0, investing at 
the current interest rate i leaves the investor better off than realizing the 
project. 
In addition to assuming a perfect capital market the NPV approach makes two 
more subtle assumptions. First, investments are supposed to be reversible, 
that is, acquired assets can be sold at any given point in time without 
additional cost. In other words, if the revenue stream changes in a way that the 
investment will become non-profitable, the investor has the possibility to 
disinvest without additional cost. The model assumes that investors can 
4 See Fisher (1997). 
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completely skip the project without facing "lock-ins• or sunk costs. It is obvious 
that many real world investment projects violate this assumption. Second, a 
possibility of waiting is absent in this approach. The NPV rule neglects the 
investor's possibility to postpone the decision which would be rational if the 
deciding actor can generate further useful information about the project. The 
NPV model, in turn, assumes that a firm has the possibility to invest right now 
or never again. Examining real world investment decisions one finds that post-
ponement is at least a feasible option. If the strategy of waiting reduces un-
certainty over future prices, costs or market developments, it is rational for the 
decision maker to wait. In this case a rational investor would weight the costs 
of waiting against the benefits of new information. Costs of waiting are twofold: 
foregone future cash flows and advantages potential competitors might gain 
during the period of delay. If the benefits of waiting exceed the cost, rational 
investors would postpone the investment and preserve an option to invest in 
the future.5 The discussion shows that although widely used the NPV rule only 
has limited explanatory power for the analysis of investment projects. 
2.1.2 Models of Investment under Certainty 
2.1.2.1 Overview 
This paragraph reviews some theoretical models of investment under certainty 
that have been influential in the literature.6 The accelerator approach based on 
pioneering work by CLARK models aggregate demand as the decisive 
determinant of the capital stock. Variations of demand imply variations of the 
capital stock via investment implying that the main determinant of investment 
is the variation of demand. 7 KEYNES focuses on the role of private expectations 
to explain investment. He points out that the decision to invest depends on the 
expected future profits of investment projects. KEYNES uses the marginal 
efficiency of capital as a measure on which firms base their investment 
decisions.8 If the NPV approach is applied, marginal efficiency is obtained by 
setting equation (2.1) equal to O and solving for i: 
The marginal efficiency of capital is the rate of return of an investment. If the 
investment yields a higher return than the market rate, it is profitable and will 
be realized. The opposite holds if the current market rate exceeds the marginal 
efficiency. The marginal efficiency of capital is sensitive to changes of 
expectations. If economic actors expect a general economic downturn in the 
future, they will also expect lower cash flows. Therefore, a change in the 
investors' perception of the future can depress the level of investment without 
5 I will extend this critique of the NPV approach in paragraph 2.1.2.3 Paragraph 2.1 .3 
introduces two models that capture the effects of irreversibilities and the option of waiting. 
6 Although many of these models have the drawbacks that have been exposed in the 
preceding paragraph, they are briefly exposed here because they are widely used in the 
literature. 
7 See Clark (1917). 
8 See Keynes (1989). 
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a change of fundamental economic variations. Uncertainty, however, is only 
mentioned verbally in the work of KEYNES but not explicitly modeled.9 
One of the most frequently used specifications for the analysis of investment 
behavior is the neoclassical model based on pioneering work by JORGENSON.10 
In this model the firm maximizes the discounted flow of profits over time by 
choosing the corresponding optimal capital stock. Investment is induced by the 
difference between the current capital stock and the profit maximizing capital 
stock K*. The basic idea of the model can be illustrated by using a simple 
example. Assume that firms can rent capital at a price of rk and the profit of a 
firm p depends besides other factors characterized by A1, ... AN on the amount 
of capital that is employed. The net profit of the firm at a given point in time 
becomes: 
(2.3) 
The profit maximizing choice of capital is given by the first order condition 
where aptaK is the first partial derivative of NP with respect to K: 
(2.4) 
Equation (2.4) states that the firm will rent capital up to the point where its 
marginal revenue equals its rental price rK which implicitly defines the capital 
stock maximizing net profit. Investment is then determined by the difference 
between the current capital stock and the desired stock of capital. 
JORGENSON makes use of this basic thought in his neoclassical model. 11 The 
demand for the capital stock is determined to maximize net worth which is 
defined as current revenue less expenditure including taxes. Maximizing net 
worth subject to a standard neoclassical production function with the constraint 
that the rate of growth of K is net investment (gross investment less replace-
ment) JORGENSON obtains the following first order conditions: 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
_q_Q_ = ~ 
8 L p 
oQ =.:.. 
oK p 
Equation (2.5) states that in the optimum the marginal productivity of labor 
aQtaL has to equal the real wage w/p. Equation (2.6) shows that the marginal 
9 The reason why the model of Keynes is placed under the heading models under certainty 
may seem puzzling. But as argued above his treatment of uncertainty remains verbal and is 
not formally modeled. Therefore, the author decided to leave the theory in this paragraph. 
10 See Jorgenson ( 1963) and ( 1971 ). 
11 See Jorgenson (1963). 
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productivity of capital aQ!oK has to equal its cost. The difference between (2.4) 
and (2.6) lies in the interpretation of the cost term. As firms usually do not rent 
capital, the numerator of the second ratio of equation (2.6) can be interpreted 
as the price of capital which JORGENSON called the user cost of capital c which 
depends on a set of variables that vary with the national tax system. 
JORGENSON assumes that output, employment and capital stock are deter-
mined by an iterative process. Each period, production and employment are 
set to the levels corresponding to the first marginality condition with capital 
stock fixed. Under the described assumptions the process converges to the 
desired maximum of net worth where the optimal capital stock K* depends on 
the planned output and a set of price variables which appear in the user cost 
of capital. As the firms do not face adjustment costs or delivery lags, they can 
achieve any K* instantaneously implying that the current capital stock 
immediately adjusts via investment to the desired capital stock that maximizes 
net worth. Investment is thus determined by variations of the optimal capital 
stock ~K*. 
There are many critical remarks concerning the neoclassical investment model 
which cannot be listed here completely.1 For our purpose it is enough to 
underline two shortcomings of the reviewed models. Since both models use 
the NPV approach, they are subject to the same criticism that has already 
been exposed above, that is, they assume that investments are reversible and 
that there is no option to wait. Unlike the Keynesian model, the neoclassical 
model does not incorporate uncertainty or expectations of actors. Instead, 
firms choose their optimal capital stock by equating the user cost of capital 
with the marginal revenue of capital. Investment decisions are taken without 
regard to what costs or marginal revenue of capital are to be assumed for the 
future . 
2.1.2.2 The q-theory of Tobin 
2.1.2.2.1 The Basic Model 
The basis for the q theory of investment pioneered by TOBIN is the theory of 
portfolio selection that analyzes how investors structure investment portfolios 
considering risks and returns of assets they currently hold or intend to hold. 13 
Rational investors choose a utility maximizing portfolio by considering return, 
risk, transaction cost for acquisition and liquidity of assets. Portfolio 
diversification allows for the reduction of the aggregate risk, if acquired assets 
are not completely and positively correlated. TOBIN'S q is defined as the market 
value of a marginal unit of capital divided by its replacement cost and can be 
written as: 
(2.7) 
p q,=; 
R 
12 An overview is given by Chirinko (1993) p.1879. 
13 See Tobin (1969). 
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where PM is the current market value and PR the replacement cost. TOBIN 
argues that a firm increases its capital stock by investing, if the value of this 
ratio is greater than unity because in this case additional capital is value 
increasing for the firm. Values of q smaller than unity imply that the firm has an 
incentive to reduce the capital stock either by disinvestment or decreasing 
replacement spending. It has to be underlined that the results are only valid for 
marginal variations of the capital stock and not average q. In economic models 
q is used to model private incentives to increase or decrease the capital stock 
via investment. A value of q exceeding unity triggers additional investment 
because the current market value of capital is higher than its replacement cost. 
In turn, values of q less than unity mean that the market value of additional 
capital is lower than the replacement costs which implies a reduction of the 
capital stock. The equilibrium value of q is unity because firms neither have an 
incentive to invest nor to reduce the capital stock. 
2.1.2.2.2 The Romer Model 
2.1.2.2.2.1 The Model 
In the ROMER Model q is interpreted in a different way.14 Assume the presence 
of N identical firms, a purchase price of capital goods that is constant and 
equal to unity. Further assume a firm that maximizes its profits facing costs of 
adjusting its capital stock taking account of the fact that it is costly for a firm to 
increase or decrease its physical capital stock. The marginal adjustment costs 
are assumed to be increasing in the size of the adjustment, that is, the bigger 
the desired change, the higher the cost of changing the capital stock. Finally, 
assume for simplicity that the rate of depreciation is 0. In the discrete time 
model the firm's maximization problem can be formally described with the 
following Lagrangian: 
(2.8) 
~ l 
L = I-( )' [ir(K,)- I, - C(/, )+ q , (K, + I , - K ,_ ,)] 
,, o I+ r 
where n(K,) are the firm's profits, 11 its investment and C(l1) the adjustment 
costs that depend on I, and the last term describes the condition that the 
capital stock in the next period equals the sum of the current capital stock plus 
investments in the current period. Calculating the first order condition and 
rearranging terms one obtains equation (2.9): 
(2.9) l+C'(/,) = q, 
The equation implies that a firm will invest up to the point where the cost of 
acquiring capital equal the value of the capital. The cost of capital consists of 
the purchase price that was assumed to be fixed at unity and the marginal 
adjustment costs C' . q can be interpreted as the shadow price of capital 
14 If not cited otherwise the following explanations are based on Romer (2001 ). Only the 
necessary formal components of the model will be presented. For a detailed formal 
formulation of the model see Romer (2001) p. 370. 
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because it shows how an additional unit of money invested in the capital stock 
changes the present value of the firms' profit. In other words, q measures the 
impact on profits if the capital constraint is loosened marginally. If q is high, the 
firm has a high incentive to invest, if q is low the opposite holds. q can also be 
interpreted according to the definition of TOBIN as the ratio of the capital's 
market value to its replacement costs. If q exceeds unity, (2.9} implies 
additional investment and vice versa. 
To show how q evolves over time one can use a current-value Hamiltonien 
function to solve the maximization problem of the firm. 15 In analogy to the 
discrete time case one obtains the following first order condition characterizing 
the optimum: 
(2.10) l+C'(/,)=q(t) 
Like in the discrete time case the firm invests up to the point where the cost of 
acquiring new capital equals the value of capital. One can derive a second 
condition which characterizes the optimum in the continuous time case: 
(2.11) ;r(K(t)) == rq(t)-qc(t) 
This condition states that the marginal revenue product of capital equals its 
user cost where Qc is the derivative of q with respect to time. Rewriting this as 
an equation for q yields: 
(2.12) qc(t) == rq(t)- 1r(K (t)) 
This implies that q is constant when rq= n (K1), or q=n(Kt}/r. From (2.12) 
equation (2.13) can be derived stating that the value of a unit of capital at a 
given time equals the discounted value of its future marginal revenue products . 
., 
(2.13) q(t) == f e-,(r -,,1r(K (T))dT 
T=t 
Having derived the characteristic conditions in the optimum one can now 
analyze the dynamics of the model in a phase diagram. If the rate of change of 
the capital stock is denoted with K, one can show that the variation of K 
depends on the value of q. Equation (2.10) states that each firm invests up to 
the point where the purchase price of capital plus the marginal adjustment 
costs equal the value of capital q. Since C'(I) is increasing in I, it follows that I 
is increasing in q. The fact that C'(O) is zero implies that I is zero when q 
equals unity. Therefore it can be derived that K is O when q is one and that K is 
increasing when q>1 . On the other hand when q<1 I becomes negative. 
Economically this means that if q equals unity, the firms do not have an 
incentive to invest as the market value of the marginal unit of capital equals its 
replacement costs. Consequently the capital stock remains unchanged and it 
15 For the formal solution see Romer (2001 ). 
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follows K=O. However, if q has a value which exceeds unity, it becomes ad-
vantageous to invest since the market value of the marginal unit of capital ex-
ceeds its replacement costs. Thus, K>O and the capital stock will grow which is 
shown by the bold arrow in the upper part of Figure 2.2. Finally, if the value of 
q is smaller than unity, the firm has an incentive to disinvest and the growth 
rate of the capital stock will be negative as it is shown by the bold arrow in the 
lower part of figure 2.2. Thus, for all points above the q=1 line K is positive im-
plying a growing capital stock while for every point below the q=1 line K is 
negative which implies that the capital stock is decreasing. 
Figure 2.2: Dynamics of the capital stock 
Source: Romer (2001) 
K 
The dynamics of qc can be derived from equation (2.12) and its implications. 
Figure 2.3: Dynamics of q 
Source: Romer (2001). K 
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Since n (K) is assumed to be decreasing in K, the set of points that satisfy 
equation (2.12) is downward-sloping in the (K,q) space which is shown in 
figure 2.3. The fact that qc is increasing in K implies that qc is positive to the 
right of the qc=O line and negative to the left. 
The phase diagram in figure 2.4 combines the information of the two previous 
figures in one graph by showing how K and q must behave to satisfy the 
conditions that describe the derived optimum. 
Figure 2.4: The Phase Diagram 
E 
>------------------------- K=O 
J 
Source: Romer (2001 ). K 
In point Ethe system reaches its stable long term equilibrium. When the initial 
value of the capital stock is given while the market value of capital is free to 
adjust, all initial levels of the capital stock that lie above the K=O and right to 
the qc=O as well as all that below the K=O line and left of the qc=O will not 
converge to a stable equilibrium. However, it can be shown that these paths 
violate the transversality condition that must hold in the optimum implying that 
all these paths can be ruled out. 16 For all other initial levels of K the dynamics 
of q and K bring the system to the saddle path and finally to the long-run-
equilibrium in point E. 
The saddle path is shown as a bold line in figure 2.5. The economic intuition 
behind this path is straightforward. Assume the systems starts at a given point 
on the saddle path to the left of E. As the corresponding value of q is greater 
than unity, additional investment is induced and the capital stock is growing. 
Decreasing returns to scale imply that the market value of capital is decreasing 
with further accumulation of capital. Hence, additional capital accumulation is 
falling over time. As prices are assumed to be constant, the value of q is 
constantly falling until again unity is reached bringing the system to the long 
run equilibrium E where q is equal to unity which implies that K=O and q=O. 
16 See Romer (2001 ). 
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Economically this means that the firms have no further incentive to decrease 
or increase their capital stock. For all initial levels of K that lie to the right of the 
relevant saddle path the line of argumentation is analogous. 
Figure 2.5: The Saddle Path 
Source: Romer (2001). K 
The phase diagram allows for the analysis of the impact of exogenous shocks on 
investment behavior and the evolution of the capital stock. 
2.1.2.2.2.2 Analyzing the Model 
This paragraph analyzes the impact of exogenous shocks on investment 
behavior and the long run equilibrium by using the example of a change in 
national tax policy. Assume that the tax takes the form of a direct payment 
which applies to the purchase price of the capital. 17 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the effects of a tax reduction on the variation of the 
capital stock. Assume that the economy starts in the long run equilibrium E1 . 
One can see from equations (2.11) and (2.12) that a higher tax would reduce 
the firm's profits for a given level of K while a lower tax would have the inverse 
effect. Changing the tax code would therefore shift the q0 =0 locus up or down 
since profits are now higher or lower for any given capital stock. If firms are 
optimizing, qc will jump up immediately to the point A on the new saddle path 
where q exceeds its equilibrium value of unity which implies additional invest-
ment. The dynamics of K and q will then gradually move down to the new long 
run equilibrium in E2• 
17 In reality the effects of taxing on investment are much more difficult to measure because 
they alter the financing structure of firms as credit or bond financing has a tax shield effect. 
For reasons of simplicity these effects will be neglected. 
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Figure 2.6: Effects of Tax Reduction 
Source: Own figure K 
The economic logic behind this process is straightforward. In the initial 
equilibrium E1 the new tax code increases the market value of capital. As re-
placement costs were assumed to be fixed at unity, q jumps up to a value 
greater than unity implying new investment. Facing decreasing returns to 
capital the additional profits of capital accumulation are falling with additional 
investment. Thus, over time the accumulation of capital reduces the value of q 
until the system reaches the new equilibrium in E2 where q=1 . In other words, 
a permanent tax cut produces a temporary boom in investment that leads to a 
higher capital stock corresponding to E2. 
2.1.2.3 Critical Evaluation of the Models 
The review of commonly applied investment models already showed some of 
their common characteristics. With the exception of verbal arguments by 
KEYNES all reviewed models do not include uncertainty about future develop-
ments. As real wor1d investors constantly deal with problems of uncertainty, 
the explanatory value of investment models remains limited unless uncertainty 
is explicitly modeled. The previous analysis also highlights that most of the 
orthodox models are explicitly or implicitly based on the NPV-approach. As 
already pointed out, this relies on two basic assumptions: the reversibility of 
investments and the absence of a waiting option. In real world investment 
projects these assumptions are often violated. First, real world investors are 
usually confronted with asset specificity meaning that acquired capital goods 
cannot or only at high costs be utilized for other purposes. WILLIAMSON 
identifies several forms of asset specificity, namely physical aspects, brand 
name specificity and human capital specificity.18 The basic idea of asset 
18 See Williamson ( 1991 ). 
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specificity can be illustrated by the concept of fundamental transformation. If a 
contract between two economic actors results in an investment that is specific 
for the contracting parties free choice of contracting is lessened by the 
resulting mutual dependence of the contracting parties because of the 
irreversible characteristics of the investment. 19 
While in transaction cost theory asset specificity explains vertical integration, 
here it is enough to conclude that asset specificity leads to sunk costs. Sunk 
costs are defined as the share of investment projects that cannot be recovered 
if the project is skipped. A good example is an investment in a power plant. 
Machines that are used for power generation can hardly be used for other 
purposes. The workforce is solely trained to work in power generation 
implying high additional costs of schooling when people have to be employed 
elsewhere. The costs for marketing campaigns cannot be recovered at all 
when the project is skipped. The fraction of an investment that can be 
considered as sunk varies considerably with the characteristics of the 
analyzed object. In general, industrial investments should theoretically imply a 
high degree of sunk cost because the acquired capital goods are specifically 
designed to produce a certain product or a group of products. Consequently 
their use for other purposes is limited and canceling a project implies a loss of 
the money invested in those specific capital goods. In particular investments in 
infrastructure are characterized by high irreversibility as the provision of 
services normally requires huge networks or large specific production facilities. 
Although one may plausibly argue that the degree of irreversibility is lower in 
the service sector, even certain investments in this sector require high specific 
investments for human capital formation or specific information technology. To 
sum up, the degree of reversibility depends on the individual characteristics of 
the project and the sector that is invested in. 
When examining the reversibility of non-specific capital ~ods such as 
computers, one has to take into account the "lemons problem". As the quality 
of used durable goods cannot be exactly estimated by potential customers, 
they are not willing to pay high prices. A demand favoring low prices however 
leads to an offer of reduced quality. These imperfections of the market are 
finally leading to adverse selection. For investors this means that even 
theoretically reversible investments yield lower returns when they are sold on 
the market for other purposes. Eventually, also existing regulations and 
institutional settings can reduce the reversibility of invested capital. An 
example are national laws protecting workers and restricting layoffs. All these 
real wor1d characteristics of investment projects lead to the conclusion that the 
neo-classical assumption of full reversibility of capital is too restrictive. 
A second fundamental assumption of the NPV-approach is the absence of a 
waiting option. Since the NPV assumes that firms have the possibility to invest 
right now or never, the model neglects the possibility to postpone a decision, 
which would be rational if the deciding actor can generate further useful 
' 9 See Williamson (1985). 
20 See Aker1of (1970). 
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information about the project. Summing up, the reviewed orthodox models are 
not suitable for the analysis of investment problems because they neglect 
waiting options and asset irreversibility. 
2.1.3 Investment under Uncertainty 
2.1.3.1 Overview 
All models that have been analyzed up to the point were based on the 
assumption of complete information. Investors are perfectly informed about 
their future revenue streams and do not face uncertainty about these pay-
ments. If not perfectly informed about the future, investors face the risk of un-
foreseen events that may decrease the planned profit of investment projects. 
Unforeseen events may even be influential enough to make investments un-
profitable that have ex-ante been considered as advantageous. Therefore, it 
may be assumed that introducing uncertainty into models of investment should 
have a considerable impact on the investment decisions of firms. Furthermore, 
the orthodox models assumed implicitly that investments are completely re-
versible meaning that investors can sell their capital goods at any given point 
in time without additional cost. It has been argued above that this assumption 
is strong and usually not in line with the characteristics of real world invest-
ments. Problems of asset specificity and adverse selection imply that invest-
ment projects contain a considerable fraction of sunk costs. As firms are faced 
with the irreversibility problem ex ante, they will be aware of it when making a 
decision. Moreover, it was argued that orthodox models of investment do not 
include a waiting option although a strategy of waiting may be profitable if 
waiting generates new valuable information. The models which are presented 
in the following paragraphs release the assumption of complete certainty, full 
reversibility and no waiting option. 
2.1.3.2 Characteristics of Uncertainty and Risk 
Using the terms uncertainty and risk requires a precise definition of their 
meaning. Orthodox models assume that investors know a project's revenue 
stream ex ante implying that the decision of the investor is made under 
certainty. Formally this means that the future outcome of the investment has 
only one value or revenue stream x1 that is realized with the probability of 
p(x)=1: 
(2.14) x1,p(_x) = I 
Uncertainty occurs when the revenue stream of the investor is not secure, that 
is, ex ante the investor does not know future outcomes. Usually all real world 
investment decisions are made under complete uncertainty which is 
characterized by two facts. First, the investor does not know the number of 
possible scenarios that may occur in the future. Second, the probabilities for 
the occurrence of possible future scenarios are unknown to the decision 
maker. These two properties of complete uncertainty render the decision 
problem even more complex. To keep the decision problem simple and 
analytically tractable it will henceforth be assumed that uncertainty only means 
choosing between different possible data situations in the future. That is, the 
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number of possible data situations and their corresponding payoffs are 
assumed to be known by the deciding agent. Formally this means, that there is 
now more than one outcome or revenue stream that may be generated in the 
Mure, say x1, x2, .. . . , x0 . Thus, one can write the possible outcomes as 
(2.15) x.,x2 , ••• .x", with O < p(x;) < I 
If the probabilities of the x; are known to the investor, the literature speaks of 
risk. If, on the contrary, they are unknown the situation is classified as 
uncertainty.21 Despite of this fixed terminology the author prefers to define the 
situation with known probabilities as uncertainty while the case of unknown 
probabilities may be denominated complete uncertainty. This distinct definition 
is useful because classifying a situation as risky requires another important 
property that will be described later. To sum up, uncertainty and risk occur in 
situations where future returns vary about an expected amount. The greater 
this variability of expected future returns, the greater the uncertainty or the risk 
for the investor. 
Faced with uncertainty a carefully planning firm can structure the decision 
problem with the use of two criteria. First, the frequency with which a decision 
problem occurs, and second, the availability of probabilities for the possible 
future outcomes x;. The combination of these two criteria leads to three 
possible classes of uncertainty that are depicted in figure 2. 7. 
1gure 27 Cl . : asses o nee amcv fU rt . t 
A VAILABILITY OF PROBABILITIES 
v. No 
u. Unique Informational Sho,tcomings Co,nplete Uncertainty 0 
>- z 
0 0 z iii w 0 :, 
0 w 
w 0 a: Often Uncertainty Informational Sho,tcomings u. 
Source: Own figure based on Adam (1996). 
In the literature on decision making under uncertainty only the case of 
complete uncertainty and uncertainty are covered. However, it is obvious that 
in both cases of informational shortcomings the investor has the possibility to 
increase his level of information by generating probabilities for future data 
scenarios. If a decision problem occurs frequently, investors can use statistical 
methods to generate a probability distribution. Hence, over time they dispose 
of probabilities for the different future scenarios and the decision problem may 
be classified as uncertainty. For the case that the decision problem is unique, 
but probabilities are known the actor faces an informational asymmetry, as he 
does not dispose about information that is available on the market. That may 
be the case if the wanted probabilities are known by insurance companies that 
21 See Levy (1998) p.5-8 or Farrar (1963). 
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will base their decision on them but not by firms that sign insurance contracts. 
However, if markets were perfect the actor could base the decision on the in-
formation. That is to say, if markets are assumed to be efficient the decision 
maker faces the problem of uncertainty. Therefore, one can argue that if 
markets are perfect and decision makers use all available information, 
uncertainty and complete uncertainty remain the only relevant cases for 
analysis. The existing decision rules for the case of complete uncertainty 
however, only offer poor results because the problem becomes formally un-
treatable. Therefore, the analysis will henceforward be restricted to the case 
where the number of future scenarios and their corresponding probabilities are 
known to the investor. 
Although the literature speaks of risk in this case, it is important to stress that 
introducing uncertainty to an investment problem does not necessarily imply 
the emergence of a risk for the decision maker. Thinking of a firm which has to 
choose between two strategies leading to different future payoffs in different 
data situations, uncertainty does not imply a risk for the company, given the 
possibility that it can adjust its strategy afterwards without facing additional 
cost. Only if the company has to make an ex ante decision which is not or only 
at high cost reversible, it has to deal with risk as the current decision affects 
future profits of the company.22 Therefore, risk can be defined as uncertainty 
over future developments affecting the investor's future returns because a 
chosen strategy is irreversible. Uncertainty, on the contrary, only refers to 
situations where the evolution of future payoffs is not known to decision 
makers but where an adjustment of strategy is possible without additional cost. 
2.1.3.3 Uncertainty in the Romer Model 
2.1.3.3.1 Modification of the Model 
If uncertainty about the future profitability of investment is assumed, the model 
of paragraph 2.1.2.2.2.1 has to be modified. As uncertainty can have various 
reasons that will not be further discussed here, the example of uncertainty 
about changing tax policy will be analyzed. If uncertainty is introduced into the 
model , equation (2.13) which states that the value of a unit of capital at a given 
time equals the discounted value of its future marginal profits has to be 
modified. With uncertainty about future profitability the firm will now base its 
decision on the expected value of profits. Thus, equation (2.13) will modify to: 
., 
(2.16) q(t) = J e-, (T-tJE,[7r(K (T))}iT 
T= t 
According to (2.16) as before firms invest up to the point where the cost of 
acquiring new capital equal the expected market value of capital. From this 
one can derive:23 
22 See Adam (1996) p.215-305. 
23 See Romer (2001 ). 
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(2.17) E, [ q Jt)] = rq(t) - JT(K (t)) 
This expression is analogous to equation (2.12) with the expectations term for 
Qc being the only difference to the model with certainty meaning that the 
market value of capital depends on expected payoffs instead of certain cash 
flows. 
2.1.3.3.2 Effects of Uncertainty on Reversible Investments 
If investments are assumed to be reversible, investors can disinvest at any 
given point in time without additional cost. It was pointed out verbally in 
paragraph 2.1 .3.2 that uncertainty only causes risks for investors when 
irreversibility of assets exists. If, in turn, investments are completely reversible 
uncertainty does not imply a risk because strategies can still be adapted to 
changing circumstances. Integrating this flexibility into the model means that 
adjustment costs are symmetric for increasing and decreasing a firm's capital 
stock. 
To show the effects of uncertainty the example of the tax cut will be modified 
for the case of uncertainty. Consider that the government is planning a 
reduction of taxes at a given time in the future and that the proposal for the tax 
cut will be voted on after a time interval T. Let us further assume that the 
probability that the proposal will pass is 0.5 and that there is no other source of 
uncertainty. Figure 2.8 illustrates the evolution of the capital stock in the phase 
diagram. 
Figure 2.8: Tax Reduction with Uncertainty and Reversible Investment 
Source: Own figure K 
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In the case of certainty an acceptance of the proposal would shift the q0=0 line 
to the position of the q=02 line with the new intercept of the K=O and the qc=O 
line marking the new long run equilibrium E2. If the proposal was rejected the 
qc=O line would remain unchanged with the old intercept marking the old long 
run equilibrium. Hence, after the proposal is voted on in T the system will 
converge to either E1 or E2• 
If the proposal is already discussed but not voted on, the resulting uncertainty 
changes the outcomes. Since the probability of a successful vote is 0.5, the 
expected qc=O line must be midway between qc=01 and q0=02• The saddle path 
corresponding to the case of uncertainty is shown as a dotted line in figure 2.8. 
Before the vote the dynamics of q of K would converge to the point Euc 
marking the intercept of this line with the K=O line. If the vote takes place, q will 
jump up or down corresponding to the outcome of the vote implying that as 
long as uncertainty persists the system is on a different saddle path than 
without uncertainty. Compared to the saddle path of the long run equilibrium E2 
under certainty investment is lower when uncertainty exists. 
Assume that the proposal will be passed after a certain time of uncertainty. As 
argued above for the time of uncertainty the dotted saddle path becomes 
relevant. Remember that K is increasing in q which means that the jump of q 
induces additional investment. Let us assume that the proposal is accepted 
implying that the long term equilibrium is E2. The lower jump of q compared to 
the case of certainty acts to reduce the value of capital before the vote, and 
thus reduces investment. Compared to points on the saddle path 
corresponding to E2 as final outcome one can identify an investment gap which 
is shown by the bold arrow in figure 2.9. 
Figure 2.9: Effects of Uncertainty with Reversible Investment 
K 
Source: Own figure Kr 
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Specifying the interval of uncertainty [Ke1 ,Kr] it is obvious that the jump of q 
and the corresponding level of investment is lower than in the certain case for 
every possible level of K. If the proposal is rejected, the investment gap turns 
to an investment surplus depicted by the dotted arrow in figure 2.9. For a given 
interval of uncertainty q implies higher investment for every possible level of K 
than in the case of certainty. Thus, one can conclude that uncertainty over 
future economic policy measures with an expansive impact reduces invest-
ment. On the other hand, uncertainty can also imply additional investment 
when there is uncertainty over restrictive policy measures. Therefore, the 
model does not permit to derive a clear cut result concerning the effect of un-
certainty on investment spending. This result is consistent with the analysis in 
paragraph 2.1.3.2 which concluded that in the case of fully reversible assets 
uncertainty does not imply a risk for investors and should not have an effect on 
investment behavior. 
2.1.3.3.3 Effects of Uncertainty on Irreversible Investments 
In this paragraph it is assumed that investment projects are irreversible. 
Irreversibility can be modeled by assuming that the adjustment costs for 
variations of the capital stock are asymmetric meaning that reducing the 
capital stock is more costly than augmenting it. In the phase diagram a saddle 
path with irreversibility becomes concave because if K exceeds its long run 
equilibrium value, it will fall only slowly because disinvestment is costly. On the 
other hand, if K is less than the long-run equilibrium, K grows very fast as 
upward adjustments are less costly. This new slope of the saddle-path is 
depicted in figure 2.1 O. 
Figure 2.10: Effects of Tax Reduction with Uncertainty and Irreversible 
Investment 
Source: Own Figure K 
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Consider again the example of a planned tax cut. As before, uncertainty 
causes the saddle path to be midway between the two saddle paths that 
represent the two long-term equilibria under certainty. With uncertainty about 
the proposal q still jumps up but less than in the case of reversible investments 
indicated by the bold arrow in figure 2.10. As higher values of q imply higher 
investment spending the introduction of irreversibility causes the amount of 
induced investment to be smaller. 
The economic logic behind this result is straightforward. Knowing that they 
cannot reduce their capital stock without additional cost in the future firms 
hesitate to invest more unless they have a clear picture of the future. This 
decreases the market value of capital before the vote and reduces investment. 
Obviously there is a value of waiting that reduces the additional amount of 
investment. 24 
Figure 2.11 compares the different effects of introducing uncertainty when in-
vestment is assumed to be either reversible or irreversible. The model starts 
from the initial long run equilibrium corresponding to point E0• The saddle 
paths under certainty are represented by SP1 and SP2• Assuming that the 
proposal is finally passed permits an analysis of the effects of uncertainty on 
investment. The two saddle paths in between characterize the situation of un-
certainty if again a 50% chance of the proposal for being passed is assumed. 
The concave saddle path represents the situation where investment is 
irreversible while the straight line represents the saddle path for reversible 
investments. In the case of certainty the tax cut would shift the saddle path to 
SP2 corresponding to the long run equilibrium in E2 and q jumps up to point A. 
Then the d~namics of q and K will bring the economy to its new long run 
equilibrium. 5 
In a situation of uncertainty the two saddle paths which are located midway 
between SP1 and SP2 become relevant. When investment is reversible, the 
saddle path is a straight line and thus q jumps up to the point B. For the 
interval of uncertainty the system will converge along the saddle path to the 
uncertain equilibrium Euc- During the time of uncertainty investment is 
therefore lower than in the certain case. The arrow AB in figure 2.11 shows the 
lower level of q that implies foregone investment for one given level of K. This 
amount is again depicted in the lower part of figure 2.11 showing the relation 
between q and investment spending where I is assumed to be a linear function 
of q . In the following analysis this amount will be referred to as the 
"Uncertainty Gap". 
24 Paragraph 2.1 .3.4 offers a detailed analysis of the DixiVPindyck model which assumes that 
there is an option value of waiting which reduces the amount of investment. 
25 Note that in the case of certainty the saddle path cannot be curved. As future events are 
clear to foresee for investors they can always choose the corresponding optimal capital 
stock without the risk to overinvest. Thus, the benchmark curve for the saddle path of 
irreversible investment is a straight line. 
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Figure 2.11: Effects of Uncertainty with Irreversible and Reversible 
Investment 
K 
Uncertainty-Gap 
Irreversibility-Gap • 
'-----·" 
Surplus * q=1 
q 
Euc 
Source: Own figure 
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When investment is irreversible the relevant saddle path is concave implying 
that at the time the proposal is considered q jumps up to point C. Due to the 
slope of the saddle path the resulting jump of q is smaller than in the case of 
certainty. During the interval of uncertainty the system will converge along the 
new saddle path to the uncertain equilibrium Euc- Knowing that the uncertain 
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equilibrium Euc can only be reached for an infinite interval of uncertainty it may 
be concluded that investment in this case is lower than in the case of 
reversibility for every possible level of K. Thus, for any given level of K there is 
an amount of investment that is foregone due to the existence of irreversibility. 
This gap that will henceforth be called "Irreversibility Gap", is depicted with the 
arrow BC in the upper and the lower part of figure 2.11. 
In contrast to the results of the previous paragraph the investment surplus in 
case of a rejection of the proposal (line E1C) is smaller than the investment 
gap (line AC). Hence, the existence of the irreversibility gap permits the 
conclusion that uncertainty reduces investment spending when investments 
are irreversible. Knowing that a higher degree of irreversibility causes the 
saddle path to become more concave and the "Irreversibility Gap" larger one 
can further conclude that the amount of forgone investment is growing in the 
degree of irreversibility. 
The economic reasoning leading to this result is intuitive. As firms know that 
building up higher capacities in times of uncertainty could imply an undesirable 
"lock-in" when the ex-post environment turns out to be less favorable, their in-
vestment will all other things equal be lower than under certainty. In this case 
there seems to be a value of waiting for the firm that keeps it from investing at 
present. 
2.1.3.4 The Dixit/Pindyck Model 
2.1.3.4.1 Overview 
The macroeconomic model in the previous paragraph was not capable to 
explain the value of waiting that implied the reduced investment spending in 
the presence of irreversible investments. Recent developments in investment 
theory offer new tools for the analysis of investment problems that may serve 
as microeconomic foundation for this value of waiting. PINDYCK and 
D1x1T/PINDYCK offer a new perspective for the analysis of investment problems 
by using the analogy to option pricing and introducing irreversible investments 
and waiting options.26 The basic idea is that opportunities to invest are 
comparable to common stock options. Investment opportunities are 
characterized by a firm's ability to make an investment in the future based on 
its individual technical knowledge, experience, market position, patents, the 
ownership of land or other possible resources. Economic theory postulates 
that the value of a company depends on its discounted future cash flows that 
in turn depend on its capacity to generate investment opportunities for the 
future. With an investment opportunity the firm holds an option that is 
comparable to a financial call option on a common stock. It offers the right but 
not the obligation to buy an asset at some future time for a fixed price, the 
value of which is unknown ex ante. Likewise, a real option allows the firm to 
invest in a project the future value of which is unknown today. Making the in-
vestment is analogue to exercising the option because it means loosing the 
26 In the literature this approach is referred to as a real option approach. See DixiUPindyck 
(1994) and Pindyck (1991 ). See also the review by Hubbard (1994). 
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flexibility to invest in the future if projects are irreversible since in a world with 
sunk cost resources are bound. Making the investment also implies not having 
the possibility to wait for new useful information about the future. As loosing 
these future options implies opportunity costs for the firm every decision rule 
that ignores the destroyed option value has to be in error. 
As already argued above all orthodox models of investment do not consider 
this option value. 27 This implies that the decision rule changes to NPV>F(V) 
where the expression on the right side represents the value of the option which 
measures the opportunity costs of investing at present that are caused by the 
elimination of the option for a future investment. Introducing this basic idea into 
an investment model DIxIr/PINDYCK find that higher uncertainty over future 
developments increases the value of the option to invest but decreases in-
vestment spending. Confronted with increasing uncertainty over future 
developments it becomes advantageous to keep the option to invest because 
the value of future information is increasing. 
2.1.3.4.2 The Model 
This paragraph presents a basic version of the DIxIr/PINDYCK model illustratin!i 
the general idea and allowing for a better understanding of the argument. 2 
Assume that a firm which is considering an irreversible investment faces un-
certainty about its future product prices. In the next period the price of the 
product will either rise with the probability of p to a known level P1 or fall with 
the probability of (1-p) to a known level P2 and then stay forever at this level. If 
the price falls, the investment generates a negative NPV which means that a 
rational investor would not engage in the project. For simplicity further assume 
that the firm produces one product per year without operating cost. To decide 
if it is better for the investor to wait one year or to invest now one can compare 
the NPV at both times. Assuming that the facility can be used forever and 
produces one product per year the NPV now is given by: 
(2.18) NPV O = -/ + f E(P) /(1 + r) ' 
t=O 
where I is the price of the facility and E(P) the expected value of the cash-flow 
equal to the expected price of the product. Postponing the investment one 
period the NPV becomes: 
(2.19) NPV,={-Il(l+r)+ t,Pil(l+r)') 
27 This may explain why many empirical studies of investment behavior do not offer satisfying 
results. Firm level studies have shown that the internal hurdle rates of firms are usually 
higher than orthodox models would predict. This may be explained by the option value that 
is implicitly considered by the enterprises. See Dixit/Pindyck (1994) p.7. 
28 If not indicated otherwise the following is based on Dixit/Pindyck (1994) and Pindyck 
(1991 ). 
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Note that in period 0 there is no expenditure and no revenue. In period 1 the 
firm will only invest if the price goes up to P1, which happens with a probability 
of p. As the price of the product is known in one year, the firm may discount its 
certain future cash-flow P1 to the period 0. By comparing both values the in-
vestor can decide if it is advantageous to invest now or to wait a year and 
make the investment decision subject to the new information about the product 
price. If the value of NPV1 exceeds the value of NPV0 waiting will be a better 
strategy for the firm. To better illustrate the implications of this approach I use 
a simple numerical example.29 Consider that a firm is planning to invest 
irreversibly in a ship building facility that can be constructed instantly at a price 
I. For simplicity assume that the facility can produce one ship per year at 
operating costs of zero. Currently the price of ships is 200 €. With a probability 
p the price of ships will go up to 300 € and with the probability of (1-p) the price 
will fall to 100 € and then remain forever at the newly fixed level as it is shown 
in figure 2.12. 
Figure 2.12: Evolution of the Ship Price 
t=O t=1 t=2 t=oo 
/ 
Po=200 
~ 
Source: Dixit,/Pindyck (1994) p.27 
Assume that 1=1600, the discount rate is 0.1 0 and that p=0.5. Now the NPVs 
of the project can be calculated to decide if it is better to invest now or to wait 
one year for the new information about the evolution of ship prices. Investing 
now would generate the following present value: 
(2.20) NPV0 =-1600+ f200/(l,l)' =-1600+2200=600 
1=0 
The current value of the ship building facility 2200 € exceeds its initial cost of 
1600 € entailing that the NPV is positive. According to the orthodox NPV rule 
the investment is profitable and investors should go ahead with the invest-
ment. Let us now assume that the investor waits one year and invests only if 
the price for ships goes up to 300 €. The NPV of investing in one year is: 
(2.21) NPV, = 0,5(-1600 /1,1 + f 300 /(1,1)') = 773 
r==I 
29 See Dixit/Pindyck ( 1994 ). 
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Since the NPV is higher if the firm waits a year, waiting is the better decision. If 
the investment is made today, the investor pays 1600 € for a project that is 
worth 2200 €. In turn, if he waits a year, he will pay 1600 €fora project that is 
then worth 3300 €. With a falling price he would pay the same amount but 
receive an asset that is just worth 1100 € implying that in this case he will not 
make the investment and keep the option to invest. The flexibility to make the 
investment decision next year is exactly worth the difference of the two NPV: 
173 €. In other words, the investor should be willing to pay 173 € for an in-
vestment opportunity that is flexible. An investment decision just based on 
equation (2.20) neglects the opportunity costs of investing now, disabling an 
investment in one year. It is important to stress that this result only holds, if the 
investment is irreversible and if there is a possibility to wait. If another firm is 
considering the same investment and a first mover advantage only allows the 
first mover to operate the business profitably, there is no waiting option and no 
opportunity cost of investing now. In this case the traditional NPV-rule is valid 
and the investment should made today. The same result is obtained when the 
project is reversible, that is when the initial payment of 1600 can be fully 
recovered if the price of ships should fall. Therefore, the opportunity costs of 
investing today (losing the opportunity to invest in one year) only needs to be 
considered if the investment is irreversible and a waiting option exists. 
An analogy to financial call options on common stocks is useful for a better 
understanding of this result. A stock option gives the right to make an invest-
ment expenditure (the exercise price of the stock) the value of which varies 
stochastically. An investment problem has essentially the same 
characteristics. The investor has the option to invest in a project at a price I, 
the value of which varies with the evolution of the price of ships in the next 
period. The option will only be exercised when the price of ships goes up to 
300 €. If the price falls, a rational investor will not exercise the option because 
the NPV becomes negative. This analogy to stock option permits to calculate 
the value of the investment opportunity with methods of option pricing.30 
Let Fo be the value of the investment opportunity today and F1 the value next 
year. F1 is a random variable that depends on the ship price next year. The 
two possible values of F1 are known. If the price goes up, the value of F1 is 
1700 (I300/(1.1)1 -1600), if the price goes down the investor will not exercise 
the option because the NPV becomes negative making the value of the option 
0. The problem is to find the value of the investment opportunity today F0. To 
do so one can create a portfolio containing the investment opportunity and a 
number of ships that makes the portfolio risk free, that is, independent of the 
evolution of the ship price. A given risk free rate that is assumed to be 10% 
permits to calculate the option value by simply setting the portfolio's return 
equal to that rate. 31 Let us assume a portfolio in which the investor holds the 
30 For an introduction to option pricing see Perridon/Steiner (1995). 
31 This equation must hold because otherwise there would be the possibility of arbitrage for 
investors. The construction of the portfolio requires the existence of a "spanning possibility" 
that is there has to be a future market for ships. See Pindyck (1991) p.1116. 
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investment opportunity and sells short the number n of ships for hedging it. 
The value of this portfolio today is: 
(2.22) <I> 0 = F0 - nP0 = F0 - 200 n 
The value of the portfolio in one year is given by: 
(2.23) <1>1 = F; -nJ: 
depending on the future value of P1• With P1=300 one obtains c1>1=1700-300n, 
with P1=100 cj> 1= -100n. To be independent of the evolution of P, n must have a 
value that solves 1700-300n = -100n. Solving this equation one obtains n=8,5. 
The return from holding the portfolio over the year is given by equation (2.24) 
where the term 0.1Po has to be included because the expected value of P1 is 
200. With an expected price change of O however, no rational investor would 
be willing to hold the long position unless he receives a payment which at least 
equals the risk free rate that was assumed to be 10%. 
(2.24) <t> 1 - <t> 0 - O. lnP0 = 680 - F0 
As the portfolio is risk free, its return equals 10% of the initial value of the 
portfolio because otherwise rational investors had the possibility of arbitrage. 
Hence, one can write: 
(2.25) 680 - F0 = 0. i(F0 - I 700) 
From equation (2.25) one can easily see that F0 is 773 €, which is exactly the 
same value that is obtained by calculating the NPV under the assumption of 
waiting a year. The value of the investment opportunity, that is, the option to 
invest in a given project in the future is 773 €. Recall that the payoff from 
investing today in equation (2.20) was 600 €. Loosing the option to invest in 
the future implied an opportunity cost of 773 € that exceeds the expected pay-
off from the investment (600 €) The full cost of the investment are therefore 
l+F(V), in our example they amount to 1600+773. One can easily see that 
1600+ 773>2200, which means that the full cost of the project exceeds its 
benefits and the firm should keep alive the option to invest. If the firm based its 
decision on the simple NPV rule it would make a sub-optimal choice. 
Figure 2.13 illustrates this graphically. The thin line in figure 2.13 shows the 
value of V-1 while the bold line represents the value of the option F(V) 
depending on the value of the project V. For all values of V<l/1,5 the value of 
the option is O because the firm will never invest because even if the ship-price 
goes up by 50% the value of V will be less than the initial cost of the project. If 
the firm never invests the option value has to be zero because in any case 
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there will be no investment in the future. For values of V>l/1,5 the value of the 
option becomes positive. The V-I line shows the net benefits of the project. In 
absence of the opportunity cost of the option value every present value of 
future payments that exceeds the cost of investment I would make the project 
profitable. One can see that the critical value for the profitability of the project 
vc is identified by the intersection of the V-I-locus and the abscissa. If the firm 
considers the full cost of the investment, profitability requires a discounted 
value of future payments that exceeds the sum of initial cost and opportunity 
cost. 
Figure 2.13: Cost and Benefits of the Project with Option Value 
1/1,5 
Source: Own figure 
l=VC v• 
V-1 
F(V) 
V 
V* marks the new critical value where V=l+F(V) implying that for values of V 
which exceed this critical value the project's return is higher than its full cost. In 
our example this would imply that V>1600 + 773. 
It can be concluded that the presence of the option value can make the 
analyzed project unfavorable in the current period. Hence, with uncertainty 
fewer investment projects will be profitable compared to the case of certainty. 
Therefore, in the presence of uncertainty investment spending in the current 
period is, all other things equal, lower. The value of the option drives a wedge 
between the traditional NPV rule and the new profitability criterion the size of 
which is determined by the value of the option to invest in the Mure. The 
D1xrr/PINDYCK model permits to derive the result that in the presence of 
irreversible investments uncertainty implies a value of waiting that reduces in-
vestment spending in the current period. However, as uncertainty is only 
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modeled for two periods, it is interesting to extend the analysis to more 
periods.32 
In a complexer model D1x1r/P1NDYCK show the effects of uncertainty when the 
value of the project varies continuously over time. In this model the level of un-
certainty is measured with the parameter cr that is defined as the variance of 
the project's value over time. As figure 2.14 indicates the graphical solution is 
analogous to the previously analyzed model and its characteristics are 
essentially the same. The value of the option follows a curved line when it 
depends on a V that varies continually over time. V* characterizes the critical 
value at which it is optimal for the firm to invest when there is a positive option 
value. For the case of certainty V-1 shows the net return of the project. In this 
case F(V}=O and the investment is favorable if V-1>0. V-1 is represented by the 
straight line in figure 2.14. vc is the critical value for V in the case of the 
certainty. 
Figure 2.14: Characteristics of the Solution in the Continuous Time Case 
V 
Source: Own figure v· 
Including the opportunity cost of investing today the critical value of Vis given 
by V*. which is the tangency point of the F(V} line and the V-1-locus. In this 
point F(V}=V-1, that is, the opportunity costs of investing today equal the net 
value of the project. In other words, the value of the project V equals its full 
costs l+F(V} consisting of its direct cost I plus the opportunity costs of investing 
F(V}. For the investment to be profitable V has to exceed V* at least at an 
infinitesimal small amount. For every V below V* one can see that V<l+F(V} 
implying that investing is not favorable because the project's value is lower 
32 The analysis can be extended to 3 or more periods with the same approach. See 
Dixit/Pindyck (1994) p.41 . 
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than the full cost of the project. As in the two period model the positive option 
value (F(V)>O) in the case of uncertainty implies that fewer investment projects 
may be considered as profitable. In the case of uncertainty the critical value of 
V exceeds the critical value in the case of certainty by V* -Ve. Therefore, the 
occurrence of uncertainty depresses investment because the opportunity costs 
of investing render fewer projects profitable. While uncertainty about future 
evolutions of the product market increases the value of V, it decreases current 
investment spending. 
2.1.3.4.3 Analyzing the Model 
This paragraph analyzes the effects of a variation in the model's parameters 
which permits to model the effects of increasing uncertainty. In the 
D1x1r/P1ovcK model growing uncertainty can be modeled by increasing cr. 
Recall the example of the ship building facility in the two periods framework. 
Assume that due to higher volatility on the market for ships the variation of the 
ship price in period 1 increases. With the same probability of 0.5 the price will 
now either rise to 350 € or fall to 50 €. This new situation is depicted in figure 
2.15. 
Figure 2.15: Evolution of Ship Prices 
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=oo 
/ 
Po=200 
~ 
P2=S0 ~ 
Source: Dixit,/Pindyck (1994) p.27 
With increasing up and down changes the variance of P1 rises which reflects 
the higher uncertainty on the ship market while the price change is mean 
preserving, that is, the expected value of P1 is still 200 €. Calculating the value 
of the investment as above with the new value of P1 entails that F0=1023 €. 
Hence, higher uncertainty increases the value of the option to invest. As a 
higher value of the option means higher opportunity cost of investing today, 
fewer projects will become profitable. Thus, all other things equal, higher un-
certainty reduces investment (because the investors will rather wait) but in-
creases the value of the investment opportunity. The reason for the increase of 
the option value is straightforward. The mean preserving spread of the ship 
price in period 1 increases the upside potential pay-off from the option 
because if the price goes up to 350 the value of the investment opportunity 
grows. At the same time the downside pay-off remains unchanged because if 
the price goes down to 50 the value of the project is less than in the case 
where the price changed to 100. Since the investor will not invest in this case 
(he will not exercise the option), the value of the option remains zero. 
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However, when potential profits increase while potential losses remain un-
changed, the value of the option necessarily has to increase. Higher 
uncertainty, in turn, means a greater incentive to wait because the option value 
increases. Figure 2. 16 depicts the graphical solution of the continuous model 
which is analogue to the two periods model. 
Figure 2.16: Effects of Higher Uncertainty 
V 
Source: Dixit/Pindyck (1994). v·, 
As the variance of the expected returns grows, the possible positive variation 
of the value of the firm's investment increases. Like in the two-periods model 
potential loss is limited to O because the option to invest will only be exercised 
if the value of V goes up. Therefore, the tangency point of the F(V) line and V-1 
has to be at a higher value of F(V) and the F(V)-line shifts to the left. As figure 
2.16 highlights the new tangency point V*2 indeed corresponds to a higher 
level of F(V). A higher value of F(V) in turn implies higher opportunity costs 
which renders fewer projects profitable. 
An increase in uncertainty therefore means a reduction of investment, as it 
becomes more profitable to keep the option to invest instead of making the 
investment. This reduction of investment is accompanied by a rising value of 
the investment opportunity. Measuring the value of the firm as the sum of all 
investment opportunities this result implies that the value of the firm is rising 
with higher uncertainty although it invests and produces less.33 Summing up, 
the model shows that an increase of cr further reduces investment spending of 
firms permitting two final conclusions. First, the occurrence of uncertainty 
33 Pindyck (1991) uses this implication of the model to explain the behavior of oil companies 
in the 80s. While prices were falling, uncertainty over future prices rose. In response, oil 
companies paid more and more for oil-bearing lands while their development expenditures 
and their production were falling. 
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decreases investment spending. Second, investment spending is falling, when 
uncertainty increases as current investment flows are falling in er. 
2.1.3.5 Critical Evaluation of the Models 
The previous paragraphs reviewed two models analyzing the effects of 
uncertainty on investment behavior. The ROMER model with reversible invest-
ment offered ambiguous results. In contrast, when investments were assumed 
to be irreversible, the model shows that uncertainty reduces investment 
spending and this reduction is growing in the degree of irreversibility. The 
D1x1T/PINDYCK model confirms these findings and provides an intuitive micro-
economic foundation for the results of the ROMER-Model. Moreover, the model 
permits to show that rising uncertainty depresses investment spending, that is, 
higher uncertainty means less investment. 
ABEUEBERL Y argue that these findings are only valid for firms starting with a 
capital stock of zero because irreversibility also has a so called hangover-
effect which prevents the firms from reducing their capital stock in economic 
downturns. As disinvestments, which would be economically desirable, are not 
possible due to the irreversibility firms keep the existing capital stock. 
Therefore, the net effect of uncertainty on the capital stock is in the long-run 
unclear.34 Although this criticism is valid for the evolution of investment stocks, 
the effects on periodical investment flows are not affected by a hangover 
effect. If firms are aware of the fact that over-investment may be hard to 
reduce in future periods, periodical investment spending will be lower implying 
that the hang-over effect is irrelevant for investment flows in a given period. 
Therefore, despite of the hang-over effect, the conclusion that uncertainty 
combined with asset irreversibility reduces investment flows remains valid. 
A more severe drawback of the D1x1r/PINDYCK model is that it neglects first 
mover advantages since firms are assumed to have a waiting option. The 
observation of real world markets shows that this is not the case in many 
industries. In particular investments in high technology sectors as 
microprocessors are characterized by enormous first mover advantages. 
Therefore, the neglect of first mover advantages limits the explanatory power 
of the model. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify many real world situations 
where the delay of an investment project is a feasible option. 
2.1.4 Summary of Propositions 
This paragraph summarizes the main propositions of the investment models 
that have been reviewed on the previous pages. It was found that uncertainty 
theoretically has a depressing effect on investment spending, if investments 
are irreversible. Furthermore, increases in uncertainty further depress invest-
ment spending, that is, periodical investments are decreasing in the level of 
uncertainty. Therefore, all exogenous influences that imply further uncertainty 
for firms will all other things equal result in less investment spending. 
Moreover, it can be concluded that reductions of investment spending are 
34 See Abel/Eberly (1994 ). 
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growing in the degree of irreversibility confirming the intuitive economic logic 
that investment projects with a high share of sunk costs are more sensitive to 
rising uncertainty. Apart from these direct results the investment models also 
have important implications for the dynamics of investments behavior. As un-
certainty only implies risk for investing firms if investment is not reversible an 
economy with long lasting high levels of risk will not only observe a reduction 
of investment but most likely also a change in the structure of investment. The 
reason for this dynamic effect is straightforward. Perceiving long lasting levels 
of high uncertainty economic actors prefer investments with low levels of 
irreversibility and short pay-off periods. However, many investments that are 
crucial for economic development are characterized by the opposite 
characteristics. For example infrastructure projects usually imply a high degree 
of irreversibility and long pay-off periods. Therefore, high uncertainty over long 
periods of time can result in systematic under-investment in sectors with low 
reversibility. 
Whether one likes this or not, the multinational corporation is probably 
a tendency that cannot be stopped. Through its propensity to nestle everywhere, settle 
everywhere, and establish connections everywhere, the multinational corporation 
destroys the possibility of national seclusion and self-sufficiency and creates a universal 
interdependence. 35 
2.2 Theory of International Investment 
2.2.1 Overview 
The economic literature on the theory of international investment is far too 
large to cover it completely in this volume.36 Nevertheless, the author 
considers it useful to offer a brief overview of the most important theoretical 
contributions in this field to allow for a better understanding of the following 
arguments. Although international capital flows may be divided into foreign 
direct investments (FDI), portfolio investments, loans and grants, this analysis 
entirely focuses on FDl.37 The following paragraph starts with a brief definition 
of FDI and sums up its main characteristics. It is argued that studying the 
theory of FDI eventually means studying the determinants that drive the 
decisions of international corporations because international capital flows are 
closely related to the behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Thus, 
understanding the underlying logic of FDI flows requires basic knowledge 
about the theory of MNEs. Thereafter, follows a closer analysis of the determi-
nants of FDI and the influence of uncertainty and risk on incoming flows. 
Although the current theory does not provide clear recommendations about the 
determinants of aggregate FDI, potential determinants and their theoretical 
plausibility are discussed.38 
35 Hymer (1972) cited by Munro (1995) p.8. 
36 For an overview see Dunning (1993). 
37 See Williamson (2001 ). 
38 This is important for the empirical analysis on the macro-level which requires the inclusion 
of control variables for the empirical estimation of FOi flows. See Chapter 4. 
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2.2.2 Definition and Characteristics of FDI 
Despite of the pressure of international organizations for uniformity there are 
still various definitions of FOi in the literature.39 The USA provided a first 
definition in the year 1937 by defining inward FOi as "all foreign equity 
interests in those American corporations or enterprises which are controlled by 
a person or group of persons ... domiciled in a foreign country. Equity interest 
encompasses all holdings of common and preferred stock, advances, and 
inter-company accounts." Despite of its importance there is no precise 
definition of the term control. In the outward survey of 1950 the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce gives a more precise definition of the characteristics of 
control. In this document direct investments are "United States equity in 
controlled foreign business enterprises... as statistically defined for the 
purpose of this survey". The definition includes four main categories: 
1. Foreign corporations, the voting securities of which are owned to the extent of 25% by persons or 
groups, ordinarily resident in the United States 
2. Foreign corporation, the voting stock of which was publidy held within the United States to an 
aggregate extent of 50 % but distributed among stockholders, so that no one investor or group 
owned as much of 25 % 
3. Sole proprietorships, partnerships or real property held abroad by residents of the United States 
4. Foreign branches of United States corporations 
The definition of FOi endorsed by the OECD and the IMF avoids the idea of 
control. Instead, "Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a 
lasting interest by a resident entity in one country (direct investor) in an entity 
resident in an economy other than that of the investor (direct investment 
enterprise)".40 The term lasting interest refers to the existence of a long-term 
relationships between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant 
degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. With this broad 
definition the OECD delivered a specification. A foreign direct investment 
enterprise is defined as an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which 
a foreign investor owns 10% or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of 
an incorporated enterprise or the equivalent of an unincorporated enterprise. 
Moreover, OECD points out that it does not require absolute control by the 
foreign investor. Instead, an effective voice, as evidenced by an ownership of 
at least 10%, implies that the investor is able to influence, or participate in the 
management of an enterprise.41 FOi compromises not only the initial 
transaction but also all subsequent transactions between the investor and the 
direct investment enterprise. Therefore, also reinvested earnings are 
contained in FOi flows. 42 
This definition of OECD, that is also used by the IMF, is governing for all 
balance of payments compilations. The United Nations System of National 
Accounts however, provides a different definition of FOi which retains the idea 
of control. Subsidiaries that are to more than 50% owned by a foreign 
39 If not otherwise indicated the overview of FOi definitions is based on Lipsey (1999). 
40 OECD (1996b) p.7-8. 
41 See OECD (1996b) p.7-8. 
42 See UNCTAD (1999b) p.160 or Fischer (1999) p.22. 
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company are labeled with the term foreign-controlled resident corporations. If 
the share of foreign ownership is between 10 and 50%, the companies are 
classified as associates and may be excluded or included by individual 
countries according to their qualitative assessment of foreign control.43 This 
definition refers more to the micro level focusing on the decisions of 
international investors and their impact on host country development. Unless 
stated otherwise data in this volume is based on the definition given by OECD 
and IMF. However, the discussion showed that the line between FOi and 
portfolio investment is not clear and that classifying real world investment flows 
is difficult. In spite of empirical problems of measurement the theoretical 
distinction helps to analyze the implications of different flow types for host 
economies. 
A closer analysis of the characteristics of foreign investment flows suggest that 
the effects of FOi and portfolio investment on host countries are distinct. FDl 
differs from other investment flows in at least two main aspects. First, as the 
definition in the previous paragraph indicates FDI implies a lasting interest of 
the investing entity in the acquired object. Although the definition avoids the 
term of control , it means that the investing entity exerts a significant influence 
on the management of the company resident in another country.44 Enterprises 
engaged in FOi usually have a motivation that exceeds the mere seeking of 
short-term profits. Instead, FOi implies the existence of a long term strategic 
interest of the investor in the acquisition. Second, rather than being just a 
capital flow, FOi involves the transfer of a package of assets or intermediate 
products which includes money capital, management expertise, technological 
know-how and human capital. FOi does not only complement local savings of 
the home country but in addition supplies more effective management and 
technology, in particular for developing countries.45 Nevertheless, the impact of 
FOi on developing host countries is a topic that has been widely discussed for 
a long time.46 Critics of FOi flows to developing countries state that in the case 
of imperfect markets with large barriers to entry MNEs can drive domestic 
producers out of the market and extract rents that eventually lower domestic 
savings and investment. 47 Even at present the theoretical literature on FOi 
does not offer a clear picture of the effects of FDI for recipient countries.48 A 
positive impact on host countries depends on the market structure and the 
number of linkages of the investment project with the host economy. However, 
if enough forward and backward linkages exist and the investments induce 
technological spillovers, host countries will experience a growth stimulating 
effect. Various empirical studies indicate that FOi exerted a positive impact on 
43 See Lipsey {2001b) p.3 
44 For a discussion of the term "influence" see Dunning (1993) p.5. 
45 See Moran (1998) p.20, Lall (2002) and UNCTAD (1999b) p.195-228. 
46 The dependency theory, which predicts negative effects of FDI, was particularly influential 
in Latin America. 
47 See Moran (1998) p.20. 
48 The corresponding literature is far too large to cite here. A good overview of the existing 
contributions can be found in Munro (1995) p.33-62 and Lall (2002). 
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the welfare of host countries.49 Although there is much empirical evidence that 
foreign investment "crowds in" domestic investment, the overall picture 
remains mixed.50 Despite of the criticism concerning FOi flows, most 
developing countries are eagerly seeking to enhance incoming FOi. To ensure 
growth enhancing positive externalities the targeting of certain industries which 
are assumed to fulfill the exposed prerequisites has become an important 
topic.51 
Besides its importance for the economic development of recipient countries 
the notion of lasting interest has yet another important implication. Since one 
characteristic of FOi is irreversibility, withdrawing quickly during a crisis 
becomes a less feasible option and investors stay in business. Several 
financial crises in the 90s showed that the volatility of financial flows is a 
potential threat for countries opening up for investment from abroad. Empirical 
studies show that FOi is indeed a less volatile source of capital than other in-
vestment flows .52 Analyzing investment behavior in recent financial crises one 
observes that outflows of FOi are considerably lower than other outflows.53 
Therefore, FOi seems to be a more sustainable source of capital for host 
countries as the risk of a sudden reversal of flows is limited due to the long-
term interest of investors. Despite of the criticism on FOi it remains an 
important potential stimulator of growth for recipient countries. This is in 
particular the case for developing nations, provided that the country's markets 
are competitive and the number of linkages with the host country economy are 
sufficient. If these requirements are met, FOi should theoretically have a 
welfare-increasing impact on host countries. 
2.2.3 Theoretical Determinants of FOi 
2.2.3.1 Overview 
Rather than a single identifiable act the investment decision process is a 
complex succession of acts that involves many elements. 54 The theory of 
international investment has essentially been seeking to analyze two main 
aspects of this complex process. First, the factors that motivate firms to 
engage in international production and second, the factors that influence the 
choice of its location. These two basic questions have been studied by many 
scholars from various different perspectives. This paragraph briefly describes 
both theoretical approaches, the ones explaining the motivations of firms to 
engage in international investment and the theoretical contributions that seek 
to explain the choice of location for investment to developing countries.55 
49 See Moran (1998) p.24. 
50 See UNCTAO (1999b) p.171-173. 
51 See UNCTAO (1999b) p.183. 
52 See Lipsey (2001a). 
53 See Williamson (2001 ). During the Mexican financial crises in 1994 for example the outflow 
of FOi was limited. See Graham/Wada (2000). 
54 See Aharoni (1966). 
55 Empirical studies on the detenninants of FOi iocation are reviewed in paragraph 2.2.4.2. 
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As most of the decisions to invest directly abroad are made by managers in 
multinational parent companies, the MNE is the dominant vehicle for FOi and 
the current theory explaining FOi is essentially a theory of MNEs.56 A MNE can 
be defined as a parent company that engages in foreign production or other 
activities through its own affiliates, that exercises direct control over the 
policies of those affiliates, and that strives to design and implement business 
strategies and other functions that transcend national boundaries.57 The first 
explanations for the behavior of MNEs were not completely embedded in a 
comprehensive theoretical framework. They are either descriptive or view in-
ternational investment as a process that originates in the will of national 
companies to internationally diversify production. Following the latter approach 
the main determinant of international capital movements is the difference 
between the return on invested capital in different countries.58 More recent 
theories to explain international firm activity may be divided into four main 
schools which are, together with important corresponding authors, depicted in 
table 2.1. 
HYMER presented a criticism of the classical view that internationalization is 
just a means of portfolio diversification by pointing out that firms which want to 
operate successfully in foreign markets need to have a comparative advan-
tage, if they want to be able to face their local competitors.59 This competitive 
advantage is an important prerequisite for FOi given the fact that local 
producers possess better access to information about the local market than 
foreign companies giving them a considerable advantage vis-a-vis their inter-
national competitors. To make successful international investments possible 
the multinationals that engage in foreign markets need certain advantages in 
technology, marketing, management or organization processes that cannot 
easily be adapted by the local firms.60 
KINDLEBERGER elaborates on the nature of the monopolistic advantages of 
MNEs and shows that they may arise in the goods market (e.g. marketing 
skills), the factors market (e.g. access to capital) or stem from the ability to 
achieve vertical or horizontal integration.61 CAVES names the monopolistic 
advantage a "unique asset" and postulates that horizontally integrating firms 
acquire them via product differentiation. Moreover, he argues that vertically 
integrating firms do not rely on unique assets but are just interested in 
ensuring their long-time supply and pricing of input goods.62 
56 See Root (1994) p.583 and p.607-608. UNCTAD (1994) reports that in 1992 the 100 
largest multinationals accounted for about one third of the combined outward stock of FOi 
of their countries of origin. See UNCTAD (1994) p.5 In a later report UNCTAD (2000) 
states that in 1997 the largest 50 multinationals accounted for over half of the outflows 
from their home countries. For some countries the share exceeded 90%. See UNCTAD 
(2000) p.71 . 
57 See Root (1994) p.577. 
58 See Root (1994) p.608 or Dunning (1993) p.68. 
59 See Hymer (1990) and Hymer (1976). 
60 See Hymer (1990). 
61 See Kindleberger (1969). 
62 See Caves (1974). 
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Table 2.1: Theories to Explain International Investment 
Theory Authors Main Arguments 
1. Monopollatlc Aclvantaga Thaory Hymer (1990), Hymer . Local firms have better information about the 
(1976) local m..-ket . MNEs that enter a domestic market must 
have a monopolistic advantage vis-•vis 
their local competitors . Transactional market failure implies 
oraanization af oroduction via hierarchies 
Kindleberger (1969) . MNEs that enter a domestic market must 
have a monopolistic advantage vis•vvis 
their local competitors . Source of monopolistic advantages can be 
the goods market, the factor market or the 
ability to engage in vertical Of horizontal 
intAl'lralion 
Vernon (1966b) . FOi can be explained by changing 
monopolistic advantages of MNEs during the 
product cycle . Production is transferred abroad when a 
higher product maturity makes labor cost 
more important . Over time the location of production shifts 
from developed countries lo developing 
countries 
Caves (1974) . FOi may be classified in verdcal, horizontal 
and conglomerate . The base for horizontal investments are 
unique assets of the firm . Vertie& investment are made to secure 
availabilitv and oricino of inout 
2. Ollgopollatlc Reaction Theory Knickerbocker (1973) . Risk avoiding members of an oligopolistic 
market will fallow one another in any 
substantial foreign m..-ket . This p..-allel investment is most likely to 
occur in highly concentrated industries with 
heterogenous products . This investment behavior is also found in 
vertically integrated markets where firms 
check their competitors efforts to secure 
inout SUDDIV 
3. The Internalization Thaory Buckley/Casson (1976), . A firm will intemalize the production of 
Casson (1979), Rugman intermediate goods when markets fail . Firm will internalize markets as long as costs 
(1981), Buckley (1987) outweigh the benefits . Firm specific knowledge is an important 
reason for internalization 
4. The Eclectic Paradigm Dunning ( 1981 ), Dunning . FOi takes place when three conditions a,e 
(1993) simultaneously fulfilled : a firm possesses 
ownership specific advantages, market 
failure implies intemalization advantages 
and the host country offers location-specific 
advantages . loc:ation•specific advantages are not limited 
to natural resource endowments but also 
include the cultural , legal, political and 
institutional environment a( host countries 
Source: Own Table 
VERNON relates the patterns of international trade and investment to the 
degree of maturity of the analyzed product.63 He argues that FDI can be ex-
plained by the changing monopolistic advantages of firms during the product 
cycle. In the early stages of its development the product is still not 
standardized and because of the monopolistic situation the price elasticity of 
demand is comparatively low. Marketing of the product requires direct contact 
63 See Vernon (1966b). 
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to the customers and a high degree of flexibility. When international wage 
differentials outweigh the cost and uncertainty of producing in other countries 
production facilities are transferred abroad. Like this production facilities move 
to other developed countries and with further growing standardization to 
developing countries. With a highly standardized product at the end of the life 
cycle the innovator countries will import the products from abroad. 
The oligopolistic reaction theory based on the work of KNICKERBOCKER 
postulates that international production occurs due to a strategic reaction of 
the firm to the behavior of its competitors. That is, firms in an oligopolistically 
structured market follow their competitors in any substantial foreign market. In 
doing so firms protect the exploitability of their firm specific assets and limit the 
scope for their competitors to strengthen their own firm specific advantages.64 
Another group of theorists sought to provide an alternative and deeper micro-
economic explanation for the existence of FOi. Starting from the theory of the 
MNE these authors are not only asking the question why firms engage in 
international transactions but also why firms choose foreign ownership instead 
of licensing. In this category of literature one can cite the internalization theory 
and the eclectic paradigm of international production. The internalization 
theory rises the question why international transactions are rather organized in 
hierarchies than in markets.65 It tries to explain the fact that firms build 
production facilities in foreign countries instead of serving the market by 
exporting their products or by using the instrument of licensing. The core 
prediction of the approach is that with a given distribution of factor-endow-
ments, the form of MNE activity is influenced by the cost of hierarchical 
organization relative to the cost of the market. The firms decide how to best 
serve the market by comparing the cost of using the market via exports with 
the cost of integrating production horizontally or vertically. The main 
explanation of FOi in this approach stems from market failures that render 
exporting or licensing (using the market) more costly than engaging in FOi 
(using hierarchies). Hence, the internationalization of firm activity is not entirely 
due to location specific variables but is explained by the benefits of internaliza-
tion.66 
The internalization approach is capable of explaining why firms choose FOi 
rather than serving foreign markets by licensing or exports. However, the 
empirical observation that some countries attract large inflows of FOi while 
others are largely ignored by MNEs suggests that also country specific 
characteristics are important for foreign investment decisions. When country 
specific factors play an important role in the decision process of MNEs, 
different country patterns have to be considered as a third dimension that in-
fluences the firm's investment decision. In addition to monopolistic and inter-
nationalization advantages the eclectic paradigm allows for the integration of 
64 See Knickerbocker (1973). 
65 For an overview see Dunning (1993) p.75-76 or Root (1994) p.618-620. 
66 See Buckley/Casson (1976), Casson (1979), Rugman (1981) and Buckley (1987). 
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country specific factors as determinants of FOi. In this paragraph no attempt 
will be made to provide for an exhaustive analysis of the literature on 
international location theory. Instead, the coverage of theories will be limited to 
those that offer an explanation for the location of FOi in developing countries. 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of important theoretical contributions to explain 
FOi in the developing world. 
Table 2.2: Theories to Explain the Location of FDI Flows to Developing 
Countries 
Theory Authors Main Arguments 
1. The lntemadonal Product Cycle Vernon (1966b) . FOi can be explained by changing 
Thaory monopolistic advantages of forms during the 
product cycle . Production is transferred abroad when a 
higher product maturity makes labor cost 
more important . Over time the location of p,oduction shifts 
from developed countries to developing 
counbies 
2. Th• International Division of Labor Frobel/Heinrichs/Kreye . Cheap labor and highly standardized 
(1981) p,oduction processes permit a transfer of 
p,oduction to developing countries . This transfer is not limited to labor intensive 
industries but also takes place in industries 
that rely heavily on energy or rttN material as 
well as those that are the source of 
environmental oollution 
3. Neoclualcal Thaory of lnvHtment Kojima (1973) . FOi is determined by facto< endowments of 
countries 
4. The Eclecdc Puadlgm Dunning (1981), Dunning . FOi takes place when three conditions are 
(1993) simultaneously fulfilled: a form possesses 
ownership specific advantages, market 
failure implies internalization advantages 
and the potential host country offers 
location-specific advantages . location-specific advantages are not limited 
to natural resource endowments but also 
include lhe cultural, legal, political and 
institutional environment of the host countrv 
Source: Own table 
VERNON'S approach has already been reviewed above. Another group of 
theorists state that factor costs play a decisive role in the process they call "the 
international division of labor". Stimulated by the availability of cheap labor in 
developing countries, lower transport costs and production processes that may 
be realized with minimum skills firms from developed countries are relocating 
their production into the developing world. Production takes place in those 
countries that provide for the most profitable factor combination. 67 
Focusing on a macro perspective one can ask why countries engage in FOi 
and what determines the attractiveness of countries for FOi in certain 
industries. KOJIMA extends the neo-classical theory of factor-endowments to 
international investment problems. He argues that outbound FOi is undertaken 
by firms that produce intermediate goods that require resources in which the 
home country has a comparative advantage, but that generate value added 
activities that require resources and capabilities in which that country is 
comparatively disadvantaged. To explain FOi between developed countries 
67 See Frobel/Heinrichs/Kreye (1981). 
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Kojima distinguishes different underlying motives as trade barriers and 
transaction- as well as transportation costs.68 Without neglecting the 
explanations of MNE activity the eclectic paradigm of DUNNING allows to 
integrate country specific factors as determinants of FOi. In recognizing the 
importance of firm specific, market specific as well as location specific factors 
the eclectic paradigm serves as a synthesis between these two approaches in 
the literature. Therefore, it may serve as an analytical framework for empirical 
research on FOi. 
2.2.3.2 The Eclectic Paradigm as Analytical Framework 
Although there are many potential motives for firms to engage in FOi that vary 
to a large extent with the industrial sector and the characteristics of the given 
firm, it is possible to provide a general overview of theoretical motives for FOi. 
DUNNING distinguishes four main reasons for a firm's decision to engage in 
international activity which are depicted in figure 2.17. 69 
F. 1gure 217 B . M f f . : as,c 01va1ons f FOi or 
Natural R•ource Seeking Market Seeking 
Physical resources Following suppliers or customers 
Labor Adaptation to local tastes 
Technological or management capacity Cost of production and transportation 
Presence on the maket of competitors 
Strmglc AaHt s .. klng Efficiency Seeking 
Merging to face strong competitors Exploit differences in factor endowments. cultures. market 
Access to distribution channels structures and institutional arrangements 
Exploit differences in consumer tastes and supply capabilities 
Source: Own figure based on Dunning (1993). 
The first possible motive is resource-seeking. Resource seeking enterprises 
invest abroad to acquire certain specific resources that cannot or only at 
higher cost be obtained in their country of origin. Those investments may be 
further distinguished by the type of resource which the firm desires to exploit. 
First, physical resources like minerals, raw materials, agricultural products etc. 
that are needed for the production process of international firms where 
investors are trying to acquire the necessary inputs at a low cost or to secure 
the sources of supply. Examples for these resources are oil, copper, tobacco, 
sugar, rubber etc. Second, the seeking of a supply of cheap labor. These 
engagements are undertaken largely by manufacturing firms that produce 
labor intensive products and are based in countries with high cost of labor. 
Examples for this kind of FOi are the labor intensive U.S. maqui/adora 
production facilities in the north of Mexico or the production of textiles in low 
labor cost nations in the far east or Latin America. Third, firms may be 
interested in an acquisition of technological capacity or management 
68 See Kojima (1973) and (1977). For an overview see Dunning (1993) p.89-90. 
69 See Dunning (1993) p.56. In this chapter he presents 3 other reasons for FOi flows: 
escape investments, support investments and passive investments that have been left out 
by the author due to their lesser theoretical importance. 
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expertise. Examples for investments of this category are the alliances in R&D 
between MNEs from industrialized countries in the information technology 
sector. 
Enterprises that invest abroad to supply the local market or the market of 
neighboring countries with their products are called "market seekers". First, 
market seeking may occur because the firm has to follow its main suppliers or 
customers to the foreign market. An example for this kind of investment is the 
increased number of cross border mergers and acquisition in the accounting, 
auditing and consultant sector with the objective of being able to offer a global 
service to multinational clients. Second, a motive for market oriented FDI is the 
fact that many products need to be adapted to local tastes and needs. This 
kind of presence on foreign markets is of particular importance for firms selling 
consumer goods like food, soft drinks or clothes where tastes vary 
considerably in different local markets. Third, a reason for the presence on 
local markets is the trade-off between economies of scale in production and 
transportation as well as transaction costs. If certain products, the 
transportation cost of which are high, can be produced efficiently in small 
scales, firms have higher incentives to be present in the destination market of 
these products. Eventually, "market seekers" may consider it as an important 
part of their international strategy to be present in important regional markets 
dominated by their competitors. 
The motivation of efficiency seeking FDI flows is to rationalize the structure of 
established resource based or market seeking investment. There are two 
kinds of efficiency seeking investments. First, firms want to exploit different 
factor endowments. This implies that capital intensive products will be 
produced in developed and labor intensive products in developing countries. 
Second, the potential motive of the investment may be a reaction to different 
consumer tastes and supply capabilities of different markets and therefore not 
based on differences in traditional factor endowments. Such efficiency seeking 
usually becomes important, when a minimum level of market- and resource-
seeking FDI has already been attained. 
The final motive for FDI is the acquisition of strategic assets to promote the 
long-term competitiveness of international companies. The main motive of 
strategic investments is not to acquire precise advantages in production cost 
or marketing but to add assets to the firm portfolio that will strengthen their 
overall strategic position. It is for example imaginable that two companies 
merge to face the strong competition of a main competitor. Another realistic 
example might be the acquisition of a company to gain control of its 
distribution channels. 
Summarizing, the expansion of a firm's activity to other countries can have 
various reasons. Therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate an all-
embracing theory capable of determining the driving forces of FDI activity. 
Although such a theory is desirable, it would always remain incomplete 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
48 RISK IN THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT 
because it could not be applied to all kinds of FOi projects. As the 
determinants of FOi decisions vary considerably between industries and 
economic sectors a theoretical approach to explain FOi can only cautiously 
formulate a paradigm that is capable of providing a basic analytical framework 
for explaining FOi. 
The eclectic paradigm seeks to offer a general framework for determining the 
extent and the pattern of foreign production by a country's own enterprises and 
the domestic production owned by foreign enterprises.70 The paradigm is a 
positive approach that helps to explain the observable behavior of MNEs and 
accepts much of the results of neo-classical trade theory which explains the 
spatial structure of output by differences in factor endowments. Following this 
approach the international specialization of countries is a result of their relative 
factor endowments. 71 However, approaches built on the theory of competitive 
advantages cannot explain the ownership structure of international output 
since in traditional theory the different factor endowments would simply 
intensify international trade. The fact that foreign firms own domestic firms 
remains unexplained by this approach. 
The eclectic paradigm starts from the existence of two kinds of market imper-
fections that allow for understanding why firms take part in international 
production. First, a structural market failure that discriminates between firms in 
their ability to gain and sustain control over property rights or to govern 
multiple and geographically dispersed value-added activities. Since firms are 
not, as neo-classical theory assumes, economic entities with identical 
production functions, in oligopolistic or monopolistic markets firms may 
possess advantages that competitors lack allowing them to face the 
competition of their local counterparts. In other words, to be successful firms 
investing abroad must possess some kind of innovatory, cost, financial or 
marketing advantages that are exclusive to the investing firm and that cannot 
easily be adapted by local firms. The market failure that allows the keeping of 
firm specific advantages over time is a prerequisite of FOi. 72 The second 
necessary market failure is transactional, that is, it is located on the markets 
for intermediate products and services. Firms choose the organizational 
structure of their engagement by weighting the cost of using the market or 
internal hierarchies for the trade of these intermediates. If the transaction costs 
of a market solution are too high firms are widening their degree of vertical or 
horizontal integration which can also imply the engagement in international 
production. This transactional market failure explains why firms choose FOi as 
70 The following paragraph is, if not cited otherwise, based on Dunning (1993) p.76-86. 
71 An explanation of the HOS-theorem can be found in every textbook of international 
economics. For the original papers see Heckscher (1950) and Ohlin (1933). 
72 This argument builds upon the work of Hymer (1990) and Hymer (1976) who argues that 
firms that engage in foreign countries need to possess some ownership-specific 
advantages to make up for the informational disadvantages vis-a-vis domestic firms. 
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a strategy of internationalization instead of serving foreign markets via exports 
or contractual arrangements. 73 
Starting from these basic convictions DUNNING identifies three conditions that 
have to be simultaneously fulfilled for a firm to engage in FOi. First, the 
possession of certain assets that are not or only at higher cost available to 
their domestic competitors. These assets, may they be tangible or intangible, 
are capable of generating a future income stream. Examples for tangible asset 
that offer this possibility are qualified labor, capital or natural endowments. 
Intangible assets can be access to technology or information as well as 
marketing or organizational skills. The assets that are specific to a firm are 
labeled ownership-specific assets or 0-advantages. The possession of 0-
advantages is a necessary condition for a MNE to engage in FOi. 
Nevertheless, it still has to be explored why firms, that own 0-advantages do 
not serve foreign markets with exports. As well as there are certain assets that 
are specific to a firm there are assets that are specific to a particular location. 
These kinds of advantages will henceforth be referred to as L-advantages and 
MNEs that want to exploit these assets have to be present in host countries. L-
advantages can take various forms, as for example natural factor endowments 
or cheap labor as well as a stable political environment for production or other 
favorable country characteristics.7 Thus, the second requirement for FOi is 
the existence of a L-advantage in the potential host country. 
However, the simultaneous existence of L- and 0-advantages is not a 
sufficient condition for FOi because for exploring L-advantages it would be 
sufficient to integrate the company into international production via the market. 
Instead of taking the risk to make an investment abroad it could be 
advantageous to explore the L-advantages through buying cheaper inputs on 
foreign markets or letting foreigners produce via licensing. The third and last 
condition that has to be fulfilled before a company engages in FOi is the 
existence of transactional market failure. The main argument is drawn from 
internalization theory which has been reviewed above. For some reasons the 
use of the market as a coordination mechanism may be more expensive than 
the coordination by internal hierarchies. In this case it is the inability of the 
market to organize a satisfactory outcome for potential contractors and 
contractees of intermediate products that explains why firms choose the 
hierarchical route for exploring the differences in L-specific assets between 
countries. In other words, this kind of failure reflects the inability of the market 
to organize transactions in an optimal way. The reason for market failure may 
73 This argument has been pushed forward by authors that follow the internalization theory 
that was presented in paragraph 2.2.3.2. However, this argument is not specific for the 
decision to engage into international production as it goes back to the analysis of the firm 
by Coase who identified transaction cost as being responsible for the existence of firms in 
market economies. See Coase (1937). 
74 This volume is an analysis of the location specific assets of countries. Grosse (2003a) 
argues that the eclectic paradigm is a suitable theoretical framewor1< for the analysis of FDI 
to Latin America. 
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be asymmetric information that eventually leads to problems of hold up, 
adverse selection or moral hazard as well as imperfections of the international 
capital market that makes vertical or horizontal integration more attractive. 
Whatever the nature of the market failure, firms choose integration to 
maximize the net benefits of lower production, transaction or governance cost 
or to reap the maximal rent from the O-advantages they possess. The advan-
tages that a firm acquires by internationalization through hierarchies instead of 
the market are henceforth referred to as Internalization-advantages (!-
advantages). 
The implications of the eclectic paradigm are straightforward. At any moment 
in time the more one country's enterprises relative to those of other locations 
possess 0-advantages, the more they have an incentive to internalize rather 
than using the market, and the more they are interested in exploiting the 
differences in location specific assets the more they are likely to engage in 
outward production. This means that enterprises only engage in FOi, if all 
three conditions that are summarized in figure 2.18 are simultaneously fulfilled. 
Figure 2.18: Internationalization in the OLI-Paradigm 
TYPE OF ADVANTAGE 
FORM OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 0°Advent1111• 1-Adventeg• L-Advantag• 
FDI Yes Yes Yes 
Exports Yes Yes No 
Contractual Arrangements Yes No No 
Source: Own figure following the dass1ficat1on of Dunning 
To sum up, the combination of the aforementioned advantages in a given 
investment project determines the form of internationalization a firm eventually 
chooses. The analysis highlights that location specific assets of host countries 
play an important role for the investment decision of MNEs. When in turn, 
location specific assets are a decisive determinant for the decision of MNEs 
over their spatial distribution of production it follows that countries without L-
specific advantages cannot attract FOi. The aggregate location specific 
advantage of a given country is influenced by various variables as for example 
the existence of resources, factor costs, and human capital formation. Besides 
these determinants the local investment climate, a proper protection of 
property rights, the absence of corruption as well as the existence of rule of 
law and political stability are variables that positively affect the investment 
decision of MNEs. High levels of political risks may outweigh other location 
specific advantages as the existence of natural resources, cheap labor, or low 
taxes. Summing up, the eclectic paradigm permits to theoretically derive 
potential location specific determinants of FOi which can be empirically tested 
with statistical models. 
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2.2.4 Empirical Studies of Aggregate FDI 
2.2.4.1 Overview 
51 
The analysis of 0-specific and I-specific advantages is an important topic for 
transaction cost economics and studies in industrial organization with a fruitful 
area for empirical research on the firm level. However, given the topic of this 
analysis and the focus on the macro-level, it is obvious to focus on the 
analysis of location specific advantages of developing countries to assess their 
attractiveness for FOi. Due to the importance of FOi flows for developing 
countries, it is important to analyze which location specific variables have an 
important impact on incoming FOi flows since studying the determinants of FOi 
decisions allows for conclusions about the design of economic policy. 
Empirical economic research identifies many potentially influential 
determinants of aggregate FOi by analyzing investment flows to countries or 
country samples. Although the literature offers a great number of econometric 
studies about the determinants of FOi, their findings remain to a large extent 
ambiguous. Due to the wide range of perspectives, methods, samples and 
analytical tools there is no consensus about the relative importance and the 
direction of the potential location specific determinants of FOi. Moreover, 
econometric models often contain variables which lack a sufficient theoretical 
foundation but provide a good fit of the model for the analyzed sample. As the 
empirical literature on determinants of FOi is too large to be completely re-
viewed, only recent contributions are presented in this paragraph.75 
The discussion of theoretical models explaining FOi concluded that there is no 
all embracing theory of FOi, from which potential determinants for empirical 
tests could be clear1y derived. Furthermore the variety of motives for firms to 
take part in international production make econometric studies of aggre~ate 
FOi a difficult task, the results of which have to be interpreted with caution. 6 In 
addition location specific assets of countries differ widely making empirical 
tests with cross-country samples even more difficult. Nevertheless, theoretical 
plausibility and empirical evidence concerning the most influential potential 
determinants of FOi will be briefly discussed because despite of its drawbacks 
econometric analysis remains a powerful tool for the empirical analysis of FOi 
flows and alternative approaches are still missing. 
2.2.4.2 Empirical Determinants of FDI 
This paragraph reviews recent empirical evidence in the literature concerning 
the impact of potentially theoretical determinants of FOi. Table 2.3 summarizes 
these findings by depicting the impact of potentially influential location specific 
variables and the significance and sign of calculated coefficients. Moreover, 
the robustness of all potential determinants is assessed by reviewing the 
75 See the more complete overview of Chakrabarti (2001 ). 
76 Kwon (2002) argues that the ambiguous results of the empirical literature on FDI stem from 
the fact that many studies focused on aggregate FDI. For attaining better results he 
proposes to focus research on the project level. 
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impact and significance of the variables in different empirical investigations 
with different methodologies.77 
T bl 2 3 E a e : mpmca IE 'd VI ence on o en 1a e ermman so Pt t'IDt t fFDI 
0esERVED EFFECT ON FDI IN DIFFERENT STUDIES 
ANAi. VZED VARIABLE POSITIVE IMPACT NEGATIVE IMPACT INSIONIFICAffT ROBUST 
M ark•t Size measured by . Overview of older Fully 
GDP studies 
Chakrabarti (2001) . Kr avis/1.ipsey 
(1982) . Schneider/Frey 
(1985) . Culem (1988) . Wheeler/Mody 
(1992) . Sader (1993) . Tsai(1994) . Shamsuddin 
(1994) . Billlnaton 11999) 
Openness mHaured by . Kravis/Lipsey . Wheeler/Mody . Wheeler/Mody Convincingly 
Trade-GDP-Redo or other (1982) (1992)' (1992)' . Culem (1988) 
varlebl•• . Edw•ds (1990) 
Host Country . Billet(1991) Fully 
lnfraatructur• (Various . Wheeler/Mody 
(1992) 
Indicators) . Loree/Guisinger 
(1995) . Hsms(2000) . Stein/Daude 
(20021 
Labor Coat meuured by . Swedenborg . Schneider/Frey . Seder (1993) No 
Host Country Wege Rate (1979) (1985) . Tsai (1994) . Wheeler/Mody . Culem (1988) . Loree/Guisinger 
(1992) . Lucas (1993) (1995) . Shamsuddin/ 1994 l 
Human Capita! ofth• . Frey(1984) Fully 
National Workforce . Schneider/Frey 
(1985) . Billet/19911 
Host Country Tax Rate . Swenson ( 1994) . Loree/Guisinger . Wheeler/Moody No 
(1995) (1992) . Cassou (1997) . Jackson/Markowsi . Kemsley (1998) (1995) . Billinaton 11999) 
Host Country Barriers to . Lunn (1980) . Culem (1988) . Blonigen/Feenstra No 
Trade . Jun/Singh (1996) (1997). . 
Host Country Exchange . Edwa-ds (1990) . Froot/Stein (1991) . Sader (1993) No 
Rate . Blonigan/Feenstra . Tuman/Emmert 
11996) 11999) 
Host Country Growth Rate . Lunn(1980) . Nigh (1988) Convincingly . Schneider/Frey 
(1985) 
. Tsai (1994) 
. Culem (1988) . BillinQton {1999) 
Host Country Current . Schneider/Frey . Culem (1988) No 
Account Balance (1985) . Shamsuddin . Lucas (1993) (1994) . Tsai 11994! 
Source: Own Table, 'The Wheeler/Mody Study 1s cited two times because they find different results for 
different sub-samples. 
77 Variables where the empirical evidence is clear are classified as fully robust while variables 
where the majority of studies find the same sign with a significant coefficient are 
considered as convincingly robust. 
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One of the most cited potential determinants of FOi is the market size of the 
host country. Recalling the market-seeking motive it seems plausible that the 
size of the destination market significantly influences the investment decision 
of MNEs. In addition efficiency seeking enterprises may find a better possibility 
to explore economies of scale in larger host markets. 
Therefore, a proxy for market size can be found in nearly all empirical studies 
of FOi, the most popular ones being GDP or GDP per capita. The empirical 
evidence for a positive impact of market size, proxied by GDP, on FOi is 
overwhelming.78 Thus, recent empirical evidence supports the theoretical 
assumption that incoming FOi is positively correlated with the size of the host 
country market. Moreover, market size turns out to be a robust determinant as 
the positive impact of this variable is confirmed by all reviewed empirical 
studies. 
Likewise, there is good theoretical evidence concerning the influence of 
variables that measure the degree of openness of countries. Openness and 
investment flows should be positively correlated when FOi is concentrated in 
the tradable sector. Although the empirical evidence for the hypothesis is not 
clear cut, there are various empirical results that indicate a positive correlation 
of openness and FDl. 79 Therefore, openness is considered a convincingly 
robust determinant of FOi. 
It is often argued in the literature that in developing countries the quality and 
the extent of the host country infrastructure are important determinants of in-
coming FOi flows. As the quality of the local infrastructure directly affects costs 
associated with the factors of production, the production process and the 
distribution of the products this argument is theoretically convincing. Empirical 
studies confirm the hypothesis that infrastructure development is an important 
criterion for FOi in developing countries indicating that infrastructure variables 
are robust determinants of FDl.80 
Another theoretically important determinant of FOi is the cost of labor in the 
host country. As pointed out before a cheap labor supply or other low factor 
costs are potential determinants of FOi since resource seeking MNEs typically 
invest in developing countries with low wages or other factor costs to decrease 
production costs. In particular when products have already attained a 
significant level of maturity factor costs become important location specific 
determinants.81 Even if theory predicts a negative correlation between 
variables measuring labor costs and FOi, empirical evidence remains mixed. 
Results range from a negative or insignificant impact to an even positive 
78 See the studies of Kravis/Lipsey (1982), Schneider/Frey (1985), Wheeler/Mody (1992), 
Sader (1993), Tsai (1994), Shamsuddin (1994) and Billington (1999). For the results of 
older studies see the overview of Chakrabarti (2001 ). 
79 See Kravis/Lipsey (1982), Culem (1988), Edwards (1990) who find a positive impact of 
openness. Wheeler/Mody (1992) find an insignificant impact of openness. 
80 See Billet (1991 ), Loree/Guisinger (1995), Harms (2000) and Stein/Daude (2002). 
81 See Vernon (1966b). 
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influence of labor costs on FDI. 82 Although host country labor costs are 
theoretically an important location specific determinant of FDI, the reviewed 
empirical studies do not confirm the theoretical prediction indicating that wages 
are no robust determinant of FDl.83 
Immediately related to the influence of host country labor costs are the skills of 
the national workforce. When low levels of qualification and skills of the 
workforce imply low labor productivity, location specific advantages of low 
wage countries may be offset completely. Therefore, a measure of human 
capital should theoretically have a positive correlation with FDI. Several 
empirical studies confirm the hypothesis that the greater the availability of a 
skilled workforce the greater the flow of FDl.84 Hence, the existing empirical 
evidence indicates that human capital of the national workforce is a robust 
determinant of FDI. 
The literature also investigates if FDI flows are sensitive to a host country's tax 
rates. As low taxes are location specific advantages that efficiency seeking 
international enterprises can exploit, economic theory suggests a negative 
correlation between host country taxes and incoming FDI. Empirical evidence 
however, remains ambiguous. Although some empirical studies find the 
expected negative correlation, there is also a great number of studies that do 
not find a significant impact and reject the hypothesis.85 To conclude, the 
ambiguous empirical evidence on the influence of taxation on FDI does not 
permit the classification of taxes as robust determinants of FDI. 
The theoretical impact of variables measuring trade barriers of host countries 
on FDI is unclear. Following the tariff hopping argument a high degree of 
protection in the host country will imply an increase in FDI as foreign 
companies are trying to avoid high tariffs. In turn, an excessive protection of 
the host country market may deter FDI, when investors are export oriented or 
heavily rely on imports of intermediary goods. The review of empirical studies 
on the effects of trade barriers likewise is inconclusive. While some authors 
find empirical evidence for the "tariff hopping" argument, there are also studies 
that reject it.86 Therefore, trade barriers cannot be classified as robust 
determinants of FDI. 
82 See Culem (1988), Sader (1993), Shamsuddin (1994) and Tsai (1994) who found a 
negative impact of wages on FOi. See the studies of Swedenborg (1979) and 
Wheeler/Mody (1992) that obtained a positive impact. 
83 Another important problem immanent to empirical studies of the impact of labor costs is the 
lack of sufficiently large comparable time series on labor costs in particular for developing 
countries, which suggests a sample selection bias of existing studies. Another problem of 
the empirical studies is that instead of unit labor costs national wage rates are used. 
84 See Frey (1984), Schneider/Frey (1985) and Billet (1991 ). 
85 See Billington (1999), Kemsley (1998), Cassou (1997) and Loree/Guisinger (1995) who 
find a significantly negative impact of a country's tax rate on FOi. Wheeler/Moody (1992) 
and Jackson/Markowski (1995) find an insignificant influence while Swenson (1994) even 
reported a positive correlation. 
86 See Lunn (1980) and Jun/Singh (1996) that accept the tariff hopping argument. For a 
rejection or an insignificant impact see Culem (1988) and Blonigen/Feenstra (1997). 
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Another potential determinant of incoming FOi is the evolution of the host 
country's exchange rate. Following the exchange rate-hypothesis countries 
with a weak or volatile exchange rate will receive less FOi because asset 
values and income streams from countries with a weak currency are subject to 
large devaluation risks. Therefore, income streams will be discounted at higher 
rates when they originate in countries with weak currencies. In turn, a weak 
host country currency may also attract FOi because acquisition prices for 
foreign investors are falling. As the empirical evidence remains mixed, it 
follows that the exchange rate cannot be classified as robust determinant of 
FOi flows.67 
There is also mixed econometric evidence with respect to variables that 
measure the economic dynamics of host countries. Following the growth 
hypothesis rapidly growing economies provide better opportunities for making 
profits and attract more FOi. Although many econometric studies seem to 
confirm the hypothesis, the variable does not turn out to be robust in all 
settings.66 Nevertheless, the review of recent empirical studies permits to 
classify the variable as being convincingly robust. 
Another dynamic variable, the impact of which on FOi has been discussed in 
the literature, is the current account balance. Following the trade-surplus 
hypothesis a positive current account is a characteristic of a healthy and 
dynamic economy with export potential. Therefore, a trade surplus should 
exert a stimulating impact on FOi. However, empirical tests of this hypothesis 
are inconclusive. While several authors find the theoretically expected positive 
sign, some authors' results indicate the opposite.69 In sum, the empirical 
evidence does not permit to classify the current account as a robust 
determinant ofFOI. 
In addition to these variables there is great number of other potential 
determinants that have not been explicitly reviewed here. Particularly relevant 
for the purpose of this study is the existing empirical evidence on the influence 
of indicators measuring political stability or political risk. All these empirical 
studies however, are reviewed separately in paragraph 2.2.5.4. To conclude, 
only a few variables that are supposed to be potential determinants of FOi turn 
out to be robust in a large number of empirical studies implying that the 
significance of many determinants depends to a large extent on the design of 
the econometric model and the selected sample. This empirical ambiguity 
implies that up to now the economic literature does not offer a widely accepted 
standard model for econometric research on FOi. Nevertheless, empirical 
87 See Blonigen,/Feenstra (1997), Froot/Stein (1991) that find a strong negative correlation of 
the exchange rate and FOi. Insignificant or positive effects were found by Edwards (1990), 
Sader (1993) and Tuman/Emmert (1999). 
88 See the studies Billington (1999), Culem (1988) and Schneider/Frey (1985) and 
Lunn(1980) for positive evidence. Tsai (1994) and Nigh (1988) find an insignificant impact 
of the growth rate. 
89 See Lucas (1993) and Schneider/Frey (1985) for results that accept the trade-surplus 
hypothesis. See Shamsuddin (1994 ), Tsai (1994) and Culem (1988) for a rejection. 
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evidence suggests that market size, openness, infrastructure, human capital of 
the workforce and host country growth rates are convincingly or fully robust 
determinants of FOi flows. In turn, other potentially influential variables being 
reviewed in this paragraph as host country wages, taxes, the exchange rate 
and tariffs are not robust to minor changes in the specification of empirical 
models.90 
2.2.5 Political Risk and International Investment 
2.2.5.1 Definition of Political Risk 
Since the term "Political Risk" is used in various economic publications without 
precise definition, this paragraph provides a definition of political risk that is 
based on a review of the existing literature and will be used throughout the 
present analysis. It was already pointed out that neoclassical investment 
theory assumes that all actors are fully informed. Uncertainty, in turn, occurs in 
a wor1d without full information and in reality, economic actors are daily 
confronted with various forms of uncertainty. Recalling the analysis in Chapter 
2, introducing uncertainty did not necessarily imply a risk for the decision 
maker. Only if an actor has to make ex ante decisions which are not, or only at 
high cost, reversible a risk occurs because current decisions directly affect 
future earnings.91 Therefore, risk can be broadly defined as uncertainty over 
future developments affecting future returns of economic actors. 
In the economic literature the definitions of political risk vary largely with the 
underlying unit of analysis.92 HOWELUCHADDICK define political risk as the 
possibility that political decisions, events or conditions in a country will affect 
the business environment such that investors will lose money or have a 
reduced profit margin. 93 LESSARD defines political risk for foreign investors as 
the risk of political discontinuities resulting in losses through expropriation or 
major policy shifts.94 Other definitions may be classified in two groups. The first 
group solely focuses on governmental action as a source of political risk. The 
second group of definitions also includes sources of risk which are outside the 
direct control of the host government.95 For foreign investors political risk can 
be a combination of both, a government's inclination to opportunistically 
interfere in operations and the presence of societal factors as civil strife or 
ethnic tensions. Therefore, here political risk is defined in a broader sense 
which also includes risks that do not emanate directly from governmental 
action. Speaking of political risk in this volume refers to uncertainty about the 
future interference or non-interference of governments as well as abrupt 
changes or discontinuities in policy affecting the revenues from or the value of 
private assets. The notion of "non-interference of governments" covers all 
those risks that are caused by an insufficient action of public administrations or 
90 These findings have implications for the methodology of the empirical analysis in Chapter 
4. See paragraph 4.2.1 . 
91 See paragraph 2.1.3.2. 
92 Simon (1982) offers an overview of earlier definitions of political risk. 
93 See Howell/Chaddick (1994) p. 71. 
94 See Lessard (1993) p.452. 
95 See Howell (2001) p.1-5. 
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that do not originate in governmental action at all . Examples are lack of public 
order, riots, strikes or revolution which clearly affect returns on investment but 
do not originate directly in governmental action. In addition, all those political 
risk factors are covered which affect the return of investors due to international 
political tensions. Cross country warfare or terrorist attacks are examples for 
exogenous risks that are not caused by governmental behavior. In this sense 
political risk occurs, if the government is not able to fulfil the tasks of ensuring 
that firms can follow their normal economic activities.96 Related to the term 
political risk is the term country risk. Since this term usually refers to the risk 
that an international loan defaults, it should not be confounded with political 
risk in general.97 Consequently LESSARD defines general country risk as the 
risk of change in an asset's value due to sovereign policy that involve general 
or selective default on, confiscation of or taxation of claims in response to 
circumstances under which either or both the ability and willingness of the 
sovereign to meet all the claims placed on it is impaired. 
It is important to stress that it is not only the existing set of regulations, 
restrictions and institutions that may reduce the attractiveness of countries for 
FOi. Governments can impose taxes on cross-border financial flows and 
payments, quantitative limitations or reserve requirements independently from 
the current status quo. Therefore, also the time dimension of the problem and 
the expectations of investors have to be considered. Independent from the 
existing political institutions the mere possibility of measures that reduce the 
investor's returns already implies a political risk.96 Given the irreversibility that 
is inherent to the majority of investments, it seems evident that investors are 
rather concerned about the government's future policy than about the past.99 It 
is straightforward to see that the aforementioned definition contains a large 
quantity of governmental action or non-action that may possibly affect the 
return on private assets. However, the term political risk is only applied to 
situations where the declining value of private assets is due to a change of the 
property rights structure. This excludes all political action which decreases the 
value of private assets indirectly and not srcecifically as for example the 
general design of fiscal or monetary policy. 0° Furthermore, this definition 
ignores all kinds of economic risks that may affect the returns of MNEs due to 
evolutions on international markets. Examples are changing terms of trade, 
variations in international interest rate, a global reduction in demand, and 
increases in oil prices and so on. It is important to stress that political risk may 
also arise although the existing de jure property rights structure of a society 
96 The author is well aware of the fact that there is no consensus about the tasks of the state 
in a market economy. Chapter 3 delivers a more detailed discussion of necessary 
governmental tasks. 
97 See BenmansurNadcar (1995) p.20-21. 
98 See Obstfeld (1995). 
99 See Harms (2000) p.72. 
100 This exclusion is only valid for a "normal course" of economic policy that does not lead to 
economic or financial crisis. Economic policies that lead to severe macroeconomic 
imbalances are a potential source of political risk. The weakness of this definition is to 
distinguish "normal" policy from a "false" policy leading to economic crisis. 
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remains unchanged. If for example the de facto structure of property rights is 
significantly changed by problems of contract enforcement, political risk 
emerges. Henceforth, aggregate political risk is defined as the sum of possible 
exogenous and endogenous risk factors where uncertainty about future 
governmental action or non-action as well as abrupt changes or discontinuities 
decrease the value of private assets due to an alteration of the property rights 
structure. 
2.2.5.2 Categories of Political Risk and Anecdotal Evidence 
The last decade saw an enormous increase of private capital flows to 
developing countries. This growing internationalization of capital markets and 
the experience of several emerging market crises during the 90s made the 
evaluation of country risk and political risk a leading issue in the world of inter-
national finance. However, already the expropriations of resource extracting 
foreign facilities in developing countries during the 30s, 60s and 70s made 
international investors aware of political risks as a relevant determinant of in-
vestment decisions. As a reaction to the suffered losses MNEs aimed at re-
moving the contractual relationship with developing countries from the 
supremacy of local laws, by requiring that the contract be governed by general 
principles of international law recognized by civilized nations. However, 
various attempts to conclude multilateral conventions on the subject of foreign 
investment protection, such as most recently the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) were unsuccessful .101 
Moreover, the high relevance of political risks as a problem of international 
finance is reflected by the specialization of several public organizations in risk 
bearing and forecasting on the national and multinational level as well as by 
the large sums covered by political risk insurers. By 1998 new coverage 
issued by members of the Berne Union for political risk insurance reached an 
amount of 42 billion US$. 102 When compared with the total volume of world 
wide FDI of 644 billion US$ for the same year, this figure underlines the im-
portance of the political risk insurance sector. In addition to these public efforts 
the last years witnessed the emergence of a large private market for the 
insurance of political risks. In the last decade this market saw a fast growth of 
private insurance companies offering innovative solutions for private investors 
willing to invest in foreign markets that are perceived as risky.103 Responding 
to the large demand private insurers considerably increased their confiscation, 
expropriation, nationalization insurance capacity (CEN) per project over the 
last years. The market leader Lloyd's of London for instance pushed its CEN to 
101 These contractual solutions began to flaw when developing countries proclaimed a ,,New 
International Economic Order" claiming the sovereignty of each state to regulate foreign 
investment and to nationalize foreign property. See Bernardini (2001) p.236-238. 
102 The Berne Union encompasses 24 national investment ensurers and Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). See West/Martin (2001 a) p.153. 
103 See BenmansourNadcar (1995) p. 149-170, West/Martin (2001a) and West/Martin 
(2001b). Most political risk insurance contracts focus on developing countries. 
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900 million US$ for the year 1999.104 Besides their demand for political risk 
insurance recent research shows that most MNEs are simultaneously active in 
in-house political risk assessment. 105 The interest of private investors in 
organizations that bear parts of their foreign investment risks leads to the 
conclusion that political risk is a major impediment of international capital flows 
to developing countries. On the multilateral level organizations like the Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) are aware of this problem and offer solutions for investors 
willing to engage in developing countries or emerging markets with a high level 
of risk. While the previous chapter provided a theoretical definition of the term 
political risk, this paragraph is concerned with the different categories of 
political risks that may affect MNEs. Following SIMON political risk may be 
categorized by using three main characteristics. These criteria for classifying 
risks and real world examples for the resulting categories of risk are depicted 
in figure 2.19. 
1gure 219 T : ypo oav o o 11ca IS f P IT IR" k s 
Macro Risks Micro Risks 
Socletal-related Governmental-releted Socletal-related Governmental-releted 
Revolution Nationalization Selective terro<ism Selective E>q)(oprialion 
Wats Expropriation Actions against personnel Changes in Regulation 
Coups d'elats Creeping expropriation Selective strikes Operational Res1rictions 
Violence Repab"iation restrictions Selective protests Discriminatory Taxation 
Factional Conflict Change of Public Priorities National boycott of firm Local content rules 
• i Civil Unrest Change of Party Breach of Contract 
" & Widespread riots Change of Government Loss of copyright protection 
0 
] Nationwide Sbikes Change of Ministers Price controls 
111 Shifts in public opinion Co,ruption 
Union activism High inflation 
Level of Public Spending 
Exchange Controls 
Labor Matkel Policy 
Cross-National Guerilla Watfa,e lntemational activists Diplomatic stress between 
International terrorism Border conflicts Selective international host and home country 
World public opinion Alliance shifts terrorism Bilateral trade agreements 
g Disinvestment pressure Emba,goes International boycott of firm Multilateral trade 
" International boycotts agreements i 
" Protectionism Selective Import/export Ill 
Unsustainable external debt restrictions 
International economic Foreign government 
instability interf•ence 
Source: Own figure based on Simon (1982} p.67. 
104 See the overview by West (2001) p.52-58, West/Martin (2001a) p.139-145 and 
West/Martin (2001 b) p.207-230. 
105 In a survey of US multinationals Hashmi/Guvenli (1992) find that all respondents at least 
occasionally engage in political risk analysis. Over 50% of the multinationals have a 
regular (yearly or quarterly) political risk assessment pattern. In the words of a leading 
manager; • [Host country] governance is as important as value." Cited in Henisz/Zelner 
(2003a) p.2. 
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First, the source of political risks can be either exogenous or endogenous to 
the political process in a given host country. Cross national warfare, for 
example, is an exogenous risk factor while civil strife is an endogenous risk. 
Second, political risks can be related to governmental action like expropria-
tions or rather to societal events like strikes or riots. Third, political risk may 
affect all firms in the host country (macro-risk) or just specific firms (micro-
risks).106 It follows that aggregate political risk is shaped by endogenous and 
exogenous risk factors which may differently affect firms present in the host 
country. Although figure 2.19 suggests that political risks can be precisely 
categorized, in reality all these different sources of political risk are 
interdependent. 
Figure 2.20 shows the possible interactions of endogenous and exogenous 
political risk factors and gives real world examples for the interaction of these 
two risk types. 
Figure 2.20: Dimensions of Aggregate Country Risk 
NATURE OF ENDOGENOUS RISK FACTORS 
NATURE OF EXOGENOUS RISK FACTORS Not significant Sec:tor4peclflc General 
Not significant No Risk Shift in regulation Breakdown in Public 
Targeted expropriation Order 
General Expropriation 
Sactor•paclflc Commercial Losses on Creeping Expropriation More of lhe same 
flrm~evel lhrough Windfall Taxes 
General Economy-wide Commercial Commercial Losses Economy wide Total 
Losses Loss 
Source: Lessard (1993) p.453 
Both figures highlight that political risks are far from being homogenous. 
Instead, investors face such diverse forms of risks as wars, expropriations, 
strikes, shifts in regulation and so on. It follows that political risk is a complex 
multidimensional phenomenon implying that suitable political risk indicators 
have to contain several potential sources of risk. Furthermore, it is straightfor-
ward to see that even if an indicator pictures the main potential sources of risk 
in a given country, it can hardly be complete. 
Another useful classification of political risk is provided by SCHIFFER/WEDER 
who distinguish between catastrophic and creeping political risk. The term 
catastrophic political risk refers to the classical risks that a host government 
expropriates the investor without offering compensation or that other 
catastrophic circumstances like wars, coups or civil unrest imply the total loss 
of private assets. This risk is usually closely related to significant changes in 
political power implying major policy changes. Creeping political risks or 
creeping expropriations in turn, contain all forms of unexpected changes in the 
106 See Simon (1982). 
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institutional framework that reduce the value of Porivate assets without resulting 
in a total loss of the title on private property. 07 In other words, a creeping 
expropriation does not result in a formal dispossession of property by its 
owner. Instead, a creeping expropriation implies that governmental actions as 
for example regulatory policy reduce the profits of private assets by slowly 
diluting property rights. For a better understanding of the latter consider the 
example of an infrastructure investment which is subject to national regulation. 
By altering the conditions of regulation the government possesses a powerful 
tool to reduce the profits of private investors. As those investors cannot easily 
withdraw, the governments have a strong incentive to act opportunistically by 
ex-post changes of taxes or regulations. 108 This incentive to exploit the 
investor by altering the relevant framework, ex-ante becomes a disincentive for 
companies planning an investment. While from this point of view a long-term 
commitment of the regulating body is desirable, one has to be aware of the 
problem that the benefit of a short term commitment is the flexibility to rectify 
wrong decisions of previous administrations.109 Faced with the large variety of 
political risks it is interesting to identify those political risk which are of 
particular importance for international investors. The easiest way to do so is to 
analyze for which kinds of political risks there is a demand or an offer of 
insurance contracts on the international political risk insurance market. For its 
guarantee and insurance business MIGA offers four big categories of political 
risks insurance contracts which are depicted in figure 2.21 . 
The risk of War and Civil Disturbance means that private assets are affected 
by a loss from, a damage to, or the destruction or disappearance of, tangible 
assets caused by politically-motivated acts of war or civil disturbance in the 
host country, including revolution, insurrection, coups d'etat, sabotage, and 
terrorism. Protection against war and civil disturbance also extends to events 
that, for a certain period, result in an interruption of project operations essential 
to overall financial viability. This type of business interruption is effective when 
the investment is considered a total loss.110 A good example for firms being 
affected by revolutionary disturbances are the U.S. firms based in Iran under 
the leadership of the U.S. friendly shah. Used to the former friendly policy 
101 See SchifferiWeder (2000). 
108 As a leading manager put it: • ... If there is regulated price, the price will be used for 
political purposes. If anyone assumes that there will be no changes it is naive. It is more 
than naive, it is stupid .... " Cited in Henisz/Zelner (2003b). There are many contributions in 
the literature which analyze the "bargaining power" of multinational firms relative to host 
country governments. Already Vernon stressed that governments have an incentive to 
renege on initial contracts when multinationals capital is sunk and its technology has 
diffused locally. As Vernon puts it:" As long as a foreign-owned goose can still lay golden 
eggs, ... the policy of most developing countries has been to squeeze the goose, not to 
destroy it or to have it fly away. Accordingly, multinational enterprises that perform a 
unique function, such as providing access to some difficult technology or some otherwise 
inaccessible foreign market, have generally been less vulnerable to government 
pressures, while subsidiaries whose withdrawal is thought to entail very little national loss 
have been more vulnerable." Cited in Henisz/Zelner (2003b) 
109 See LaffonVTirole (1994). 
110 See MIGA (2002). 
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towards foreign firms they were strongly affected by the riots and civil 
disturbances preceding the Iranian Revolution. 111 More recently one can cite 
the losses of U.S. firms in Haiti or in former Yugoslavia that were due to civil 
strife.112 
Figure 2.21: Categories of Political Risk Insurance offered by MIGA 
CATEGORY DEFINITION 
Wat atid Civil Disturbance 
Restricted Transfer of Profits 
Breach of Contract 
Expropriation 
Private assets ate affected by a loss from, a damage to, or the destruction or 
disappearance of, tangible assets caused by polillcaly-motivated acts of war or civil 
disturbance 
Loss ol the investment as a resutt of acts by the host government that may reduce 
or eliminate ownership of, control over, or rights to the insured investment 
Refers to losses arising from the host government's breach or repudiation of a 
con tr act with the investor 
Transfer Restriction means losses arising from .,, investor's inability to convert local 
currency (capita, interest, principal, profits. royalties and other remittances) into 
foreign exchange for transfer outside lhe host country 
Source: Own figure based on MIGA (2002). 
With expropriation MIGA identifies the loss of the investment as a result of acts 
by the host government that may reduce or eliminate ownership of, control 
over, or rights to the insured investment. In addition to outright nationalization 
and confiscation, "creeping" expropriation, that is a series of acts that, over 
time, have an expropriatory effect, is also covered. MIGA insurance coverage 
is available on a limited basis for partial expropriation (e.g., confiscation of 
funds or tangible assets). Not covered are non-discriminatory measures by the 
host government in the exercise of legitimate regulatory authority.113 There are 
many historical examples for expropriations of foreign investors. The 
nationalization of the oil industry, the banking sector and the sulphur industry 
in Mexico.114 The nationalization of the International Petroleum Company and 
many other foreign firms between 1968 and 1975 by the Peruvian government 
or the wave of nationalizations under the presidency of Allende in Chile 
between 1970-1973. Another prominent example is the "Zairianization-
Program" enacted by president Mobutu expropriating more than 1500 foreign-
owned enterprises. 115 A more recent example is the expropriation of white 
farmers in Zimbabwe under Mugabe. 
Breach of Contract refers to losses arising from the host government's breach 
or repudiation of a contract with the investor. In the event of an alleged breach 
or repudiation, the investor must be able to invoke a dispute resolution 
mechanism (e.g., an arbitration) in the underlying contract and obtain an 
award for damages. If, after a specified period of time, the investor has not 
received payment or if the dispute resolution mechanism fails to function 
111 See Kennedy (1991 ). 
112 See Howell/Chaddick (1994). 
113 See MIGA (2002). 
114 For a more detailed review of expropriations in Mexico see paragraph 5.1 .2.2. 
115 See Kennedy (1991) and Markwick (2001) p.41. 
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because of actions taken by the host government, MIGA will pay 
compensation. 116 A historical example for a breach of contract is the case of 
Belco and Occidental, two oil corporations active in Peru. When Garcia was 
elected president in 1985 he forced the two companies to renegotiate their 
operating agreements on less favorable terms.117 
The risk of transfer restrictions refers to potential losses arising from an 
investor's inability to convert local currency (capital, interest, principal, profits, 
royalties and other remittances) into foreign exchange for transfer outside the 
host country. The coverage of MIGA insures against excessive delays in 
acquiring foreign exchange caused by host government action or failure to act, 
by adverse changes in exchange control laws or regulations, and by 
deterioration in conditions governing the conversion and transfer of local 
currency. Losses that are caused by currency devaluation are not covered. 
There are many historical examples for the imposition of transfer restrictions. 
During the 60s South Africa reacted with capital controls to the massive flight 
of capital following riots in major cities. In the aftermath of the peso 
devaluation during the debt crisis Mexico imposed foreign exchange 
controls.118 More recently China arbitrarily ended the allocation of forei~n 
exchange to a Chinese-American joint venture for political reasons in 1989.11 
Summing up, the aforementioned examples as well as the large private and 
public offer for the insurance of political risks highlight the importance of this 
topic for the structure of international capital flows. Furthermore this paragraph 
underlined the importance of political risk analysis in the investment decision 
process of MNEs. The next paragraph reviews existing economic models of 
political and country risk. 
2.2.5.3 Modeling Political Risks for International Investors 
2.2.5.3.1 Existing Models of Political Risks 
The anecdotal evidence from the previous paragraph illustrated how political 
risk may adversely affect international investors and borrowers. The economic 
modeling of such risks was given a lot of attention in reaction to the debt crisis 
at the beginning of the 80s. However, being the most important form of inter-
national capital flows at that time, most of the authors were concerned with 
debt flows. These models analyze problems that arise out of credit relations 
between developed and developing countries with a particular interest in the 
factors determining the default risk of countries. The main conclusion offered 
by these types of models is that the major problem of international lending is 
contract enforcement. As supranational institutions lack the power to ensure 
an efficient enforcement of international contracts, sanctions which are 
imposed on a country that defaults on its international debt are usually 
inefficient. To put it in other words, in international lending no mechanisms 
116 See MIGA (2002). 
117 See Kennedy (1991) p.44-61. 
118 See Simon (1982) p.67. 
119 See Howell/Chaddick (1994). 
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exist that would allow for a credible commitment to repayment as it is the case 
for national debt contracts. 120 Technically speaking host countries are 
confronted with a severe problem of time inconsistency, which means that the 
government has an incentive to ex post reverse its ex ante plans. 
Compared to the abundance of literature on the impact of country risk or 
political risk on international lending there are fewer models that are 
concerned with the influence of political risk on international investment flows. 
Earlier models of political risk are mainly concerned with the question of how 
political risks emerge in host countries. and do not explain how political risks 
influence FDI flows.121 Despite of the distinct characteristics of debt and in-
vestment, the problem of time inconsistency in the sovereign debt models can 
also be extended to investment problems being aware of one major difference. 
A debt contract usually contains a set of formal rules which are agreed on by 
the contracting parties implying that deviations from the agreements can easily 
be identified although contract enforcement remains difficult. In the case of FDI 
there is a great variety of possible host government interference with private 
assets which may not be explicitly covered in a contract. This fact makes the 
identification and sanctioning of deviations more difficult and renders the 
problem of time inconsistency more severe for FDI. 122 Despite of potential risks 
for foreign investors developing countries witnessed a growth of FDI inflows 
during the last decades. This, in turn, suggests that there must be at least 
indirect sanctioning mechanisms that prevent governments from the worst 
opportunistic behavior. 
To explain this EAT0N/GERS0VITZ present a model assuming that expropriated 
investors will never invest again in the former host countries. As a reaction to 
opportunistic behavior of the host country government they consequently 
exclude it from foreign capital flows in the future implying that after an 
opportunistic deviation the host country exclusively relies on the domestic 
capital stock. One finds a similar line of argument in the more recent 
contribution of COLE/ENGLISH. Both models stress a "reputation effect" that 
reduces the incentive of governments to act opportunistically. Deciding over 
opportunistic behavior, governments have to consider the trade-off between 
the one time gain and the discounted future losses of their actions. So 
weighting the cost and benefits of an expropriation can prevent them from 
expropriating if the future losses are large enough. 123 
Inherent to the argumentation of these two models is the fact that greater in-
dependence from other countries increases a government's incentive to act 
opportunistically because the autarchy cost of being excluded in the future is 
lower. The implicit assumption is that the cost of opportunistic behavior is de-
12° For a review of the older literature see Eaton/Gersovitz/Stiglitz (1986). 
121 See the overview in Oseghale (1993). This emergence of political risk is discussed in 
greater detail in paragraph 3.2. 
122 See Harms (2000). 
123 See Eaton/Gersovitz (1983) and Cole/English (1991 ). 
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creasing in the country's income and the size of the national capital stock. 
This, in turn, implies the awkward result that the risk of a country is growing in 
its level of development. Following this logic richer countries should turn out to 
be more riskier than poor countries which is clearly at odds with the existing 
empirical evidence that rather suggests the opposite. It follows that the cost of 
autarchy have to be influenced by more factors than just the national capital 
stock. Other sanctions that establish a positive correlation of income and cost 
of autarchy are reductions in the country's productivity, disruptions in its ability 
to trade or the seizure of assets or these assets' returns that a country holds 
abroad. 124 
KONRAD models the expropriation risk of foreign investors as the result of a 
competition between investors and several competing government groups 
which lack supreme power to fully reallocate property rights.125 In a recent 
paper JANEBA uses a model in which investments can be made simultaneously 
in more than one country which do not only differ in terms of production cost 
but also in the degree of commitment power. In this framework MNEs face a 
trade-off between investing in a low-cost and low-credibility country on the one 
hand and a high-cost but high credibility country on the other hand. If the low 
credibility country cannot give a credible commitment to the existing tax rate 
the existence of a high credibility country allows the firm to produce in both 
countries or to hold excess capacity for strategic reasons. Doing so the firm 
can minimize the risk that the firm becomes a victim of opportunistic behavior 
in the low credibility country. Therefore, holding plants in politically stable 
countries reduces the firm's dependence on a single government. The power 
to shift production quickly reduces the influence of political risk on the amount 
that is invested. As expected lacking commitment of host governments leads 
to welfare-losses. Yet they are not due to mere under-investment but caused 
by the fact that the MNE produces and invest in the less cost efficient 
location. 126 
2.2.5.3.2 Implications of General Investment Models 
The previous paragraph reviewed a set of models which focused on the 
special characteristics of FOi to explain the impact of political risks on the 
investment behavior of MNEs. The approach offered here focuses on the 
decision making process of the foreign investor. To do so the effects of un-
certainty on investment decisions that were analyzed in paragraph 2.1.3 have 
to be recalled . The presented models permit to derive the result that 
uncertainty reduces investment spending, when investment projects are 
irreversible. Although decisions about FDI differ from decisions about domestic 
projects, the characteristics of the investment decision process are similar 
because rational economic actors only invest if a considered project is advan-
tageous. 
124 See Harms (2000) p.95-100. 
125 See Konrad (2001 ). 
126 See Janeba (2001 ). 
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Hence, similar to the process of investing in their home countries foreign 
investors base their decisions on a calculus designed to assess the profitability 
of the project. Therefore, the results which have been derived for general 
investment problems are also valid for international investment decision. This, 
in turn, means that also foreign investors will react with a reduction of invest-
ment spending when uncertainty increases and investments are irreversible. 
Hence, it may be argued that a rise in host country uncertainty will affect FOi in 
the same way as it affects domestic investment decisions. In addition foreign 
investors face an informational disadvantage vis-a-vis their local competitors 
which means that the influence of rising uncertainty should have an even 
stronger influence on foreign investors than on their domestic counterparts. 
Accepting the fact that political uncertainties negatively affect local investors it 
is plausible to argue that their foreign counterparts are likewise or even more 
affected. Therefore, the policy implications derived from the DIXIT/PINDYCK 
model are essentially valid for international investment problems. 
Assume that a firm is planning to invest in a foreign country and that during the 
decision process it analyzes the aggregate risk of the project. Assume that crA 
is the aggregate risk of the investment project which corresponds to the 
parameter that reflected uncertainty of expected payoffs in the DIXIT/PINDYCK 
model where higher uncertainty was characterized by a higher variance of 
future returns. Paragraph 2.2.5.1 defined political risk as uncertainty about the 
future interference or non-interference of governments as well as abrupt 
changes or discontinuities in policy affecting the revenues from or the value of 
private assets. To analyze how this type of risk influences the overall risk of 
the project I assume the possibility that every component of a project's 
aggregate risk can be separately identified. The historical examples in the pre-
ceding paragraph showed that political risks often severely influence the return 
of investment projects and in many cases even imply a total loss of the in-
vested assets. Let crPR be the parameter measuring the influence of the level of 
political uncertainty in the host country on the planned project. Let the 
aggregate risk of a project crA be the sum of different independent partial risks 
cr1 - crn and a product of this sum with general political risk affecting each 
independent risk of the project. The independent partial risks are determined 
by the characteristics of the project and the current situation on the world 
market. Hence, the sum of this independent partial risk reflects the inherent 
risk of the project without any intervention of the government or other non-
economic events affecting its return. Political risk is an exogenous factor that 
may influence the profitability of the project independent from its inherent 
characteristics. The existence of political risk can imply that a project becomes 
disadvantageous that would be inherently profitable, if it was not affected by 
other exogenous risks. That is to say, if the project was realized in an 
environment that was perfectly stable its return would be positive. Exogenous 
political risk may arise in various forms. Expropriations, breach of contract, civil 
disturbances and other risk factors can imply a loss to the firm although the 
project in itself is profitable. For reasons of simplicity assume that crpR is the 
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only source of political risk that has an influence on the independent inherent 
risks of the project. Hence, crA can be written as: 
or 
n 
(2.27) a A = (L a;)a PR 
i= I 
where crpR is a multiplier that can theoretically take every value between O and 
OC) and captures the influence of aggregate political risk on the variance of a 
project's returns. It is straightforward to see from equation (2.27) that every 
change in the level of political risk immediately affects the aggregate risk of the 
project. If crPR exceeds unity aggregate political risk is increasing the variance 
of the project's returns which implies a higher level of aggregate project risk for 
the investor. A parameter value of unity in turn, would imply that the existing 
level of political risk is not significant for the return of the project and its risk is 
solely determined by its inherent characteristics. In this situation investors can 
focus on real commercial project risks rather than on policy risks created by 
potentially adverse government actions. A parameter value of crpR<1 is at first 
sight less intuitive because it means that aggregate risk of the project is 
decreased by the existing level of political risk. However, taking the example of 
a firm that is state-owned or at least backed by public guarantees and whose 
total debts in the case of default will be covered by the state it becomes 
imaginable that the individual risk is lowered by public intervention. In this case 
the institutional design of the host country reduces the de facto risk of the 
project. 
Assuming that crPR enters as a multiplier as shown (2.26) and (2.27) is 
restrictive because it means that every partial risk of the project is affected by 
a change in the political environment. Although historical evidence shows that 
this assumption is realistic for many risks of a project, this is hardly valid for all. 
For example project risks due to technical characteristics or natural processes 
are not affected by a change in the overall political environment of the host 
country. If the independent partial risks that are influenced by political risk are 
denoted with cr; and those that remain unaffected with cre, equation can be 
modified and becomes: 
(2.28) aA = fa, +(fa;)aPR 
e=I i··l 
It can easily be seen from (2.28) that the influence of a variation in crpR now 
has less impact on the aggregate risk crA. Although smaller, the impact of a 
variation in the level of political risk is, all other things equal, still evident. 
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The effect of political risk on investment decision is illustrated in figure 2.22 
that is analogue to the graphical solution of the OIxIr/PINDYCK-Model from 
paragraph 2.1.3.4. 
Figure 2.22: Effects of Political Risk in the DIXIT/PINDYCK-Model 
V 
Source: Own figure v·, V*2 
With crpR >1 the F(V) line shifts to the left implying that the value of the option 
to invest increases. Economically this means that higher variations of future 
earnings imply that for the firm the value of new information and thus the value 
of waiting increases. Being an opportunity cost of investing today the higher 
option value renders fewer projects advantageous because the critical value 
for the profitability of the project V* goes up. Hence, with a higher level of risk 
the tangency point between the F(V) line and the V-1 line moves to the right. 
With V*2 as the new critical value including political risk, investments that 
would be favorable if just economic risks were considered generate losses to 
the firm. As a consequence firms reduce investment spending which implies 
that with a significant level of political risk, that is a value of crpR > 1, all other 
things equal current FOi flows to host countries tend to decrease. It is obvious 
that the assumption that the aggregate risk of a given project can be precisely 
divided in sub-risks is not realistic. Nevertheless, this theoretical approach 
allows for a better understanding of how political risk affects profitability and 
private investment decisions. 
2.2.5.4 Empirical Evidence 
The previous paragraph presented a model studying the impact of political risk 
on the investment decision of MNEs. This paragraph reviews the existing 
empirical studies on the impact of political risk on FOi . There are various 
empirical methods that may be used to assess the importance of political risk 
in the investment decision process of MNEs. The most straightforward 
empirical approach is to ask decision makers in MNEs for their opinion about 
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the influence of political risk on their investment behavior. When surveyed 
about the importance of political risk managers usually rank moderate or low 
political risk among the most important criteria for an investment decision 
abroad. 
Table 2.4 summarizes existing empirical studies using interviews or surveys to 
investigate the importance of political risk for investment decisions of MNEs. 
Already the pioneering studies of BASI, AHARONI, and ROOT indicate that 
political risk is a decisive variable for the decision of MNEs to start productive 
activities abroad.127 
T bl 2 4 S a e : urvey-B ase dE mp1r1ca u ,es o I St d" o 11ca IS f P IT IR" k 
Author Method Semple Main Findings 
Basi (1963) Mail survey of international International Companies . A country's pol~ical risk 
executives 
and market potential are 
main determinants of 
FOi 
Aharoni (1966) In-depth interviews with 38 U.S. corporations that . Political risk is a decisive 
company officials were invested or planned to 
variable fOf FOi 
decisions 
invest in Israel 
Root (1968) Mail-Survey of company 106 officials from UK, France, . Political risk is an 
officials Mexico, Brazil and India. impOftant determinant of 
FOi 
B ass/McGregor,W aters Survey asking executives to 175 firms contacted out of . Host government 
(1977) rate 44 variables concerning which 102 responded 
policies and government 
instability are important 
their relative importance for determinants of FOi 
FOi decisions 
Rolfe et al. (1993) Survey of US companies 103 US companies with . Officials ranked the 
asking fOf preferred operations abroad 
absence of transfer 
restrictions and the 
investment incentives existence of guarantees 
against expropriation as 
more important than tax 
incentives 
OECO (1994) Survey of company officials of 291 company officials from an . Bureaucratic, legislative 
investors and potential international pool of firms issues and political 
volatility a-e mentioned 
investors about motives of as investment barriers 
investment and faced bariers 
Tu/Schive (1995) Mail survey of foreign 1000 international companies . Political Stability, social 
companies in Taiwan asking contacted out of which 121 order and governmental attitude towards FOi are 
for lhe relative importance of responded important factors for FOi 
18 factors for FOi decisions 
Hatem (1997) Combination of questionnaire 311 international firms . Political and social risk 
and interviews (mosdy US and European) are important determinants of FDI 
answering the questionnaire 
and 100 firms giving direct 
interviews 
Hatem (1998) Combination of questionnaire 311 international firms (US . Political and social risk 
and interviews and European) answering the are important 
determinants of FOi 
questionnaire and 100 firms 
giving direct interviews 
IAOB (2001) Survey asking for major At least 100 companies in . Policy instability is a 
obstacles to business each of 73 countries major obstacle to 
business ooer ations 
127 See Basi (1963), Aharoni (1966)and Root (1968). 
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Table 2.4: Continued 
Author Method Semple Main Findings 
MIGA (2002) Global FOi-Survey 191 transnational . 64 % of the surveyed 
corporations companies see a stable 
political and socia 
environment as a very 
influential determinant of 
FD! decisions, 36% see 
caruption and 33% 
crime and safety as very 
influential. . Between 40 and 60 % 
see war, security of 
staff, transfer restriction, 
breach of contract, 
ineffective enfacement 
of laws and 
expropriations as the 
oreatest risks fa FDI. 
Ng/Tuan (2002) Mail survey of faeign 124 faeign companies in . Stability and continuity 
investors China of governmental policy 
are impo,tant for the 
investment environment . The absence of capita 
transfer restrictions is 
important for the 
investment environment 
McKinsey&Company (2002) Global Survey of Investor W oridwide survey of 200 . 46% of investors think 
Opinion institutional investors that effective 
enforcement of property 
rights is very impor1ant 
fa investment decision . 32% think that efforts of 
the government to foght 
corruption are very 
important for investment 
decision 
Source: Own table 
Recent survey studies confirm these findings. ROLFE ET AL. asked U.S. 
companies for a ranking of their preferred investment incentives. Among 
twenty incentives the absence of transfer restrictions and the existence of 
guarantees against expropriation turned out to be more important than tax 
cuts.128 
OECD asked 291 company officials of potential investors and investors in 
transition countries about motives for and barriers to investment decisions. 
The main obstacles that were mentioned by manajers were bureaucratic and 
legislative issues as well as political volatility. 1 Tu/SCHIVE surveyed the 
opinions of managers of foreign companies in Taiwan. Among 18 other 
potentially influential factors for FOi political stability and social order were 
consistently ranked at the top. 130 The international survey of over 300 
questionnaires and 100 direct interviews with international companies by 
HATEM offers similar results. In particular, U.S. and Japanese companies 
ranked political and social risks as important determinants of their investment 
decision.131 In a recent report the IADB published a survey asking 100 
128 See Rolfe et al. (1993). 
129 See OECD (1994). 
130 See Tu/Schive (1995). 
131 See Hatem (1997) and Hatem (1998). 
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companies in each of the analyzed 73 countries for major obstacles to doing 
business. Policy instability ranked on the third place after problems of 
financing and taxes. When analyzing the Latin American sample the result was 
even clearer as in Venezuela, Ecuador and Brazil around 70% of the surveyed 
business people think that policy instability is a major obstacle to business. For 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru around 50% hold the same view.132 
Other empirical studies use historical data to explain the determinants of in-
coming FDI using econometric models. The empirical evidence of older 
econometric studies that vary largely in methodology, perspective and sample 
selection is mixed. Most of these econometric studies reject the hypothesis 
that political risk has a significant negative correlation with FDl. 133 More recent 
econometric studies are reviewed in table 2.5.134 
SCHNEIDER/FREY use a variable that measures past and present policies 
(GNP) and the investors' perception of the future policy of the country. The 
latter is proxied by the Institutional Investor Country Credit Rating (IICCR) 
which is published by the Institutional Investor Magazine. Both variables' 
coefficients were significant at the 99% level. Moreover, the study shows a 
negative correlation between the number of political strikes and riots in the 
host country on FDl. 135 
In a panel-regression of manufacturing investment of U.S. firms 
WHEELER/MODY find that political risk had no significant impact on investment. 
The index Risk they added as a proxy for political risk is based on criteria like 
"terrorism risk", the "probability of opposition takeover", the "distribution of 
wealth" and the "attitude towards private enterprise". However, other crucial 
criteria like expropriation risk are missing. 
HARMS argues that the insignificance of political risk maybe due to a sample 
selection bias as the sample consists of 22 high-income countries, 16 middle 
income countries and 4 low-income countries. This, in turn, implies that 
countries in which political risk is assumed to be of particular importance are 
clear1y underrepresented. 136 Furthermore the study focuses on the electronics 
industry which may be considered as "footloose" implying low irreversibility. 
This, in turn, reduces the influence of political risk variables as the 
comparatively low levels of sunk costs enable a quick withdrawal if risks are 
increasing. 
132 See IADB (2001) p.27-33. 
133 For an overview of older studies see UN (1992) p.50-52 and Oseghale (1993). 
134 It has to be underlined that many of these studies do not explicitly focus on the analysis of 
political risk but just include risk indicators as control variables. 
135 See Schneider/Frey (1985). 
136 See Wheeler/Mody (1992) and the comment of Harms (2000) p.65. 
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T bl 2 5 E a e conometr1c E mpmca tu 1eso IS d" t P r · o 1tica IR" k IS 
Author Method Sample Main Findings 
GrNn/Cunnlngham (1972) Cross sectional analysis 25countries . Political lnstabilrty does 
not affect FOi 
Schnelder/Frey (1915) Cross sectional analysis 54 developing countries . Investors' perception of 
future policy at the 
counlry proxied by the 
Institutional Investor 
Country Credit Rating 
{IICCR) was significant 
at the 99% level. . Negative correlation 
between the number at 
political slrikes and riots 
in the host counlry and 
FOi 
BIiiet (1991) Cross sectional analysis of 108 developing counlries . Political Instability does 
various years for the period affect incoming FOi . Political Repression 
1975-1986 does not have a positive 
imDact on FOi 
WhHler/Mody (1992) Panel Analysis 41 countries . Political risk has litUe 
effect on FOi . Geopolitical risk is a 
significant determinant 
at FOi 
Oseghale (1993) Latin American countries . adverse changes in host 
government policy have 
a significant negative 
correlation with FOi . political instability and 
conflicts with other 
states had significantly 
negative effects in many 
sub-samples but did not 
turn out to be robust in 
all tested model settlnas 
Woodward/Rolfe (1993) Panel Analysis 187 foreign investment . An Indicator of political 
projects in the Caribean 
stability was significant 
at the 10% level. 
Jun/Singh (1996) Panel Analysis 31 countries . Both tested indices at 
political risk have a 
significant influence on 
FOi as a share of GOP . Average number of work 
days that ,we lost due to 
strikes or other events 
a,e signifoeant for 
countries with low levels 
of incomina FOi 
Harms (2000) 55 developing countries . A significant effect of 
political risk on foreign 
investment . Splitting the sample into 
a low income and a high 
income group the 
coefficient is higher but 
less significant than in 
the middle-income sub 
samcle 
Dnbek/P•yne (2001) Panel Analysis 52countries . Higher government 
lransparency positively 
affects FOi flows 
Hausmann/Arin (2001) Panel Analysis Latin America, countries . Country Risk has a 
strong and significant 
impact on incoming 
capital flows . Institutional quality has a 
strong positive and 
sianifoeant imoact on FOi 
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Table 2.5: Continued 
Author Method Sample Main Findings 
Harm/Ursprung (2002) Panel Analysis 62 developing and emerging . High levels of individual 
market countries 
freedom attract FOi. . Sum of three sub indices 
of the International 
Country Risk Guide 
measuring corruption in 
government, the quality 
of the bureaucra:y and 
a country's law and 
order is a significant 
determinant of FOi 
Sun/Tong/Yun (2002) Panel Analysis 30 Chinese provinces . The risk ranking ol 
Political Risk Services 
Group used as a proxy 
fo, political risk is 
significant on the 1 % 
level 
Steln/Oaude (2002) Panel Analysis 63countries . Institutional quality of 
nations has a strong 
positive and significant 
impa:t on FOi . Lack of government 
commitment deters FOi 
Josi/Nunnenkamp (2002) Panel Analysis Host countries for German . Country Risk has a 
FOi 
significant impact on 
capital flows fro,n 
Germanv 
Source: Own Table 
OSEGHALE analyzes the influence of political risk on investment with time 
series examining U.S. FDI in Latin American Countries. A variable measuring 
adverse changes in host government policy has a significant negative 
correlation with FDI to host countries. Variables measuring political instability 
and conflicts with other states had significantly negative effects in many sub-
samples but did not turn out to be robust in all tested model settings. 137 
WOODWARD/ROLFE analyzed 187 foreign investment projects in the Caribbean 
Basin for the period from 1984-1987. They find an indicator of political stability 
to be significant at the 10% level. 138 JUN/SINGH test potential determinants of 
FOi divided by GDP using a panel of 31 countries for the period from 1970 to 
1993. As a proxy for political risk they include the Political Risk Index (PRI) 
and the Operation Risk Index (ORI) of Business Environment Risk Intelligence 
(BERi). The PRl-index assesses the likelihood of political instability whereas 
the ORI-Index measures the general business environment. A panel of 105 
experts evaluate a wide range of factors as the "enforceability of contracts", 
"nationalization" and the "attitude towards foreign investors and profits". 
JUN/SINGH find that both indexes have a significant influence. Furthermore, 
they find that the average number of work days that are lost due to strikes or 
other events are significant for FDI to countries with low levels of incoming 
FDl.139 
BISWAS uses sub-indices published in the International Country Risk Guide of 
the Political Risk Services Group (PRS Group). The indices reflect the risk of 
137 See Oseghale (1993). 
138 See Woodward/Rolfe (1993). 
139 See Jun/Singh (1996). 
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contract repudiation by host country governments, the risk of expropriation, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, the degree of corruption and the rule of law. The 
study uses a panel of 44 countries for the period from 1983 to 1990 and finds 
a significant influence of the risk indices on U.S. FOi divided by GNP.140 In a 
recent econometric study on FOi to China SUNfrONG/YU find strong evidence 
that political risk is a significant determinant of investment. Using a panel of 30 
Chinese provinces for the period 1986-1998 and introducing the risk ranking of 
PRS Group as a proxy for political risk they find the coefficient to be significant 
on the 1 % level. This result turns out to be robust for several model settings 
and sub-periods. 141 
HARMS uses a panel of 55 developing countries for the period from 1987 to 
1995 to test for the influence of political risk on foreign investment measured 
as the sum of FOi and portfolio equity investment in per capita terms. 
Controlling for the quality of infrastructure, macroeconomic distortions, 
openness and the evolution of international interest rates he finds a significant 
effect of political risk on investment. Splitting the sample into a low income and 
a high income group he finds that the coefficient is higher but less significant in 
the middle-income sub-sample.142 In a later paper HARMS/URSPRUNG tested 
the hypothesis that international investment is attracted by political regimes 
that deny their citizens political rights making it easier to suppress wages. In a 
panel analysis of 62 developing and emerging market countries for the period 
from 1989 to 1997 they find the opposite. Proxying citizens'political rights with 
the Freedom House Index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties they find that a 
high level of individual freedom attracts FOi. In the same analysis they also 
included a variable that is the sum of three subindices of the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measuring corruption in government, the quality of 
the bureaucracy and a country's law and order tradition which turned out to be 
significant determinants of FOi. 143 
This review of existing empirical studies shows that there is strong evidence 
for a decisive influence of political risk examining manager surveys while the 
results of econometric studies are less striking. These divergent empirical 
results indicate that the failure of many econometric studies to show a 
significant impact of political risk on FOi rather stem from methodological 
deficiencies than from the absence of a significant correlation between the two 
variables. There are many theoretical and methodological objections to 
existing econometric studies. 144 One important theoretical objection is the 
choice of the variables that proxy political risks. Although the reviewed studies 
vary considerably in their choice of dependent variables, most of them identify 
140 Harms (2000) delivers an overview of the study. 
141 See Sun/Tong/Yu (2002). 
142 See Harms (2000). 
143 See Hanns/Ursprung (2002). Billet (1991) offers a discussion about the the influence of 
civil rights repression on FOi flows. In an empirical analysis he finds that in relatively 
richer developing countries like Latin American countries political repression does not 
create a better business climate. See Billet (1991) p.29-53. 
144 See Oseghale (1993). 
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political risk with some measure of political stability and social turmoil while 
other important components of political risk as for example the risk of expro-
priation are systematically not considered. Another theoretical drawback of 
these indicators of political risk is their exclusively backward-looking nature 
based on the implicit assumption that risk evaluations are mainly influenced by 
past policy events. However, if investors are rational, they should rather be 
concerned about the probability that policies may change unfavorable in the 
future. As a result most of these indicators should be weak predictors of the 
future investment climate.145 Another reason for the deficiencies of existing 
econometric studies is the influence of other variables and a low quality of 
data. 
Moreover, even if a significant influence of aggregate political risk indicators is 
detected, the sources of risk are not transparent and not further explored. 
Given these unsatisfying results, it is impossible to derive policy implications 
for developing countries seeking to attract more FDI. Applying different 
methodologies of political risk analysis simultaneously permits a better under-
standing of the sources of political risks and allows to formulate strategies for 
the mitigation of risk. Therefore, the author considers it useful to combine 
econometric analysis with an in depth analysis of a country case study. 146 
Furthermore, the econometric methodology is modified to better suit the 
characteristics of empirical FDI models which permits to obtain more 
conclusive results on the impact of political risks on FDI. 
2.3 Concluding Remarks 
This paragraph postulates some primary hypotheses that may be drawn from 
Chapter 2 that are to be examined in greater detail in the following chapters. 
Investment models under uncertainty permit the theoretical conclusion that un-
certainty reduces investment spending when investment projects are 
irreversible. Furthermore theoretical analysis and the review of the existing 
empirical evidence suggest that political risk is an influential variable for the 
investment decision process of MNEs. Given the fierce competition for FDI 
among developing nations, high national levels of political risk become a major 
obstacle for incoming FDI. Developing countries often lack an institutional 
structure that permits the creation of a stable and reliable business environ-
ment. Expropriation risks, corruption, populist policies, regulatory and judicial 
inefficiency as well as social unrest are all examples for factors causing 
investor uncertainty turning into obstacles for FDI. 
Together these results indicate that shifting the focus of investment promotion 
policy of developing countries could imply welfare gains because investment 
incentives may be the wrong policy to attract FDI, as the sources of risks are 
not removed. Rather than granting special conditions and thus stimulating 
profits for investors a credible and transparent economic policy seems to be 
145 See Harms (1999) p.64. and Henisz/Zelner (1999). For a detailed discussion of political 
risk indicators see paragraph 3.3. 
146 See the empirical research in Chapter 4 and 5. 
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more efficient to enhance FOi. A policy reducing investor uncertainty may help 
to attract investment more efficiently and less costly than tax exceptions or 
other incentives. This is in particular the case for high risk countries with low 
levels of political credibility that do not receive FOi due to high investor uncer-
tainty. For these countries attracting FOi is costly as investors will not invest 
unless they are adequately compensated for the high risk. Even if developing 
countries continue granting incentives, lower levels of political risk would re-
quire lower payments for risk compensation resulting in lower "cost of capital" 
of external financing. Additionally, a national risk reduction strategy would 
imply a "double dividend" as domestic investment is likewise positively 
influenced by risk mitigating reforms. 
In turn, policies increasing investor uncertainty should always be avoided, 
given their depressing impact on FOi. This becomes of particular importance 
when FOi flows show signs of hysteresis meaning that even if risks are 
objectively absent, past policies still influence the present investment behavior 
and path dependency implies that errors of the past still have an influence in 
the future. The additional fact that reputation plays an important role for the 
attraction of international investment makes hostile policies towards FOi an 
even more severe problem. Hence, reducing perceived investor uncertainty is 
a key element of an efficient investment promotion policy. To reduce 
uncertainty economic policy must be transparent and predictable which means 
that policy makers have to avoid policy surprises which undermine their 
credibility and imply future investor uncertainty. Instead, in order to implement 
a long term strategy for the promotion of foreign investment credible commit-
ments not to opportunistically interfere in private property rights have to be 
made. 
The theoretical investment models captured uncertainty with an exogenous 
parameter er the determinants of which were not further analyzed. As the 
preceding paragraphs indicate political risk may have diverse reasons. War-
fare or expropriations could imply a complete loss of assets while other risk 
factors only slowly dilute property rights. The diversity of political risk factors 
requires a more detailed analysis of the origins of political risk that isolates the 
characteristics of a host country which lead to the emergence of political risk. 
Furthermore, it has to be investigated how these risks can be adequately 
measured and which societal institutions are important for the mitigation of 
risks. Therefore, Chapter 3 provides a detailed analysis of the determinants of 
political risk and their measurement. 
It has already been pointed out that there are various sources of political risk 
that may affect foreign investors. Besides incentives, there is a great variety of 
measures which may be used for the mitigation of political risks which means 
reducing the probability of "bad surprises" for investors. To do so governments 
have to give credible commitment not to interfere in the activities of private 
investors. Even if the current institutional environment of the host country does 
not favor investment, it does not per se imply a risk. Surprises only occur, if the 
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existing institutional structure of the economy changes without any possibility 
for the investor to anticipate these changes. Hence, it is not only the current 
institutional structure which causes a risks for the investor but also the 
feasibility of drastic policy swings in the future. It is straightforward to see that 
constantly changing policy restricts the capability of economic actors to plan 
future investments in a reasonable way. Consequently, continuity of economic 
policy and transparent and foreseeable policy instruments should be the 
guidelines of a risk-mitigating economic policy. Also tying the hands of the 
government by strict rules that limit the possibilities of intervention may be a 
good method to reduce uncertainty for investors. Essentially, there are two 
ways to approach this problem. First, one may establish measures which try to 
reduce the perceived degree of risk through domestic reforms. One measure 
may be to establish more veto rights in the political process resulting in a 
decline of discretionary freedom for politicians. 147 Thus, tying the hands of 
policy makers by binding them either by precise written laws or controlling 
institutions results in a higher degree of certainty for economic agents. 
However, changing the institutional setting of an economy is a lengthy, costly 
and difficult process. Furthermore, the introduction of vetoes in the political 
process on the one hand results in higher stability and investor credibility but 
on the other hand produces possible delays in decision making. Second, to 
avoid these problems host countries may reduce political risk by external 
commitments like the signing of international agreements or the membership 
in international organizations. In doing so governments externally tie their 
hands with the aim to reduce risks for private investors. These different 
strategies of risk mitigation are further analyzed in Chapter 3. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
Paragraph 2.1 started with a definition of investment and a description of the 
different categories of investment. Thereafter, it reviewed the basic logic of in-
vestment theory and the most common models used in the literature. It 
criticizes the orthodox models for neglecting waiting options and irreversible 
investments. Introducing these two features into investment models permits 
deriving the result that uncertainty has an depressing effect on investment 
spending when investment are irreversible. Higher uncertainty implies further 
falling investment spending. Furthermore, the depressing effect is growing in 
the degree of irreversibility. The DIXIT/PINDYCK model used the analogy to 
option pricing as a microeconomic explanation for the depressing effect of 
higher uncertainty. 
Paragraph 2.2 provided a definition of FDI and a review of common theories to 
explain MNE activity. Furthermore, it offers an overview of the empirical 
literature studying the determinants of incoming FOi. It defines political risk 
and shows that it negatively affects the investment spending of international 
investors. Moreover, a review of the existing empirical evidence highlighted the 
importance of political risk for FDI. 
147 This approach will be further discussed in paragraph 3.1 .2.5. 
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Paragraph 2.3 briefly summarized some possible policy implications of the 
theoretical models and the empirical evidence and offered some concluding 
remarks. Furthermore, it provides a short outline of the topics that will be 
analyzed in Chapter 3. 
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3. Political Risk and National Institutions 
"Men are powerless to secure the future; 
institutions alone fix the destinies of nations." 
Napoleon I, Imperial seance (1815) 
3.1 Political Institutions and Economic Performance 
3.1.1 Overview 
This chapter deals with explaining how political risks emerge and offers a 
theoretical foundation for the analysis of the impact of social and political 
variables on private investment decisions. This basic theoretical framework 
permits avoiding the ad hoc hypotheses about the economic impact of socio-
economic variables that are a common deficiency of many empirical analyses. 
Moreover, it is discussed how political risk may be adequately quantified and 
measured. Eventually, the chapter analyzes how host countries may efficiently 
mitigate political risk by discussing potential remedies against political risk and 
their political feasibility of implementation. 
3.1.2 The Analytical Framework 
3.1.2.1 Theoretical Foundations 
The conviction that government and politics influence the economic 
performance of national economies is not new. In medieval Europe the rise of 
successful independent cities or city states, in particular in the north of Italy, 
demonstrated the importance of good government for economic welfare and 
prosperity .1 A pair of frescoes in the Italian city of Sienna painted around 1340 
by Ambrogio Lorenzetti captures this knowledge in an impressive allegory of 
bad and good government where good government is illustrated by wisdom, 
peace, justice and prosperity while bad government is identified with cruelty, 
treason, war and poverty. In spite of this common knowledge orthodox 
economics for a long time ignored processes inherent to the political system of 
countries as determinants of economic outcomes. Instead, state and govern-
ment were treated as monolithic entities that were assumed to be benevolent 
and seeking to enact policies maximizing the welfare of society. 
Economists of the Public-Choice-School first gave up this assumptions and 
based their writings on the central hypothesis that self-interested governments 
are maximizing their own utility functions instead of social welfare.2 While the 
Public-Choice school analyzes economic behavior within a given set of rules, 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Constitutional Economics go one step 
beyond by analyzing the optimality and choice of rules as well as their impact 
on economic behavior.3 NIE stresses the important role of institutions for the 
process of economic development and growth. Empirical evidence indicating 
that institutions are an important determinant of economic development is by 
now abundant. 4 The crucial role played by sociopolitical factors in determining 
1 One example is the Republic of Venice that became an important center of commerce. See 
Tullock (2002a) p.252-253. 
2 Tullock (2002b) gives an oveNiew of the Public Choice Theory. 
3 Erlei/Leschke/Sauerland (1999) or Richter/Furubotn (1999) provide an oveNiew of NIE. 
• See World Bank (1997). For an oveNiew of the large empirical literature see Worldbank 
(1998), Worldbank (2003) or IADB (2000). 
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the costs of bargaining, contracting, monitoring and enforcing has by now 
achieved the status of conventional wisdom not only in economic history but 
also in development theory. 
NORTH argues that understanding the long run potential of countries for 
economic development requires a precise analysis of their institutional setting. 
Institutions can be defined as humanly devised constraints that structure 
political , economic and social interactions. They may consist of both informal 
constraints (taboos, customs etc.) and formal rules (constitutions, laws etc.). 
Organizations, in turn, are collective actors, usually with their own institutions 
of governance, that make choices subject to these institutional constraints. 5 
Analyzing the history of Europe NORTH/THOMAS show that institutions deeply 
influence the capacity of nations to generate economic growth and welfare. 
Economic history provides many examples of countries which were failing to 
produce adequate institutions that could ensure sustained economic growth 
and prosperity.6 
Figure 3.1 classifies societal institutions concerning their feasibility of change 
and their degree of formality . In addition important societal organizations are 
identified whose interactions with formal and informal rules shape the 
institutional environment of countries. 
Figure 3.1: Social Norms, Rules and Organizations Coordinating Human 
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The political system of a country can be defined as a set of institutions that 
guides the government's current functioning and future evolution, and provides 
the society's governance structure. Therefore, the political system is the 
primary source of formal , legally sanctioned regulations and institutional 
5 See North (1990) and North (1991 ). 
6 See NorthfThomas (1973). 
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change.7 Considering the political system as an important part of the national 
institutional setting, it deeply influences the development perspectives of 
countries by defining the basic framework for the actions of private economic 
actors. As NORTH puts it 
" ... a theory of institutions also inevitably involves an analysis of the political structure of a society and 
the degree to which that political structure provides a framework of effective enforcement." 8 
COASE argues that all exchange implies transaction costs for the negotiation, 
control, and enforcement of contracts. 9 In developed market economies 
economic exchange usually takes place in an impersonal framework. Faced 
with high transaction costs individuals limit their exchange which, all other 
things equal, results in lower societal welfare. An important fraction of total 
transaction costs are the costs of contract enforcement. To enable wealth 
enhancing exchange, parties to an exchange must be able to enforce 
contracts at a cost that keeps the action worthwhile for them. While simple 
spot market transactions are usually self enforceable, complex contractual 
agreements require efficient third party enforcement. Third party enforcement 
involves a neutral party with the ability to measure the attributes of a contract 
and to enforce agreements such that the offending party has to compensate 
the injured party to a degree that makes it costly to violate the contract. 10 The 
risk of long term contracts for example where contractees may be confronted 
with opportunistic behavior of the other party may be efficiently mitigated if a 
neutral institution for dispute settlement exists.11 Hence, institutions of 
enforcement evolve out of the necessity to reduce transactional cost of private 
economic activity. In spite of private contract enforcing institutions that 
developed historically, state-controlled bodies are usually the cornerstone of 
an enforcement system. 12 Effective public third party enforcement of private 
contracts considerably decreases transaction costs. The institutional environ-
ment of a country being the sum of the national humanly devised constraints 
essentially operates as a tool to facilitate trust and confidence so that high 
transaction costs may be overcome. National institutions become a major 
determinant of national economic activity because they shape the incentives of 
individuals and enable more complex contracting. NORTH draws the conclusion 
that 
7 See Haber et al. (1999). 
8 North (1986) p. 231 . 
9 See Coase (1937). 
10 See North (1990) p.54-60. 
11 The idea that societies need an agent with coercive power to permit efficient societal 
outcomes goes back to the writings of Hobbes. See Hobbes (1966). 
12 An example for a private enforcement is the medieval institution of the "podesta". The 
podesta was an outside executive administrator with limited military command that was 
hired by communes and city-states in the 12th and 13th century to settle local disputes and 
to serve as an intermediary between communes and the emperor. See Nye (1997) p.130. 
Another example is the "lex mercatoria", a sophisticated privately enforced commercial 
code that was created in the early Middle Ages by European merchants and partly remains 
in effect. See World Bank (1997) p.45. 
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"the New Institutional Economics must not be only a theory of property rights and their evolution but a 
theory of the political process, a theory of the state, and of the way in which the institutional structure 
of the state and its individuals specify and enforce property rights." 13 
It follows that the political system is a decisive part of the institutional structure 
of a society or in other words, an important subset of the national institutional 
framework which has an important impact on its economic development 
prospects and the activities of private economic actors. 14 Political risks for 
investors arise when the institutional structure of the potential host country is 
inadequate since the institutional setting of a society with its formal and 
informal rules forms a framework for private investment decisions. Without 
well-developed contracts and no way of enforcing agreements between 
different societal groups, it is unlikely that specialization will emerge in forms 
that are conducive to production and economic development. Confronted with 
an inadequate institutional framework the incentives of private actors to invest 
are low and capital accumulation will be negatively affected. Investment in 
turn, is one of the key determinants of economic growth and welfare. If for 
example property rights are not properly assigned and protected, private in-
vestment incentives are lower which results, all other things equal, in lower 
growth. Therefore, political risks analysis essentially is an analysis of the 
institutional environment for private investment. In consequence a country's 
investment climate can be defined as the policy, institutional and behavioral 
environment, both present and expected, that affects the returns and risks 
associated with investment. 15 
The fundamental policy question is what forms of political and regulatory 
systems are required to ensure that a private market economy works efficiently 
and private investment is fostered. A normative approach to the analysis of the 
investment climate requires to determine the ideal institutional environment 
which maximizes private investment incentives. As this is hardly possible, only 
main prerequisites for high investment incentives and political actions which 
deter private investment may be identified in order to properly analyze political 
hazards for investors. This, in turn, requires a basic theoretical framework that 
helps understanding how institutions develop over time. It was argued before 
that the necessity of third party enforcement implies a central role for the state. 
This is of particular importance in two dimensions. First, as already pointed 
out, enforcing institutions have to provide a reliable framework for exchange 
between individuals reducing their transaction costs. National institutions here 
play the role of a catalyst for private economic activity stimulating national 
growth. The importance of the second dimension stems from the fact that the 
enforcing entity has a proper utility function. Put simply, if a state has coercive 
power, it may use it to serve his own interest at the expense of the rest of 
society. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an institutional setting which 
13 North (1986) p. 233. 
14 The constitutional economics literature is too large to cite here. Richter/Furubotn (1999) or 
Erlei/Leschke/Sauertand (1999) provide an overview. 
15 See Newfarmer (2002) p.258. 
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restricts the power of the enforcing institutions to limit the possibility of 
predatory activity. As MADISON put it: 
"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to 
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government 
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige if to control itself "16 
A state that opportunistically interferes in private economic activity eventually 
distorts individual incentives. Limiting possibilities for the abuse of state power 
is a challenge for every country since governments which are unrestricted and 
uncontrolled are likely to engage in predatory behavior. Economic history 
shows how limited power of sovereigns led to favorable economic outcomes 
compared to the distortionary effects of unlimited governmental discretion. 17 
Figure 3.2 summarizes the aforementioned arguments and shows how 
national institutions influence the incentive structure for private investment and 
eventually economic outcomes. 
Figure 3.2: Political System, Institutions and Incentives for Private 
Investment 
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To explain how national institutions evolve over time one may use the 
theoretical approach of NORTH that explains the change of societal institutions 
with the interaction of institutions with national organizations. Its point of 
16 James Madison, Federalist No.51 (1788) cited in Henisz (2002a) p.17. Earlier claims for an 
effective control of government can be found in the work of Locke and Montesquieu. See 
Schmidt (2000) p.66-90. 
17 Levi (1988) argues that rulers maximize state revenue subject to the constraints of their 
bargaining power, their transaction costs, and their discount rates. She provides empirical 
evidence for this hypothesis in several case studies. Nye (1997) uses the tenn "parasitic 
rule" to name opportunistic governmental behavior. See Nye (1997) p.128-136. 
North/Thomas show how the parliament-controlled monarchy England economically 
outperformed other European countries with unlimited sovereigns. See North/Thomas 
(1973). 
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departure is the conviction that institutions and the standard constraints used 
in economic analysis determine opportunities in societies. Organizations are 
created to take advantage of these opportunities and alter institutions as they 
evolve. Institutional change is induced by changing perceptions of the 
members of these organizations realizing that they could do better by altering 
the existing institutional framework. If political markets were perfect, changes 
in the overall set of constraints, as for example changes in relative prices, 
should impl¥i an alteration of the institutional environment to fit the new re-
quirements. 8 
Real world institutional settings however, may remain inefficient for three 
reasons. First, informational constraints imply that actors may make sub-
optimal decisions that lead to the persistence of overcome structures. With 
regard to the complexity of reality mental models are necessarily reduced, 
have a limited processing capacity and only change slowly while ideologies 
may lead to a perpetuation of inefficient structures because they are perceived 
as being just or fair. Second, the symbiotic relationship between institutions 
and organizations implies that inefficient national institutions may persist 
because national organizations have an interest in keeping the status quo. If 
the institutional framework disfavors productive activity, it will in the long run 
strangle economic growth. Organizations that evolve in such a framework will 
become more efficient, but only in rendering the society even less conducive 
to productive activities. In the absence of functioning political markets such an 
unfavorable path of development may persist over time.19 Third , since the 
creation of new institutions implies high fixed costs economies of scale favor 
established institutions. Moreover, individual behavior is adapted to the 
framework of established institutions which increases the pressure for the 
persistence of existing institutional arrangements. As institutions are only 
slowly changing over time the past of societies matters for the present. 
Therefore, the historical development of societies is path dependent which 
means that having chosen a particular path in the past influences development 
perspective in the future. Path dependency, in turn, entails the danger that 
societies can get locked into existing institutions which avoids the generation 
of new, more efficient national institutions.20 The theory of institutional change 
highlights that the analysis of national institutions requires a dynamic 
perspective. Countries with unfavorable institutions for private investment can 
end up in a vicious circle of low investment and a further deteriorating 
institutional environment. On the other hand, countries can break out of this 
vicious circle by creating more favorable institutions that stimulate private in-
vestment incentives and over time permit a further amelioration of the 
institutional environment. 
Based on this basic theoretical framework the next paragraphs further 
describe four important dimensions of societal institutional that are of particular 
18 This point is made by North!Thomas (1973). 
19 See North (1990). 
20 See North (1990). 
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importance for private investment decisions: First, the assignment and 
protection of individual property rights as a framework for individual interaction. 
Second, the establishment of a society where the rule of law prevails. Third , 
the capability of the sovereign institution to give a credible commitment to 
enable private exchange and to avoid opportunistic governmental behavior. 
Fourth, the capability of individuals in a society to facilitate exchange by trust 
or other forms of social capital that avoid conflict and diminish transaction 
cost.21 
3.1.2.2 Property Rights 
The previous paragraph describes how institutions form a general framework 
for all economic activity, how they evolve over time and what determines the 
process of change. It closes with the result that this framework forms the 
incentives for private actors in national economies and thus influences 
economic performance. It is evident that private ownership is one of the 
constitutive pillars of market economies. Private ownership however, may only 
be ensured if property rights are clearly assigned to the members of society 
and can be protected against arbitrary intervention of other individuals or the 
state. Property rights are a bundle of rights over the use and the income to be 
derived from property and the ability to alienate an asset or a resource. 22 Since 
well defined property rights entitle actors to use an economic good according 
to their interests and give the right to invest resources and to produce new 
products with physical and human capital, property rights are one decisive 
driver of investment and economic growth. 
Without well defined property rights, individuals cannot fully reap the benefits 
from their investments. Poorly defined property rights or the risk of future 
dilutions imply poor incentives for engaging in private productive activity and 
thus eventually lead to lower investment rates. The greater the perceived risk 
of losing existing property rights, the less likely the holder of these rights will 
be to forego current consumption to accumulate property, thus slowing in-
vestment that contributes to growth.23 As a consequence aggregate societal 
welfare is lower compared to a situation when property rights are well defined. 
The property rights structure of a society constitutes a basic set of economic 
21 It is important to note that a partial analysis of these different institutional subsets is 
necessary to reduce complexity. However, in reality these institutional subsets are 
interdependent which implies that ignoring these interdependencies means loosing 
explanatory power. 
22 As Alchian/Demsetz put it: "It is not the resource that is owned; it is a bundle, or a portion, 
of rights to use a resource that is owned." See Alchian/Demsetz (1973) p.17. 
23 See Weimer (1997) p.2-10. Already Adam Smith recognized the importance of property 
rights for economic efficiency. He writes: " ... in all countries where there is tolerable security 
[of property], every man of common understanding will endeavor to employ whatever 
[capital] stock he can command .... A man must be perfectly crazy who, where there is 
tolerable security [of property], does not employ all the [capital] stock which he 
commands . ... In those unfortunate countries .. . where men are continually afraid of the 
violence of their superiors, they frequently bury and conceal a great part of their [capital] 
stock .. . in case of their being threatened with any of those disasters to which they 
consider themselves as at all times exposed." Smith (1976) p.301. 
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rules that shapes private incentives to invest and considerably influences the 
welfare of societies since it is a method of assigning to particular individuals 
the authority to select, for specific goods, any use from an unprohibited class 
of uses. 24 As an efficient assignment of property rights is a costly process, 
DEMSETZ argues that property rights only develop when gains from a better 
specification are larger than the costs. Therefore, individuals in society will 
promote a better specification of property rights up to the point where the 
marginal cost of the process equals its marginal benefits. That is, property 
rights emerge in a way that maximizes total surplus in society.25 
However, an efficient assignment of property rights alone does not enable well 
functioning transactions between private actors. Property rights must also be 
enforceable to unfold their positive societal implications. To put it in other 
words, instead of being merely de-jure, there has to be a de-facto protection of 
private property rights. Societies have to establish a sanctioning mechanism 
that punishes the violation of private property rights by other members of the 
society, that is, it has to prevent individuals from interfering with the property of 
other individuals. At the same time the effective protection of property rights is 
of particular importance for the relationship of private actors with the enforcing 
institution. The fundamental task of property rights protection is not only to 
prevent property rights violations caused by other private individuals in society 
but also those that originate in public predatory activity. Summing up, not only 
the task of assigning property rights is central to economic development but 
also the enforcement of those rights. 
3.1.2.3 The Concept of Credible Commitment 
The term credible commitment is widely used in the economic literature.26 A 
commitment can be defined as a promise, pledge, vow, convenant, guarantee, 
or bond to perform in a specified fashion. A commitment can be credible in 
either of two senses, the motivational and the imperative, respectively. A 
commitment is credible in the motivational sense if at the time of performance 
the committing party continues to want to honor that commitment. It is 
motivationally credible because it is incentive-compatible and hence self-
enforcing. In turn, a commitment is credible in the imperative sense if the 
committing party is unable to act otherwise, whether the acting entity wants to 
act otherwise or not. In this sense the commitment is credible, not because it is 
compatible with contemporaneous preferences but rather because 
performance is coerced or discretion to do otherwise is disabled.27 
Here credible commitment refers to the ability of governments to give a 
credible guarantee that private contracts are enforced and that opportunistic 
government interference in economic activities of individuals is avoided. First, 
24 See Eggertsson (1990) p.33. 
25 See Demsetz (1967) who shows with the example of North American fur hunters that 
better defined property rights evolved when the payoffs of a better specification were 
growing with a higher demand for furs. 
26 See North (1993), Olson(1993) and McGuire/Olson (1996). 
27 See Shepsle (1991 ). 
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a credible commitment of the state guarantees the existence of a credible and 
enforceable institutional framework that governs private economic interaction. 
NORTH stresses that credible commitment is a prerequisite for economic 
development because it allows for transacting in capital and other markets at 
low cost.28 Political philosophers have long understood that external 
constraints on individual actions are credibility enhancing. HOBBES points out 
that man is the most savage of animals, and that a state of nature is a 
condition of a war of every man against every man. Therefore, in the absence 
of a state that establishes order the life of man becomes "solitary, poore, 
nasty, brutish and short."29 Furthermore, HOBBES argues that private contracts 
can only be efficiently enforced by a third party holding coercive power.30 
Assuming that self interested private actors will only engage in economic 
activity if they are sure that they will reap benefits from their engagement, it is 
necessary that agreements between individuals can be enforced. Since 
contracts between individuals are often incomplete and parties to the contract 
do not possess the power to enforce them, economic actors have to be 
protected against contractual hazards and opportunistic behavior of 
contracting counterparts by adequate institutional arrangements. National 
institutions have to provide for measures of settlement if conflicts arise which 
are not covered in the contract. Thus, an important part of the analysis of 
national institutions is the assessment of their ability to provide a credible 
framework for private economic activity.31 
The second dimension of credible commitment stems from the fact that a 
government with coercive power to enforce an institutional framework for 
private economic transactions may itself expropriate rents from those 
transactions.32 To put it in other words, creating an enforcing entity that 
provides credibility to private interaction poses the problem that it may misuse 
its power to serve its own interest. The danger of self interested governmental 
behavior may be well illustrated by citing MACHIAVELLI'S advice to the ruler: 
28 See North (1990). 
29 See Hobbes (1966). 
30 Hobbes writes: "If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe presently, 
but trust one another, in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of Warre of 
every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspicion it is Voyd: But if there be a 
common Power to set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel 
performance; it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first has no assurance the other will 
performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition avarice, 
anger and other Passions without the fear of some coercive Power; which in the condition 
of meer Nature where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own feats 
cannot possibly be supposed .... But in a civil estate where there is a Power set up to 
constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; 
and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged to do so." 
Hobbes (1966) p.91 
31 Among the many examples for such a framewor1< are a civil code, a commercial code. a 
banking regulation and an efficient judicial sector. 
32 Whiting argues that credible commitment can means trust of private investors that the 
government recognizes and upholds their claims to their assets. See Whiting (1998) p.168. 
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"A prudent ruler, therefore, cannot and should not, keep his word when keeping it is to his 
disadvantage and when the reasons that make him promise no longer exist." 33 
Applying MACHIAVELLI'S words to the analysis of investment incentives it 
becomes evident that governments that nationalize industries, tax income and 
affect private property rights in many other ways have a credibility problem 
concerning future investment. In the long run a government that expropriates 
private surplus or is not able to commit to not expropriating distorts the 
incentives of economic actors since individuals who cannot be sure of keeping 
the benefits of their invested capital will spend less money for productive 
activities. Actors will shift their focus from engaging in welfare-enhancing in-
vestment to securing the existing stock of capital they possess. Capital is then 
allocated to investment projects that offer lower but immediate returns 
because by doing so investors can reduce the risk of governmental 
expropriation. Additionally, capital may be shifted to the informal sector or 
abroad where it cannot unfold its positive impact on the development of the 
national economy. It is straightforward to see that in a situation without a limit 
on possible predatory behavior of the government allocative efficiency of the 
national economy is severely disturbed and future prospects for growth and 
welfare are reduced. In the long run a lack of governmental credibility can 
become a serious obstacle for economic development. Yet from an investor 
point of view credible commitment has another important dimension since it 
requires a basic continuity of policy. Governments do not only have to 
establish sound rules and enforce them but also to guarantee that those rules 
are not permanently changed. Frequent and unpredictable change of rules, the 
failure to implement announced changes, and the arbitrary enforcement of 
rules all produce uncertainties for investors that will end up depressing invest-
ment. To limit these uncertainties the process of rulemaking has to be 
predictable and transparent. 34 
It is argued here that property rights have to be protected against violations 
from other individuals or the state by a credible commitment of the govern-
ment. The question however, of what determines the possibility of credible 
commitments in countries has not been answered. The following paragraphs 
analyze societal institutions that may ensure a credible framework for private 
contracting and avoid public abuses of power. 
3.1.2.4 Rule of Law 
The previous paragraphs stressed the importance of third party contract en-
forcement and credible commitments by governments to ensure an incentive 
structure that is favorable for stimulating investment and growth. It already 
identified the problem of creating an organization holding coercive power that 
is simultaneously capable of ensuring third party enforcement without abusing 
33 Machiavelli (1997) p.66. 
34 In a survey covering 69 countries and 3600 firms the entrepreneurs reported that they 
were seriously affected by policy surprises. In Latin America 60% of the interviewed voiced 
this complaint while in Southeast Asia only 30% of the respondents considered policy 
surprises a problem. See World Bank (1997) p.34-38. 
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its power. Therefore, the fundamental problem is to create a state with 
sufficient coercive power to lower the cost of private transactions which is at 
the same time bound not to opportunistically interfere in private economic 
transactions. This dilemma may be solved by a functioning and efficient legal 
system that provides a legitimate base for private and public behavior and 
establishes a state with prevailing rule of law. In this context the law defines 
the basic framework within which the pursuit of all other activities takes 
place.35 
Essentially, rule of law refers to those established rules of a general and im-
personal nature that order the relationship between state and society, between 
individuals in society, and within the state itself. Being more precise, rule of 
law means government by law and with adherence to a predictable and 
working legal order. Rule of law is in place when the government is 
constrained or bound by the law through effective limits or checks and 
balances on political power and public office. The institutional design of legal 
accountability may take the form of various arrangements of separation of 
powers usually prescribed in the constitution and control of public office 
holders through regular elections. In other words, rule of law characterizes 
those control mechanisms by which the government can be brought to account 
according to established normative criteria.36 Rule of law requires that nobody 
is above the law and that public officials as well as private actors act 
"secundum legem", that is in conformity with the existing legislation. When 
working properly, rule of law brings definition, specificity, clarity and 
predictability into human interactions. It establishes networks of responsibility 
and accountability entailing that all agents in society are subject to appropriate, 
legally established controls of the lawfulness of their acts.37 For producing 
such results a necessary condition is that rules have certain characteristics: 38 
1. All laws should be prospective, open and clear 
2. Laws should be relatively stable 
3. The making of laws must be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules 
4. Independence of the Judiciary must be guaranteed 
5. The principles of natural justice must be observed (open and fair hearing; absence of bias) 
6. Courts should have review powers to ensure conformity to the rule of law 
7. Courts should be easily accessible 
8. Discretion of crime-preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law 
The organization which underpins the establishment of rule of law and legal 
accountability to national legislation is the judiciary.39 An independent and 
efficient judiciary is vital to ensure that legislative and executive authorities 
35 See Rawls (1971) p.236. 
36 See Domingo (1999). 
37 Acting within the law is not sufficient when basic rights are violated by the existing 
legislation. See O'Donnell (1998) p.13-16. 
38 The following listing is based on Raz (1977) p.198-201 . 
39 See Domingo (1999) . Prillaman writes: " ... an independent judiciary serves as the ultimate 
guarantor of conslitutionalism: sovereignty is derived from the people, but the courts 
ensure that no agency of government acting on behalf of the people violates the principles 
of the rule of law. See Prillaman (2000) p.1. 
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remain fully accountable under the law and to interpret and enforce the 
existing legislation. If a country is to enjoy the benefits of a rule of law, the 
mere passing of legislation has to be complemented by effective law 
enforcement because when private or public actors violate the law with 
impunity the rule of law becomes ineffective.40 Thus, for the achievement of its 
functions a judiciary has to ensure enforcement while being independent and 
efficient.41 One can speak of a properly functioning judiciary when it 
simultaneously demonstrates independence, efficiency and access.42 Without 
an efficient legal system in turn, private property rights cannot be assigned 
properly, undesirable actions cannot be condemned and sanctions for the non 
fulfillment of societal norms cannot be established. An efficient system for the 
provision of these goods is the establishment of a "Rechtsstaat", a society 
where the principle of rule of law prevails.43 A functioning "Rechtsstaat" is a 
bridge between limits on governmental power and limits on individual 
freedoms which legitimates the public use of coercion.44 A "Rechtsstaat" 
ensures basic rights of the citizenry, provides for checks and balances through 
an effective division of powers in government and ensures legal certainty for 
citizens in their acts with public authorities or other citizens. 45 Although a 
society where the principle of rule of law is established has many virtues for its 
citizens, this analysis will be limited to its economic effects.46 
Together with informal norms judicial institutions promote the economic 
development of societies by reducing uncertainty, diminishing transaction 
costs, facilitating the enforcement of contracts and protecting private property 
rights. In an environment of rule of law the government possesses sufficient 
power to implement its policy, to protect the rights of the citizens as well as to 
act with transparency and efficiency to create a climate of confidence and 
credibility. By creating an atmosphere of certainty, predictability, and credibility 
a functioning rule of law fosters the functioning of national markets.47 A 
transparent and efficient legal system stimulates economic incentives for 
private investment by providing for an environment of certainty in which 
40 See O'Donnell (1998) p.15. 
41 See World Bank (1997) p.8 and p.99-100. 
42 See Prillaman (2000) p.15-29. Ungar characterizes a functioning judiciary that guarantees 
the rule of law with the attributes accountability, independence and universal access. See 
Ungar (2002) p.1-5. 
43 The concepts of rule of law, "Rechtsstaat" and "estado de derecho" are not synonymous. 
See O'Donnell (1998). There are slight differences between the british rule of law tradition 
and the continental European concept of a "Rechtsstaat". Theobald argues that the former 
is more oriented on the legitimacy of procedures in legislation and application of the law 
while the latter is largely focused on the establishment of precise individual rights that are 
codified in legislation. See Theobald (1999) p.63-69. Despite of these differences the 
terms will henceforth be considered as being synonyms. For an introduction to the German 
concept of a "Rechtsstaat" see Katz (1999) p.82-106. 
44 See Lopez Portillo Vargas (2001). 
45 See Rubio et al. (1994). 
46 It is straightforward to see that a "Rechtsstaat" is also an important social and political 
achievement and thus per se desirable without analyzing its economic implications. 
47 See Ayala Espino (2002) p.121-143. 
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individuals can engage in economic activities without the fear of arbitrary inter-
vention by other citizens or public authorities. The legal system is an important 
determinant of profitabiliti for national firms as it directly affects the transaction 
costs on the micro-level. 8 Several empirical studies confirm the importance of 
an efficient legal system for economic growth and development.49 
At this point it is important to stress that high levels of societal and political 
corruption may undermine the principle of rule of law. When legal norms and 
rules are not enforced due to the payment of bribes or the use of nepotism, the 
legal system is unable to unfold its positive impact on the development 
perspectives of societies. Although the current literature provides many 
definitions of corruption, the term may be broadly defined as the misuse of 
public power for private benefit.50 For a long time it was argued among 
economists that corruption is a means of aiding the economy in the case of 
cumbersome regulation and excessive bureaucracy.51 Meanwhile there is a 
large strand of literature that demonstrates the adverse effects of corruption on 
investment, economic growth and development. 52 Chapter 2 argues that 
higher uncertainty decreases investment spending if investment projects are 
irreversible. Besides increasing the direct costs of doing business, high levels 
of corruption in host countries increase uncertainty for a firm that operates in 
such an environment. In high corruption countries the return of a company 
depends to a large extent on the results of in-transparent transactions as for 
example bribery or nepotism. When the granting of certain licenses or permits 
or the winning of public contracts depends on corrupt behavior instead of on 
the efficiency of companies not only national welfare is diminished. Moreover, 
legal uncertainty will increase the variation of a company's future returns im-
plying higher risks for companies when the decision making of the national 
bureaucracy is distorted by corruption. 53 As corruption is usually limited to a 
small circle of insiders, foreign investors may be more severely affected than 
their national counterparts as they lack the necessary connections to engage 
in bribery. 
Furthermore, corruption affects the quality of the public administration. As it is 
put by PRS Group, corruption is "a threat to foreign investment by distorting 
the economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency of government 
and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through 
patronage rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the 
48 See Rubio et al. (1994). 
49 See Dollar/Kraay (2001 ). Klapper/Love (2002) argue that the quality of the legal system 
and investor protection affects corporate capital costs. Firm level governance and 
performance is lower in countries with weak legal systems suggesting that improving the 
legal system should remain a priority for policy makers. Sherwood et al. (1994) estimate 
that growth losses due to inefficient legal systems amount up to 15%. 
50 See World Bank (1997) p.102. For an overview over different definitions and forms of 
corruption see Pritzl (1997) p.46-63. 
51 See Huntington (1989). 
52 For a recent overview of the literature see Lambsdorf (2001 ). 
53 See Lambsdorf (2001 ). 
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political process".54 The literature offers extensive empirical evidence for the 
depressing impact of corruption on investment. 55 A recent study of the Wor1d 
Bank on several transformation countries highlights the important role of 
corruption as a determinant for investment behavior. On the macro level the 
study concludes that high corruption countries have lower levels of aggregate 
investment than medium corruption countries. Evidence on the micro-level 
suggests that firms operating in high corruption environments tend to have 
lower investment growth rates than firms operating in medium corruption 
environments. 56 Several earlier empirical studies confirm the result that high 
levels of corruption are an important impediment to investment. 57 In the 
medium or long run high levels of corruption further aggravate this problem by 
undermining the credibility of national institutions that are important 
determinants of long-run growth perspectives as for example the judicial 
system or the public administration.58 Recent empirical work finds that political 
corruption also significantly reduces the volume of incoming foreign investment 
flows by acting like a tax on MNEs.59 
To sum up, deficiencies in the rule of law are serious impediments for invest-
ment as private investors are affected in many ways by an inefficient legal 
system or high levels of corruption. Private contracts cannot be efficiently 
enforced and protection against opportunistic behavior of contractual partners 
or against possible predatory governmental behavior is low. Legal uncertainty 
is a particular serious disincentive for long term investments that require a 
foreseeable evolution of the national institutional environment. Therefore, an 
inefficient judiciary which is not able to create an environment where rule of 
law is established is an important impediment for potential investors. Another 
measure that is capable of determining the level of the government's ability to 
give a credible commitment to economic actors is its degree of discretionary 
freedom. 
3.1.2.5 Discretionary Freedom of the Government 
Above it was argued that ensuring private property rights and creating an 
appropriate incentive structure for economic actors requires limitation and 
control of governmental power. The ability to give a credible commitment not 
to seize private assets or to opportunistically interfere in private transactions 
has been identified as a central prerequisite for private investment incentives 
and successful economic development. A criterion that is capable of reflecting 
this ability is discretionary freedom of host country governments. The degree 
of governmental discretion measures to what extent the governing body is 
subject to external constraints that limit the scope of its decision making 
54 See PRS Group (2003). 
55 As an example see Word Bank (1997) p.102-109. 
56 See Worldbank (2000). 
57 See Mauro (1995) and Knack/Keefer (1995). 
58 See Lopez Presa et al. (1998). 
59 See Wei (2000). He estimates that an increase in the corruption level from that of 
Singapore to that of Mexico would have the same restrictive impact like a 50 percentage 
point tax increase for multinationals. 
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process and policy implementation. In other words, governmental discretion 
measures to what degree a government is subject to checks and balances by 
other societal organizations. 
For a better understanding assume for simplicity that government is a 
monolithic entity maximizing its own utility function. It is straightforward to see 
that the scope of government for future action depends on its level of 
independence. If the ruling body is not subject to any form of external control, 
the variety of possible future decisions is high because without any form of 
external auditing those policies will be implemented that best serve the interest 
of government. So without any form of checks and balances the ruler's 
decisions are solely based on his utility function. 60 Hence, the possible policy 
outcome may vary along the personal policy space that represents the 
preferences of the government. In such an institutional setting the risk that the 
ruler may interfere with the interest of other members of society is high. 61 The 
government however, may be limited in its choice by formal instruments of 
constraint. Important examples for restraining societal institutions are an 
efficient judicial system and horizontal or vertical separation of powers. 62 
Figure 3.3 illustrates possible variations of policy outcomes for the case of 
government with unlimited governmental discretion. If the government is not 
subject to control of other societal organizations with veto rights (Actor A, Actor 
B), it is free to implement any policy that is in line with its preferences that are 
represented by the arrow. Since other organizations in society do not enjoy a 
right to veto the decision of the government, private actors have to accept any 
possible policy outcome even if it is not in line with their own preferences. With 
a given initial distribution of preferences the ruling authority may choose every 
outcome between the dotted lines marking the upper and lower end of its 
preference-arrow. In this case the risk that the interests of private actors are 
violated by governmental action is high. 
If, in turn, the government's decisions were subject to some form of external 
control , like a veto of a controlling organization, it would limit the scope of the 
ruler's decision. Introducing a veto for actors A and B should therefore limit the 
variation of future policy outcomes. 
60 If the governmental utility function is known to economic actors transparency and reliability 
are promoted. 
61 Shepsle writes "Discretion is the enemy of optimality, commitment its ally." See Shepsle 
(1991) p.246. 
62 See Wond Bank (1997) p.99-102. 
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Figure 3.3: Variation of Policy Outcomes with Unlimited Discretion 
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Figure 3.4 illustrates the situation with the same preference structure when A 
and B have a right to veto the decision made by the government. Facing the 
veto power of A and B the ruling body can only implement a policy that can be 
agreed upon with both societal organizations. The need to reach a consensus 
with A and B limits the scope of governmental discretion and thus the possible 
variation of policy outcomes. Comparing the policy outcomes of figure 3.3 and 
3.4 highlights that the introduction of constraints on government reduces the 
variation of future policy outcomes and reduces the risk that the interest of 
other societal actors is neglected.63 The simple graphical example illustrates 
that the extent of governmental discretion is a determinant of future policy 
variations. The broader the separation of powers, the greater will be the 
number of veto points to be navigated to change any rule-based commitments. 
Separation of powers therefore increases confidence in the stability of societal 
rules. 
The degree of governmental discretion also is a decisive variable for investors. 
If the level of governmental discretion is high, it means that their possibility to 
have an influence on future political decisions is low. This implies a higher risk 
of future changes that are not corresponding to their interest. Thus, unfavor-
able future changes from the current status quo become more likely when 
governments are comparably unconstrained. Therefore, unlimited govern-
63 Already Montesqieu's work on the division of powers argues that supervising societal 
institutions limiting the discretionary freedom of governmental branches limit the abuse of 
public coercive power. See Montesqieu (1979). 
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mental discretion combined with an ineffective protection of basic individual 
rights is a source of political risk. States with too much flexibility and 
insufficient constraints will find that their actions are not viewed as credible, 
and investment will suffer.64 
Figure 3.4: Variation of Policy Outcomes with Limited Discretion 
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However, excessive discretionary freedom of policy makers and public 
servants poses another important problem. If it depends entirely on the will of 
a public servant to grant a certain license or permit, his personal incentive to 
accept bribes or other personal favors as an exchange for his service is high. 
If, as often the case in developing countries, external monitoring is rare and 
public servants are poorly paid, this incentive is further intensified. In this case 
arbitrary public power is used to reap personal benefit rather than producing 
public goods.65 Therefore, high levels of political discretion in government and 
administration create an environment that is highly susceptible for the 
development of institutionalized corruption.66 
Discretion can be effectively limited if governing bodies and administrations 
are subject to the control of other institutions as the law or other societal veto 
players.67 Veto players can be defined as those individual or collective actors 
64 See World Bank (1997) p.109. 
65 See World Bank (1997) p.25. 
66 See Jain (2001 ). 
67 See World Bank (1997) p.28. 
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whose consent is required to introduce a new policy.68 There is a large variety 
of institutions and organizations that may act as veto players or legislative 
restraints in modern societies. First, a constitution which is binding for the 
executive and limits the discretionary freedom of policy makers and public 
servants by protecting basic individual rights and prescribing appropriate 
procedures for governance. Second, all political parties in parliament and in 
particular those of the opposition as well as independent courts. Although 
limiting governmental discretion is essential for a successful development of 
market economies, it is straightforward to see that this process may cause 
unwanted consequences if it is carried too far. Governments that are too 
limited by other veto organizations loose their power to implement programs 
that allow for the adaptation to changing circumstances. Excessive restraints 
may eventually lead to paralysis and as OLSON describes an interest group 
dominated society is economically less efficient.69 
However, as important it may be, this argument does not affect the ex ante 
calculus of investors. When planning an engagement, the absence or low 
probability of political change due to high levels of constraints generates 
certainty for the investor because he can assume that societal variables will 
not change during his planning horizon. On the other hand, if constraints are 
low, the probability of political change is high which induces uncertainty 
because the investor knows that political change will probably affect the return 
of his project. It is straightforward to see that already a basic protection against 
public predatory behavior by vetoing institutions may be enough to protect 
investors and reduce uncertainty considerably.70 A constitution that protects 
individual rights and an efficient judicial system that may enforce this 
constitutional protection are examples for limits on governmental discretion 
that do not lead to paralysis. However, if, like in many developing countries, 
judicial institutions are weak and the constitutional protection of property rights 
insufficient high governmental discretion should be resulting in higher levels of 
investor uncertainty. 
3.1.2.6 The Concept of Social Capital 
It was argued above that well functioning national institutions are important for 
the process of national development. However, it was already pointed out 
above that not only formal institutions may be influential for the process of 
national development but also informal institutions. Societal characteristics and 
norms and networks that govern the interaction of individuals may be seen as 
an influential part of the informal institutional framework co-determining 
national welfare. Recent literature in economics and other social sciences 
uses the term social capital in analogy to the notion of human capital to 
capture the economic effects of these variables. Although the term is widely 
used, there is no unique definition in the literature as available definitions 
range from focusing on microeconomic factors of societal relations to 
68 See Tsebelis (1995). 
69 See Olson (1982). 
70 It may be assumed that the marginal efficiency of additional veto points is falling over time. 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
POLITICAL RISK AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 97 
macroeconomic factors or even political measures or psychological as well as 
sociological concepts. 71 Defining the term as norms and networks that facilitate 
collective actions the notion of social capital has some virtues which make it a 
valuable approach for studying problems in development economics.72 
Lowering transaction costs of private actors has already been identified as an 
efficient mean to foster economic development. To understand the relevance 
of the concept of social capital for the following analysis it is helpful to briefly 
discuss an example concerning the impact of trust on transaction costs. If a 
society or a group in society is characterized by high levels of trust among its 
members economic transactions are facilitated because members of that 
group have no need to extensively refer to measures of precaution against 
opportunistic behavior of their contractual counterparts. Thus, functioning net-
works of trust, as for example codices of business ethics among merchants, 
facilitate private economic transactions by lowering transaction cost. 73 Even if 
conflicts occur, functioning networks of trust enable a less costly process of 
conflict resolution by negotiation or by intervention of a third party. It is even 
imaginable that groups with high levels of internal trust may efficiently organize 
economic transactions without any form of third party enforcement. Therefore, 
it is to be expected that functioning networks of trust have all other things 
equal a positive impact on capital accumulation and growth. 74 If, in turn, a 
society or a group in society is characterized by low levels of trust, the 
opposite implications hold. Since contracting and conflict resolution are more 
costly in low trust environments, low levels of trust imply high levels of 
transaction cost which, all other things equal, decrease incentives to engage in 
welfare-enhancing private transactions. 
Following the aforementioned definition societal levels of trust are a form of 
social capital that permits to lower transaction costs in society illustrating that 
low levels of social capital can become an obstacle to economic 
development. 75 This problem is even more severe when a lack of social capital 
coincides with weak institutions of third party enforcement. In such a situation 
transaction costs for private economic activity become prohibitively high 
creating an institutional framework which is detrimental to investment, 
economic growth and development. This unlucky combination however, is the 
reality for many developing countries implying a serious burden for private 
economic activity. The concept of social capital may also serve to describe 
those societal characteristics that cause high costs of transactions and may be 
defined as anti-social capital. This negative definition of the theoretical concept 
71 For a recent discussion of the varying definitions of the term social capital see Woolcock 
(2002) and Lin (2001 ). 
72 See Woolcock (2002). 
73 Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) have conceptualized trust as one component of 
social capital that can improve the efficiency of a society by facilitating coordinated action. 
74 Knack/Zak (2003) find that interpersonal trust has a positive growth effect and that trust 
can be stimulated by education, redistributive transfers and freedom. 
75 See Fukuyama (2001 ). 
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can be applied to capture the implications of societal characteristics with a 
supposed negative impact on transaction costs. 
Possible sources of social capital are not limited to networks of trust or ethical 
communities. Instead, there are many potentially influential variables that 
determine the level of social capital. The absence of ethnic, cultural, linguistic 
or religious conflicts as well as severe distributive inequalities are all 
characteristics with a positive influence on societal levels of transaction costs. 
For the purpose of this analysis the concept becomes particularly valuable as 
it offers a simple analytical framework for studying the economic impact of 
societal characteristics. With this analytical tool socioeconomic variables that 
may have an influence on foreign investment decisions may be analyzed 
concerning their impact on the level of societal transaction costs. In other 
words, instead of ad-hoc postulating a causal relationship between societal 
variables and investment decisions, one may analyze the influence of a certain 
variable by judging its most likely impact on the level of societal transaction 
costs and eventually on incentives to invest. Consequently the concept of 
social capital offers a suitable theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
effects of societal variables on economic decision making that may be used for 
empirical research.76 
"Who governs?" and "How well?" are the two 
most basic questions of political science. 
Robert Putnam (Making Democracy Work) 77 
3.1.3 Political Regime Type and FDI 
3.1.3.1 Systematic Order Of Political Regimes 
Whether regime type has an impact on economic growth is a widely debated 
topic in the economic and political science literature. 78 Therefore, the impact of 
political regime type on private investment incentives is an important topic and 
political risk assessment inevitably requires an analysis of different real world 
political regimes.79 I start with setting out a systematic order of political 
regimes that allows for a better theoretical analysis of their different 
characteristics. Although the author is aware of the fact that political systems 
in reality never own the properties of these ideal constructs, a theoretical 
distinction of different regime types is useful for further reflections on the 
impact of political systems on investment behavior. 
The limited scope of this volume makes it impossible to give a complete over-
view of the large literature on typologies of political systems. Instead, the 
76 See Chapter 4 and 5. 
77 Putnam (1993) p.63. cited by Nye (1997) p.121 . 
78 An influential study is the work of Barro (1996). A review of the empirical literature is given 
by Kurzman/Werum/Burkhart (2002). For a complete literature overview see 
Przeworski/Limongi (1993) and Przeworski et al. (2000). Although it may be argued that 
unsatisfying empirical results stem from methodological deficiencies of existing studies, 
here there is no room for an extensive discussion of the impact of political regimes on 
economic growth. A critical evaluation is given by Durham (1999). 
79 Many political risk analysts consider regime type as an influential variable for the extent of 
political risk. See the discussion of political risk indices in paragraph 3.3. 
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concept of MERKEL permits the classification of political systems with regard to 
six criteria.80 Using this approach nearly all existing political systems can be 
assigned to three basic categories: democracies, authoritarian systems and 
totalitarian systems. These ideal types of political systems and their 
corresponding characteristics are depicted in figure 3.5: 
Figure 3.5: Typology of Political Systems 
DEMOCRACY AUTHORITARIAN RULE TOTALITARIAN RULE 
l.EOITIW.CY OF RULE Peoples Sovereignty Mentalities (Nationalism, Ideology 
Patriotism etc.) 
ACCESSION TO RULE Open. Universal Suffrage Limited. Limited Suffrage Closed. No Suffrage 
MONOPOLY OF RULE Democratically Legitimized Leaders o, Oligarchs, Leaders, Ensured by 
Institutions Ensured by Repression Repression 
STRUCTURE OF RULE Pluralistic. Division of Powers Semi-pluralistic. Limited Monistic, No Division of Power 
Division of Powers 
SCOPE OF RULE Limited Large Unlimited 
METHOD OF RULE Ruleofl- Rule of Law or Repressive Repressive Rule 
Rule 
Source: Merkel ( 1999) p.28 
Democracies are typically characterized by universal suffrage, a pluralistic 
structure of rule, a limited scope of rule and by the existence of rule of law. 
Government is based on the sovereignty of people and democratically 
legitimized institutions. Only political systems having these characteristics may 
be labeled as fully democratic. DAHL identifies six minimal requirements for a 
modern democratic system. 81 
1. Elected officials 
2. Free, fair and frequent elections 
3. Freedom of expression 
4. Alternative sources of information 
5. Associational autonomy 
6. Inclusive citizenship 
Democracy is a system of rule with open end, that is, outcomes of the political 
process are the result of a competition between different political forces.82 The 
process of political competition takes place in a democratically legitimized 
framework of a priori fixed rules shaped by the constitution. 83 Democratic 
systems may be classified in ideal democracies, polyarchies, and defect 
80 See Merkel (1999) p.23-56. 
81 See Dahl ( 1998) p 85. 
82 Przeworski states that "democracy is a system in which parties lose elections ." See 
Przeworski et al. (2000) p.16. The idea of democracy as a competition between different 
political groups in society for electoral support is based on the work of Schumpeter (1993) 
and Downs (1957). 
83 See Merkel (1999). 
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democracies. As ideal democracies largely remain a theoretical construct most 
of the existing democracies may be labeled polyarchic, that is, they differ to 
some extent from the theoretical construct but still possess most of the basic 
characteristic of democratic systems. In turn, defect democracies already 
show signs of authoritarian rule although they are still nearer to democratic 
systems than to authoritarian rule.64 
In contrast, authoritarian rule may be defined as a system of government 
which is not democratic. Recalling the characteristics of authoritarian rule 
given in figure 3.5 shows that unlike in democracies legitimization of rule is not 
given by the population but instead by mentalities or beliefs and that the 
accession to rule is limited by religious, ethnic or other characteristics. 
Governance is not exercised by democratically legitimized institutions but by 
non-elected actors that often ensure their power by repression. The structure 
of rule is typically semi-pluralistic, that is, the division of powers is limited or 
non-existent while the scope of rule is large meaning that basic rights of the 
population may be easily violated. Although the degree to which rule of law is 
accepted may vary, arbitrary laws are a characteristic of authoritarian systems. 
Since political theory permits to classify various sub-categories of authoritarian 
rule, also real world authoritarian systems are far from being homogeneous. In 
fact the existing forms of undemocratic government are diverse. 85 
Distinguishing authoritarian rule from totalitarian rule is a difficult task because 
the essential characteristics of these two political system are similar. In 
addition to the criteria that have been depicted in figure 3.5 one may speak of 
totalitarian rule if the following criteria are fulfilled: 
1. The existence of ideology 
2. The existence of a single party 
3. The existence of terror by party organizations or secret services 
4. State monopoly in the media 
5. State monopoly of force 
6. Economic centralism 
Using these ideal categories of political systems basically all historical political 
systems may be classified and allows for the construction of a continuum of 
political systems with the extreme regime types of perfect democracy and 
perfect totalitarian rule as polar cases.86 Figure 3.6 depicts this systematic 
order of political systems giving historical examples of real world political 
systems. 
84 See Merkel (1999). 
85 See Tullock (2002a). 
86 It has to be stressed that even in western democracies citizen participation is far from 
being perfect. See OECD (2001 ). 
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Figure 3.6: Continuum of Political Systems 
Democracy Authoritarian Rule Total itarian Rule 
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Democracy Democracy 
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ys Systems l 
Source: Merkel (1999) p.55. 
The systematic order of political systems which has been developed in this 
paragraph permits a closer economic analysis of political regimes. 
3.1 .3.2 Economic Analysis of Political Regimes 
While the previous chapter distinguished different political regime types, this 
paragraph is dedicated to studying how these systems may influence private 
investment decisions. McGUIRE/OLSON develop a three stage hierarchy of 
political regimes comparing anarchy, autocracy, and democracy. By providing 
public goods such as law and order and by limiting discretionary expropriation, 
an autocratic leader can obtain more resources for himself and at the same 
time leave his subjects better off than in the case of anarchy. This self-
limitation of an autocratic ruler is due to his encompassing interest in the 
domain he controls meaning that he profits from every increase in production 
realized by his subjects as a consequence of his credible commitment.87 
McGUIRE/OLSON speak of an "invisible hand", leading the rational bandit to 
settle down and replace anarchy with authoritarian government, which leads to 
an increase in output as citizens have more incentives to produce. Comparing 
the economic outcomes of such an authoritarian rule with the outcomes of 
democratic rule permits drawing conclusions about the influence of regime 
type on private investment incentives. McGUIRE/OLSON show that a ruling 
majority in democratic systems will limit redistribution as a significant share of 
the market income of society is earned by the rulers themselves. As a 
87 See McGuire/Olson (1996). 
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consequence redistribution is comparably lower and private investment 
incentives should be higher.66 WINTROBE's review of common public choice 
models confirms the result that from a theoretical point of view redistribution in 
dictatorships tends to be higher than in democratic regimes. The same result 
holds for the extent of public corruption as there are fewer constraints on rent 
distribution. 69 
The MCGUIRE/OLSON model holds valuable insights into how the type of 
political regime influences economic performance by focusing on the problem 
of tax setting. However, their basic argument may be extended to all kinds of 
political actions which influence the national business climate as autocrats 
have an incentive to extract the maximum possible surplus from society 
because they can levy a monopoly charge on every economic activity. 
Historical evidence confirms that many autocratic leaders collected as much 
revenue as possible by pushing the tax rate to its maximum.90 Moreover, 
MCGUIRE/OLSON argue that autocratic leaders only have an incentive to 
provide public order and basic protection of property rights when they are 
maximizing long run revenues. Although a long term thinking autocrat ensures 
that his subjects' profits are not wholly expropriated since he benefits from 
higher future output, this result is only valid if the autocrat's grip on power is 
secure. Assuming a short-time horizon of the autocrat or personal fear to be 
overthrown changes results significantly because it now becomes perfectly 
rational for the dictator to seize as many assets as he can while he is still in 
power. In this case, the leader has no reason to consider the future output of 
society and will abrogate contracts in order to maximize his short-run 
income.91 Consequently the argument that autocratic leaders limit their theft 
does not hold for all imaginable situations, even more since an independent 
institutional structure which is capable of enforcing the leaders' promises does 
not exist. 92 
BARZEL argues that autocratic leaders have a vital interest in limiting the 
probability of a revolution against their rule. Therefore, a dictator limits societal 
welfare gains which could result in a demand for more civil rights and 
establishes a costly system of supervision and repression which suppresses 
possible revolutionary tendencies in society.93 NYE shows that distorted out-
comes and deadweight losses are inevitable by-products of strong rule with 
costly monitoring and uncertainties regarding current and future control of the 
88 See McGuire/Olson (1996). The existence of this "Olson-effect" is confirmed in the 
theoretical model of Lee (2003). 
89 See Wintrobe (1998). A simple argument for the tendency of higher redistribution is the 
mere fact that in authoritarian regimes the resistance of the taxed population is lower than in 
democracies. See Wintrobe (2001) p.43. 
90 See Olson (1993). 
91 See Clague et al. (1996). Abramovich (2001) argues that in general dictators and their 
loyal groups only have low incentives to implement sound economic policies and that 
therefore high growth dictatorships are rare phenomena. See Abramovich (2001 ). 
92 See Olson (1993). 
93 See Barzel (2000). 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
POLITICAL RISK AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 103 
citizens.94 To ensure a minimum degree of loyalty among followers and to 
avoid palace revolutions dictators have to redistribute rents to their followers 
which likewise has welfare-depressing effects. So ensuring power in an 
autocracy requires a policy-mix of repression and loyalty payments which can 
be used to characterize the nature of authoritarian governments.95 Moreover, 
low levels of legitimacy may result in future civil strife as the discontent of 
citizens is growing over time. 
There is abundant historical evidence for autocratic leaders having short-time 
horizons due to an insecure hold on power. Likewise there are many examples 
for costly systems of suppression (for example a secret police) which 
significantly reduced societal welfare. Furthermore, nearly all authoritarian 
governments had to redistribute rents to their followers to ensure loyalty to the 
regime_% The mere possibility that an autocrat has a short-time-horizon 
reduces confidence in government which all other things equal depresses in-
vestment because the promise of an autocratic leader not to seize private 
assets is never completely credible. Since authoritarian systems do not offer 
judicial protection of individual property rights, dictators who renege on given 
commitments cannot be sued implying that technically speaking dictators have 
a severe signaling problem.97 From historical examples of dictatorships it is 
evident that succession crises further enhance uncertainty because economic 
actors cannot foresee the consequences of a leaders' death or removal from 
power. 
All the aforementioned uncertainties should, all other things equal, decrease 
investment spending because private actors cannot be sure that they will fully 
reap the future benefits of their investment. If investment takes place anyway, 
it is likely that the structure of investment changes favoring projects that have 
short pay-off-periods even if potential returns are lower. In particular invest-
ments in developing countries need protection from violation of property rights 
by other individuals or from opportunistic government action. Since autocratic 
regimes have difficulties in giving credible commitments to private property 
rights, they fail to ensure right incentives for private investment decisions. A 
democratic system with constitutional protection of individual property rights 
seems more suitable to meet these expectations of private investors as the 
same institutions that ensure a proper functioning of democracy can also 
ensure the protection of property rights and the enforcement of civil and public 
94 See Nye (1997). 
95 Using these criteria Wintrobe defines four basic types of authoritarian government: tinpots 
(low repression, low loyalty), tyrants (high repression, low loyalty), totalitarian (high 
repression, high loyalty), and timocrats (low repression, high loyalty). See Wintrobe (2001) 
p.38-41. Abramovich (2001) argues that the dictator has an incentives to have a small 
group of loyal followers to facilitate supervision and to limit loyalty ensuring payments to a 
minimum. See Abramovich (2001) p.143-145. 
96 Several examples are given by Wintrobe (2001) p.39. 
97 See Wintrobe (1998). 
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contracts. 98 In addition to being prerequisites for democracies a constitution, 
an independent judiciary and rule of law provide investors with the required 
legal security for doing business because governments can more easily give a 
credible commitment to the protection of property rights when its hands are 
tied by independently controlling institutions that protect private property 
against private violations and governmental interference. Recalling the 
prerequisites for a favorable investment climate that have been derived in the 
preceding paragraphs, it follows that democracies should better allow for 
credible commitment, an effective assignment and protection of private 
property rights, as well as for the establishment of a political system with 
checks and balances based on the rule of law. Furthermore, societal 
participation in universal suffrage and legitimized rulers ensure lower levels of 
social tensions due to lacking social capital that could endanger private assets. 
Therefore, it is to be expected that investment incentives are more favorable in 
democracies. 
Given these arguments the disappointing records of many democratic 
countries in the protection of investor rights are astonishing.99 To understand 
this it has to be underlined that a de jure democratic system without the 
characteristics of a functioning democracy does not provide investors with 
credible commitments.100 Hence, the pure labeling of a country as "democratic" 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the ability to credibly 
commit and to protect investor rights. That is to say, if democratic institutions 
do not work properly, the investment enhancing effects of a reliable 
institutional framework will not materialize since an inefficient judiciary for 
example cannot effectively enforce legislation in commercial law suits. If 
existing laws cannot be enforced, legal certainty of investors is not increasing 
and if parliaments and the judiciary cannot effectively control the government 
the protection of individuals against public predatory activity is de-facto 
inexistent. Therefore, the empirical analysis of the institutional environment for 
investment cannot be limited to investigating if controlling institutions exist but 
simultaneously has to analyze if they work properly. The next paragraphs are 
dedicated to the analysis of models explaining the emergence of political risks. 
98 Empirical evidence by Claque et al. confinns that democracies in general provide greater 
security of property and contractual rights than autocracies. Moreover, they find that 
property rights in young democracies are weaker than in long lasting democracies. See 
Claque et al. (1996). 
99 In a recent study Kurzman/VVerum/Burkhart (2002) only found a weak positive impact of 
democracy on investment. Tavares/Wacziarg (2001) in turn find a negative impact of 
democracy on physical capital accumulation. 
100 The fact that most public choice models do not distinguish between functioning and defect 
democracies is identified as a major problem by Wintrobe (1998). As examples for defect 
democracies he identifies among others the democracies of Latin America. See Wintrobe 
(1998) p.32. 
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3.2. Modeling the Emergence of Political Risks 
3.2.1 Classical Political Risk Models 
105 
While the political risk models in Chapter 2 show how political risks influence 
private investment decisions, this paragraph analyzes how political risks 
emerge and what are its sources. I start with a review of influential classical 
models explaining the emergence of political risks in host countries. SMITH 
presents a model where political risk depends on the likelihood of civil strife in 
host countries. 101 He argues that civil strife emerges when the perceived 
relative deprivation of the population increases. With relative deprivation SMITH 
refers to the discrepancy between value expectations (living conditions that the 
citizens think they are entitled to have) and value capabilities (living conditions 
that the citizens think they will get and keep). If deprivation grows, that is, the 
discrepancy between expectations and capabilities becomes larger, citizens 
respond with discontent and anger leading to catastrophic events like riots, 
strikes or violent demonstrations. Other influential factors for the risk of civil 
strife are the coercive capacities of government, societal institutions, the 
historical tendency to civil strife and finally the legitimacy of the existing 
political regime. The model implies that high degrees of inequality in societies 
as well as weak and illegitimate governments and insufficient institutional 
structures are the most important sources of political risks. However, since the 
model defines political instability in the form of civil strife as the primary form of 
political risk, more subtle risks that originate in predatory governmental 
behavior are not covered. Therefore, the model is only suitable for the 
explanation of catastrophic political risks.102 
The model of ROOT, in turn, identifies governmental action as the primary 
source of political risk since the government of a host country is constantly 
adjusting its policy to changes in the national economy and society. 103 
Although the government itself also initiates political change, it is never wholly 
free in its process of decision making. Interest groups in society, their ideology 
and power as well as their relation to the government constitute a political 
process that shapes national policies towards foreign investors. To changes in 
this political game the government responds with an alteration of national 
policy towards MNEs. Therefore, the behavior of host governments towards 
MNEs is seen as a response to economic and social change mediated by their 
leadership, ideology, and capabilities. Changes in the political system or in 
society trigger governmental responses that determine type, nature and extent 
of political risk. Unlike SMITH, ROOT argues that political risks essentially 
emerge from actions of national governments implying that the model is not 
capable of explaining political risks that are not directly caused by govern-
ments but instead have their origin in catastrophic events like riots, strikes and 
violence. Nevertheless, the model is valuable because it indicates that political 
101 See Smith (1971) and the critical review in Oseghale (1993). 
102 Most of the older econometric studies of political risk are based on this restrictive 
definition of political risk in Simon's model. The inconclusive results of the studies may be 
due to this theoretical foundation. See Oseghale (1993) p.17. 
103 See Root (1973). 
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risks are influenced by the structure of the political system and societal 
characteristics. 
ScHbLLHAMMER provides a synthesis of the two previous models by assuming 
that political risks derive from governmental action that in turn is determined by 
changes in such factors as civil strife, economic conditions, institutionalization 
or the coercive potential of governments.104 Extent and nature of political risks 
for MNEs are thus determined by the interplay of the societal situation and 
possible changes induced by the host country government. In sum, both, 
political instabilities and changes in host country policies are possible sources 
of political risk. SIMON argues that political risk may emerge from different 
sources, which have already been depicted in figure 2.19. 105 The individual risk 
factors may be classified in internal-societal factors, external-societal factors, 
internal-government-related factors and external-government related factors. 
Emanating from internal societal related reasons are risks of civil strife like 
revolution, civil war and strike which are often referred to as political 
instabilities in the literature. In turn, emanating from internal government-
related sources are risks of host government policy alterations like expropria-
tions or operational restrictions. Eventually, government or societal related 
external risks emanate from guerilla warfare, other armed conflicts or hostile 
diplomatic actions. For the MNE aggregate political risk is the sum of all this 
partial risks implying that its investment behavior is determined by its 
perception of the magnitude of political risk in these different environments. 
Having reviewed classical models of political risk the next paragraph presents 
a model which is capable of explaining in greater detail the risk of unforeseen 
host government policy changes. 
3.2.2 The Political Constraints Model 
Based on the concept of discretionary freedom HENISZ developed a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of political hazards for investors that focuses on the 
emergence of government related political risks. Studying market entry modes 
of foreign firms HENISZ derives a systematic order of potential hazards 
confronting the management of a company. First, if firms choose to enter a 
foreign market by engaging in a joint venture with a domestic company, they 
face the risk that partners act opportunistically which may be named inde-
pendent contractual hazard. The second risk for MNEs stems from the fact 
that political actors may expropriate assets or profits and is labeled 
independent political hazard. Third, joint-venture partners may instigate 
political action that alters the investor's relationship with the local government 
to their favor resulting in a contractual hazard caused by the presence of 
political hazards. 106 The following analysis focuses on what determines the risk 
of independent political hazards for MNEs. 
104 See Schollhammer (1978). 
105 See Simon (1982). 
106 See Henisz (2000a). 
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HENISZ presents a model that may be used for the analysis of political risk as a 
determinant of foreign investment decisions. 107 The analysis starts with the 
empirical observation that countries with comparable levels of infrastructure 
stocks and GDP per capita display vast differences in infrastructure invest-
ment. They argue that these major differences are caused by higher political 
risks which result from the failure of national governments to give credible 
commitments not to opportunistically interfere in private investment projects. 
Although a general prerequisite for investment, commitment is more essential 
for infrastructure projects, because opportunistic alteration of public policy has 
an tremendous impact on the expected profits of projects. As infrastructure 
projects usually imply a high share of sunk cost, politicians assume that in-
vestors will not divest when planned profits are not attained. In addition high 
economies of scale in infrastructure projects mean that markets are often 
served by a single producer who is subject to regulation. This, in turn, makes it 
easy for host governments to achieve popular reallocations of revenue 
streams by altering regulatory policies so that private investors are negatively 
affected. 
Although more severe for infrastructure investments, all investors whose 
projects contain a considerable fraction of sunk cost essentially face the same 
problem.108 HENISZ argues that a proper evaluation of the risk of an investment 
project in a foreign country requires more than a careful observation of the 
present situation or the past development. Instead, the ability to properly 
evaluate the risk of policy change in the future is more essential for private 
investors. Thus, the decisive variable for the MNEs' risk position is the 
government's ability to give credible commitments that future policy will not 
change the status quo in a way that private profits are affected. Therefore, 
HENISZ suggests that measuring the likelihood of future policy changes is a 
more appropriate form of measuring political risk than analyzing past oriented 
variables. Moreover, this approach forges an explicit link between the structure 
of the political system in host countries and likely policy outcomes by arguing 
that credibility and reliability of national policy determines investment 
spending.109 
The proposed influence of institutional factors on investment decision passes 
via two channels. First, frequent arbitrary changes in taxation, regulation or 
other economic policy increase investor uncertainty. Chapter 2 showed that 
higher uncertainty results in higher real option values of investment 
opportunities as opportunity cost of investment. With private hurdle rates 
growing investment spending will decrease which eventually also affects 
national growth prospects. Second, an institutional environment with high 
discretion is more viable to political lobbying activities. 11° Foreign investors, 
who unlike their national competitors are not familiar with host country 
107 See Zelner/Henisz (1999). 
108 Chapter 2 showed that risks only occur if investments are irreversible. 
109 See Henisz (2000b). 
110 See Henisz (2000b). 
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characteristics, are potential losers in such a lobbying process. Accepting the 
argument that a higher probability of policy change leads, all other things 
equal, to lower investment rates the next step is analyzing the structural 
determinants of the feasibility of future policy change. 
Recalling the argument from paragraph 3.1.2.5 that the variation of policy out-
come is falling in the level of political constraints, the existence of an effective 
opposition to the host government is a decisive variable for the feasibility of 
policy change. Opposition increases when the number of national institutions 
that may veto decisions of government is growing. Veto players may be 
defined as those individual or collective actors whose consent is required to 
introduce a new policy.111 A higher number of veto players like chambers of 
parliament, opposition parties or sub-national organizations make it harder for 
governments to implement policy changes. Therefore, additional societal veto 
players effectively reduce discretionary freedom of policy makers by setting up 
constraints for the implementation of new policies. 
However, when aligned to the host government the effects of additional veto 
players are low since veto players with a similar preference structure are no 
effective constraint for the host government. Hence, the number of effective 
veto players does not only depend on the structure of political institutions but 
also on the preferences of actors and possible alignments between actors. 112 
To adjust for alignments across the existing branches of government, the level 
of constraints has to be modified because when alignment increases, a higher 
feasibility of political change reduces the level of political constraints.113 Figure 
3. 7 shows how these variables determine the existing level of political 
constraints, the discretionary freedom of governmental action and eventually 
the risk of policy change. 
Instead of using private risk perceptions the political constraints model derives 
the risk of future policy changes from the structure of the national political 
system by determining the number of independent national vetoes 
constraining governmental discretion. In this model a detailed analysis of the 
structure of the national political system is crucial for the assessment of 
political risks. 114 
111 See Tsebelis (1995). 
112 To illustrate this argument take the example of Mexico before the administration of 
president Zedillo. Although the Mexican political system had veto institutions as a 
judiciary, a parliament and federalism, de facto all veto players were aligned to or 
controlled by the executive branch. Therefore, de facto constraints of executive policy 
were nearly inexistent. 
113 In a different model by Zelner/Henisz (1999) also the intensity of interest group 
competition is seen as a decisive determinant of investment as it affects the likelihood that 
a firm's lobbying activities result in a favorable change of policy. In case of high interest 
group competition econometric evidence on electric utility investments shows that higher 
levels of political constraints (limited discretionary choice for policy makers) increases 
investment spending. 
114 An empirical measure that permits to measure the political constraints of the national 
government is presented in paragraph 3.3.5. 
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Figure 3.7: Determinants of Political Risk in the Political Constraints 
Model 
_J 
! 
Source: Own figure. 
The political constraint model uses no political science constructs such as 
autocracy or democracy, but reveals the ease with which a policy maker in a 
given country can change taxation, regulatory or other policies in a way that 
reduces the expected returns of MNEs. The interplay between political 
constraints and alignments between political actors is the decisive factor that 
influences investment spending. 
3.2.3 The Effective Party Approach 
DURHAM proposes a continuous measure founded on the concept of 
discretionary choice that permits to evaluate a government's ability to give 
credible commitments.115 Similar to HENISZ, DURHAM argues that policy out-
comes are determined by the degree of discretionary freedom of national 
governments. That is, regimes with constraints on governmental action can 
solve the aforementioned commitment problem by arranging political 
institutions in a way as to disable or render costly the exercise of discretionary 
authority of host governments. Based on this theoretical argument, DURHAM 
develops a measure capable of reflecting the discretionary freedom of 
politicians. He argues that the effective number of parties in government is a 
good proxy for the degree of discretionary freedom in a country because both 
internal party discipline and external competition between parties do limit the 
decisional freedom of politicians. 
115 See Durham (1999). 
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The effective number of parties N can be calculated by using the following 
simple formula: 
(3.1) 
I 
N = -.--
I,Pl2 
i=l 
where N is the number of effective parties and Pl represents the share of the 
total number of parliamentary seats the I-th party holds. In the case that each 
party holds an equal share of parliamentary seats N equals the actual number 
of parties that do exist in government. In case of an authoritarian government 
N becomes unity as the ruling party possesses all seats in parliament. 
However, for many real world political regimes not only the number of effective 
parties in the legislation is decisive, but also the degree of discretion in the 
executive branch. Correcting the measure by including the executive branch of 
government one obtains: 
I I 
- -+--
• n 
(3.2) L,Pl 2 I,Pe 2 
N = l =l e= l 
2 
where Pe is the number of effective parties in the executive branch. Like the 
model of HENISZ the effective party index has the great advantage to focus 
directly on the institutional characteristics of political systems, which are 
neglected by the traditional, outcome orientated, risk indices and to allow for 
distinguishing democratic countries according to their constitutional framework. 
A deficiency of this measure is that it is not possible to distinguish between 
benevolent dictators with the aim to foster economic development and 
malevolent dictators with the simple aim to maximize personal income. 
Comparing the growth rates of party-less dictatorships and single party 
regimes Durham finds that checks and balances limiting the degree of 
discretion are promoting economic growth. Furthermore, the econometric 
analysis shows that lower discretion in autocratic regimes increases invest-
ment.11s 
3.2.4 Synthesis and Hypothesis 
The previous discussion has shown that political risk is a complex 
multidimensional phenomenon. Since such diverse variables as a low protec-
tion of property rights, lacking rule of law, corruption, unlimited governmental 
discretion, the risk of civil strife, and an inefficient judiciary are all potentially 
influential for the investment decision process of MNEs, it follows that political 
risk assessment necessarily needs a broad focus. Nevertheless, the reviewed 
models permit to derive more precise hypotheses which may be empirically 
tested. Given the diversity of possible political risk sources a grouping of 
different risk factors is useful to facilitate the empirical analysis. Throughout 
the literature it is generally agreed that aggregate country risk is the result of 
116 See Durtlam (1999). 
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political, social and economic risk factors.117 Therefore, I formed three risk 
groups applying similar criteria. This clustering of risks indicators has the 
econometric advantage that degrees of freedom are preserved without loosing 
information about the sources of risk. However, it has to be underlined that 
these analytical categories of political risk are not intended to be mutually 
exclusive. 
First, there are political risks which are a direct consequence of governmental 
action or deficiencies in public administration. Expropriations, lacking rule of 
law, governmental corruption or discriminatory taxation are illustrative 
examples for this group of risk. In the presence of high uncertainty due to 
institutional deficiencies investment suffers because investors are not willing to 
commit resources in highly uncertain and volatile environments. Unless firms 
are confident that policies will remain reasonably stable over time, they will fail 
to invest. 118 Unconstrained governments however, cannot guarantee a basic 
continuity of policy that would limit investor uncertainty. 119 That is, countries 
with governments that are not subject to any form of political control or checks 
and balances imply higher risks for international investors as the probability of 
adverse future policy changes is higher. The HENISZ model shows that the 
feasibility of policy change can be measured by the existing number of 
effective vetoes. Thus, theory suggests that lower constraints increase the risk 
of policy variation resulting in lower investment flows. The inspection of other 
sources of governmental related risks shows that a major part of aggregate 
political risk is inherent to the political structure of the host country. Rather 
than being accidental, corruption and legal uncertainty for instance may be 
rooted in the deficient institutional setting of the host country. For Latin 
American countries it is to be expected that governance related risks like a 
lacking rule of law, unconstrained governments and high levels of political 
corruption have an important influence on foreign investment decisions. 
Therefore, it is expected that a governance indicator pooling different 
governance ratings has a significant and positive impact on FDI. 120 
Second, there are political risks like civil strife resulting from societal events 
and characteristics which are not directly caused by governmental action. 
Potentially influential characteristics of a given society are high poverty rates, 
distributive inequalities or lacking political inclusiveness. Theoretically, social 
instabilities as riots, civil wars or other forms of social unrest are important 
117 See Oetzel/Bettis/Zenner (2001) p.129. 
118 See World Bank (1997) p.36-45. 
119 The World Bank writes: " ... potentially the largest source of state-inflicted damage is 
uncertainty. If the state changes rules often, or does not clarify the rules by which the 
state itself will behave, business and individuals cannot be sure today what will be 
profitable tomorrow. They will then adopt costly strategies to insure against an uncertain 
future - by entering the informal economy, for example, or sending capital abroad- all of 
which impede development". World Bank (1997) p.32. 
120 To avoid confusion it has to be underlined that higher ratings of the governance indicator 
imply lower political risk. Therefore, higher governance ratings should have a positive 
impact on FOi. Unless explicitly mentioned the same logic applies to all other indicators 
that have been used. 
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potential sources of political risk as they lower social capital implying higher 
transactions cost or even cause a total loss of assets for investors. However, 
civil strife only becomes important for investors if assets or the production 
process are directly affected by societal tensions. If countries pass a critical 
threshold of political stability, as most emerging markets have, it is unlikely that 
societal tensions severely harm foreign investors. Therefore, it is to be ex-
pected that societal risk factors are of lesser importance for investors in Latin 
American countries. Despite of a high future potential for societal conflict 
caused by poverty and inequality, severe societal conflicts like civil wars, 
revolutions or riots that endanger foreign assets are not to be expected in the 
region.121 Therefore, the importance of societal risk factors for aggregate 
political risk should be comparatively low. In consequence an indicator of 
societal risk is expected to have a weak or insignificant impact on FDI flows to 
Latin American countries. 
Third, there are political risks emerging from factors that are studied by 
orthodox models of country risk focusing on hard macroeconomic data. High 
inflation, extensive national budget deficits, high volatility of the exchange rate 
or severe imbalances of the current account are good examples for influential 
variables in orthodox country risk analysis. Given the experience of foreign 
investors with a decade of severe macroeconomic imbalances following the 
debt crisis, it is to be expected that macroeconomic risk factors have an im-
portant influence on FDI flows to the region. Since sound macroeconomic 
policy, low inflation rates, moderate budget deficits and sound external debt 
contribute to lower political risks, an indicator of macroeconomic stability 
should be positively correlated with FDI flows to the region. 
The formulation of these hypotheses highlights that the econometric analysis 
in Chapter 4 does not only focus on the impact of aggregate political risk on 
FDI flows to Latin America but instead also analyzes the influence of sub-
groups of aggregate political risk, namely the risk exposure of foreign investors 
due to governmental behavior, societal risk factors and the macroeconomic 
environment. The empirical investigations in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 show 
which political risk factors are likely to have a major influence on the decisions 
of foreign investors in the Latin American region and Mexico respectively. 
3.3 Empirical Measures of Political Risks 
3.3.1 Overview 
The large variety of political risk determinants entails the empirical difficulty of 
correct measurement since appropriate risk indicators have to contain those 
macroeconomic, political and social characteristics of a host country which are 
potential sources of corporate losses. 122 Although the political risk analysis and 
121 Of course there are exceptions from higher social stability in Latin America as for example 
Colombia with its massive presence of guerilla activity and the Chavez government in 
Venezuela that provokes massive resistance in the population. 
122 Since orthodox country or macroeconomic risk factors are economically intuitive the 
following paragraphs focus on governmental and societal related risk factors. 
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insurance market by now offers a large quantity of indicators which are widely 
used by both private companies and academic researchers, empirical 
evidence suggests that their forecasting performance is limited.123 However, 
since alternate data sources are missing, political risk research, may it be for 
academic or for business purposes, requires the use of these indicators. 
Therefore, this paragraph discusses the efficiency of the most influential risk 
indicators which are used by managers and academics.124 In general MNEs 
can choose between four different methodologies for the assessment of 
political risks in host countries which are depicted in figure 3.8. 125 
Igure 38Mthdl : e 0 o ogIes m o ItIca IS . P I'. IR' kA na1ysIs 
METHODOI.OOY CHARACTERISTICS EVALUATION 
"Old Hands" Relying on opinions of professionals High predictability, low comparability 
with a high level of experience in a between countries 
particular region or country 
Delphi-T echnlques Builds on the Old-Hands method by Questionable operationalization of 
polling various experts through a variables, low predictability due to the 
common format absence of an explicit model 
Quantitative Measures Employing macro-level statistics to Low predictability due to the absence of 
generate models of political risk forecasts, not published often enough 
Grand Tour Investors visit the country to examine Cultural differences cloud perceptions, 
the micrerlevel variables with an impact low comparability due to subjective 
their project methods 
Source: Own figure 
Given the better availability of data and the inter-country comparability, I use 
indicators based on Delphi-Techniques and quantitative measures for the 
empirical research in Chapter 4 and 5. 126 Most of these political risk indicators 
are component-indicators which aggregate various sub-indicators to an 
aggregate measure of political risk. The country evaluations are usually made 
by experts that subjectively assign scores to each sub-indicator. The 
aggregate risk of countries is then calculated by generating a weighted sum of 
the different sub-categories and is supposed to reflect the risk exposure for 
exporters or investors in a given country. Beside these perceptional measures 
a risk indicator, which is objectively derived from the political structure of the 
host country, is presented . 
A country risk rating of the Economist which was first published in 1986 in the 
Economist Magazine received a lot of public attention.127 Although a real 
theoretical underpinning was lacking, the chosen determinants of risk offered a 
123 See Howell/Chaddick (1994). 
124 Due to the large variety of political risk indicators this review necessarily cannot be 
complete. Therefore, only those risk indicators which are presented in the International 
Handbook of Country Risk Analysis will be reviewed. The indices that have not been used 
for the empirical research in Chapter 4 and 5 will only be briefly presented. Indices that 
exclusively focus on macro-economic data are not discussed. 
125 For a more detailed discussion of the methods see Molano (2001) p.20-27. 
126 The case study on Mexico in Chapter 5 also uses qualitative assessments. 
127 See the review of Howell/Chaddick (1994 ). 
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picture that is reflective of the prevalent thinking among international investors. 
The rating presents a list of factors that contain economic, political and social 
variables as well as a scheme for weighting them to assess the climate to 
invest in countries. The composite risk index has a maximum of 100 points 
where 33 are attributed to economic factors, 50 to politics, and 17 to society. 
High scores of the aggregate index indicate a high level of risk while low 
scores reflect a good institutional environment for investment. The four social 
and six political variables that were considered as important determinants of 
FOi are depicted in figure 3.9. 
F" 1gure 3 S . I d P .9: oc1a an olit1cal Varia bl Id es in the Economist- n ex 
COMPONENT POINTS (MAX.) 
Bad Neighbors 3 
Authoritarianism 7 
Staleness 5 
Illegitimacy 9 
Generals in Power 6 
Wa/Armed Insurrection 20 
Urbanization Pace 3 
Islamic Fundamentalism 4 
Corruption 6 
Ethnic Tensions 4 
Source: Howell/Chaddick (1994). 
Staleness refers to the fact that after being in power for a certain period of time 
governments begin to get detached implying that the longer a government is in 
power the higher is the risk of complacency, delay and corruption so that a 
certain number of changes in government lowers political risk.128 Illegitimacy 
measures the acceptance of the current regime by the population proposing 
that a high degree of acceptance reduces the risk of civil strife and upheavals. 
With illegitimate governments persisting in power for a long time the future risk 
of civil strife or violent resistance grows. Similarly military governments re-
placing civilian governments reduce the probability of efficient governance. 
Apart from the physical destruction of the capital stock, war disrupts the 
economy in several other ways. Supplies of raw materials are delayed or 
allocated to war use, the principle of the rule of law is undermined, human 
capital is destroyed etc. Urbanization pace refers to the risks that accompany 
a rapid pace of urban centralization like for example an expansion of drug 
trade, crime and prostitution or extreme levels of urban poverty. Islamic 
fundamentalism is considered an important threat to foreign investors since 
host countries with a high fraction of Muslim radicals imply high risks for 
investors that are not Islamic. Corruption distorts economic incentives and 
poses a threat to foreign investors since high levels of corruption imply that 
investors have to use resources for political purposes that could otherwise 
have been used for value creating activities. Moreover, excessive levels of 
128 PRS Group expla ins high rates of governmental corruption in host countries with 
staleness. 
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corruption cause a low predictability of the future business environment. Ethnic 
Tensions imply risks for foreign investors because they may redirect govern-
ment attention and lead to higher rates of crime and civil unrest. 
The rating focuses on risks that have been classified as catastrophic and 
largely neglects relevant political risks of a more subtle nature. In particular the 
indicator does not include political risks resulting from creeping expropriations 
or a repudiation of contract which are of increasing importance in international 
finance. 129 HOWELLlCHADDICK tested the ability of the index to predict 
corporate losses for the period between 1987 and 1992. Examining the 
correlation of the risk index with a loss indicator constructed from US data 
provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) revealed 
that the ability of the Economist Rating to predict future corporate losses is 
low.130 This permits the conclusion that the Economist Model is not particular 
useful for measuring political risks for MNEs. 
Besides the risk rating published in the magazine the Economist Intelligence 
Unit offers a risk rating service for the private sector that is published 
periodically. The risk rating methodology of CRS examines risk from two 
distinct perspectives. First, aggregate risk is grouped in the analytical 
categories political risk, economic policy risk, economic structure risk and 
liquidity factors risk. Second, risk exposure associated with investing in 
particular types of assets, that is, specific investment risks, are distinguished. 
The published letter scores for risk range from A (lowest risk) to E (highest 
risk) . The measure of political risk is divided into two subcategories: political 
stability and political effectiveness. While the former evaluates whether the 
political situation of a given country is free of external or internal threats to 
security the latter criterion focuses on issues of good governance. Each of the 
two categories consists of several subindicators which are depicted in figure 
3.10. 
Fi ure 3.10: Political Risk Variables in the CRS-lndex 
POLITICAL ST ABILITY 
Wa, 
Social Unrest 
Orderly political transfer 
Politically motivated violence 
International disputes 
Source: Howell (1998). 
POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS 
Change in Government 
Institutional Effectiveness 
Bureaucracy 
Transparency, Fairness 
Corruption 
Cnme 
With the additional variables that evaluate political effectiveness in host 
countries the CRS index avoids the drawbacks of the older index which largely 
focused on catastrophic political risks. 
129 Although it can be argued that the probability of opportunistic government behavior is 
implicitly represented by the regime type variable, the coverage remains inappropriate. 
130 See Howell/Chaddick (1994). 
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The Business Risk Service (BRS) which is published three times a year since 
1978 by Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERi) offers information on 
political risks in 50 countries of the world. BERl's comprehensive 
recommendation concerning the risk exposure of firms in given countries is an 
average of three separate ratings. The Political Risk Index (PRI) is composed 
of ratings for ten political and social variables. The other two, the Operations 
Index and the Repatriation-factor include weighted ratings on 15 economic, 
financial and structural variables as well as an assessment of the country's 
legal framework. While the former index reflects the operating conditions in 
host countries the latter pictures risks connected with the repatriation of profits 
and access to foreign exchange. 
Like the Economist Index the BRS is based on scores assigned to different 
risk components by experts. For political risk variables experts can assign a 
maximum of 7 points to each of the ten subcomponents, with seven 
representing the lowest and O the highest of level risk. Therefore, an overall 
score of 70 corresponds to the lowest possible level of risk. The ten 
subvariables of the Political Risk Index are divided into three categories which 
are shown in figure 3.11: 
Figure 3.11: Components of the BERi- Political Risk Index 
CATEGORY OF RISK CoMPONENTS 
Internal Causes of Political Risk 
E><lernal Causes of Political Risk 
Symptoms of Political Risk 
Source: Howell (1998). 
• Fractionalization of the Polilica Spectrum 
• Fractionalization by Language and Ethnic"' Religious 
Groops 
• Restrictive measures to retain power 
• Mentality (xenophobia, nepotism, nationalism, corruption 
etc.) 
• Social conditions (wealth distribution, population density 
etc.) 
• Organization and strength of the radical left 
• Dependence on a Hostile Major Power 
• Negative Influences of Regional Political Forces 
• Societal Conflict (demonstrations, strikes, violence etc.) 
• Instability 
The present evaluation of these risks is supplemented by an assessment of 
the most likely future situation in 1,5 and 1 O years. A measure of aggregate 
political risk for investors is constructed by summing up the scores of each 
partial component weighted by their relative importance. Finally, 30 bonus 
points for particularly favorable business conditions may be added to the eight 
internal or external variables by the judging experts allowing for a maximum 
score of 100 points. The aggregation of the 1 O subcomponents and the 
number of bonus points reflects aggregate political risk, with a score of 100 
representing the lowest possible risk. 
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"Fractionalization of the political spectrum" represents the divisions among 
political perspectives in a society, with the number of perspectives seen as an 
indicator of low consistency and regularity in politics arguing that a high 
diversity of political or ideological thought results in an increased risk of 
political discontinuities.131 "Fractionalization by language, ethnic or religious 
groups" parallels the ethnic tension variable in the Economist-Index where a 
high degree of fractionalization implies a higher risk of civil unrest or violence. 
"Restrictive measures to retain power" is similar to the criterion 
authoritarianism in the Economist rating. 
The variable "mentality" includes such diverse dimensions as xenophobia, 
nationalism, corruption, nepotism and willingness to compromise making it a 
veritable "catch-all". Although each of the mentioned variables may intuitively 
be considered as a risk for MNEs, the aggregation of such diverse risk factors 
in one component makes an interpretation of the assigned score a difficult task 
and the rating somewhat arbitrary. The variable social conditions reflects the 
argument that high inequalities in society result in a higher probability of 
undesired societal developments as for example high crime rates, drug use 
and civil unrest. 
The two external determinants for political risk are "dependence on a hostile 
major power" and "negative influences of regional political forces". The former 
criterion parallels the "bad neighbor" variable of the Economist-Index based on 
the idea that the influence of major powers increases political risk in host 
countries. The latter criterion reflects the negative influences of political forces 
in a certain region and parallels the "trouble spots" argument in the Economist 
rating. The two variables measuring societal risks are "societal conflict" and 
"instability" where the former pictures every relevant form of civil strife that may 
have deterrent effects on private investment as for example demonstrations, 
strikes, riots etc and the latter political instability in countries as perceived by 
the number of non-constitutional changes, assassinations, guerilla wars, ethnic 
tensions etc. 
In addition to the quantification of each subindicator BERi provides score 
intervals as guidelines for the evaluation of political risks in host countries 
which are shown in figure 3.12. Like the Economist-Index the BERi-index 
largely focuses on events that are society-related and of catastrophic nature 
implying that the index is subject to the same criticism than the Economist-
Index. The capability of this index to correctly measure political risks however, 
is higher than that of the Economist index. 
131This argument is at odds with the political constraints approach that has been reviewed in 
paragraph 3.2.2. 
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Figure 3.12: Guidelines of Political Risk According to BERi 
BERi-iNDEX-SCORE 
100-70 
69-55 
54-40 
39-0 
Source: Howell (1998). 
LEVEL OF POLITICAL RISK 
Low Risk 
Political changes will not lead to conditions seriously adverse 
to business. No major sociopolWeal disturbances are expected. 
Moderate Risk 
Political changes seriously adverse to business have occurred 
in the past, but governments in power during the forecast 
period have a low probability of introducing such changes. 
Some demonstrations and strikes have a high probability of 
occurring. 
High Risk 
Political developments seriously adverse to business exist or 
could occur during the forecast period. Major sociopolitical 
disturbances, including sustained rioting, have a high 
probability of occurring periodically. 
Prohibitive Risk 
Political conditions severely restrict business operations. Loss 
of assets from rioting and insurgencies is possible. 
Disturbances are part of daily life. 
H0WELUBRADDICK empirically tested the predictive properties of the BERi 
index with the same loss indicator derived from OPIC-data. Although the BERi 
index performs considerably better than the Economist index in forecasting 
losses for private firms, its overall explanatory remains limited since it explains 
only 26% of the variance in the losses for the analyzed period from 1987-
1992.132 
3.3.2 The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
The International Country Risk Guide model for the forecasting of financial, 
economic and political risk was created in 1980.133 Its rating comprises 22 
variables in three sub categories of risk: political, financial and economic 
where the political risk category is given a 50% weight for the calculation of 
aggregate risk rating while the categories of financial and economic each have 
a weight of 25%. The political risk rating includes 12 weighted variables 
covering both political and social attributes where each component is assigned 
a maximum numerical value, with the highest number of points indicating 
lowest potential risk and vice versa. Political risk assessments are made on 
the basis of a subjective analysis of the available information by the PRS staff. 
Unlike other political risk indices the ICRG rating systematically considers the 
structure of the national political system as a determinant of political risk. 
Before evaluating political risks with a quantitative rating system analyzed 
countries are ordered by regime type. These classifications of political regimes 
are fundamental to the ICRG rating system as they reflect the basic premise 
that a growing degree of democracy in host countries reflects a higher 
132 See Howell/Chaddick (1994). 
133 If not cited otherwise the content of this paragraph is based on Howell (2001a). 
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accountability of national institutions which in turn implies a lower risk of 
political shocks. 134 The basic classifications of different regime types and their 
corresponding characteristics are shown in figure 3.13. 
Figure 3.13: Political Systems in ICRG 
TYPE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Accounlable Democracy 
Dominated Democracy 
De facto On••P• r1y Stele 
De Jure One0 Per1y Stat• 
Aut• rchy 
Source: Howell (2001a). 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Government or executive has not served more than two 
terms 
Free and fair elections for the legislature and executives 
determined by constitution or statue 
Active presence of more than one political party and a 
viable opposiUon 
Evidence of checks and balances among the three 
elements of government: executive, legislative and 
judicial 
Evidence of an independent judiciary 
Evidence of the protection of personal liberties through 
constitutional or other legal guarantees 
Government or executive has served more than two 
successive terms 
Free and fair elections for the legislature and executives 
determined by constitution or statue 
Active presence of more than one political party 
Evidence of checks and balances between executive, 
legislative and judicial 
Evidence of an independent judiciary 
Evidence of the protection of personal liberties 
Government or executive that has served more than two 
successive terms. or where the political or electoral 
system is designed or distorted to ensure the domination 
of governance by a particular government or executive 
Holding of regular elections as determined by constitution 
or statue 
Active presence of more than one political pa1y 
Evidence of restrictions on the activity of non-government 
political parties (such as disproportionate media access 
between the governing and the non-governing parties. 
harassment of the leaders and/or supporters of non-
government political parties, the creation of impediments 
and obstacles affecting only the non-government political 
parties, electoral fraud, etc.) 
A constitutional requirement that there be only one 
governing party 
Lack of any legally recognized opposition 
Leadership of the state by a group or single person, 
without being subject to any franchise, either through 
military might or inherited right 
134 This premise is in line with the analysis of the influence of regime type in paragraph 3.1.3. 
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Having classified the country to a category of government type each of a fixed 
number of other indicators is evaluated with a scoring model. After a risk 
assessment has been awarded to each of the 22 risk indicators all 
subcomponents are aggregated in an aggregate risk rating for each of the 
three basic risk categories (Political Risk, Financial Risk, Economic Risk). The 
12 components of the aggregate political risk rating and the maximum score 
which may be assigned to them are depicted in figure 3.14. 
Figure 3.14: Components of the ICRG Political Risk Index 
Source: Howell (2001a). 
COMPONENT 
Government Stability 
Socioeconomic Conditions 
Investment Profile 
Internal Conflicl 
E><ternal Conflict 
Corruption 
Military in Politics 
Religious Tensions 
Law and Order 
Ethnic Tensions 
Democratic Accountability 
Bureaucracy Quality 
POINTS (MAX.) 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
Government stability with a possible maximum of 12 points is a measure that 
basically reflects two criteria. First, the government's ability to carry out its 
declared programs and second, its ability to stay in office. This will depend on 
the type of governance, the cohesion of the government and governing party 
or parties, the closeness of the next election, the government's command of 
the legislature and the popular approval of government policies. The 
component socioeconomic conditions in turn, refers to the general public 
satisfaction with governmental economic policy. The greater the popular 
dissatisfaction with the current government the greater are the chances that it 
will be forced to change policy or that the government falls. Socioeconomic 
factors cover a broad spectrum of factors ranging from infant mortality and 
medical provision to housing and interest rates. It is important to stress that 
within this range different indicators may have different weights from society to 
society.135 Investment profile measures the government's attitude to inward 
investment and basically consists of an evaluation of expropriation risk, risk of 
contract repudiations, levels of taxation, restrictions on the repatriation of 
profits and labor costs. For the aggregate score expropriation and repudiation 
risks are weighted as most influential components of this subindicator. 
135 This implies that highly developed industrial countries may have a lower score than 
developing countries because a 2% rise in the unemployment rate is considered 
negligible in a society with unemployment rates around 30% but as politically influential in 
societies that are used to low unemployment rates. 
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Internal conflict is a measure that captures the degree of political violence and 
its influence on governance in host countries. The lowest ratings are usually 
given to countries with an ongoing civil war while the highest values are 
assigned to those where there is no armed opposition and the government 
does not indulge in arbitrary violence. Intermediate ratings are awarded on the 
basis of whether threats are posed to government and business or just to 
business, whether the violence has a political purpose (terrorism), whether 
violent groups are well-organized, whether the violence is sporadic or 
sustained and whether it is restricted to a certain area or region. External 
conflict in turn, is an assessment of risk to government or inward investment 
originating from actions outside the country. Possible sources are trade 
restrictions, embargoes, geopolitical disputes, armed threats, border 
incursions, foreign supported insurgency and warfare. External conflicts 
adversely affect investment in various ways ranging from restrictions on 
operations to violent changes in society. 
The sub-index corruption is a measure of corruption within the political system 
of the host country. The most common forms of corruption met directly by 
business are demands for special payments and bribes connected with 
permits, licenses and tax assessments. Moreover, the measure takes into 
account corruption in form of excessive patronage, nepotism and secret party 
funding. According to PRS Group an additional risk for investors in such 
corruption is that at some time it becomes so overweening that a public 
scandal may provoke the fall or overthrow of the government, a major 
reorganizations of the country's political institutions or in the worst case a 
breakdown in law and order rendering the country ungovernable. The rating of 
the likelihood of corruption in the framework of the ICRG is subject to the 
assumption that the risk of corruption is correlated to the time the government 
is in power. The component military in politics assesses the involvement of the 
military in the political decision process. Besides a diminution of democratic 
accountability high military involvement poses the threat that elected govern-
ments change their policy due to military pressure. The greatest risks are 
implied by the threat or the actual implementation of a military regime. 
Although a military regime may provide stability in the short run, the long run 
effect will be rather destabilizing as the system becomes corrupt or creates an 
armed opposition. 
Religious tensions may stem from the domination of society or governance by 
a single religious group seeking to replace civil law by religious law in order to 
exclude other rel igious groups from the political process. Foreign investors 
may be affected by civil dissent or performance requirements due to religious 
reasons. The variable "law and order" describes the strength and impartiality of 
the legal system and the popular observance of law. The component "ethnic 
tensions" pictures the degree of tensions within a country attributable to racial , 
nationality or language divisions. "Democratic accountability" measures how 
responsive the government is to its people since durable low levels of 
responsiveness increase the probability that the government will fall. As 
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democratically elected governments also implement policies that are not 
approved by the population it is important to note that democratic 
accountability is not guaranteed by fair elections. The quality of the 
bureaucracy tends to function as a shock absorber for the practical 
implementation of measures when government policy changes abruptly. 
Countries that have a strong bureaucracy receive higher ratings as the risk of 
drastic changes in policy is lower. On the contrary, countries with a weak 
bureaucracy intensify the risk of being subject to drastic policy swings. 
H0WELUCHADDICK evaluated the performance of the ICRG in predicting 
corporate losses for the period between 1987-1992 concluding that the ICRG 
performed better in forecasting losses than all other indicators that have been 
reviewed. Of particular influence were the sub-variables "exchange controls", 
"international liabilities" and "repatriation restrictions" .136 The ICRG has also 
been widely used as a proxy for political risk in empirical studies on the impact 
of national institutional quality on investment and growth. ERB ET AL. show that 
the ICRG performs satisfactorily in explaining expected fixed income 
returns. 137 Because of its good predictive performance, the good data 
availability and the coverage of the characteristics of the political system in the 
host country, the ICRG is a suitable measure for political risk caused by 
societal events or governmental action. The next paragraph presents a 
measure of political risk which is not based on the aggregation of 
subcomponents but instead directly derived from the structure of the political 
system in the host country. 
3.3.3 The POLCON-lndex 
The POLCON-lndex is based on the Political Constraints approach by HENISZ 
that has been presented in paragraph 3.2.2. It is based on the conviction that 
discretionary freedom of government increases the risk of future policy swings 
which negatively affects private investment. To test this hypothesis HENISZ 
created the political constraints index (POLCON) which may be used for 
empirical research. The index shows the extent to which the executive is 
constrained in its choice of future policies by other societal institutions. As 
argued earlier high constraints on host country governments imply that a future 
variation from the status quo policy becomes less likely. This in turn, reduces 
the risk that MNEs are affected by arbitrary policy changes of the current 
government, allowing for the conclusion that higher political constraints reduce 
the political risk of investing in a country and vice versa. As pointed out before 
governments are constrained most effectively by vetoes in the political system 
because effective veto players decrease governmental discretion resulting in a 
lower feasibility of abrupt policy changes. 
The POLCON index takes values between O and unity. Values approaching 
unity represent high political constraints and low governmental discretion while 
values approaching zero reflect low levels of constraints and high 
136 See Howell/Chaddick (1994). 
137 See Erb et al. (1996). 
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governmental discretion. Because of homogenous preferences or possible 
alignments between actors, the number of de-jure veto players is not sufficient 
to picture the level of political constraints. If, for example, judges are appointed 
and controlled by the ruling party, a simple count of the number of vetoes 
would significantly over-evaluate the level of political constraints because the 
homogenous preferences of the two actors do not imply an effective constraint 
for the executive. It follows that veto players which have similar preferences or 
are aligned to other players only have limited constraining impact. 
The POLCON index is constructed by using a spatial model of political choice 
based on data extracted from political science databases. For each nation it 
considers the number of independent branches of government with veto power 
over policy change (executive, lower and upper chambers, judiciary and sub-
federal institutions). The preferences of these branches and the status quo-
policy are assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, 
unidimensional policy space. Considering possible alignments between 
different veto players POLCON is modified using data on the party 
composition of executive and legislative branches. Denoting political actors 
with E for executive and L for legislative branch the preferences of each actor 
can be written as: 136 
Assume that the status quo policy Xo and the preferences of all actors are in-
dependently and identically drawn from a uniformly distributed unidimensional 
policy space [0, 1] and that every actor has a veto over the final policy 
decision. The utility of a political actor I with a policy outcome Xis given by: 
where U, ranges from a maximum of zero (when X=XI) to a minimum of -1 
(when X=0 and X1 =1 or vice versa. The variable of interest to investors is how 
much political actors are constrained in their choices of future policy, which 
may be calculated as (1-level of political discretion). Discretion is measured as 
the expected range of policy which all participating players can agree upon. 
Consider the case of a country where the executive is unchecked. Because 
the executive always attains the policy outcome XE corresponding to its 
maximum of utility, discretion equals 1 and the level of political constraints 
becomes 1-1=0. With a growing number of independent veto players 
discretion decreases and political constraints grow. In a country with an 
executive that is controlled by an effective unicameral legislature L the 
executive has to win the support of the legislative chamber to implement policy 
change. Now to maximize utility the executive can only achieve the outcome 
138 The following is based on Henisz (2002a) and Henisz (2000b). 
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that is closest to XE and in line with the preferences of L. Assuming that 
preferences are drawn independently and identically from a uniform 
distribution makes it possible to express the expected difference between two 
actors as 
3.5 1/(n + 2) 
with n being the number of actors. Considering the two players E and L the 
initial draw yields an expected differential of preferences of ¼ (1/(2+2) 
resulting in six possible preference orderings in the policy space that are 
assumed to be of identical likelihood. 139 All possible preference orderings are 
depicted in figure 3.15 with the rows of E indicating the range of outcomes 
preferred by the executive to the status quo Xo and the row of L standing for 
the outcomes preferred to the status quo by the legislative.140 In the first and 
second ordering there is no other attainable policy outcome than the status 
quo because the preferences of the executive and the legislative do not over-
lap. As both of them enjoy a definite veto power over final decisions the 
keeping of the status quo is the only attainable solution of the policy game and 
no change in policy is to be expected in this case. Therefore, discretion about 
policy change equals 0 which implies a value of political constraints of 1 (1-
0=1). 
In preference ordering 3 executive and legislative only agree upon a policy that 
is situated between ¼ and ¾ of the unidimensional policy space. Discretion of 
policy makers thus equals ½ implying a value of political constraints of ½. The 
same holds for the preference orderings 4-6 resulting in a political constraints 
score of ½ for each of these settings. When all six preference orderings have 
the same probability of occurrence the overall value of political constraints for 
the case of two veto players becomes ( 1+1 + ½ + ½ + ½ ½ ) / 6 = 2/3 
compared to the score of 0 for an unchecked executive. 
With growing numbers of veto players political constraints on the executive as 
measured by this index are increasing indicating that additional de-jure veto 
players reduce discretionary freedom of policy makers. However, it is 
important to stress that this value of constraints is solely based on the number 
of de jure veto points, that is, it neglects the de facto impact of the veto on the 
extent to which a policy maker is constrained in his choice. Therefore, 
POLCON has to be corrected by taking into account the preferences of the 
players and alignments between veto institutions. 
139 The Index measures the feasibility of policy change in a country. Therefore, the keeping of 
the status quo is considered as being a quasi player. Although the status quo is no veto-
player, the POLCON Index considers it as being an alternative to change. Therefore, it 
has to be considered in the preference orderings of the game. 
140 Note that for reasons of expositional convenience the preference orderings are centered 
on the unit line. As long as the expected difference between any two preferred points 
remains one quarter, the quantitative results remain insensitive to the absolute location of 
these points. 
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Figure 3.15: Preference Orderings with Two Veto Players 
Political Constraints 0 1/4 1/2 3/4 
PO 1 1 
Xe Xo Xu 
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE 
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL 
0 1/4 1/2 3/4 
P02 1 
Xu Xo XE 
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEE 
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL 
0 1/4 1/2 3/4 
P03 1/2 
Xo Xs XLI 
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEE 
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL 
0 1/4 1/2 3/4 
P04 1/2 
Xo Xu Xe 
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE 
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL 
0 1/4 1/2 3/4 
POS 1/2 
Xe, XLI Xo 
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE 
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL 
0 1/4 1/2 3/4 
P06 1/2 
Xu Xe, Xo 
l: 2/3 EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE 
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL 
Source: Henisz (2002a) p.54 
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It is straightforward to see that for the previous example of two veto institutions 
an alignment between both players would significantly change the level of 
constraints. For the polar case that both actors are completely aligned the 
value for executive discretion would equal 1 resulting in a political constraints 
measure of O equal to the score of an unchecked executive and vice versa. 
Therefore, complete alignments may be analyzed without expanding the 
model. 
Problems arise when political actors are neither completely aligned nor 
completely independent. To capture this effect the index has to be modified by 
incorporating the party composition in different branches of government. If the 
party controlling the executive also possesses a majority in the legislature, the 
level of political constraints is negatively correlated with the concentration of 
that majority because allied legislatures with great majorities are less costly to 
manage. If in contrast the legislature is dominated by a majority of the 
opposition party, higher fractionalization leads to a loss of opposition strength 
and diminishes political constraints. Hence, with higher fractionalization of an 
opposition which dominates the legislative branch political constraints are 
converging to the scores of a non-checked executive and vice versa. To cover 
these effects the de jure POLCON-lndex is adjusted with a fractionalization 
index measuring the fractionalization of the legislature 
3.6 
" [(n; -1)~!.l 
Fl=I-I N 
;=i N-1 
where n is the number of parties, n; the number of seats held by the nth party 
and N the total number of seats. Since this formula measures the probability 
that two random draws from the legislature are from different parties, a high 
value of equation 3.6 represents a highly fractionalized legislature and vice 
versa. The final score of the POLCON depends on the level of de jure veto 
rights and the extent to which political actors are aligned with each other. 
When the executive is aligned with the legislature the value of POLCON can 
be calculated by taking the sum of the political constraint value for full 
alignment and the product of the fractionalization index with the difference 
between the independent and the completely aligned values. Then POLCON 
becomes: 
3.7 POLCON = POLCONA +Fl*(POLCON1 -POLCONA) 
Assume that the Fl index is ¼, which means that congress is dominated by 
one party. With two national de-jure vetoes and the same party controlling 
executive and legislature a fractionalization index that equals ¼ implies that 
POLCON becomes: 
3.8 POLCON = O+ I/ 4*(2/3-0) = 1/6 
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The result 1/6 is intuitively correct because it reflects the higher discretion of 
the executive resulting from a less fractionalized legislature that is dominated 
by the same party. With falling levels of fractionalization the score of POLCON 
converges to the value for complete alignment. If in turn, the legislature is 
dominated by an opposition party, lower fractionalization has exactly the 
opposite effect because it strengthens opposition power and reduces govern-
mental discretion. The formula for calculating POLCON changes to: 
3.9 POLCON = POLCONA +( I -F!)*(POLCON1 - POLCONA ) 
For our example of two veto players and a fractionalization index of 1/4 this 
implies the following value of POLCON: 
3. to POLCON = 0+ (I - 1/ 4) *(2 / 3 - 0)= 1/ 2 
For reasons of symmetry also this result is in line with expectations as a rather 
homogenous opposition in the legislature limits discretion of the executive re-
sulting in high levels of political constraints. The next paragraph gives a critical 
evaluation of the risk indices that have been discussed before. 
3.3.4 Critical Evaluations of Political Risk Indices 
The preceding paragraphs discussed several political risk indicators and their 
ability to correctly predict future corporate losses for foreign investors. Table 
3.1 summarizes the main focus, the weaknesses and strengths of these 
political risk indices. The indices that have been discuss~d in the previous 
paragraphs may be classified into two groups First, composite indicators 
consisting of several subvariables which have been assigned a score by 
country experts and second, continuous measures, namely POLCON, which 
may be objectively derived from the political system in the host country. 
Although the predictive value of most composite indicators was found to be 
limited, they are widely used in international finance due to their intuitive logic 
and their comparably simple construction. 141 For many host countries and in 
particular for fairly developed emerging markets however, the large weight of 
catastrophic events compared to other risk factors is a drawback. Among the 
composite indicators that have been reviewed above the ICRG seems most 
appropriate for empirical purposes because it also recognizes more subtle 
141 Testing the ability to correctly predict major currency devaluation Oetzel/Bettis/Zenner 
(2001) found that most of the commonly used indicators had a weak predictive 
performance. In their analysis the ICRG performed best. However, as Drabek/Payne 
(2001) convincingly argue, even if risk indicators are weak predictors of company losses 
they still influence corporate investment decisions. That is, the considered indices are 
influential for investment decisions even if they rather mirror risk perceptions than real risk 
exposure. 
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political risks and its predictive capability was found to be comparatively 
high.142 
Table 3.1: Main Characteristics of Political Risk Indicators 
INDICATORS INDICATOR TYPE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS 
Economist Index Composite lndicato< . Focus on catastrophic events . Neglect of political structure in the home country 
(exception: authoritarian government and generals 
in power) . Expropriation risks and operational restriction risks 
are missing . Empirical analysis shows limited predictive 
capacity 
Country Risk Services Index (CRS) Composite Indicator . Focus on catastrophic and structural risk factors . No empirical evidence on predictive capacity 
BERi index Composite lndicato, . Focus on catastrophic and structural risk factors . Empirical evidence shows limited predictive 
capacity 
ICRG Composite Indicator . Focus on catastrophic and structural risk factors . Convincing empirical evidence on predictive 
capacity 
POLCON Continuous Indicator . Objectively derived from political system in the 
host country . Focuses on governmental-related political risk . Measures the reasibility of lulure policy changes . Neglects societal related sources of risk 
Source: Own table 
In addition to the criticism concerning each of the presented indicators, it is 
important to make a few general remarks about composite indicators. The 
Economist-Index, the CRS Index, the BERi-index and the ICRG all share the 
common property of being the results of subjective perceptions about the 
current and future situation in host countries. Therefore, the quality of the risk 
assessment entirely depends on the qualification and the information 
processing capacity of the judging persons. Although the evaluation of risks is 
done by experts, it is important to stress that these country ratings are 
vulnerable for personal errors or manipulations. 143 Of particular relevance for 
foreign investors is the risk that the individual perceptions of experts are rather 
based on recent trends than guided by fundamental probabilities of political 
risk in the future. If investors invest in emerging markets with high growth rates 
leading to a reduction of risk perceptions for this country, it does not 
necessarily follow that the true risk exposure of these markets really declined. 
Instead, independent from past experiences the probability of opportunistic 
changes in governmental policy, which can imply hazards for foreign investors, 
142 Other risk measures have not been used for the empirical analysis either because it was 
cost prohibitive to purchase them, because country ratings were only available for short 
time periods or because the access was limited by the publisher. 
143 This argument is also made by Bubnova (2000) p.19-20. 
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remains unchanged.144 Moreover, expert evaluations may be biased by 
hysteresis-effects meaning that past risks still have a considerable impact on 
present or future risk perceptions. In particular catastrophic political risks 
arising massive public attention are likely to influence long term political risk 
ratings even if the causes of risk are by now absent. The resulting path-
dependency of risk ratings implies that current ratings may not picture the true 
risk exposure for MNEs and that investment decisions solely based on 
composite risk indicators may therefore result in missed business opportunities 
due to an unjustified over-evaluation of host country risk. Furthermore, 
perceptional indices have a tautological nature because it is hardly surprising 
that investors engage less in countries that are publicly perceived as risky. 
However, when experts err in predicting political risks in host countries 
perceptual measures of political risk only picture the expert's personal view of 
the country while hardly revealing anything about real sources of risk. If the 
predictions of the evaluating staff rely on models that lack the necessary 
sophistication composite risk indices may be totally misleading. All these 
drawbacks of composite political risk indices permit the conclusion that the 
predictive value of composite indices remains limited and that investment 
decisions should not be solely based on these measures. 145 
Another drawback of these measures becomes obvious when composite risk 
indicators are used for empirical research on FDI inflows because aggregation 
makes the derivation of policy implications more difficult. If aggregate index 
scores are found to be influential for FDI the results do not permit to precisely 
identify the underlying sources of risk since the mere result that political risk is 
influential for incoming FDI does not indicate which sub-risk are of particular 
importance and how those risks can be mitigated . In other words, finding a 
political risk index to be a significant obstacle to FDI does not reveal if the 
government has to improve the macroeconomic environment or to strengthen 
the enforcement of property rights to attract higher inflows of FDI. Therefore, 
empirical research on FDI should also determine the most influential risk 
factors in order to permit deriving strategies for the mitigation of political 
risks.146 
Additional problems of many risk indicators stem from the fact that the 
characteristics of the political system in host countries and in particular regime 
type are largely ignored. Although economic theory argues that democracies 
should have higher investment rates than autocratic countries, the empirical 
evidence is often at odds with this conclusion. 147 While for example Russia 
receives significantly higher values for democracy than for example Taiwan or 
144 See Zelner/Henisz (1999). 
145 See Zelner/Henisz (1999). 
146 Therefore, the empirical part uses different categories of political risk that allow for the 
identification of the underlying risk sources. 
147 See the theoretical discussion about the influence of regime type in paragraph 3.1. 3. that 
concludes that well functioning democracies in fact decrease risks for investors. However, 
these credibility enhancing effects only occur if democratic systems are well functioning, 
that is, if systems do not have to be considered as defect democracies. 
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Singapore the investment climate is obviously better in latter countries. 
Therefore, the pure classification of countries with political science constructs 
as democracy or authoritarian rule does not permit to evaluate a host country's 
investment climate. The POLCON Index avoids these problems because it is 
objectively derived from the structure of the political system in host countries. 
Therefore, it is not subject to the critique of being tautological or biased by the 
perceptions of experts. Instead of focusing on perceptions that may be 
influenced by past trends, it pictures the ability of governments to give a 
credible commitment to current policy. Since POL CON reflects the feasibility of 
arbitrary policy changes in host countries it should be capable of measuring 
the fraction of political risks that originates in governmental action, in particular 
risks of expropriation, creeping expropriation, repudiation of contracts, 
discriminatory taxation and so on. The forward looking nature of the index 
avoids the problems of backward oriented composite indicators. In turn, 
POLCON does not reflect risks that do not directly originate in governmental 
action. All risks with societal or external origins are ignored by POLCON which 
leads to a systematic underrating of risk when decisions are solely based on 
this indicator. As catastrophic risks can cause a total loss of assets the under-
valuation of these risks is severe in politically unstable countries with a high 
probability of revolutions, armed conflicts, riots etc. Although many emerging 
markets currently have a low probability for catastrophic events, this argument 
clearly limits POLCON's suitability as risk indicator. Moreover, POLCON is not 
capable of picturing de facto political practices that deviate from the de jure 
rules of the constitution. Due to its technical derivation without a closer 
analysis of the political situation in host countries the index may over- or 
undervalue the level of political constraints . 148 
Therefore, a true political risk assignment necessarily has to consider both 
approaches, composite indicators and POLCON, as important determinants of 
risk for FOi projects. By applying a two-step-method which uses both 
indicators in the risk assessment process the danger of a misleading risk 
evaluation becomes lower. However, there is another important limit on the 
validity of all country risk indicators. As pointed out before determinants of FOi 
depend to a large extent on the individual characteristics of investment 
projects. In addition the theoretical analysis of investment decisions under un-
certainty revealed that different degrees of reversibility imply different impacts 
of uncertainty on investment decisions. It is obvious that also the decisions of 
real world investors vary largely with the characteristics of the planned invest-
ment project. 149 Investors with high shares of sunk cost for example should be 
146 The case study on Mexico in Chapter 5 shows that in the Mexican case POLCON 
systematically overvalues the level of political constraints because constitutional rules and 
de-facto politics differ considerably. See Chapter 5. 
149 See Howell (2001b) and Markwick (2001 ). The empirical research of Fatehi/Safizadeh 
(1994) reveals that sociopolilical instabilities had a different impact on FDI in 
manufacturing and extractive industries. The fact that the impact of political risk was 
higher in extractive industries indicates that higher irreversibility has an impact on the 
investment decision. Kwon (2002) argues that vertical and export oriented FDI are less 
sensitive to political risk than horizontal and market-oriented FDI because government 
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more sensitive to expropriation threats than investors in footloose industries. 
Therefore, an ideal political risk index should vary with the needs of the 
investor and the characteristics of the project. In other words, political risk 
indicators that perform well in the oil industry are not necessarily ideal for tele-
communications investment and vice versa. Although highly relevant, this 
common problem can hardly be avoided in empirical investigations on the 
macro level. Nevertheless, an interpretation of empirical results has to 
consider this drawback of political risk indicators. 
The discussion shows that political risk assessment is a comrclex process that 
should not be entirely led by standardized methods. 1 0 Although the 
econometric study of FOi in Chapter 4 requires standardization, the case study 
on Mexico in Chapter 5 permits to simultaneously use quantitative indicators 
and qualitative reasoning for the risk assessment. Summing up, despite of the 
indicated limitations of the reviewed risk indices they are the most powerful 
available tool for empirical research on the impact of political risks on FOi. 
Therefore, these variables are used in the panel analysis in Chapter 4 studying 
the impact of political risk variables on FDI inflows to Latin American countries 
as well as in the case study in Chapter 5 for the quantification of political risk 
exposure in Mexico. The next paragraph discusses risk mitigation strategies 
for countries with high levels of political risk. 
3.4 Mitigating Political Risk 
3.4.1 Overview 
Having exposed the risks factors that are influential for the investment 
decisions of MNEs the following paragraphs analyze how political risk may be 
efficiently mitigated by host country governments. The emergence of risk 
mitigation and investment promotion efforts are a result of the fierce 
competition among host governments for the attraction of FOi. Although this 
competition is not an entirely new phenomenon, its aggressiveness and 
intensity is constantly increasing. 151 This development is of particular 
relevance to developing countries with a high demand for external finance 
because only those countries will attract considerable amounts of FOi that 
provide location specific assets as infrastructure, skills and an attractive 
institutional environment. 152 Consequently during the last years a process of 
policy adjustments and promotional campaigns initiated among potential host 
countries to attract foreign investors. 153 Even developing countries that 
traditionally did not have the necessity to compete for FOi due to the existence 
incentives for expropriation are higher in the latter. His empirical findings however, only 
offer weak support for this theoretical hypothesis. 
150 As recognized in the Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis: "Political Risk 
analysis is an art, not a laboratory science which lends itself to precise predictions" ... . 
"Numerical ratings are of very little value unless they are backed by written, qualitative 
assessment, to explain how the analyst came to a conclusion." See Howell (1998) p.61. 
151 Wells et al. (2001) offer some reasons for the intensification of the competition for 
international investments. See Wells et al. (2001) p.1-7. 
152 See Lall (2002) p.331 . 
153 See Wheeler/Mody (1992). 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
132 POLITICAL RISK AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
of vast natural resources or a large domestic market have begun initiatives to 
attract export-oriented FOi. This new competitive environment has prompted 
analogies between competition among governments for FOi and competition 
among companies for market shares. Given the similarities of the situations, 
countries may adopt marketing strategies that parallel those of private 
companies. In analogy to the variables product, price and promotion countries 
can essentially manipulate three variables to attract higher FOi flows: 154 
1. Intrinsic advantages or disadvantages of the investment site (Analogy to product characteristics) 
2. The cost to investors of locating and operating within the investment site (Analogy to product 
price) 
3. Activities that disseminate information about, or attempt to create a positive image of the 
investment site and provide investment services (Analogy to product promotion) 
From these general investment promotion possibilities host countries choose 
the appropriate "marketing mix'' which permits attracting the desired amount of 
FOi at the lowest possible cost. While industrial countries often initiate general 
campaigns to create a positive image of the national investment climate 
developing countries usually initiate promotion efforts which are more directly 
targeted at investors that are likely to be attracted.155 
3.4.2 National Mitigation Strategies 
3.4.2.1 Investment Incentives, Social Standards and Environmental 
Legislation 
A widely discussed policy for the mitigation of political risks is decreasing 
location and operation cost of MNEs by granting investment incentives.156 In-
vestment incentives can be defined as a package of fiscal- and economic-
related inducements that are offered by host governments with the goal of 
attracting higher FOi inflows.157 The basic idea of this approach is 
straightforward. Instead of directly mitigating high levels of political risk by 
policy reforms international investors are compensated for their additional risk 
exposure by higher returns. Governmental incentives can take various forms 
as for example tax grants, lower prices for land, the provision of additional 
infrastructure etc. 158 Following a profit maximization view MNEs will invest 
more if they are confronted with relatively low taxes or other investment 
incentives as the net return on capital is increasing. According to this view 
economic and fiscal policies of host countries are a primary motivating factor 
for MNEs as these policies ameliorate or counter the risk and uncertainty 
found in developing countries. While in the first place the concept seems to be 
154 Therefore, Wells et al. speak of "marketing a country" when referring to investment 
promotion. See Wells et al. (2001 ). 
155 See Wells et al. (2001) p.42-47. The authors also argue that usually big countries need 
less marketing efforts as their large national market is sufficient to attract international 
investors. See Wells et al. (2001) p. 178-180. 
156 Labelling investment incentives as national risk mitigation strategy is problematic because 
it is rather a means of curing symptoms than reasons. However, as it is a widely practised 
"national strategy" it is discussed under 3.4.2. 
157 See Billet (1991) p.64. 
,sa See Guisinger (1986) p.82 -83 for an overview of possible investment incentives. 
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a suitable means of promoting FOi, a closer look identifies many drawbacks of 
such a strategy. 159 
First, whatever measure is taken to attract foreign companies incentives, imply 
a high cost to the host government. 160 Tax incentives for instance mean 
foregone future tax flows while other measures as the provision of additional 
infrastructure are a direct burden for public finances. Due to these fiscal losses 
the potential benefits of FOi on the host economy are reduced. 161 Moreover, 
incentive regimes usually impose high administrative costs which further 
reduce the net benefit of incoming FOi. 162 Thus, a rationally deciding govern-
ment should carefully weight the potential benefits of the foreign productive 
engagement against the cost of incentive provision. Additionally, it may be 
argued that in some cases governments waste fiscal resources for the 
attraction of companies that would have invested anyway. Moreover, the 
offering of a generous investment incentive package may be even an adverse 
signal for MNEs deterring investment as international investors perceive the 
incentives as an effort to compensate for other major deficiencies of the in-
vestment climate. 163 Consequently, recent empirical evidence suggests that 
incentives only make a difference between competing countries when the 
basic, more important conditions are comparable. It follows that incentives will 
not make up for serious deficiencies in the investment environment which can 
often be found in developing countries. 164 
Second, as by definition incentives are limited to foreign investors their 
competitive advantage is fostered. In most developing countries local 
competitors already suffer from competitive disadvantages due to lacking 
financial resources and technology. If specific investment incentives are 
granted they are more severely affected by the lack of a level playing field. If, 
as a consequence, MNEs completely dominate the domestic market creating 
an un-competitive market structure the potential benefits of FOi are further 
reduced . While domestic reforms that ameliorate the investment climate in 
host countries offer a "double-dividend" investment incentives do not benefit 
159 The empirical evidence on the FOi enhancing impact of investment incentives is at best 
weak. See the overview in Moriset/Pirnia (2002). Although Guisinger (1986) and 
Loree/Guisinger (1995) find a significant positive impact of investment incentives, they 
argue that the incentives become inefficient when other countries also grant them. 
160 Oman (2001) reports that amounts spent on incentives rose considerably during the last 
years. While incentive payments ranged between 17000 to 51000 US$ per created job in 
the mid 80s during the 90s these payments ranged from 94000 to 420000 US$. It is 
estimated that Daimler-Chrysler received subsidies of 340000 US$ (largely in the form of 
tax holidays) per created job for an investment in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. 
161 Empirical research by Wells et al. shows that tax incentives are less cost efficient than 
other investment promotion techniques without transfers to MNEs. See Wells et al. (2001) 
p.121-129. 
162 See Moriset/Pimia (2002) p.285. 
163 See Billet (1991) p.67 and Oman (2000) p.115. Investors with rational expectations would 
not invest in this case, because they anticipate to be affected by higher levels of political 
risk in the future. 
164 See Oman (2001) p.68 and Morisset/Pirnia (2002) p.277-288. 
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domestic investors which entails a skewed competition between MNEs and 
domestic producers. Moreover, these subsidies may act to reduce societal 
welfare. 
Third, investment incentives do not eliminate domestic sources of political risk. 
Therefore, incentives are more a means of reducing symptoms than of curing 
the reasons for political risk. Even if the strategy of attracting FDI turns out to 
be successful, incentives are no sustainable solution for the problem of lacking 
investment due to high-risk environments.165 
Considering these direct and indirect costs of an incentive-based strategy its 
overall long term efficiency seems at least questionable. 166 The ambiguous 
economic implications of an investment incentive strategy arises the question 
of why countries actually implement such a strategy. Policy reform often is a 
lengthy process that may produce results that are not as far reaching as 
initially intended. Furthermore, it is hard to demonstrate for a government that 
it is really intending to continue the reform path despite of popular pressure. 
Therefore, governments of high risk countries that are on the path of reform 
suffer from a serious credibility problem that may in the first place impede 
favorable reactions of international investors. To solve this problem, national 
governments may have to engage in granting incentives to compensate inter-
national investors for their lack of credibility. Hence, incentives may indeed be 
efficient in the short run to compensate for the effects of lacking governmental 
credibility. Nevertheless, in the long run the strategy will rather produce 
undesirable results. Therefore, if they are granted at all , investment incentives 
should be timely limited to avoid these negative consequences.167 
Theoretically, attracting investment to high risk environments by low social or 
environmental standards is similar to FDI promotion by incentives. Again the 
focus of governmental efforts is not to solve the problems that are entailing 
high risk levels but to compensate international investors by offering social or 
environmental legislation that is considerably weaker than in other countries. 168 
165 Wells et al. (2001) argue that investment incentives are counterproductive because they 
tend to delay the implementation of reforms which are more likely to affect the investment 
decision. Oman (2001) argues that incentives may attract the wrong kinds of investors 
who do not stay beyond the duration of the subsidies limiting positive spillovers on the 
host country economy. 
166 This argument is used by the IFC. See CFI (1997). The empirical results concerning the 
effectiveness of investment incentives are ambiguous. See Billet (1991) p.61-80 and 
Moriset/Pirnia (2002). Blomstrom/Kokko (2003) state that investment incentives only have 
welfare enhancing effects for host countries when foreign direct investments generate 
positive externalities that outweigh the cost of granting incentives. They continue arguing 
that investment incentives which exclusively focus on foreign investors are not an efficient 
way to increase national welfare. 
167 Chapter 5 will analyze the importance of the investment incentive strategy for the case of 
Mexico. 
168 Oman argues that the effectiveness of low environmental and labor standards as tools to 
attract FOi are limited. In ear1ier work he does not find evidence for the hypothesis that 
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The cost difference that is generated by these lower standards is similar to 
granting incentives. It is straightforward to see that a national strategy based 
on lowering standards is not sustainable in the long run since environmental 
and social costs diminish societal welfare that is supposed to be created by 
the enhanced presence of foreign investors. Concerning the ongoing debate 
about social standards as measures of protection for industrial countries it is 
important to stress that it is unrealistic to demand similar environmental and 
social standards for industrialized and developing countries since lower 
standards in developing countries are not necessarily signs of social dumping 
or unfair competition but simply reflect different levels of economic and social 
development. Despite of this argument, the extensive use of social and 
environmental resources for the attraction of FDI does not seem to be an 
efficient strategy in the long run. Environmental damages have to, if it is 
possible at all, be costly repaired by using governmental resources. Low labor 
and social standards are not merely a moral problem but also have economic 
impacts by lowering the productivity of the labor force and by impeding human 
capital formation. 
To conclude one may state that the strategies that have been outlined in this 
paragraph may only serve as aligning strategies that offer efficient results in 
the short run. As a long term strategy for the attraction of FDI low standards or 
investment incentives are not efficient. 
3.4.2.2 Macroeconomic Stability 
It is by now common knowledge that creating and ensuring macroeconomic 
stability is a prerequisite for successful economic development and that an un-
stable macro-economic environment distorts private incentives to invest by 
producing uncertainty and insecurity. As pointed out in the analysis of the 
political risk literature the classical concept of country risk mainly focuses on 
macroeconomic indicators and their implications for international lenders or 
investors. Orthodox country risk analysis is thus basically an analysis of the 
current macroeconomic situation of a given country and as to which this 
situation implies risks for MNEs. Although the definition of political risk that has 
been presented above clearly extends this classical interpretation, it has to be 
underlined that macroeconomic indicators are still an important determinant of 
aggregate political risk. Therefore, the maintenance of a stable 
macroeconomic framework including sensible monetary and fiscal policy as 
well as a functioning exchange rate policy become an important part in a 
national risk mitigation strategy. 
It is straightforward to see that macroeconomic problems as high levels of 
inflation or a highly volatile national currency are severe disincentives for inter-
national investors. Although FDI usually reacts less volatile to macroeconomic 
indicators than portfolio investments, enduring instabilities may also induce 
lower levels of FDI. This is even more important considering possible 
enhanced competition for FOi leads to a "race to the bottom", that is a severe lowering of 
social, environmental and labor standards. See Oman (2000) and Oman (2001 ). 
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hysteresis effects that may be caused by severe macroeconomic crises. That 
is, even if the most important sources of risk have been eliminated investors 
still perceive the country as being more risky than before. The Latin American 
debt crisis, for example, highlighted how severe macroeconomic imbalances 
reduce the attractiveness of countries for FDI. Therefore, since the outbreak of 
the debt crisis stabilization policies have been a main focus in the economic 
policy of many emerging market countries and an important tool for political 
risk mitigation. Moreover, sound macroeconomic policy does not only affect 
foreign investors but also their domestic counterparts which benefit to the 
same extent from low levels of inflation, sustainable fiscal deficits and external 
macroeconomic stability. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
macroeconomic risk mitigation strategy is efficient and sustainable in the long 
run. The next paragraph discusses the efficiency of a risk mitigation strategy 
focusing on domestic institutional reforms. 
3.4.2.3 Accountability, Transparency and Rules-Based Governance 
The previous paragraphs focused on institutional prerequisites for the 
establishment of a favorable domestic investment climate and showed how 
risks for investors may arise if the institutional framework is not adequate. 
While many national risk mitigation strategies focus on the compensation of 
international investors for their higher risk exposure the strategy that is 
presented here is concerned with domestic institutional reform to directly 
tackle the problem of political risk.169 As already pointed out in the previous 
paragraph one important part of this national beauty contest is the 
maintenance of macroeconomic stability. Nevertheless, domestic institutional 
reform goes far beyond this by aiming at the removal of institutional 
impediments to a favorable national investment climate. For developing 
countries possible goals of this policy are achieving a better assignment of 
property rights, promoting a better functioning of the legal system and 
enhancing individual constitutional guarantees. The more general objective of 
these reforms is the establishment of what the literature calls good 
governance. Here there is no room for a complete overview of the extensive 
literature on good governance.170 Therefore, only those parts of the concept 
are mentioned here that are of particular importance for the incentive structure 
of private investors, namely accountability, transparency, predictability and the 
rule of law.171 Important elements of good governance are a transparent and 
accountable government that on the one hand lowers transaction costs of 
private contracting and on the other hand is limited by a set of basic rules that 
protect individual rights against abuses of public organizations with coercive 
power. Since rule of law and predictability of governmental policy lower trans-
action costs and reduce the probability of "policy surprises" for investors it is 
straightforward to see that the process of institutional reforms directly tackles 
169 In the literature this strategy of domestic policy reform to enhance the attractiveness for 
FOi has been referred to as national "beauty contest". This expression has been used by 
Eduardo Fernandez-Arias in a comment on a paper by Oman (2001). See Fernandez-
Arias (2001 ). 
110 See World Bank (1994). 
171 See Isham et al. (1995) p.11 . 
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the sources of low investor confidence. 172 Although theoretically the strategy of 
domestic policy reform is a means of reducing risks for investors, it poses 
several problems to host countries. 
First, domestic institutional reform is a costly and lengthy process. As already 
pointed out adapting national institutions to the needs of national and 
international investors takes a long time and may face the severe resistance of 
societal forces as governmental organizations, parties, or other interest groups 
that may impede or at least slow down the reform process. 173 Reforming the 
national judiciary for example is a complex, costly and lengthy process that 
may mobilize the resistance of those powerful societal interest flroups that do 
benefit from the existing inefficiencies of the current system. 1 4 Given these 
difficulties in the implementation of institutional reform it is necessary to think 
of an accompanying strategy that may reduce levels of political risk more 
quickly. Second, national actors and newly founded or reformed organizations 
may lack the necessary credibility to attract FOi since all contractual mitigation 
measures that rely directly on state investor relations do not resolve the 
credibility problem of developing countries. This implies that for countries with 
a negative track record of arbitrary governmental intervention and regulation of 
FOi the solution of domestic institutional reform is less feasible. In analogy to 
the literature on central bank credibility one may assume that newly created or 
reformed organizations that were associated with unstable policies in the past 
will not quickly gain the full confidence of international investors. Instead, 
building credibility is a lengthy process that needs accompanying measures if 
results of the reform policy are to be seen rapidly. Third, it is a major problem 
for national policy makers to lock-in reform programs. Politicians are usually 
under high public pressure and depend on the support of national interest 
groups. Unpopular reforms that imply losses for certain interest groups in 
society are therefore subject to high pressure of revision. Thus, for politicians a 
successful reform program is more likely to be implemented and maintained 
with accompanying measures that lock-in reforms, that is, make them 
unresponsive to populist pressure. 
Summing up, the implementation of domestic institutional reforms and macro-
economic stability are two main pillars of a successful national risk mitigation 
strategy. However, the implementation of institutional reforms is a lengthy and 
172 This strategy may also be directly focused on attracting foreign investors. In negotiations 
with multinationals the State could commit not to nationalize foreign assets or accept so-
called stabilization clauses by which the state exempts foreign investors from changes it 
may introduce in its legislation or from administrative measures of general application 
whenever their effect would be to significantly reduce economic returns expected from the 
investment. Another possibility which less limits national sovereignty are the agreement to 
renegotiation clauses which permit to renegotiate the contractual tenns and conditions in 
case of supervening circumstances as new legislative or regulatory measures. See 
Bernardini (2001) p.241 
173 North's theory of institutional change argues that institutional change is slow and that 
countries can get locked into inefficient institutional structures. See North (1990) and the 
brief summary in paragraph 3.1.2.1. 
174 See Ayala Espino (2002). 
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costly process so that results usually do not occur rapidly. Moreover, national 
institutions may lack credibility and politicians may face the problem to lock in 
institutional reforms against high populist pressure. Therefore, it may be 
efficient to accompany institutional reforms with other strategies to tackle these 
implementation problems. 
3.4.3 International Strategies 
3.4.3.1 Multilateral Agreements 
International risk mitigation strategies focus on gaining credibility from signing 
international agreements or joining international organizations. The basic idea 
is that countries with weak institutions can restraint their government to 
precisely specified rules and lock it into international mechanisms that are 
costly to reverse. In addition to other goals international agreements are then 
used to successfully lock in institutional change. 175 Although sovereign 
countries still can reverse policies, international commitments force govern-
ments to not just calculate the costs and benefits of policy reversals, but also 
the broader cost of reneging on international treaties for which their partners 
will hold them accountable. 176 Apart from other consequences a membership 
of a country in an international organization implies that national political actors 
are no longer exclusively limited by national but also by international law. 
Multilateral agreements on trade, investment, environmental standards or any 
other topic submit national policy makers to the international law that has been 
agreed on and to the mechanisms of control and supervision of multilateral 
organizations. Thus, international commitment mechanisms can serve in 
enhancin~ credibility as a short-term substitute while national institutions are 
build up. 77 International agreements may therefore be valued for their 
"signaling" properties because member countries can demonstrate to potential 
investors that they are committed to play by the rules and that this commitment 
will not be easy to reverse.178 Up to now however, various attempts to 
conclude multilateral conventions on the subject of FOi protection, such as, 
most recently the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) launched by 
OECD members, were unsuccessful. 179 
175 See WTO (2003) p.50. 
176 See World Bank (1997) p.6 and p.101. The World Bank further argues that the mere 
integration of countries into the world economy helps sustaining macroeconomic stability 
as it becomes more costly to pursue inconsistent economic policies. See World Bank 
(1997) p.48. 
177 See World Bank (1997) p.109. 
178 See WTO (2003) p.50 
179 Exceptions are the multilateral investment protection agreements on the regional level 
such as ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment from 1987, 
the NAFTA investment chapter from 1992, and the agreement for the protection of 
investment under the MERCOSUR treaty from 1991 . The only "true" multilateral 
conventions are the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of other States (ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) convention insuring against political risks. See Bernardini (2001) p.236-238. For 
further details on the MAI see UNCTAD (1999a) and Robertson (2002). 
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While it may be argued that large and powerful countries or negotiating blocks 
may have the possibility to ignore international obligations it is less likely that 
developing countries or emerging markets can afford to neglect international 
obligations. Since multilateral agreements complement national legislation by 
defining binding international rules, efficient enforcement mechanisms of 
multilateral treaties imply constraints for national policy makers limiting their 
degree of political discretion. Therefore, multilateral agreements help mitigate 
political risks by providing higher legal certainty for investors through the 
establishment of transparent international rules that may be referred to when 
conflicts occur. Credible and efficient conflict resolution mechanisms imply a 
rise in investor confidence as they have the possibility to refer their claims and 
complaints to dispute settlement bodies of international organizations instead 
of just to the local judiciary. These legal guarantees on the international level 
are favorable for the investor even if local legislation for the protection of 
foreign assets already exists because in countries with low political stability 
risks for long term investments are not effectively diminished by domestic 
legislation that may easily undergo changes over time. The appointment of an 
international arbitrator reduces the risk that local courts deciding on investment 
disputes are influenced by political pressure of host governments.180 However, 
multinational agreements are not only directly useful as a risk mitigation 
strategy. At the same time they can act as complements of a national 
institutional reform strategy since multilateral contracts facilitate the lock-in of 
domestic reform projects by tying the hands of national politicians through 
international law and making them immune against domestic populist 
pressure. Furthermore, the recognition of international agreements allows for a 
credibility gain of national institutions as they are subject to better international 
control and supervision. Therefore, the signing of international treaties 
additionally implies an "import" of credibility from the international organization. 
Moreover, if the international agreement that has been signed is a free trade 
agreement, the market that can be served by an investment in the region 
grows. Growing market size in turn, strengthens one of the key fundamentals 
to which investors attach great importance.161 
Thus, the membership in international organizations may be an important 
means of accompanying domestic policy reforms by facilitating their local 
implementation. Gains in credibility, immunization against domestic populist 
pressure and higher legal certainty of economic actors are important measures 
that help ensuring the achievement of rapid and stable reform processes. 
Nevertheless, it is important to underline that in the long run a multilateral 
international risk mitigation strategy can only be successful if international 
obligations are honored and if the process of international integration is 
accompanied by successful domestic reforms. Violating or ignoring 
international obligations in turn, will result in undermining credibility and 
investor confidence. 
180 See Bernardini (2001) p.240-246. 
181 See Oman (2001). 
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3.4.3.2 Bilateral Agreements and Regional Integration 
The functioning of bilateral agreements and regional integration blocks as a 
means of political risk mitigation is similar to that of multilateral integration 
strategies since national rules are complemented by international obligations 
and international mechanisms of control and supervision. Since national 
politicians are subject to higher controls, basic investor rights are guaranteed 
on the international level, and international obligations facilitate the domestic 
"lock-in" of reforms the mechanisms that cause the risk mitigation effect are 
similar. Faced with the failure to establish a multilateral agreement for the 
protection of investor rights many countries favored a policy of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) for risk mitigation. Since the mid 90s the number of 
BITs increased enormously reaching a level of about 1500 agreements in-
volving 180 states as contracting parties. 162 Rather than promoting a further 
liberalization of domestic FDI regulations most bilateral investment treaties are 
designed to protect basic rights of foreign investors as for example 
unrestricted monetary transfers or protection against expropriation.163 
Despite of basic similarities, there is one difference between bilateral and 
multilateral treaties. Multilateral agreements are usually supported by a variety 
of international actors among them large industrialized countries. Therefore, 
international organizations and their mechanisms of enforcement and control 
in general enjoy a high degree of transparency and credibility which is not 
necessarily the case for bilateral treaties or other regional integration 
agreements. If integration agreements or bilateral treaties are signed by 
countries with high levels of risk and low credibility the process of risk 
mitigation by international integration may not turn out to be efficient. To put it 
in other words, international agreements between countries with a weak 
institutional framework will not necessarily result in the desired credibility 
enhancing effect of international integration, since it is unlikely that countries 
with low national credibility create international obligations that turn out to be 
reliable.164 Even if such a treaty contains rules that are per se credible and 
honored in the long run it is unlikely that international financial actors do 
perceive it as a tool for fostering credibility and for locking in domestic reform 
efforts. This implies that the success of bilateral strategies for international risk 
mitigation or regional integration efforts largely depends upon the credibility of 
the signing parties. If all member states of the international agreement are 
characterized by weak domestic institutions and low credibility the potential for 
an import of international credibility remains limited. It is more probable that 
these effects occur if at least one of the signing member states possesses 
strong national institutions and enjoys international credibility. For developing 
countries this reasoning implies that joining forces with other developing 
' 82 See Bernardini (2001) p.238. 
183 See Sacerdoti (2000) and Bernardini (2001 ). 
184 This point is made by Grosse who comparing NAFTA and MERCOSUR argues:" Without 
a similar link to the US (like Mexico in NAFTA), Mercosur will never achieve a similar level 
of investor confidence, nor the integration of MNE activities that Mexico has experienced." 
Grosse (2003b) p.664. 
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nations will most likely not produce the credibility enhancing effect that may 
occur if international treaties are signed with developed countries.165 
3.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 gives a theoretical foundation for political risk analysis arguing that 
political risk analysis essentially consists of an analysis of the institutional 
environment in host countries and that the analysis of transaction costs for 
private economic activity permits to identify prerequisites and obstacles for a 
favorable investment climate. Based on these theoretical reflections several 
models explaining the emergence of political risk have been discussed. The 
synthesis of these models that classified political risk in three basic groups 
(societal risks, governmental risks and macroeconomic risks) aims at 
facilitating empirical tests of the main hypotheses in later chapters. Thereafter, 
the possibilities for empirical measurement of political risk have been 
discussed by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of existing political risk 
indices. Eventually, the chapter offered a brief discussion of potential risk 
mitigation strategies for high risk countries. It concluded that incentive based 
strategies have the drawback of being costly and inefficient in the long run 
while domestic risk mitigation strategies based on institutional reform were 
identified as efficient but lengthy and costly which means that their results take 
time to emerge. The chapter concluded by stating that international economic 
integration may help to quickly obtain positive results in risk mitigation. 
Complementing national efforts with "borrowing" credibility from multilateral 
organizations or industrial countries with high levels of national credibility is a 
way to more rapidly achieve positive results in terms of national credibility. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 3 of this volume focused on theoretical explanations for the 
emergence of political risk and analyzed the efficiency of potential empirical 
political risk measures. Paragraph 3.1 set the theoretical foundations for the 
analysis by showing that political risks emerge if the domestic institutional 
structure of a market economy is deficient and does not provide right 
incentives for private investment behavior. Based on NIE it developed a basic 
theoretical framework that permits to study the impact of political and socio-
economic variables on investment behavior without having to refer to ad-hoc 
hypothesis. Additionally it discussed the influence of political regime type on 
investment incentives in host countries. 
Paragraph 3.2 presents several theoretical models that explain the emergence 
of political risk in countries. Their strengths and weaknesses are discussed 
and the paragraph closes with a theoretical synthesis of the presented 
approaches that may be used as a base for the empirical investigations in 
Chapter 4 and 5 of this volume. 
185 Without entering into a detailed discussion about the potential benefits and problems of 
regional integration and bilateral treaties it has to be underlined that this result is limited to 
the credibility enhancing effects of international treaties. 
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Paragraph 3.3 is concerned with empirical measures in political risk analysis. It 
presents different commonly used measures of political risk and discusses 
their strengths, weaknesses and limitations. It closes with an assessment of 
indicator quality and argues which empirical indicators were chosen for the 
empirical analysis in Chapter 4 and 5 of this volume. The choice of the suitable 
indicators was governed by theoretical considerations and empirical concerns 
of data availability. 
In paragraph 3.4 the chapter turns to the analysis of the efficiency of risk 
mitigation strategies for countries with high risk environments. It briefly 
discusses theoretical strengths and weaknesses of different risk mitigation 
measures and concludes that risk mitigation by granting investment incentives 
is a costly and unsustainable strategy that does not tackle the problems that 
are at the heart of high levels of political risk. Strategies that aim at promoting 
macroeconomic stability and the reform of national institutions have been 
identified as more suitable measures of national risk mitigation. I argue that the 
involvement in multilateral treaties or bilateral treaties where at least one 
signing member enjoys high international credibility theoretically are efficient 
strategies to attain higher levels of investor confidence and credibility. 
Paragraph 3.5 holds a conclusion that summarizes the most important 
implications of this chapter for the following analysis. 
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"It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one 
begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts." 
Sherlock Holmes, A Scandal in Bohemia 
4. Political Risk and FOi in Latin America 
4.1 Stylized Facts on Foreign Investment in Latin America 
Latin America has a long tradition as a destination of international capital 
flows. As a continent favorably endowed with natural resources, it inevitably 
arose the interest of foreigners since its discovery by the Spanish. The 
conquest and the colonial rule that followed were characterized by a focus of 
the European nations to exploit the rich national resources of the new wortd. 
Already before independence the American colonies of Portugal and Spain 
were heavily involved in international business in the form of exchange of raw 
materials as gold and silver for manufactured products from Europe. Spanish 
and Portuguese individuals and firms owned a variety of investments such as 
farms and raw material ventures in the colonies. This concentration of FOi in 
the primary sector, and in particular in extractive industries and large scale 
plantations also continued after independence. With the beginning of the 
industrial revolution FOi to the region accelerated with foreign participation in 
mining and infrastructure projects such as railways and telegraph systems. 
Nevertheless, most of the financial flows in the nineteenth century were related 
to bond issues by Latin American governments on European stock 
exchanges. 1 
In the twentieth century the production of natural resources such as oil, 
copper, bauxite and bananas attracted resource-seeking FOi to Latin America, 
in particular from the US, to build and operate large scale mines or 
plantations.2 Until the past three decades market seeking FOi in the 
manufacturing sector, usually with low capital content, was largely attracted to 
the big three economies of the region: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. During 
the entire period up to the Second Wortd War the United Kingdom and the 
United States were the sources of approximately two-thirds of long term capital 
flows to Latin America.3 Inflows of FOi lost momentum when Latin American 
governments became more protective of their domestic natural resources 
during the 60s and 70s.4 A dogmatic debate about the dependence of Latin 
American countries on MNEs based in industrial countries and the inward-
looking industrialization of Latin America nations following the ECLAC model 
were responsible for a declining growth of international investment to Latin 
America. During the ?Os many Latin American governments obliged foreign 
extractive and utility investors to sell ownership to nationals. Across a wide 
range of activities foreign firms were limited in their ownership and control of 
business in Latin America. These limits consisted of ownership restrictions, 
1 See Grosse (2001) and Grosse (1989) p.7-29. 
2 See Grosse (2003). 
3 See Grosse (1989) p.11-24. 
4 See Grosse (2001 ). The restrictions were accompanied by expropriations in many Latin 
American countries. Paragraph 5.2.2.2 reviews the changing political attitudes towards FOi 
for the Mexican case. 
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rules on profit remittances and royalty payments as well as of exchange 
controls, taxes and quantitative restrictions.5 
In the following years FOi shifted from natural resources toward the 
manufacturing sector. During the lost decade of the 80s FOi to Latin America 
only grew slowly with investors still favoring manufacturing over other types of 
investment. The crisis of the Latin American development model after the debt 
crisis led to a new wave of economic opening and liberalization during the late 
80s. In the 90s FOi was concentrated in services, partly induced by large scale 
privatization of former public service companies in telecommunication, 
financial services, electrical power generation etc.6 
As figure 4.1 shows, Latin America and the Caribbean held the lion share of 
private resource flows to developing countries in the year 2001 indicating that 
the liberalization and opening strengthened the role of foreign investment in 
Latin American countries. The introduction already highlighted the stagnation 
of official net resource flows to developing countries compared to the dynamic 
evolution of private capital flows which peaked in the late 90s. Sustaining the 
level of external financing requires consistent national economic policies that 
do not decrease investor confidence about the stability and the economic 
prospects of the region. 
Figure 4.1: Geographical Distribution of FOi To Developing Countries in 
2001 
Soulh Asia 2% 
Middle East & North Africa~~ 
Latin Amer ica & Caribbean 42% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 8% 
I East Asia & Pacific 29~. / 
Europe & Central Asia 17% 
Source: Own figure using data of Wortd Bank (2002): Global Development Finance 
5 See Grosse (2003b ). 
6 Interestingly in these sectors foreign investors have a massive presence. In 
telecommunications Telefonica from Spain and US firms as GTE and Bell South are the 
dominant carriers. In electric power Endesa from Spain, Houston Energy, AES and Duke 
Power are leading distributors and generators of energy in the region . In banking Banco 
Santander_Central Hispano and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya from Spain along with Citybank and 
Hong Kong Bank have build regionwide networks of affiliates. See Grosse (2003b). 
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Therefore, similar to all other developing countries, Latin America's economic 
policy has to be designed in a way that permits attracting foreign investors. 
Given the importance of private external financing for the region and the 
volatility of international capital movements, inconsistent economic policies 
and public violations of basic investor rights imply enormous cost for the 
countries in the region in terms of foregone future investment flows. If FOi is 
deterred, a country also looses the benefits immanent to these long term in-
vestments as transfers of technology and management know how as well as 
growth and productivity enhancing linkages to the national market. As already 
argued in the introduction, high political risk in a given country is not only a 
major problem for MNEs eager to do business in the region but also for the 
countries themselves because it reduces their access to sources of external 
financing. The recent events in Argentina where the government abandoned 
the dollar parity and declared the inability to service its foreign debt 
impressively highlights the severe effects of inconsistent economic policy for 
countries of the region. 
For every complex problem there is an easy answer, and it is wrong. 
4.2 Empirical Investigation of the Impact of Political Risk on FOi 
4.2.1 Methodology 
H.L. Mencken 
The following paragraphs present an empirical model which tests for the main 
hypotheses that have been derived in Chapter 2 and 3 of this volume by using 
the empirical measures of political risk that have been discussed in Chapter 3. 
For the empirical test I use a panel of all Latin American countries excluding 
the Caribbean covering the period from 1982 to 1997.7 For isolating the impact 
of political risk indicators on FOi flows, variables are included in the model that 
control for other determinants of FOi. The discussion in paragraph 2.2.3.2 
revealed that there is no theoretical consensus about the variables that 
determine FOi, since contemporary theory only offers a verbal eclectic 
paradigm for the explanation of FOi that is lacking an exact formalization and 
specification of influential parameters in the form of a mathematical model. 
Given this limitation empirical research on FOi has to follow what EDWARDS 
calls a pragmatic approach.8 
This implies that empirical research has to focus on the use of proxy variables 
that control for the potential factors of influence that have been identified in 
theory. However, also the review of empirical studies leaves the reader with a 
rather ambiguous picture of the variables that explain FOi flows. This lack of 
consensus may be explained, to some extent, with the large variances in 
methodology, perspectives, sample selection and analytical tools that 
7 The choice of this period was detennined by limited data availability and by the aim to 
gather a panel for a large number of Latin American countries. Belize that was originally 
placed in the sample has been removed as reliable political risk data was not available for 
the chosen period. 
8 See Edwards (1990). 
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researchers have been using. Moreover, the selection of independent 
variables often seems arbitrary and lacking sufficient theoretical foundation. As 
most authors only use a small subset of variables that are of particular interest 
to them, a wide selection of variables have been found to be correlated with 
FOi in different directions in different studies.9 Therefore, the selection of 
appropriate control variables and the right specification of an econometric 
model for incoming FOi flows are difficult tasks. 
In the presence of high uncertainty about the determinants of FOi inflows and 
with a sole interest in the influence of political risk variables on FOi flows to 
Latin America it is appropriate to use an econometric methodology that has 
been proposed by LEAMER. 10 Instead of choosing the classical econometric 
approach of specifying and respecifying empirical models according to the 
achieved results, he proposes to use a sensitivity analysis to test for the 
influence of a certain variable on an independent variable. LEAMER's argument 
starts with the conviction that all empirical models are inevitably 
approximations of the real world and by any means incomplete. This implies 
that choosing one particular model and founding policy implications only on 
empirical testing of this particular model may be misleading, because the im-
plications are just founded on one specification out of the thicket of possible 
specifications of the model. This implies that inferences derived from a given 
model about the impact of a variation in a particular explanatory variable on 
the dependent variable should be suspended if the explanatory variable does 
not turn out to be robust. An independent variable can be considered as 
robust, if it remains statistically significant with the same sign, when the 
conditioning information set is subjected to changes. To put it in other words, if 
the inferences drawn from the estimator of this variable are highly sensitive to 
small variations in the modeling framework, they are too fragile to serve as a 
basis for action. If the sign or the value of the estimator changes due to minor 
changes in the specification of the model , e.g. in the variables that are 
controlled for, the results of the estimation have to be interpreted carefully. An 
application of LEAMER'S approach is the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis 
(EBA) which tests for the robustness of the influence of the variables of 
interest. 11 To do so I specify a simple empirical model including a "core model" 
with key determinants of FOi and the political risk variables of interest. In a 
second step it is tested, if the included political risk indicators stay robust when 
the specification of the empirical model changes slightly by including additional 
explanatory variables. 
For the analysis potential determinants of FDI have to be classified in three 
groups of variables: X-variables, I-variables and 2-variables. X-variables are 
those variables that have been less controversial in the empirical literature and 
9 See Chakrabarti (2001 ). 
10 See Leamer (1983) and Leamer (1985). 
11 An example of an EBA for the explanation of FOi flows can be found in Chakrabarti (2001 ). 
Ear1ier applications of sensitivity analysis can be found in the literature on economic 
growth. See Levine/Renelt (1992). 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
POLITICAL RISK AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 147 
can be referred to as robust determinants of FOi. The set of I-variables 
consists of variables that are of particular interest to the researcher. Z-
variables in turn, are doubtful determinants that are chosen from a pool of 
variables that are claimed to be influential in the literature or the influence of 
which theoretically seems plausible. For the specification of the "core-model" I 
define X-variables as those variables that have come out with the same sign 
and significant coefficient estimates in various empirical studies. These so-
called free variables are the "core" of the empirical model which is not adjusted 
during the process of testing. Examining the empirical literature on FOi the 
factors Market Size and Openness turn out to be the least controversial 
determinants influencing incoming FOi flows. 12 For developing countries also 
the quality of the local infrastructure has been identified as an important factor 
that influences the amount of incoming FOi to developing countries. Market 
size is usually proxied by the GDP of a given country while openness can be 
measured with the ratio of exports and imports to GDP. This openness 
measure also controls for the effect of opening and liberalizing the economy 
because higher trade flows are assumed to be correlated with more liberal 
legislation on FOi. However, including both measures into the right hand side 
of the equation causes a severe problem of multicollinearity which biases the 
regressions estimators and renders an usual interpretation of the coefficients 
impossible.13 To solve this problem I divide the left hand side of the equation 
by GDP. So instead of considering market size as a determinant of total FOi 
flows, this equation estimates the determinants of the FOi/GDP ratio. This 
methodology controls for the large country bias without problems of multi-
collinearity and with more degrees of freedom, since one explanatory variable 
is removed from the right hand side of the equation. 14 Furthermore it avoids a 
possible endogeneity problem as FOi may also be influenced by growth 
suggesting a symbiotic relationship between the two variable. The quality of 
the local infrastructure is proxied by the number of telephone lines per 1000 
people as data on other variables like kilometers of paved roads is not 
available for all countries of the sample. Therefore, openness and the quality 
of infrastructure are the only X-variables of the empirical model. 
I-variables are the variables of real interest in the sensitivity analysis. An initial 
set of I-variables is included into the equation and then a "base-regression" is 
run that contains only the X-variables and the I-variables of interest to the 
researcher. The resulting estimator is then tested for its robustness by varying 
the set of Z-variables that are included into the model and determining whether 
the considered coefficients stay significant and with the same sign. If this is the 
12 See the discussion of the empirical literature in paragraph 2.2.4.2. 
13 An observation of the correlation matrix confirms the presence of multicollinearity. 
14 Proceeding like this has the drawback that political risk may also affect the denominator of 
this ratio which potentially biases the regression results. An alternative for correcting for 
the large country bias is dividing by population size. However, as population size does not 
proxy in suitable way what theory identifies as market size regression results with the 
FOi/Popuiation-Ratio did not offer convincing results. Therefore, the following analysis 
uses the FOi/GDP-Ratio. 
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case, the I-variable may be classified as robust. In cases where small 
variations in the model setting imply a change of sign or a loss of significance 
the variable has to be labeled as not robust. Besides determining the impact of 
different risk indicators on FOi I also study the impact of different sources of 
risk. Therefore, in addition to analyzing the impact of variables measuring 
aggregate political risk, in this study different subgroups of risk are analyzed to 
identify the sources of risk for international investors. The sub-variables of 
political risk that are introduced as I-variables to the model have already been 
described in Chapter 3 which identified potential political hazards to 
international investors and provided a theoretical analysis of different sources 
of political risk. To facilitate the empirical analysis of a complex 
multidimensional phenomenon as political risk I defined groups representing 
different sources of political risk. This procedure has the important 
econometric advantage that it preserves degrees of freedom without loosing 
information on the sources of risk. Thus, aggregate political risk has been 
subdivided in three groups according to the nature of underlying reasons. 
Despite of the fact that such a theoretical distinction is by definition incomplete 
and sometimes unclear it has been considered a useful simplification that 
facilitates the empirical analysis that follows. It is obvious however, that this 
classification cannot be rigid and has to be interpreted as one of multiple 
possible groupings for the analysis of political risks. Henceforth I distinguish 
between three main sources of political risk: macroeconomic risks, 
governmentally induced risks and socially induced risks. 
The first category consists of classical variables of country risk that measure 
hazards resulting out of the macroeconomic environment in the host country. 
The risk factors are those that are generally used in orthodox country risk 
analysis as it is done by financial institutions. The index which is used here 
consists of "pure" economic variables that reflect the current macro-economic 
stability of the host country. It contains the rate of inflation, the national budget 
deficit as percentage of GDP, the reserves debt ratio, the interest rate spread 
over LIBOR, the fraction of short-term-debt in total debt and the current account 
balance. All these indicators proxy the risk exposure to macroeconomic 
imbalances which may have a detrimental impact on FOi. To better picture the 
influence of macroeconomic imbalances and to make the indicator comparable 
with the other score-model-based indicators that have been used in this study I 
transformed hard macroeconomic data into an indicator with a 0-10 rating for 
macroeconomic stability. This measure has been constructed by pooling in-
formation from different macroeconomic variables and using a methodology 
proposed by the World Economic Forum for the transformation of the hard 
data into numerical ratings. This transformation formulates a rating by 
comparing national indicator values to maximum and minimum benchmark 
values in the reference sample.15 To ensure comparability between the 
indicators I chose the IRIS 3 sample based on PRS data, from which the other 
15 For the formula see Annex I. 
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political risk indicators have been taken, as reference sample for the 
transformation. 
The second category of political risks contains all variables that reflect the part 
of aggregate political risk that directly originates in governmental action. The 
variables that are included in this section are the quality of the national 
bureaucracy, the level of governmental corruption, the risk of expropriation and 
the risk of repudiation of government contracts. These different indicators are 
pooled to obtain an aggregate governance indicator that permits to assess the 
influence of good governance on FOi flows. A second governance indicator 
additionally includes the level of political constraints which are imposed on the 
national executive. 
The third category of risk consists of the variables that measure the part of 
aggregate political risk that has primarily societal origins. In this category I in-
clude variables that measure the part of risk that is not caused by direct 
governmental actions but that results out of the characteristics of the countries 
at study. It contains the variables rule of law tradition and the degree of ethnic 
tensions. Table A.1 in Annex I gives an overview of all variables that have 
been used for the analysis and their methodology of construction. 
The last group of variables in the model is called Z-variables. Z-variables are 
variables that have been plausibly argued in the literature to be potential 
determinants of FOi. Empirical evidence on their influence however, remains 
mixed implying that they have to be considered as doubtful variables. These Z-
variables are included in the model to test whether the I-variables remain 
robust, if the model setting is slightly changed. As potential determinants I only 
chose those variables that turned out to be significant in at least a few 
analyzed model settings. 16 
For the estimation of the panel I use a fixed effects model. There are two 
reasons for choosing this model instead of a so-called random effects model. 
The first reason is technical. The use of random effects model requires that the 
sample is selected randomly from an underlying population. If studies focus on 
large geographical regions, like in our case, the random sampling assumption 
is flawed implying that the estimation with the random effects model is not 
appropriate for this study. Second, the fixed effect approach has the 
advantage that the country specific constant term accounts for all those 
variables that affect FDI flows to a country that are not explicitly modeled and 
that do not change over time. In panel data analysis this constant term is 
called an unobserved effect. When different time periods for the same 
individual are studied this term captures exactly those features of the individual 
that do not vary over time. So when the particular interest of the researcher is 
only on time-varying explanatory variables, as it is the case in this empirical 
model, it is convenient not to have to model time-constant factors that are not 
16 Paragraph 4.2.3 holds a description of the included variables. 
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of direct interest. 17 Examples for time-invariant variables of different countries 
that may bias the results if they are not considered are the endowments of a 
country with natural resources, its climate or other geographical particularities. 
Including a fixed effect implies that the estimators in question are not biased 
by omitted variables of that type. However, when interpreting the results, one 
has to bear in mind that estimation with the fixed-effects model has the 
important drawback that only the within-country dimension of the panel is 
explored properly. If variables in question turn out to be insignificant, I estimate 
a model using a common intercept term to test, if the result is biased by this 
deficiency of the fixed effects model. 16 
Standard econometric tests are performed for each of the specified model 
settings to ensure that the coefficients may be interpreted as usual. In the 
presence of serial auto-correlation standard correction measures may be 
applied that allow for a correct interpretation of the estimated parameter 
coefficients. However, problems with auto-correlation have not been 
encountered indicating a satisfactory specification of the empirical model. 
Variance and standard errors of the estimators are also biased in the presence 
of heteroskedasticity which implies that standard t- and F-test are no longer 
valid. To avoid misleading inferences caused by this problem I use the matrix 
of heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors based on the work of WHITE.19 
Although not performed here some recent econometric articles propose the 
use of unit root and cointegration tests for panel data.20 In time series analysis 
the testing for unit roots and cointergration have meanwhile become standard 
although even the standard tests which are usually applied only have limited 
explanatory power.21 In panel data analysis however, this problem is 
aggravated as most of the currently proposed tests for panel data have the 
important drawback that they only test for the null hypothesis that all series 
have a unit root. Therefore, these tests are subject to the severe criticism that 
it is well possible that some individual series have a unit root while others are 
stationary. This possible heterogeneity of different time series in a panel has 
the convenient implication that problems caused by non-stationarity may be 
less severe. That is, even if the noise in some of the individual time series is 
strong, the fact that it is independent across individuals implies that by pooling 
the data the effect of the residuals can be reduced. Hence, the estimated 
coefficient is still a consistent estimate where the usual standard errors and t-
ratios are valid and can be interpreted as usual. KAO shows that the LSDV 
estimator converges to its true value in the case of a spurious regression 
model.22 Moreover, PHILIPS/MOON show that even in the presence of non-
17 See Wooldridge (2002) p.247-296. 
18 It is important to stress that the estimation without country specific constants may bias the 
result due to a problem of omitted variables. 
19 See White (1960). 
2° For an overview see Baltagi (2002) p.233-256. 
21 See Pindyck/Rubinfeld (1991) p.440-471 . 
22 See Kao (1999). 
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stationary panel data the pooled least squares estimator is consistent which 
also holds in the case of individual fixed effects.23 It follows that the problem of 
spurious regression is of lesser importance if panel data is used.24 Finally also 
the relatively small t-dimension of the data sample I use does not necessarily 
impose the use of stationarity and cointegration tests. 25 
4.2.2 Model Specification 
Having presented the methodology of the study I now formally specify the em-
pirical model that is used for the empirical test. The general structure of the 
model for an EBA analysis can be written in the following form: 
4.1 Y =a,+ px,, +'}'111 +oZ,, +& 
where Y stands for the dependent variable, ai is a constant that is specific for 
every country of the used panel, X is the set of free variables that have been 
classified as less controversial, I is the set of variables the influence of which is 
of particular interest, Z is the subset of variables that have been classified as 
potential determinants of FOi and E is an error term. As the available data is a 
panel all used variables in the model vary in the cross sectional dimension and 
the time dimension which is indicated by the sub indices i and t. Using the 
variables that are defined in table A.1 the core equation of the fixed effects 
model becomes 
4.2 FD!S11 =a,+ f]1OPEN11 + f]2TELE11 +yPOLITICALRJSK11 +oZ11 +& 
where OPEN and TELE are the only free variables and POLITICALRISK 
stands for a particular political risk variable or a combination of those variables 
the influence of which is to be tested. Each political risk variable or set of 
variables is then tested for its robustness by including all possible linear 
combinations of the identified z variables. If the coefficients of the variable at 
question are not changing sign and stay significant throughout all tested model 
settings, they are classified as robust. In the contrary case the I-variables are 
classified as not robust. If variables turn out to be not robust, in a second step 
a model with common intercept term is estimated to take into consideration a 
potential bias that may result from the neglect of the in-between dimension of 
the data that is immanent to the fixed effects model. The model with common 
intercept term may be written as 
4.3 FDIS11 = a + /JPPEN11 + /J2TELE + /J3POLITICALRISK11 + oZ,, + & 
where the only difference between 4.2 and 4.3 is the intercept term that is now 
a constant throughout the t and the i dimension. However, as the author 
23 See Phillips/Moon (1999) and Phillips/Moon (2000). 
24 Philips/Moon (1999). 
25 An F-type test based on MaddalaM'u (1999) to test for the stationarity of the panel could 
not be used because the number of observations was not sufficient. 
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considers the Fixed-Effects-Model as superior, results of the common intercept 
model are only reported if they indicate a bias caused by the drawbacks of the 
Fixed-Effects Model. 
4.2.3 Data Issues 
Although it would have been desirable to test for the impact of political risk on 
industrial sectors with different degrees of reversibility, this could not be 
realized due the lack of reliable disaggregated data for the countries of the 
sample.26 To avoid problems resulting from unreliable local data sources, if 
possible, data from the World Bank and other multilateral institutions has been 
used. Table A.1 in Annex I gives a complete overview of the data sources that 
have been consulted, the definitions of the used variables and the sign that is 
to be expected theoretically. Note that also the variables that only have been 
used as subparts to form an indicator are listed. For the transfer of hard data 
to the 1-10 scale I used a method applied by the World Economic Forum for 
the calculation of the Macroeconomic stability subindex in the World 
Competitiveness Report 2001/2002.27 However, to obtain reasonable results in 
some cases minor adjustments had to be made to account for extreme outliers 
in the data. For example countries with hyper-inflation or extremely high 
spreads over LIBOR due to financial crisis have been eliminated. Including 
these outliers would have implied a reduced explanatory value of the 
indicators as even moderate quality of the variable at question would have 
been rated with high scale values.28 
Some potentially influential variables could not be taken into account because 
reliable data was either completely missing or limited so that sample size 
would have been decreased intolerably. In this case proxy variables with better 
data availability were introduced into the empirical model. One example is 
human capital formation in host countries where I use the illiteracy rate of the 
whole population to control for the skills of the national workforce. Another 
example is the quality of the national infrastructure that has been 
approximated by the number of telephone lines per 1000 people. A similar 
problem occurred, when the social political risk variable was constructed as 
reliable yearly data was not available for every influential factor. Concerning 
measures of poverty and income distribution I consulted information from the 
largest available data sets assembled by DEININGER/SQUIRE and the World 
Income Inequality Database (WIID).29 Even in these most complete collections 
of data on income distribution and poverty, many observations are missing 
which complicates empirical work with the data. Thus, including the data, 
26 This test would also entail the difficulty to theoretically detennine the reversibility of 
investments in different industries. 
27 See Annex I. 
28 If outliers had not been eliminated countries with three digit inflation rates would have 
received macroeconomic stability ratings better than unity. To preserve the explanatory 
value countries with hyperinflation were not considered in calculating the sample 
maximum. 
29 See Deininger/Squire (1996) and UNDP (2000). 
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although desirable, would have diminished sample size considerably. The 
same holds for data on national labor costs and tax rates. 
FREEMAN/O0STEND0RP compiled a large panel data set with comparable data 
on international wages.30 Nevertheless, data for the Latin American sample 
was limited implying that there were not sufficient observations for the intro-
duction of a variable controlling for labor cost. The same holds for data about 
national tax rates. The Wor1d Bank provides some time series that may 
theoretically serve as a proxy variable for the national tax burden as for 
example information on the share of income and corporate taxes of total 
governmental income. However, when included into the model, this proxy does 
not offer good results, because it obviously does not correctly proxy the tax 
burden of foreign enterprises. Anyhow the exclusion of these two variables is 
not an important shortcoming of the empirical model because in the recent 
literature the empirical evidence on the influence of labor cost and tax on FDI 
is not convincing.31 
4.2.3 Results 
The specification of the empirical model allows to test for the robustness of the 
different political risk indicators which are included as I-variables. Table 4.1 
presents the results of a test for the influence of an aggregate political risk 
variable that has been constructed by using data from the International 
Country Risk Guide and the Wor1d Bank including macroeconomic risk factors, 
societal risk factors and governance-related risk factors. As Z-variables I 
chose the illiteracy rate to control for the quality of human capital, the GDP 
growth rate to control for the growth dynamic of the economy and the 
exchange rate to control for the influence of the weak currency hypothesis. 
Table 4.1: Influence of Aggregate Political Risk on FDI 
REGRESSION NUMBER 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OPEN 0.000917 0.000930 0.000898 0.000921 0.000908 0.000910 0.000929 0.000901 
(0.0155) (0.0149) (0.0166) (0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0182) 
TELE 0.000202 0.000231 0.000195 0.000206 0.000225 0.000227 0.000230 0.000199 
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0008) 
AGRISK 0.004889 0.005224•• 0.004204 0.004849 0.005684° 0.005606° 0.006274 .. 0.004170 
(0.1271) (0.0372) (0.2090) (0.1386) (0.0798) (0.0706) (0.0461) (0.2215) 
ILLIT 0.001098 0.001270 0.001226 0.001124 0.000420 
(0.1103) (0.0650) (0.0806) (0.0964) (0.0544) 
GROW 0.000422 0.000479 0.000476 
(0.0537) (0.0354) (0.0381) 
EXCH -1 .02E-06 7.67E-07 4.64E-07 -9.27E-07 
(0.7359) (0.7922) (0.8738) (0.7602) 
R 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 
OBS 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
Source: Own table, p-values corresponding to White-Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
in parentheses. *estimator significant at the 10% level, **estimator significant at the 5% level, 
***estimator significant at the 1% level, OBS are number of observations. 
30 See Freeman/Oostendorp (2000). 
31 See paragraph 2.2.4.2. 
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The same Z-variables will be used for every sensitivity analysis in this 
paragraph. Although the risk indicator turns out to be significant at the 5% level 
in two tested model settings, the risk variable looses significance when minor 
respecifications of the empirical model are made. Therefore, the empirical 
results indicate that AGRISK is not a robust determinant of FOi flows to Latin 
American countries. For a closer examination of the reasons for this 
insignificance I split the aggregate risk indicator into its sub-parts to analyze if 
particular sub-indicators of aggregate risk eventually turn out to be robust 
throughout minor respecifications of the empirical FOi model. 
Table 4.2 depicts the results that the model yields, if political risk is specified 
as solely resulting from the quality of the macroeconomic environment, as 
traditional country risk evaluation methods would suggest. Recall that the 
indicator MACROI was calculated in transferring hard macroeconomic data to 
a 1-10 scale using a method proposed by the World Economic Forum.32 It 
measures the risk that macroeconomic imbalances adversely affect the 
decisions of foreign investors to invest in a country of the region. 
Table 4.2: Influence of Macroeconomic Risk Factors on FDI 
REGRESSION NUMBER 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OPEN 0.000958 0.000962 0.000930 0.000959 0.000938 0.000938 0 .000962 0.000931 
(0.0071) (0.0101) (0.0084) (0.0084) (00117) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0099) 
TELE 0.000260 0.000267 0 .000244 0.000261 0.000261 0 .000261 0.000267 0.000245 
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) 
MACROI 0.003102 0.003101 0.002541 0.003076 0.002503 0.002496 0.003088 0.002512 
(0.1367) (0.1384) (0.2316) (0.1726) (0.2790) (0.2566) (0.1632) (0.2740) 
ILLIT 0.000148 0.000390 0 .000386 0.000142 
(0.8620) (0.6528) (0.6702) (0.8617) 
GROW 0.000473 0.000509 0.000509 0.000473 
(0.0233) (0.0356) (0.0367) (0.0237) 
EXCH -3.30E-07 9.48E-08 -1 .62E-07 -3.66E-07 
(0.9195) (0.9734) (0.9547) (0.9115) 
R 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.55 
OBS 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
Source: Own table, p-values corresponding to White-Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
in parentheses, *estimator significant at the 10% level, **estimator significant at the 5% level, 
... estimator significant at the 1% level, OBS are number of observations. 
Although the macroeconomic environment theoretically is an important risk 
factor for foreign investors, the results in table 4.2 do not confirm this 
hypothesis. The coefficient of the variable shows the right sign but is not 
significant on the 10% level in all tested model settings suggesting that the 
quality of the macroeconomic environment is not significant for the decisions of 
foreign investors interested in Latin American countries. To control if this result 
is caused by the drawback of the fixed effects model that only the within 
country dimension of the panel is explored properly, I performed the same 
regression using OLS with a common intercept term as given in equation 4.3 
32 See World Economic Forum (2002) p. 51 . For the fonnula see Annex I. 
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which shows similar results. Obtaining similar findings BUBNOVA argues that 
risks caused by erratic or inconsistent economic policies can be more easily 
diversified than other risks implying that investors react less sensitive to 
macroeconomic imbalances.33 
There are two other reasons for these counter intuitive results explaining the 
outcomes as a consequence of the characteristic situation of the Latin 
American countries in the analyzed time period. First, the macroeconomic 
environment only becomes an influential determinant of FOi in the presence of 
severe imbalances or instabilities. That is to say that, in the absence of crisis a 
poor quality of the macroeconomic environment may be overcompensated by 
the positive impact of other location specific variables. In other words, 
investors are willing to accept less stable macroeconomic situations, if other 
variables on which their decision is based are favorable and suggest an in-
vestment. Second, investors to the region might have been less sensitive to 
macroeconomic disturbances because basically all Latin American countries 
found themselves in the middle of stabilizing reforms after the experience of 
the severe crisis during the beginning of the 80s. As the most severe 
imbalances occurred in the aftermath of the debt crisis investors could have 
perceived in the following years that risks resulting from the macroeconomic 
environment already were in decline. Moreover, as the stabilization policies of 
the affected countries were subject to external control by international 
organizations their national economic policy gained credibility and investors 
did not expect a fall back into severe imbalances. Despite of these possible ex-
planations the result is surprising. 
As pointed out in the preceding paragraphs other potentially important sub-
components of aggregate political risk are risks which are not directly caused 
by governmental behavior but instead result from societal characteristics of the 
host countries. Table 4.3 presents the results that were obtained when testing 
for the influence of societal characteristics on FOi flows to Latin American 
countries. The indicator of societal risk SOCII is composed by using a 
measure of ethnic tensions and a measure that evaluates the rule of law 
tradition in the country. This indicator of societal risks performed considerably 
better than its macroeconomic counterpart. While the indicator is significant at 
the 10% level in nearly all the performed regressions it is significant at the 5% 
level in four cases. Thus, societal risk factors seem to have a higher relevance 
for FOi to Latin American countries than macroeconomic risk factors but still 
the empirical evidence is not very convincing. There are many possible 
reasons for these results. To avoid bias caused by the use of the fixed effects 
model I reestimated the equation with a common intercept term to better 
explore the in-between dimension of the data. However, the results concerning 
the significance of the societal risk parameter did not change. 
33 See Bubnova (2000) p.20. 
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Table 4.3: Influence of Societal Risk Factors on FOi 
REGRESSION NUMBER 
VARIABLE (11 (2) (3) (41 (51 (8) (7) (8) 
OPEN 0.000894 0.000907 0.000868 0.000899 0.000879 0.000879 0.000909 0.000872 
(0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0233) (0.0205) (0.0233) (0.0222) (0.0198) (0.0242) 
TELE 0.000240 0.000280 0.000221 0.000247 0.000268 0.000268 0.000282 0.000227 
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) 
SOCII 0.005094" 0.005971"" 0.004773 0.005107" 0.005793 .. 0.005799"' 0.005947" 0.004788 
(0.0809) (0.0276) (0.1037) (0.0797) (0.0351) (0.0325) (0.0306) (0.1019) 
ILLIT 0.001016 0.001249 0.001258) 0.000982 
(0.1759) (0.1045) (0.1006) (0.1917) 
GRCTW 0.000482 0.000571 0.000572 0.000477 
(0.0115) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0128) 
EXCH -1 .85E-06 -1 .81E-07 -7.49E-07 -1 .63E-06 
(0.5172) (0.9488) (0.7887) (0.5717) 
R 0.55 o.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 o.55 0.55 
~ m m m m m m m m 
Source: Own table, irvalues corresponding to White-Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
in parentheses, *estimator significant at the 10% level, **estimator significant at the 5% level, 
***estimator significant at the 1 % level, OBS are number of observations. 
Therefore, the empirical analysis suggest that, like macroeconomic risk 
factors, societal risks are only of minor importance for FOi decisions in Latin 
America. These results are in line with the hypothesis of the author that 
societal risk variables should be of minor importance for the region as a 
minimum level of societal and political stability has already been attained in 
Latin America. The analysis indicates that the countries of the region already 
passed the critical threshold of political stability where catastrophic risks cease 
to be most relevant for MNEs. In fact during the analyzed time period most of 
the countries in the region did not experience severe societal instabilities that 
resulted in total asset losses of international investors. With the exception of 
Colombia where civil war constantly endangers public security, neither 
situations of severe civil strife occurred in the region. The absence of severe 
societal risk factors however, suggests that these risks should have a less 
important influence for the investment decisions of MNEs. 
The last group of political risk indicators that has been derived are risks that 
are directly linked to the performance of the national governments. Table 4.4 
presents the results of a test for the influence of governance related risk 
factors on FOi flows to Latin American countries. The indicator GOVII contains 
subvariables measuring the quality of the national bureaucracy, the level of 
governmental corruption, the risk of expropriation, the risk of repudiation of 
government contracts and POLCON as a measure for discretionary freedom of 
host governments. Unlike the risk factors that have been tested before the 
obtained coefficient for governance risk is significant at the 1 % level in all per-
formed regressions of the sensitivity analysis implying that the indicator is 
highly robust to respecifications of the empirical model. The results suggest 
that governance related risk is an important explanatory variable for FOi flows 
and a major source of risk for MNEs in Latin American countries. 
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Table 4.4: Influence of Governance-Related Risk Factors on FOi 
REGRESSION NUMBER 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OPEN 0.000908 0.000931 0.000888 0.000913 0.000909 0.000908 0.000932 0.000894 
(0.0109) (0.0098) (0.0125) (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0112) (0.0102) (0.0129) 
TELE 0.000144 0.000179 0.000138 0.000152 0.000175 0.000174 0.000181 0.000145 
(0.0182) (0.0027) (0.0265) (0.0113) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0025) (0.0175) 
GOVII 0.005054" .. 0.006890" .. 0 .004678°•· 0.005115 ... 0.006559°•• 0.006565· .. .0.006873 ... 0.004743 ... 
(0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0029) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0024) 
ILUT 0.001802 0.001922 0.001938 0.001767 
(0.0316) (0.0206) (0.0230) (0.0303) 
GROW 0.000373 0.000457 0 .000459 0.000363 
(0.0644) (0.0312) (0.0298) (0.0736) 
EXCH -2.51E-06 -3.30E-07 -7.65E-07 -2.29E-06 
(0.3794) (0.9011) (0.7742) (0.4234) 
R 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
OBS 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
Source: Own table, p-values corresponding to White-Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
in parentheses, *estimator significant at the 10% level, **estimator significant at the 5% level, 
... estimator significant at the 1 % level, OBS are number of observations. 
Therefore, the quality of governance and the credibility of national govern-
ments are crucial elements of a policy designed for attracting international 
investors. Given the overall significance and robustness of governance related 
risk factors, it is interesting to test for the influence of sub-indicators of the 
governance indicators to assess which subvariables are of particular interest 
for international investors. An important subindicator of GOVII is POLCON 
measuring the discretionary freedom of host governments to adversely change 
national policy. To test if POLCON is a significant determinant of FOi flows the 
indicator is introduced as I-variable into the model. Table 4.5 shows the results 
which are obtained when POLCON is used as sole proxy for governance 
related political risks. 
Table 4.5: Influence of Governmental Discretion on FOi 
REGRESSION NUMBER 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OPEN 0.000994 0.001004 0.000966 0.00102 0.001002 0.000977 0.001029 0.000993 
(0.0219) (0.0244) (0.0252) (0 .0216) (0.0261) (0.0266) (0 .0239) (0.0248) 
TELE 0.000239 0.000267 0.000217 0.000282 0.000294 0.000255 0.000306 0.00026 
(0.0032) (0.0007) (0.008) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0018) 
POLCONIV 0.017566 0.018497 0.015503 0.015701 0.014738 0.016592 0.016565 0.013681 
(0.1224) (0.1 097) (0.1839) (0.1747) (0.2142) (0.1585) (0 .1558) (0.2477) 
ILLIT 0.000516 0.000696 0.000756 0.00046 
(0.5891) (0.4771) (0 .4458) (0.6262) 
GRON 0.000489 0.000543 0.000554 0.000483 
(0.0852) (0.0769) (0.074) (0.0868) 
EXCH -1 .62E-05 -1 .56E-05 -1 .59E-05 -1 .61E-05 
(0.0866) (0.0976) (0.0838) (0.0969) 
R 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
OBS 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 
Source: Own table, p-values corresponding to White-Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
in parentheses, OBS are number of observations. 
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As Chapter 3 suggested, theoretically the discretionary freedom of host 
governments measured by the existing veto points in the national political 
system is an important determinant of risk. The empirical results indicate a 
rejection of the initial hypothesis that governmental discretion is an influential 
variable for FOi flows to Latin American countries. The coefficient of POLCON 
has the expected positive sign but does not turn out to be significant at the 5% 
level in any of the specified model settings. Hence, the empirical evidence for 
the Latin American sample suggest that governmental discretion is of no major 
importance as a determinant of FOi flows to the region. 
The insignificance of POLCON as determinant of incoming Latin American FOi 
flows indicates that the overall significance and robustness of GOVII stems 
from the other variables that have been used to build the indicator. All other 
subindicators of GOVII have been taken form the IRIS-3 database which in 
turn, is based on data provided by PRS Group. Therefore, I recalculated the 
governance indicator without including POLCON as a measure of govern-
mental discretion. Table 4.6 shows the results, when the influence of the 
resulting new governance indicator GOVI on FOi is tested with the empirical 
model. The results seem to confirm that the country risk measures taken from 
the IRIS-3 data set are indeed responsible for the robust significance of the 
governance indicator GOVII. 
Table 4.6: Influence of Governance-Related Risk Factors on FOi 
(excluding POLCON) 
REGRESSION NUMBER 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
OPEN 0.000904 0.000922 0.000882 0.000910 0.000896 0.000895 0.000924 
(0.0127) (0.0112) (0.0149) (0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0132) 0.0115 
TELE 0.000163 0.000198 0.000153 0.000171 0.000190 0.000189 0.000201 
(0.0062) (0.0008) (0.0130) (0.0038) (0.0019) (0.0020) 0.0007 
GOVI 0.004840""" 0.007678""" 0.004474••· 0.004967""" 0.007448""" 0.007454""" 0.007663" .. 
(0.0065) (0.0000) (0.0132) (0.0048) (0.0000) (0.0000) 0.0000 
ILLIT 0.002252 0.002411 0.002440 0.002201 
(0.0079) (0.0043) (0.0045) 0.0082 
GROW 0.000425 0.000530 0.000534 
(0.0248) (0.0076) (0.0069) 
EXCH -2.99E-06 -6.32E-07 -1.17E-06 
(0.2596) (0.7986) 0.6367 
R 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.55 
OBS 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
(8) 
0.000888 
(0.0150) 
0.000161 
(0.0086) 
0.004600""" 
(0.0100) 
0.000412 
(0.0303) 
-2.71E-06 
(0.3103) 
0.55 
288 
Source: Own table, p-values corresponding to White-Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
in parentheses, *estimator significant at the 10% level, **estimator significant at the 5% level, 
***estimator significant at the 1% level, OBS are number of observations. 
GOV I is significant at the 1 % level in all tested model settings and the R2 of 
the model is similar to the values when GOVII was used as governance 
indicator. Hence, GOVI can be classified as being a robust determinant of in-
coming FOi flows to Latin American countries. These empirical findings 
indicate that subindicators of GOVI as the quality of the national bureaucracy 
and risks resulting from governmental corruption, expropriation and the 
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repudiation of contracts are central determinants of political risk in Latin 
America. 
Summarizing the results of the regressions performed above permits to derive 
some final implications about the sensitivity and robustness of the analyzed 
political risk indicators for the Latin American sample. For each tested political 
risk indicator table 4. 7 depicts an interval in which the coefficient of the 
indicator varied to minor re-specifications of the tested model. A second 
interval is given that shows the variance of the p-value of the coefficient 
indicating the significance of the variable in different model settings. When 
indicators had the expected sign and were significant in some of the tested 
modeling frameworks, they have been classified as significant. Examining the 
interval of the p-value and verifying if the sign of the indicator changed permits 
to classify the different political risk indicators into robust and not robust 
indicators of political risk. 
Table 4.7: Robustness of Political Risk Indicators 
POLffiCAI. RISK VARIABLE COEFFICIENT INT ERV AL CHANGING SIGN P-VALUE INTERVAL SIGNIFICANT ROBUST 
AGRISK {0.004170; 0.006274) No {0.0372; 0.2215) Yes No 
MACROI {0.002505; 0.003102) No {0.1367; 0.2790) No No 
SOCII {0.004773; 0.005971) No {0.0276; 0.1037} Yes No 
GOVI {0.00474; 0.007678) No {0.00001 ; 0.0132) Yes Yes 
GOVII (0.004678; 0.006890} No {0.0000; 0.0024} Yes Yes 
POLCONIV (0.013681 ; 0.018497} No (0.1097; 0.2477} No No 
Source: Own table 
The table shows that only governance related political risk variables can be 
classified as robust determinants of FOi flows to Latin American countries. 
Splitting the aggregate governance indicator into its subparts reveals that 
POLCON is neither a significant nor robust determinant of FOi flows to Latin 
America. In turn, those subindicators which have been taken from the IRIS-3 
data set turned out to be significant and robust determinants of FOi when 
pooled in the indicator GOVI. Macroeconomic risk factors as well as societal 
risk variables did not turn out to be robust determinants of FOi inflows to the 
region. The former result is surprising as the long periods of macroeconomic 
instabilities in Latin America would rather suggest an important influence of 
macroeconomic stability. However, this theoretical hypothesis could not be 
confirmed by the empirical results of this econometric study. In turn, the minor 
role of societal risk factors for inflows of foreign investment to Latin America is 
less surprising. During the 80s and in particular during the 90s Latin American 
countries made enormous progress in democratization and elimination of 
violent social conflicts. With the exception of Colombia the analyzed time 
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period did not witness severe forms of civil unrest or strife. This explains the 
reduced importance of societal risk variables for that time period, as societal 
risk usually gain importance when a severe crisis or catastrophic events occur. 
In spite of these results, it is appropriate to underline the possibility that 
prevailing inequalities and high levels of poverty in the region may imply that 
these risk factors gain importance in the near future.34 Moreover, the empirical 
evidence on the influence of societal risk factors on foreign investment 
decisions may be biased by a lack of reliable data on this matter. 
4.3 Conclusion 
The quantitative empirical investigations reveal that political risk has a high 
and significant influence on the FDI/GDP ratio in Latin American countries for 
the analyzed time period from 1982-1997. However, this result does not hold 
for all tested sub-parts of aggregate political risk which is in line with our 
criticism concerning earlier empirical studies. While those indicators that 
measure political risk resulting out of governance-related factors turned out to 
be of the expected (positive) sign and robust to small variations of the applied 
empirical model, measures accounting for societal and macroeconomic risk 
factors were not found to be robust in all tested model settings. These 
empirical results are in line with the hypothesis that governance related risk 
factors are nowadays gaining importance while the impact of societal political 
risk factors in Latin America seems to be in decline.35 However, high societal 
inequalities, ethnic and religious conflicts and poverty may turn out to be im-
portant risks in the near future. 36 
The lacking robustness of the indicator measuring risks resulting from the 
existing macroeconomic environment is harder to explain.37 It may be argued 
that progresses in stabilization policies during the 80s rendered 
macroeconomics a less influential risk factor for MNEs as the most severe 
problems that prevailed during the early 80s had already been tackled. That is, 
the macroeconomic environment only is an important factor in the calculus of 
MNEs when severe imbalances are to be expected. Once a certain level of 
stability has been attained, that is, severe imbalances as e.g. hyperinflation 
have been overcome, macroeconomic determinants loose importance for the 
direct investment decisions of international enterprises. Nevertheless, the 
present empirical results seem surprising and more empirical research is 
34 The empirical results suffer from the fact that reliable yearly data on income distribution or 
poverty levels was not available for all countries and time periods and therefore could not 
be considered. 
35 These empirical results are line with the findings of Bubnova (2000) who finds that the 
most relevant risk factors for investors were poor bureaucratic quality, corruption and the 
lack of institutional constraints on governmental action. 
36 Nevertheless the political risk analysis for Mexico confirms the result that societal risk 
factors are of lesser importance for foreign investors. See Chapter 5. 
37 Although counter intuitive also Bubnova (2000) finds that among different risk factors 
investors were least concerned about risks stemming from short-sighted economic 
policies. 
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needed to fully understand the declining role of the macroeconomic environ-
ment as political risk factor that is pictured in this analysis. 
Without doubt the empirical findings permit the conclusion that the quality of 
governance is of particular importance for FOi flows to Latin America. The 
governance indicator that has been constructed for this analysis was found to 
be a highly significant determinant of the FOi/GDP ratio. It follows that an im-
provement in the governance index would lead to a significant positive change 
in the FOi/GDP ratio of Latin American countries. These inferences drawn 
from the analysis are most likely not biased by a misspecification of the 
empirical model, as the governance indicator stays robust at the 1% level, 
even if the model is altered marginally. Hence, the improvement of national 
governance seems to be the most powerful tool to foster inflows of FOi to the 
emerging economies in Latin America. This conclusion is of particular 
importance for host countries as the amelioration of domestic governance not 
only fosters FOi but simultaneously implies a "double-dividend" as also 
domestic investors do benefit from better governance. Therefore, the results of 
this analysis permit the careful conclusion that national £Olicy should focus on 
the establishment of good-governance in Latin America. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a simple econometric model to test for the influence of 
political risk variables on the inflows of FOi for a panel of Latin American 
countries in the period from 1982 to 1997. Data for the empirical analysis was 
largely collected from the publications of international organizations like the 
World Bank. The country risk measures I used were taken from the IRIS3 data 
set provided by PRS group and POLCON. A macroeconomic risk indicator 
was derived from disposable hard data that has been transferred to a 1-10 
scale using a methodology developed by the World Economic Forum. This 
analysis distinguished risk originating in governmental behavior, societal 
characteristics and the macroeconomic environment. For the estimation a 
fixed effect model was used that incorporates time invariant coefficients of 
every analyzed country in a constant term. I find that measures of political risk 
that incorporate the quality of governance and administration are highly 
significant and robust determinants of incoming FOi flows. In contrast, political 
risks that originate in societal characteristics or the macro-economic 
environment were not robust in all tested models but usually showed the 
expected sign when estimators were significant. The surprising result that 
indicators measuring macro-economic risk exposure did not turn out to be 
robust may be explained considering that in the absence of severe imbalances 
macro-economic risk factors loose decisiveness. The analysis permits the 
conclusion that good governance is a decisive determinant of the quantity of 
FOi to Latin American countries. While societal risks can surely be influential in 
other countries this empirical analysis did not confirm that there is a systematic 
38 The case study on Mexico in Chapter 5 confirms the result that good governance is 
essential for the attraction of FOi flows. 
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statistical connection between societal determinants of political risk and FDI 
flows to Latin America for the analyzed time period. 
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5. Political Risk and FOi in Mexico 
5.1 Politics in Mexico 
5.1.1 Stylized Facts of Mexican Political History 
After independence from Spain in 1821 Mexico experienced long periods of 
political instability, civil wars and quickly changing governments caused by the 
struggle for power that was unfolding between liberals and conservatives.1 
Moreover, Mexico experienced the invasion of the country by the United 
States followed by a loss of large territories as Texas, Alta California and New 
Mexico. Under the liberal rule of Benito Juarez from 1859 to 1872 that was 
based on the Constitution of 1857 important changes were implemented as for 
example the abolition of preferential treatments for members of the military 
and the church as well as the obligation of the church to sell its large 
possessions of land. As a reaction to this liberal policy Mexican conservatives 
eagerly tried to convince European powers of the necessity to provide aid for 
restoring their power. When Mexico asked for a two years moratorium on its 
external debt, the French government decided to invade Mexico in order to 
enforce its claims forcing Juarez to exile in the north of Mexico. After the 
successful invasion the French enthroned Maximilian of Habsburg who should 
later be executed by the eventually victorious liberals. This long period of 
political turmoil ended when Porfirio Diaz established his authoritarian 
government in 1877. Although de jure a democratic republic based on the 
constitution of 1857, the rule of Diaz was characterized by his personal 
dominance in all sectors of government. He used appointments to reward 
supporters and left a national administration with a high fraction of military 
officers and businessmen. This technique which was generously applied 
produced corruption in all levels of political life and enhanced the political 
culture that public office was rather a reward to be taken advantage of than a 
public responsibility. Diaz reversed the cautious process of decentralization 
that was begun under Juarez by concentrating power in the hands of the 
national government. To further strengthen the federal government Diaz 
engaged in largely expanding the national bureaucracy. The power of the 
judicial and the legislative branch were decreased making them subordinate to 
the presidency and public elections were merely held to anew the loyalty of the 
Mexican people to the regime of the dictator. Opposition was suppressed by 
imprisonment, threats and violence while the press was subject to censorship. 
Typically lower social groups, and in particular indians that were believed to be 
racially inferior and an obstacle to national development, were the victims of 
the most violent oppressions. As power was largely concentrated in the hands 
of Diaz, his successors inherited an institutionally weak political system that 
lacked legitimacy and an extremely large, corrupt state apparatus as well as a 
society with severe inequalities.2 This inequality, the oppressive and racist 
nature of the regime that largely ignored the interests of workers and peasants 
as well as the favoritism towards foreigners and foreign corporations led to the 
outbreak of the Mexican revolution in 1910. The revolution of 1910-20 marks 
the beginning of modern Mexican political history with the revolutionary 
1 See Cordova Vianello (1994). 
2 See Camp (2003) p. 31-40. 
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constitution of 1917 still being in effect. Although the 1917 constitution draws 
very much on its predecessor from 1857, it additionally establishes 
revolutionary principles concerning the separation of church and state, labor 
regulation and rules that were aimed at reducing the foreign domination of the 
Mexican economy.3 
The Mexican revolution again implied long years of political instability with 
quickly changing governments, large numbers of deaths in the population and 
a severe economic crisis. Although the military phase of the revolution ended 
around 1920, the time until 1940 was characterized by political instabilities and 
occasional violent societal conflicts. In an initiative of president Calles, who 
ruled from 1924-1928 but dominated political life during the so-called 
maximato for six more years the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) was 
founded in 1929. Calles designed a ruling party with corporatist structure 
which could channel the different ideological positions in the revolutionary 
movement to avoid the outbreak of further violence. This party that should later 
change its name to Partido de la Revoluci6n Mexicana (PRM) in 1938 and 
then to Partido de la Revoluci6n lnstitucional (PRI) in 1946 should remain in 
power until the year 2000 when Vincente Fox became the first Mexican 
president that was not a member of the former governmental party. The 
renaming of the party in 1938 by president Cardenas was accompanied by an 
reorganization of the party in corporatist lines with separate sectors being 
created for labor, the peasantry, the military, and middle class groups.4 If the 
initial goal of this reform was to provide a framework for the expression of 
popular demands, the system soon became an instrument of political control 
and electoral manipulation. In exchange for granting political and economic 
benefits to sector leaders the party could ensure its power. The change of the 
official party's name in PRI in 1946 signaled a turn away from the revolutionary 
upheavals of the Cardenas years in favor of political stability and economic 
development. 5 Hence, the response of the Mexican leaders to the enduring 
political instabilities and the massive devastation of the revolution was as 
CHAND writes 
"to create a highly centralized political system with an extremely powerful president and a dominant 
state-sponsored political party, whose function was to garner support for the revolutionary elite and 
ensure that social demands were channeled through the confines of the official party, where they were 
more easily controlled." 6 
Although the Mexican constitution proclaims the separation of powers and a 
system of checks and balances that allows for a control of the executive 
branch, the reality was characterized by a president ruling without any 
3 The constitutional rules are further explored in the paragraphs on the branches of 
government. Paragraph 5.2.2.1 .1 discusses the economic implications of the 1917 
constitution for FOi. 
4 See Whiting (1992) p. 37-45. 
5 See Chand (2001) p.13-25 
6 See Chand (2001) p.14. 
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effective control of the legislative branch or the judiciary.7 This particular 
organization of the PRI implied that a clear distinction between the party and 
the state was no longer possible. The status as "official" party ensured the 
party's superiority vis-a-vis the opposition parties in terms of media presence, 
financial resources and government patronage. PRI candidates for public 
offices were not democratically elected but chosen by an intimate inner circle 
of the party usually led by the president. This political practice of handpicking 
candidates was also applied for presidential candidates. The so-called dedazo 
meant that the current president chooses the next PRI candidate to run for the 
presidency. Considering the dominant role of the PRI in Mexican politics 
picking the presidential candidate was equivalent to choosing the next 
president of Mexico.8 If, despite of their superiority in every respect, PRI 
candidates failed at the polls, the regime took advantage of electoral fraud to 
ensure the victory of its candidate. Although violent repression has never been 
used systematically, the government occasionally recurred to coercive 
measures to suppress dissident movements.9 During the 80s the PRI 
cautiously initiated reforms that should finally foster democracy and strengthen 
the opposition.10 This process of democratization was in part initiated by the 
party itself but also a reaction to the popular demands for more democracy in 
Mexico. A starting point for massive public protests was the gubernatorial 
election in the state of Chihuahua in 1986 that was characterized by massive 
irregularities. This fraudulent election provoked a wave of protests among the 
Mexican population including many civil organizations and the catholic church 
that threatened to suspend service if the elections were not annulled. Protest 
continued after the fraudulent presidential election of 1988 where the popular 
PRI dissident Cuautemoc Cardenas and the PAN candidate Manuel Clouthier 
challenged the PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Although there is 
some evidence that Cardenas won the election, Salinas was announced 
winner and took the presidency.11 Repeated experiences of electoral fraud and 
growing discontent with the regime finally obliged the PRI to enact electoral 
reforms that strengthened the role of the opposition and culminated in the 
election of the PAN candidate Fox in 2000.12 The problem of electoral fraud 
7 See Penner (1999) p. 39-47. For a more detailed analysis of the president's, the 
legislatives' and the judiciary's role in Mexican politics see paragraph 5.1.2.2, 5.1.2.3 and 
paragraph 5.1.2.4 respectively. As Pritzl (1997) points out an inefficient separation of 
powers is a characteristic of many Latin American countries. See Pritz! (1997) p.64-80. 
8 The PRI stopped this practice in 1999 under the rule of president Zedillo when for the first 
lime in the history of the PRI an open presidential primary was held that eventually chose 
Francisco Labatista as the PRI candidate for the presidential race in 2000. See Camp 
(2003). Despite of this move towards democratization it is argued that the primary was in 
fact a disguised "dedazo" because of the privileges Zedillo's candidate Labatista enjoyed. 
See Langston (2002) p.80. 
9 The most prominent example are the student massacre that took place in 1968 where 
hundreds of protesting students were shot on the Tlatelolco square in Mexico City and the 
violent repression of student protests in Corpus Christi in 1971 . But there are several other 
examples for violent repression. See Philip (1992). 
10 Semo (1996) gives an overview over the initiating phase of the democratization process. 
11 See Chand (2001) p. 13-74. 
12 For a short overview of the electoral reforms see Swan/Martorelli/Molinar (1998). 
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was tackled by the creation of the lnstituto Federal Electoral (IFE) to supervise 
the electoral process, the financing of parties and competitive access to the 
media. 13 The growing importance of opposition parties in congress and on the 
regional level slowly established a system of checks and balances that helped 
constrain the power of the federal government and to break the dominance of 
the PRl. 14 Consequently, from the late 80s onward Mexico changed from being 
an authoritarian one-party state to becoming a multiparty democracy with a 
competitive electoral process. Moreover, the extremely powerful position of the 
presidency was opposed by a stronger congress and a more independent 
judiciary which are now posing limits to the executive branch of the Mexican 
government. 15 
5.1.2 The Current Political System in Mexico 
5.1.2.1 Overview 
This paragraph describes the main characteristics and institutions of the 
current Mexican political system. Due to its high complexity the description will 
be limited to mechanisms that are important for the analysis of political risks 
emerging from its institutional characteristics.16 Before the different branches 
of the system are reviewed in greater detail this paragraph offers a brief 
overview of important characteristics of Mexican politics. Mexico, the official 
name of which is the United Mexican States, is a federal republic of 31 states 
and one federal district with the states being divided into 2394 municipalities. 
The capital and seat of government is Mexico City which is also the cultural 
and economic center of the country. De jure Mexico is a presidential 
democracy with many similarities to that of the United States. It is based on a 
constitution that was passed during the Mexican revolution in 1917 which 
divides power between an executive branch, a legislative branch, the judiciary 
and the federal states. The executive branch of federal government is 
represented by the president of the republic who is publicly elected for a six 
year term and a cabinet of 19 agencies. The legislative branch consists of a 
bicameral congress that is divided into a 128-member Senate and a 500-
member Chamber of Deputies. Senate elections are held every six years. 
Chamber of Deputies elections are held every three years. On the state level 
governors, town councils and mayors are directly elected by the population. 
The judiciary has local , state and national levels the last comprising a court of 
appeals and a supreme court that may overrule legislation that violates the 
constitution. The main parties of the political spectrum are the former state 
party PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), the conservative National Action 
Party (PAN) and the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) with 51 
seats. Smaller fractions are the Labor Party (PT) and the Ecologist Green 
13 For a detailed description of the IFE and its role in ensuring fair elections see Prud'home 
(1998). 
14 For an overview of the growing influence of the Mexican opposition parties during the late 
80s and 90s see Chand (2001) p.13-74 and Camp (2003) p.186-213. 
15 See Camp (2003) p.174-180. 
16 Camp (2003) and Castro Rea et al. (1999) offer an excellent initial overview over the 
Mexican political system. 
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Party of Mexico (PVEM). The seat distribution in the Senate is still 
characterized by a majority of the PRI with 60 seats followed by the PAN, PRO 
and PVEM with 46, 15 and 5 seats respectively. A general principle of the 
Mexican political system is the principle of no reelection to any political 
position in the Mexican government including all seats in the federal and state 
legislatures. 17 Although there was a lot of progress in this matter during the 
last years, the press and media remain partly controlled. For a long time the 
federal government retained direct control over the press through its monopoly 
of newsprint. In the second half of the 90s the ability to control government 
advertising remained. Too critical media or press coverage of political events 
may therefore be sanctioned with the withdrawal of government advertisement 
contracts. 18 Inherited from the interventionist past the federal government still 
operates public enterprises in economic sectors like petroleum, 
petrochemicals, electricity, communications, transportation, and agriculture. 
"La silla presidencial esta embrujada: cualquier 
persona buena que se sienta en el/a se convierle en ma/a" 
Emiliano Zapata 
5.1.2.2 The Executive Branch of Government 
One of the keys to understanding Mexican politics is the role of the national 
presidency because since independence all of Mexico's political systems have 
been based on presidentialism.19 This means that the executive power lies in 
the hand of the president who is publicly elected for a six year term or sexenio 
without the possibility of being reelected.20 Despite of similarities with the US 
system the powe:s of the Mexican president went far beyond those that are 
found in other presi1ential democracies.21 In fact, the dominant role of the 
president is not a consequence of his constitutional powers but of a 
combination of de facto structures in Mexican politics. Many scholars refer to 
the presidency as an institution with "meta-constitutional" powers.22 Therefore, 
the de facto rules of Mexican government differ to a large extent from the de 
jure rules of the Mexican constitution which establishes a strict division of 
power. 23 A close look on historical presidential governments reveals that since 
the official party PRI was founded in 1929 the Mexican president has been the 
dominant force in national politics. Before the reforms enacted by the 
administrations of Zedillo and Fox the position of the president in Mexico could 
17 This constitutional principle is a revolutionary heritage caused by the dictatorship of Porfirio 
Diaz who ruled the country from 1877 to 1911. 
18 See PRS Group (2003). The change of government in 2000 limited the possibility of the 
PRI to influence the press. 
19 For a history of Mexican presidentialism see Cordova Vianello (1994). 
20 The principle of no re-election has not been violated during the last years. See Philip 
(1992). 
21 See Sutherland (1999). The author does not enter here the controversial discussion of the 
political science literature if presidential governments are generally inferior to 
parliamentary democracies. For an overview of the discussion see Mainwaring/Shugart 
(1997). For a detailed criticism of presidential democracies see LinzNalenzuela (1994). 
22 See Weldon (1997) for a detailed analysis of the factors that enable these meta-
constitutional powers. 
23 See Penner (1999). 
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be compared to that of "an absolute monarch for six years". 24 Article 71 of the 
1917 constitution enables the president to initiate legislation which comprises 
the right to initiate amendments of the constitution. Article 72 states that the 
president can veto legislation and only be overturned by a two-thirds vote of 
congress. In addition the president had the right to nominate ministers, the 
judiciary, high rank officials and important party leaders, to name the mayor of 
Mexico City and to remove state governors and congress members from 
office.25 Between 1946 and 1996 presidents removed 67 governors and during 
the Salinas administration 17 publicly elected governors resigned "voluntarily" 
and were replaced by members of the presidents inner circle.26 Thus, in spite 
of the federalist system established by the constitution Mexican politics are in 
fact highly centralized. 27 In addition to his legislative powers the Mexican 
president may issue regulations that seive as guidelines for the interpretation 
of existing legislation.26 The president may nominate and remove all members 
of his cabinet, as well as name diplomatic officers, military officers of a certain 
rank and supreme court judges with the latter necessitating the approval of 
senate. Moreover, before Zedillo presidents made use of the so-called dedazo 
to name their successor. Although the constitution does not provide the 
president with extraordinary decree powers, he was granted the right to 
regulate domestic and foreign commerce including taxes, tariffs and subsidies 
on his own account as well as to inteivene in monetary policy.29 
However, more than the constitutional powers of the president, his partisan 
powers, that is, his ability to control congress and his own party, are 
responsible for the large extent of his power. It is highly probable that the 
powerful position of the head of state erodes when he faces a congress 
dominated by opposition parties.30 In fact, an important reason for the strength 
of the presidency in Mexico was the fact that the disciplined PRI dominated 
congress and approved nearly all presidential bills without amendments. 31 In 
fact the PRI majority in congress made the legislation process in parliament a 
24 Daniel Cosfo Villegas cited by Philip (1992) p.167. 
25 The mayor of Mexico City is now publicly elected. 
26 See Rodrfguez (1999) and Weldon (1997). 
27 See Cornelius (1996) and Bolanos Guerra (1994). 
28 See Carbonell y Sanchez (1994) . 
29 Currently, the Bank of Mexico is an independent organization. Since 1994 the NAFTA 
treaty also limits the presidential power in the design of economic policy. In the case of 
invasions and severe disturbances of internal peace the president gains extraordinary 
decree powers. The extraordinary powers of the presidency in economic policy relied on a 
constitutional amendment that has been passed under the rule of president Miguel 
Aleman. See Carbonell y Sanchez (1994). 
30 The experiences of president Fox who faces a congress that is dominated by opposition 
parties show that the power of the president is now effectively constrained by the 
legislative branch as several presidential bills have not been passed. 
31 See Weldon (1997). As Philip states:" The PRI was not designed to represent the views of 
an articulate membership, but to reward conformity and control elections; all efforts to 
reform the PRI by turning it into a members' party have been successfully resisted. Philip 
(1992) p. 165. For a more detailed analysis of the role of congress see paragraph 5.1.2.3. 
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simple formality. To illustrate the latter point table 5.1 depicts the bill success 
rate of the Mexican president for two different legislative periods. 
Table 5.1: Bill Success Rate of the Mexican Presidencv 
Bills Presented 
Executive Success Rate 
Source: Camp (2003) p.173 
1994-1997 
LEGISLATURE 
274 
99% 
1997-2000 
LEGISLATURE 
677 
90% 
The presidential control of congress and the minor role of opposition parties 
implied that the president was even able to change the constitution with high 
discretionary power. Since its establishment in 1917 the constitution has been 
changed more than 350 times according to the current political and societal 
necessities.32 These constitutional amendments have been used to implement 
government policy or to further strengthen the power of the executive.33 The 
presidential gain in power by the lacking control of congress over bills is 
enforced by the lacking control of the judiciary.34 The weakness of the other 
branches of government implied that the Mexican president played the 
decisive role for all political decisions including economic policy. The joint 
responsibility of the presidential office for such diverse matters as fiscal policy, 
national health, ecological norms, national education, social policies and the 
national economic strategy made the president the veritable geometric center 
of the political system. 35 
Another important factor that influences Mexican presidential politics is the 
camari/la-system. A camarilla is a group of political actors who share political 
interests and rely on one another to improve their chances in political 
leadership. The Mexican political system is permeated by these clientelistic 
relationships that have been formed over long periods of time and are based 
on personal loyalty. A camari/la leader who ascends in an organization places 
the members of his group in other influential positions. As the Mexican political 
system does not permit a re-election of the president the supreme patron and 
his camarilla are removed every six years and replaced by the new presidents 
group. 36 One immediate consequence of this system of personal loyalties is 
that the responsiveness and accountability of officials is greatly diminished. 
Moreover, it is an important source of political discontinuity. A recent study 
reveals that 80 % of top office holders are replaced every 12 years and 90 % 
every 18 years. At the end of each administration nearly one third of top-level 
32 See Rubio et al. (1994) p.25. This extraordinary power was exercised until 1988 when the 
PRI lost the necessary two-thirds majority in congress. See Sutherland (1999). 
33 See Penner (1999). 
34 See paragraph 5.1.2.4. 
35 See Bolanos Guerra (1994) . 
36 See Camp (2003) and Cornelius (1996). 
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players drop out of political life. So every six ~ears 18000 publicly elected 
posts and 25000 designated posts are changed.3 
The reforms of Zedillo and Fox as well as the loss of the PRI majority in 
congress marks the end of unchecked presidential rule. It remains to be seen 
how the role of the president will be changing subject to these alternate 
conditions. In any case the analysis of the president's position in Mexican 
politics shows that before the recent reforms the executive power was hardly 
limited or controlled by any other governmental branch. 38 This lack of checks 
and balances often led to arbitrary decisions of the president that highly 
affected the well-being of the Mexican people and implied a massive abuse of 
power for personal or political ends. 39 Therefore, the quality of Mexican policy 
depends to a large extent on the personal qualities of the currently ruling 
president.40 According to the so-called pendulum theory the policy of Mexican 
presidents swings from left to right following the preferences of the president 
and his camarilla.41 The most prominent example of an economic policy that 
has been essentially shaped by a president is the term of president Lopez 
Portillo. One observer classified his economic policy as a presidential 
economy rather than a policy that was conducted following any specific 
economic doctrine. There is evidence that in the years preceding the debt 
crisis the president personally blocked necessary cuts in public spending that 
were proposed by his advisors.42 However, the most prominent example for 
his arbitrary decisions is the nationalization of the Mexican banks in 1982 that 
was announced without warning. The president obviously decided on this 
matter without consulting sufficient advice and considering affected groups. 43 
The nationalization of the banks and the exchange controls were imposed by 
an executive decree. Article 28 of the constitution that prohibits monopolies 
was amended with a new paragraph that allowed for the bank nationalization 
37 See Cornelius (1996) and Sutherland (1999). 
38 Rubio et al. state: ... nuestro Sistema constitucional de frenos y contra pesos de hecho no 
funciona porque las distintos 6rganos de poder no tienen intereses contrapuestos ni 
capacidad institucional de defenderlos." Rubio et al. (1994) p.168. 
39 See Cornelius (1996). As one observer states: "No matter how irrational a project may be 
in the eyes of specialists, if the president approves it, it must be carried out''. Cited by 
Morris (1991) p.37. The detailed analysis of four presidential terms by Philips (1992) 
confirms the result that presidents often carry out arbitrary acts that have an important 
impact on the economy. 
40 A British observer commented: "It seems to me that this system is workable only so long 
as the candidates successively selected by the retiring president are people of restraint 
and sound common sense. The opportunities for abuse of power and the apparent lack of 
any of the normal checks and balances usually associated with democratic regimes do not 
offer any guarantee of permanent political stability. Cited by Philip (1992) p.169. Philip 
(1992) argues that the presidential terms of Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970), Echeverria (1970-
1976) and in particular Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) were characterized by weak ruling 
performances. 
41 See Philip (1992) p.178-183. In contrast Whiting argues that despite of high presidential 
influence Mexican politics show a basic continuity. See Whiting (1992). 
42 See Philip (1992) p.115-132. 
43 See Camp (2003). For a detailed analysis of the bank nationalization see Elizondo (2001 ). 
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which was again suspended in 1990 when president Salinas initiated the 
reprivatization of the banks.44 Lopez Portillo announced his decision to the 
cabinet 12 hours before his address to the public and asked for resignation of 
everyone that objected.45 The fact that a single political actor can make 
decisions that deeply influence the economy may serve to illustrate the 
inherent dangers of this massive concentration of political power.46 
5.1.2.3 The Legislative Branch of Government 
De jure the Mexican constitution provides the legislative body of the Mexican 
political system with great powers.47 The chamber of deputies and the senate 
have the right to present fiscal initiatives, to control the annual budget and 
ministers as well as to participate in the designation of important officials in 
public administration. Considering these constitutional powers of the Mexican 
congress one is attempted to conclude that its power is similar to that of the 
US congress. However, as already pointed out, during the last 70 years the 
presidency exerted the central role in Mexican politics.48 The reasons for this 
de facto weakness of the Mexican congress stem from the particularities of the 
Mexican political system. One important reason is the minor role of opposition 
parties. Between 1940 and 1961 the percentage of seats in the chamber of 
deputies attributed to the PRI attained 96%. Due to cautious political reforms 
that strengthened the role of opposition parties this percenta~e fell to 83% and 
61% for the periods 1964-1976 and 1979-1994 respectively. 9 The distribution 
of seats in the senate during the last years followed similar patterns. Until 1988 
the PRI controlled 100% of the seats in senate. 50 Opposition parties therefore 
had little influence on policy making.51 However, it may be argued that the long 
time dominance of one party does not necessarily imply a weak position of the 
congress. What additionally reinforces the presidential power in the Mexican 
case is the principle of no reelection of legislators, the high internal discipline 
of the PRI and the fact that until 1994 the president was simultaneously head 
of the PRI. 
To allow for a better understanding these particularities will be examined more 
closely. In the first place the constitutional principle of no reelection hinders the 
development of legislative knowledge by members of congress. The complete 
44 The nationalization of the banks is not the only example for arbitrary changes of the 
constitution according to political objectives. See Rubio et al. (1994). 
45 See Maxfield (1990). 
46 Elizondo (2001) argues that the expropriation of the banks was not an illegitimate violation 
of property rights since the Mexican constitution permits the discretional restriction of 
property rights by the president. Paragraph 5.3.3.4 gives a more detailed analysis of the 
risk of expropriation in Mexico. 
47 See Nacif (2003) p.2-4. 
48 In the 1960s Vernon commented the role of the Mexican legislature as following: " ... in 
practice, the legislature is a passive creature which hardly ever fails to carry out the wishes 
of the president; independent action on its part is almost unknown." Vernon (1963) p.11. 
49 See Massicotte (1999) p.93-101. 
50 See Camp (2003) p.175. 
51 See Langston (2002) p.64-66. 
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change of congress members after every election avoids that legislators gain 
experience in the complex programs and procedures of government which 
impedes a continuity in legislative policy of congress. Moreover, this principle 
leads to strong incentives for legislators of the president's party to remain loyal 
as their political future entirely depends on the benevolence of the party leader 
to assign them to lucrative posts. 52 So every member of congress, 
independent of the party he belongs to, has an incentive to rather vote 
according to party discipline instead of representing the interests of his 
constituencies. 53 
Up to the times of Zedillo the president was simultaneously head of the PRI. 54 
It may be argued that this fatal combination was the source of presidential 
dominance and the de facto irrelevance of the Mexican congress. 55 
Consequently presidential bills to congress nearly always passed without 
substantial amendments of the legislative body. In fact there have been no 
serious conflicts neither between the two legislative bodies nor between the 
executive branch and congress in the past.56 The bill success rates that were 
presented in table 5.1 are an important empirical evidence for the minor role of 
the Mexican congress in shaping governmental policy. Thus, the long year 
dominance of the PRI in congress, the president's role as head of the PRI and 
high internal discipline within the party combined with the principle of no 
reelection implied that the legislative's role to provide for checks and balances 
of the executive branch of government could not be properly executed. 
The minor role of congress as an institution of democratic control of 
government is also reflected in the low esteem of Mexican citizens of congress 
that is illustrated in table 5.2. While 83% of US citizens expressed confidence 
in congress in 1990 the corresponding figures for Mexico are 16%, 28% and 
21% for the years 1988, 1998 and 2000 respectively. Moreover, the 
confidence of Mexican citizens in national political parties is considerably lower 
than in the US although here the difference is less striking. 
Despite of the negative view of citizens, the role of the Mexican congress is 
gradually strengthened by the growing importance of opposition parties. The 
first important step to a better control of executive power was the national 
election of 1988 where the PRI for the first time in history lost its two-thirds 
majority in congress that is crucial for constitutional amendments. 
52 See Massicotte (1999). 
53 See Nacif (2003) p.5-6. 
54 See Nacif (2003) p.6. 
55 See Weldon (1997) who analyses in greater detail the prerequisites for the meta-
constitutional powers of the Mexican presidency. 
56 See Massicotte (1999). The exception in Mexican history is the time of the so-called 
"maximato" (1928-1935) when the former president and party leader Calles dominated 
congress and the direction of Mexican policy. See Weldon (1997). Morris states that 
"congress has historically served as a virtual rubber stamp to presidential desires". Morris 
(1991) p.27. 
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Table 5.2: Confidence of Mexicans and US Americans in Congress and 
Parties 
INSTITUTION 
Congress 
Political Parties 
USA 
1990 
83 
Source: Camp (2003) p.55. 
PERCENTAOE OF RESPONDENTS OMNO POSITIVE EVALUATION 
USA Mexico Mexico Mexico 
2000 1988 1998 2000 
16 28 21 
56 29 20 
In the midterm elections of 1997 the PRI even lost its majority to the opposition 
parties leaving president Zedillo faced with a majority of the opposition parties 
in congress. The experience of the first years with higher opposition control 
suggests that the role of congress in Mexican politics becomes more 
important. 57 The current president Fox essentially faces the same situation as 
congress is not controlled by a majority of the president's party PAN. Hence, 
the beginning democratic transformation of the Mexican political system 
implies that the traditional "presidencialismo" of former years is no longer 
existent. With this particularity of the semi-authoritarian past diminishing the 
importance of congress for the design of Mexican politics is expected to be 
growing in the future. This process implies that the Mexican legislative branch 
is changing from a de facto irrelevant institution to a legislative body that may 
be able to fulfill the tasks that it is contributed to in the constitution. That is to 
say, that for the years to come one may expect a more effective control of the 
national executive by the lejislative branch of government that may better limit 
arbitrary executive actions. 
5.1.2.4 The National Judiciary 
As already pointed out in paragraph 3.1.2.4 a functioning judiciary is essential 
for democratic countries with market based economic systems. Like in the US 
the Mexican judicial system has courts at the local, the state and the national 
level, the last comprising a court of appeals and a supreme court. At present 
the supreme court consists of 11 judges that may serve for up to 15 years and 
are appointed by the president with a two-thirds approval of the senate. 59 
These current rules are the result of an ambitious judicial reform that has been 
enacted under the rule of president Zedillo to fight the inefficiency and the 
corruption that prevailed in the national judiciary. In part the reform is a 
reaction to the violation of the principle of the separation of powers which, 
although explicitly stated in the Mexican constitution, has never been 
achieved. As it was the case for the legislative branch of government, the role 
57 Lujambio (1998) reviews the effects of growing opposition party presence in congress 
since 1988. 
58 Nacif (2003) presents a formal model of the Mexican political system modeling an 
executive that is constrained by divided government. Despite of critics highlighting the 
danger of deadlock policy in this situation the model shows that efficient government is still 
possible through coalition building. 
59 See Camp (2003). 
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of the judiciary as an independent power in government has not been exerted 
in the Mexican political practice of the last years. In fact, also the judiciary has 
been largely dominated by the president as he played a decisive role in the 
process of the appointment of judges.60 
At the governmental level a supreme court is influential for national decision-
making when it is independent from other branches of government and when it 
can legislate through rulings. The German supreme court for example may 
declare that laws are violating the constitution which obligates the parliament 
to alter existing legislation. The Mexican constitution of 1917 establishes no 
legal base for annulling laws or decrees that violate the constitution. Thus, the 
power of the court to shape national policy and to control constitutionality by 
rulings was nearly inexistent or at best inefficiently exercised. The reforms of 
Zedillo strengthened the role of the judiciary by granting the supreme court the 
right to decide on the constitutionality of laws and regulations which implies 
that norms that violate the constitution may be suspended.61 Individual 
constitutional guarantees however, only offer protection for the citizens if they 
can be effectively enforced.62 In the past only few individuals could protect 
themselves against arbitrary governmental acts.63 To foster independence of 
the court no politicians, government officials or congress members are allowed 
to be appointed. Additionally the power of the senate in the decision process 
on the appointment was enlarged to restrict presidential influence. The 
administration of Fox continued Zedillos policy of strengthening the supreme 
court which recently lead to some cases in which the judges qualified 
presidential initiatives as anti constitutional.64 Thus, on the governmental level 
the reforms enabled the Mexican judiciary to better perform its constitutional 
role as a counterbalance to the executive power. 
In spite of these reforms the lower levels of the judiciary are still taunted by 
severe problems of corruption, political manipulation and long duration of trials. 
The lack of transparency and consistency makes it nearly impossible for the 
average citizen to resort to the system to protect his or her individual rights. 
60 See Holland (1999). Rubio et al. (1994) state: "La division de poderes es una ficcion, tanto 
en el marco de las leyes como en la practica politica, sobre todo en lo que concieme al 
roder judicial." Rubio et al. (1994) p.34. 
1 What existed before was a limited form of judicial revision called amparo that was focused 
on the protection of individual rights. See Holland (1999). For a detailed analysis of judicial 
constitutional control see Castro (2000). 
62 As a Mexican jurist states: "La historia ha demostrado que un pretendido derecho sin el 
respaldo judicial no es mas que una declaracion en el papel. El problema central de la ley 
constitucional es encontrar un modo practico de asegurar al individuo una proteccion 
plena y efectiva contra los excesos arbitrarios del poder. Esto solo es posible mediante la 
intervenci6n judicial." Tamayo y Salmoran (1989) p.248 
63 In 1992 only 11 % of all amparo-lawsuits that claimed the in constitutionality of laws or 
administrative acts were successful. 77% of the claims were revised because they lacked 
the necessary formal prerequisites of constitutional claims. In addition, the amparo could 
only protect individual rights but not declare the inconstitutionality of laws. See Rubio et al. 
(1994). 
64 See Camp (2003). 
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Criminal justice is still characterized by massive human rights violations up to 
the use of torture to obtain confessions. In particular citizens with low incomes 
or with indigenous origin are targets of human rights violations as they do not 
dispose of contacts or sufficient means to pay bribes.65 A sufficiently large 
bribe in turn, may buy a verdict of innocence or the ignorance of law enforcing 
institutions towards crime. Additionally the judicial system is bureaucratic and 
slow which implies that bribes are not only paid for a favorable judgement but 
also for speeding up the decision. The fact that judges are badly paid further 
increases corruption and the payment of bribes to judges. The absence of 
transparency, reliability, integrity and consistency imply that the respect of the 
Mexican citizens for the law remains low.66 Mexicans do not feel protected by 
the law since the impunity of criminals may be viewed daily. The same is true 
for the national police that is widely known for inefficiency and corruption. The 
low quality and efficiency of the system is confirmed by the low esteem that it 
enjoys in the Mexican public. Table 5.3 depicts the results of surveys in 
Mexico and the USA where people were asked if they had confidence in the 
judiciary and the police. 
Table 5.3: Confidence of Mexicans and US Americans in the Judiciary 
INSTITUTION 
Law/Courts 
USA 
1990 
Police 88 
Source: Camp (2003) p.55. 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS GMNG POSITIVE EVALUATION 
USA Mexico Mexico Mexico 
2000 1988 1998 2000 
80 32 31 22 
87 12 33 22 
The results show that despite of the enacted reforms the trust of Mexicans in 
the judicial system has not grown significantly during the last years indicating 
that the efforts were not sufficient. As GoNzALEZ G6MEZ writes the unreliability 
and intransparency as well as the low levels of esteem for the law and the 
enforcing organizations creates a "culture of illegality" in Mexico.67 Even the 
winning of the presidency by the PAN in 2000 did not result in higher levels of 
confidence for the national legal institutions. However, it is to be expected that 
growing pressure from interest groups inside and outside the country for a 
better functioning of the Mexican judiciary will improve the situation in the 
future.68 
5.1.2.5 The Political Parties 
Up to the year 1988 the analysis of Mexican political parties may be limited to 
an investigation of the PRI as the only party with a significant level of political 
influence in society. The official party held large majorities in both chambers of 
65 See Camp (2003) and Rubio et al (1994). 
66 See Holland (1999) and Castro (2000). A low respect for the judiciary is a common 
problem in nearly all Latin American countries. See Buscaglia/Dakolias/Ratliff (1995). 
67 See Gonzalez Gomez (2001). For a closer analysis of rule of law in Mexico see paragraph 
5.3.2.2. 
68 See Domingo (1999). 
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congress and dominated public administrations, the judiciary and other key 
governmental organizations. The long history of the PRI as the unique, 
corporatist party that had to integrate all parts of society implied that its 
influence spread to nearly every important interest group including unions and 
peasant organizations.69 This dominant role led to a virtual fusion between the 
party and the state that resembled the former Soviet Union which is 
symbolically pictured by the fact that the PRl's emblem has the same colors as 
the Mexican flag (green, white and red) and that public social spendin~ used to 
be accompanied by colorful propaganda evoking the party's emblem.7 
The role of opposition parties was merely limited to enhance the legitimacy of 
the semi-authoritarian regime that was governing Mexico. Despite of their 
presence in congress their de-facto influence on the design of Mexican policy 
was severely limited either by repression of the regime or by their lack of 
unity.71 The transformation of the Mexican society towards a true democracy 
during the 90s however, implied a steadily growing importance of opposition 
parties. The severe problems of inefficiency, corruption and the inability of the 
one-party regime to enhance public welfare initiated a process of 
democratization in Mexico that was partly rooted in the growing awareness of 
the Mexican population of the importance of democracy and partly due to 
cautious reforms inside the PRI. Faced by the devastating consequences of 
the Mexican economic crisis during the 80s the population offered massive 
resistance to the usual governmental practices of corruption, inefficiency and 
electoral fraud to ensure PRI dominance. 72 One important consequence of this 
democratic transformation was the enhanced role of the opposition parties in 
Mexican politics. The emergence of a multiparty system with higher electoral 
competition completely changed the characteristics of the Mexican political 
system as opposition parties for the first time faced a nearly level playing field 
to compete with the PRI. This democratic transformation reached a climax in 
the 2000 presidential election in which for a first time a non PRI member won 
the presidential race. 
The current political system has five influential parties. The most important in 
terms of their current electoral support are the former governing party PRI, the 
conservative-center party PAN, and the left-center PRD that was founded by 
ex-PRI members. The other two with a lesser share in votes are the Mexican 
ecological or green party and the labor party.73 The growing competitiveness 
and the erosion of the PRl's superior position imply that the role of the parties 
inside the political process grows. In the years of PRI dominance the role of 
69 For a detailed analysis of the structure and the functioning of the PRI see Rodriguez 
(1998b). 
70 See Otero (1996) p.11 . 
71 See Gomez Tagle (1999). 
72 See Chand (2001) for an excellent analysis of the sources of the Mexican process of 
democratization. 
73 For an analysis of the party ideology and position in the political spectrum of PRI, PAN and 
PRO see Moreno (1998) and Rodriguez (1998a) 
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other parties was reduced to accept presidential bills in congress and to 
provide a stable basis for executive domination. This domination was further 
enhanced by the absence of democratic structures inside the PRI that would at 
least have ensured a competitive electoral process inside the party.74 As the 
ancient regime's practices of executive dominance will no longer work in the 
current political environment the parties will inevitably become a more decisive 
force in the Mexican political system. The competitiveness of elections and the 
absence of fraud are most likely to produce governments that do not face 
majorities in congress which implies a need of cooperation between parties to 
enact legislation. Moreover, the former official party PRI will have to modify 
from being a corporatist party without real need of ensuring electoral success 
by good governance to an organization that is capable of competing in a multi-
party framework. The former opposition parties in turn, have to show how they 
will perform in governing the country and to overcome the role of being just 
alternatives to the unique dominating party. Therefore, Mexican political 
parties will play a major role for the design of future Mexican politics. 
5.1.2.6 The Federalist System 
By the constitution of 1917 Mexico is a federalist republic where the states 
play an important role for the government of the country since articles 39 and 
41 of the constitution divide power between federal government, state 
government and the municipalities. On the state level the governors, town 
councils and mayors are directly elected by the population and the constitution 
proclaims that local governments are sovereign and independent from the 
central government in its internal matters.75 Despite of these constitutional 
guarantees during the years of PRI dominance, the autonomy of the states 
was subject to important limitations. To get nominated as candidate for a post 
as a local governor politicians usually had to show their loyalty to the federal 
government. Moreover, like on the federal level , local elections were 
influenced by fraud, manipulation and repression. In remote areas fraud was 
even more severe because due to lacking resources it was hard for opposition 
parties to guarantee free and fair elections. 76 
To avoid excessive autonomy of regional governors the ~resident often made 
use of his right to remove state governors from office. 7 So in spite of the 
federalism prescribed in the constitution the Mexican political system is de 
facto highly centralized. 78 Despite of cautious decentralization efforts since the 
late 80s Mexico still remains a country where the local entities are in fact 
highly dependent of the federal government. 79 Another fact that under1ines the 
reduced role of the states and municipalities is the distribution of fiscal 
74 See Gomez Tagle (1999). 
75 See Penner (1999). 
76 See Chand (2001 ). In some elections in remote rural areas the PRI obtained "soviet-style" 
results with near1y 100% of approval. 
77 See Rodriguez (1999) and Weldon (1997). 
78 See Bolanos Guerra (1994). 
79 See Penner (1999) and Cornelius (1996). 
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resources. In the past the federal government retained control of 85% of 
revenues that only under multiple control has been recently lowered by 
congress to 75%.80 Like other characteristics of Mexican politics however, also 
Mexican federalism has been affected by the democratic transformation of the 
country. More and more local governments are now controlled by opposition 
parties which implies that the influence of the federal government on local 
affairs is slowly diminishing. In particular the economically important northern 
states are by now dominated by PAN governments.81 In the year 2000 eleven 
states were controlled by the opposition parties PAN and PRO accounting for 
33% of the population and 48% of national GDP.82 Although the role of states 
and municipalities as a constraint for the central government is still limited, the 
ongoing process of decentralization and the establishment of opposition party 
rule in several states is likely to further strengthen the role of local entities. 
5.1.2.7 Freedom of Speech, Press and Media 
Freedom of speech as well as free press and media play a vital role in 
democracies in fulfilling the task of a proper information of the public and an 
external control of government and the public administration. It is obvious that 
these important task can only be properly fulfilled if the press and media are 
not subject to governmental controls or censorship and if individuals are free to 
express their point of view since only a free press and media may inform the 
citizens about corruption and other abuses of public office and evaluate 
properly governmental initiatives and programs. Hence, only a free press can 
exert external control over governmental action by mobilizing public opinion 
against violations of political principles or national law. 
Freedom of press and media as well as the individual freedom of speech are 
guaranteed in article 60 and 70 of the Mexican constitution.83 Nevertheless, in 
Mexico the freedom of media is a difficult topic. Although not directly 
controlled , politicians may exert considerable influence on the press by the 
placement and withdrawal of financially lucrative government advertising. 
Moreover, for a long time the national monopoly on newsprint ensured that 
delivery to unfriendly dailies could be suspended. Critical articles and 
commentaries could be answered by the canceling of government contracts 
that ensure the economic survival of the medium or by the suspension of 
newsprint supply. Besides, payments of bribes for political journalists and 
publishers were an institutionalized part of Mexican press and media. 
Therefore, much of the governmental control of the media relied on collusion 
instead of coercion.84 A widespread practice in the Mexican printing press is 
the publishing of paid political announcements that are disguised as news 
80 See Camp (2003). 
81 See Chand (2001 ). 
82 See Camp (2003). 
83 See Carreno Car16nNillanueva (1998). 
84 See Orme (1997). As Evelyn P. Stevens argues: "It would be an exceptionally courageous 
publisher, or a very foolish one, who would bite the hand which feeds him". Cited by Morris 
(1991) p.54. 
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stories, the so-called gacetillas. Although reliable data on the importance of 
gacetil/as is not available, it is estimated that they are responsible for a large 
share of the newspaper's incomes and that the economic survivability of many 
papers would be endangered without these payments.65 In addition pressure 
on critical journalists was also exercised by outright coercion as threatening, 
kidnapping, violence and even assassinations.86 Although press freedom still 
remains limited, there has been great progress in this topic, in particular in the 
print media where many newspapers now show more independent reporting. 
Hence, the process of democratization was also influential for the media which 
implied that over time the coverage of governmental policy in the printing press 
became more critical. However, an important characteristic of Mexico is that 
the societal influence of the printing press remains limited as the number of 
sales of even the most renown national newspapers is comparably small.87 
Moreover, the high degree of government intervention discouraged the 
Mexican business community to invest in the press since a profitable press 
with independent reporting is too risky and a safe press without government 
criticism is hardly profitable. 
Consequently television is the most important mean of information for Mexican 
citizens. Despite of growing independence in the printing press major 
television channels remained essentially pro-government.88 In particular the 
dominating television broadcasting company TELEVISA had close ties to the 
PRI and for a long time favored the party in its media coverage of electoral 
campaigns.89 There is also evidence that TELEVISA broadcasting of the 
Chiapas uprising was heavily pro-government biased.90 During the years of 
PRI dominance the official party heavily relied on its priority access to the 
media to stabilize its influence in the Mexican society and to ensure a positive 
outcome of elections. Thus, more equal access to the media was one of the 
most important achievements that allowed for the success of Mexican 
opposition parties. Other reforms of the press were already enacted under the 
rule of Salinas when the government newsprint monopoly was ended, direct 
government payments to journalists were cut and privatizing a government 
85 See Keenan (1997). 
116 See Conger (1997), Moynihan (1997) and Solomon (1997). Assessing the number of 
attacked or murdered journalists is a difficult task. Some of the cited authors nevertheless 
compare the level of violence against journalist with Colombia. Though it cannot be 
guaranteed in all cases that violence is connected to the reporting of the journalist and 
enacted by the government investigation on the cases is nearly always unsuccessful or 
even intentionally delayed by officials which creates a situation of impunity for the 
masterminds of the attacks. 
87 See Riva Palacio (1997). 
88 See Sarmiento (1997) and Castaneda (1997). 
89 See Belejack (1997), Miller/Darling (1997) and Castaneda (1997). After the 1994 
presidential election the PAN candidate Diego Fernandez stated that the success was not 
the PRl's but a triumph of PRONASOL (a program for poverty alleviation), PROCAMPO (a 
program of rural subsidies) and TELEVISA. See Otero (1996) p.15. 
90 See Lopez (1997). 
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television network created the first competitor for TELEVISA. The government of 
Zedillo cautiously followed the course of reform.91 
Despite of these successes compared to other countries the freedom of press 
and media is still severely restricted in Mexico. The Freedom House press 
freedom indicator that is depicted in figure 5.1 confirms this statement 
suggesting that recent improvements and reforms were not sufficient. An index 
value of 100 represents a fully controlled press while 0 stands for a fully free 
press though the average index scores of western democracies usually vary 
around a value of 10. The inspection of the data for Mexico reveals that the 
enacted reforms of press and media only had a minor impact on the freedom 
of Mexican press and media. 
Figure 5.1: Freedom House Press Freedom Indicator for Mexico (1994-
2000) 
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The comparison of Mexico with other Latin American countries in figure 5.2 
reveals that its degree of press freedom is one of the worst in the region since 
only press freedom in the authoritarian Peru of Fujimori received a lower 
rating. 
91 See Onne (1997). It has to be stated that the number of violent aggressions against 
journalists increased heavily in the Salinas administration. See Conger (1997). 
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Figure 5.2 Freedom House Press Freedom Indicator for Major Latin 
American Countries (1994-2000) 
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With index values varying around 50, that are comparable to those of 
Pakistan, Nigeria or Tanzania, Mexico still has a long way to go to establish a 
free and reliable media sector comparable to Western democracies. In this 
context it is interesting that the NAFTA contract limits the foreign equity 
participation in Mexican television companies and newspapers to 49% with the 
exception of simply translated foreign-edited newspapers. 92 One may conclude 
that the important task that a free press plays in democracies can still not be 
properly executed by the Mexican press. Despite of the considerable progress 
during the last years information of the public and control of government by the 
Mexican press are still unsatisfactory. 
5.2 Foreign Capital Flows to Mexico 
5.2.1 Brief Economic History 
5.2.1.1 Overview 
The independence of Mexico in 1821 and the preceding wars marked the 
beginning of a weak nation state that still suffered from the long years of 
Spanish paternalism. The years following independence were characterized by 
durable political instability and economic stagnation. In the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century the authoritarian rule of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911) restored 
political stability for the first time since independence. As a consequence 
Mexico experienced higher growth which was mainly stimulated by the 
dynamic export sector.93 Although the dominating development strategy was 
characterized by a "desarollo hacia afuera", the 1890s mark the beginning of 
Mexican Industrialization in sectors as textiles, steel, cement glass etc. The 
92 See Orme (1997). 
93 The export sector grew at an annually average rate of 6, 1% during the years of Diaz's rule. 
See Knight (2000). For a short analysis of the economic policy of Diaz see 
Haber/Razo/Maurer (1999). 
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socio-economic situation which was characterized by the authoritarian and 
racist political regime, an agricultural sector linked to peasant dispossession 
and labor coercion and the inequality in the distribution of benefits from the 
development process led to growing social unrest and finally to the outbreak of 
the Mexican revolution. 94 During the long period of armed conflict and social 
tensions the economic downturn reached its peak in 1917 with collapsing 
exports, high inflation and growing poverty. Short periods of recovery and 
decline followed until Mexico was hit by the consequences of the great 
depression. The fall in global demand harshly affected the export sector and 
between 1929 and 1932 Mexican exports fell by 64.9% leading to a general 
economic downturn. 95 
The presidency of Lazaro Cardenas from 1934-1940 was marked by a 
complete restructuring of the state and its relation to the economy. The focus 
of the public sector shifted from the wealthy groups to peasants and workers 
leaving the private industrial sector largely untouched. An agrarian reform96 
that benefited a large part of the population shifted additional resources from 
commercial agriculture to industry which in turn fostered the process of 
industrialization. During the Second Wor1d War the increasingly centralized 
and authoritarian government focused on the expansion of public infrastructure 
and urbanization for the benefit of the industrial sector and commerce.97 
Mexico experienced high growth due to the increasing demand for Mexican 
commodities and natural resources during the war period.96 
In 1948 the Mexican minister of economy obtained the right to change the list 
of goods under protection reinforcing the restrictive policy on imports. 
Throughout the 50s the protection scheme was gradually enlarged culminating 
in the practice that every industry which substituted imports automatically 
enjoyed full protection implying that the scope of protection changed from 
being a tool for the management of balance of payment-problems to a 
development strategy. By protecting domestic industries the government 
sought to foster the national process of industrialization and to reduce Mexican 
dependence on imported capital goods which in turn would diminish the 
vulnerability of the Mexican economy to external shocks.99 
The decade of the fifties saw real aggregate investment growing with an 
average annual rate of 17% while GDP grew at a rate of 6.2%. Growth rates of 
94 See Knight (2000) p. 124-131 . Many developments of Mexican politics in the 20111 century 
can only be understood being aware of the revolutionary heritage of the Mexican society. 
The emergence of "Mexicanization" as a form of economic nationalism for example is 
based on revolutionary principles and has been very influential for the debate about foreign 
investment in Mexico. See paragraph 5.2.2.1.1 for an analysis of its influence on the 
national FOi legislation. 
95 See Cardenas (2000a) p.197-201 and FitzGerald (2000). 
96 For a detailed analysis of the land reform of Cardenas see Gordon (1975). 
97 See Cardenas (2000b) p.182-185 
98 See OECD (1992) p.15. 
99 See Cardenas (2000b) p.185-190. 
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real GDP continued to be high throughout the 60s stimulated by a dynamic 
industrial sector despite of declines in agriculture and the traditionally strong 
mining sector. At the same time inflation rates kept at a moderate level. The 
Mexican development model during this time (desaro//o estabilizador) may be 
seen as a success.100 However, already the late 60s mark a turning point for 
the economic development of Mexico by bringing to light the first signs of 
weaknesses of the chosen national development strategy. As a reaction to the 
considerable entries of foreign firms the Mexican business community was 
seeking further governmental protection. So, instead of protecting the 
domestic market the government now switched to a strategy of protecting 
domestic producers. Among other restrictive measures foreiijn control of 
shares in Mexican companies was limited to a maximum of 49%. 01 
Over time the extensive protection of domestic firms led to a steady decline in 
competitiveness of Mexican producers. Many businesses were inefficient 
operating with high profit rates and high cost to public finances due to 
subsidies at the expense of tax-payers. The "infant industry protection" of 
domestic sectors finally implied a total loss of international competitivity and a 
high inefficiency of Mexican firms. Nevertheless, the national government did 
not review its development policy by gradually liberalizing and opening up to 
foreign trade and investment. A result of maintaining this strategy was the 
growing dependence on external borrowing. The oil boom of the 70s and the 
excess of investment seeking liquidity from banks in industrial countries 
fostered a growing external debt throughout the seventies. 102 When economic 
growth was slowing in the 70s and political tensions mounted after the 1968 
massacre of students, the governments of Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) and 
Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) embarked on a populist strategy of heavy public 
spending and expansion of the public sector. This tendency was aggravated 
when large oil reserves were discovered in the wake of the first oil shock.103 
The important increase of international interest rates and the elevate level of 
external debt finally led to the outbreak of the great Latin American debt crisis 
causing severe economic problems not only in Mexico but throughout Latin 
America. 104 
Mexico declared a moratorium on external debt in 1982 which led to important 
disturbances of the international financial system as the credit exposure of 
many international banks was considerable. In a last desperate struggle to 
manage the crisis Mexico announced the complete nationalization of the 
banking system leading to an even bigger loss of investor confidence. As a 
consequence of the debt crisis Mexican growth rates fell sharply and remained 
low for the rest of the 80s. Inflation rates grew reaching three digit rates and 
100 See Ros (1993). 
101 See the review of the Mexican FDI legislation in paragraph 5.2.2.1. 
102 See Cardenas (2000b) p.191-199. 
103 See OECD (1992) p.16. 
104 For a general review of the Latin American debt crisis see Ffrench-Davis (2000). For an 
overview of the events in Mexico see Kramer (1997) p.112-152. 
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real wages declined leaving the country in a deep economic crisis.105 The 
outbreak of the debt crisis ended the strategy of import substitution and 
initiated a period of profound economic reforms that deeply influenced the 
economic performance of the years to come. Hence, the great debt crisis of 
the 80s marks a watershed in the economic history of Mexico because the 
following liberal reforms were to endure until the beginning of the new 
millenium. 
5.2.1.2 The Reform Period 1982-today 
The policy responses to the 80s debt crisis involved drastic exchange rate and 
fiscal adjustments as well as a complete change of the national development 
strategy. The government of de la Madrid initiated an austerity program to 
overcome the crisis and liberal reforms were implemented to bring the 
Mexican economy back to economic stability and growth. In 1982 three 
devaluations took place that were designed to cut the unsustainable balance 
of payments deficit. Fiscal adjustments relied on a decrease in public 
investment, real salary reductions for government employees, and increases in 
indirect taxes and public prices. Long negotiations with the IMF and the 
consortia of lenders followed to achieve a rescheduling of Mexican external 
debt.106 Figure 5.3 shows that the aftermath of the debt crisis was 
characterized by a severe fall of per capita growth rates which only showed 
signs of recovery during the late 80s. 
Figure 5.3: GDP per Capita Growth between 1980-1990 
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Although by the end of the 80s the Mexican government succeeded in 
assuring macroeconomic stability, the adjustment policy implied high costs to 
the population since in particular already deprived members of the Mexican 
society had to shoulder the heavy burden of the national stabilization policy. 
Low growth severely affected poverty levels in the country. As public spending 
105 See Kramer (1997) p.112-121 . 
106 For an overview of the management of the debt crisis in Mexico see OECD (1992) and 
Kramer (1997) p.121 -144. 
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was cut people depending on public transfers were heavily affected by the 
adjustment process. Throughout the 80s real incomes were on average 30% 
lower than in the years preceding the crisis. 107 As an reaction to the surge in 
poverty and the resulting potential for social unrest the Salinas administration 
initiated the PRONASOL program with the objective of alleviating poverty and 
strengthening the legitimacy of the PRI government. 106 
Following the short term management of the debt crisis the Mexican 
government started important economic reforms aiming at liberalizing and 
opening the economy to foreign trade and investment. Under the de la Madrid 
administration import liberalization measures were initiated that culminated in 
Mexico's signing of GA TT in 1986. Besides to fighting inflation, the Economic 
Solidarity Pact of 1987 led to a further reduction of tariffs and import licensing 
requirements.109 As a consequence of these liberalization measures Mexican 
non-oil exports rose from 5.5 billion US$ in 1981 to over 16 billion in 1990 with 
the automobile and maquiladora sector being the most important drivers of 
growth. 110 Moreover, large privatization programs reduced the enormous 
number of public enterprises in Mexico. Between 1983 and 1988 the 
government sold 122 state-owned enterprises. In this period the Mexican 
government was involved in only 13 of the 28 productive sectors in which it 
was active in 1982.111 
During the sextenio of de la Madrids successor Salinas de Gortari the process 
of opening and liberalizing the economy accelerated and efforts were 
concentrated on promoting macroeconomic stability and a continuing opening 
of the economy to the world market. Tariffs were reduced and the restrictive 
FOi legislation was reviewed.112 The output coverage of import licenses was 
reduced from 92% in 1985 to 20% in 1990. Average tariffs fell from 24% to 
13% over the same period. An additional focus of Mexican efforts was to 
promote the export sector. The production coverage of export restrictions fell 
from 25% in 1987 to below 18% in 1990.113 For the period between 1988 and 
2000 Mexican exports grew at a yearly average of 15,1%. Public sector-
specific industrial policy was reduced to allow for a better functioning of market 
processes.114 From 1989 on the Mexican government continued the process of 
privatization by starting the sale of large public enterprises, some of them 
monopolies. Among the privatized enterprises were the telephone company 
TELMEX, the airlines MEXICANA and Aero Mexcio, the copper mining 
107 See Kramer (1995a). 
108 For an overview of the PRONASOL program see Kramer (1995b). Otero (1996) states 
that PRONASOL was rather a political tool for avoiding electoral success of the 
opposition. He shows that PRONASOL tended to spend more where electoral competition 
from the PRO was more intense. See Otero (1996) p.15. 
109 See OECD (1992) p.30-36 and Lustig/Ros (1999) p.19-27. 
110 See Ros (1993) and Peters (2001 ). 
111 See Sanchez et al. (1993) and Kramer (1997) p.147-150. 
112 See paragraph 5.2.2.1.1 . 
113 See OECD (1992) p.137-141 . 
114 See Peters (2001) p.224-227 and Lustig/Ros (1999) p. 30-32. 
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company CANANEA, the insurer ASEMEX, several steel companies and 18 
commercial banks. 115 The absolute number of public enterprise fell from 1155 
in 1982 to 223 in 1992.116 
By 1990 Mexico succeeded in bringing inflation down to rates around 20%. 
Low international interest rates as well as growing investor confidence in the 
Mexican reform process stimulated massive inflows of portfolio investment to 
Mexico leading to a real appreciation of the Peso. The current account deficit 
rose quickly and capital inflows led to a domestic credit boom in the absence 
of prudential supervisions in the financial sector. The enhanced international 
credibility Mexico gained through the signing of the NAFTA treaty was 
reflected in an enormous increase of FOi and other capital flows. The armed 
uprising in Chiapas and the assassination of the PRI presidential candidate 
Colosio in 1994 provoked the first foreign capital withdrawals finally leading to 
the substantial depreciation of the Peso. The dollar parity went from 4 pesos in 
December 1994 to 7.55 pesos in March 1995 when finally stopped by an 
emergency economic program involving the US government, the IMF and the 
Bank of International Settlements.117 The so-called 'Tequila-Crisis" was 
followed by a sharp recession of the Mexican economy. GDP dropped by 6.6% 
,capital formation even by 30% and open unemployment nearly doubled in 
1995. The Mexican crisis had a negative impact on Latin America as a 
whole.118 However, recovery from the crisis was quick with growth rates of 
5.1 % in 1996 and 6.8% in 1997 due to growing export revenues and high fixed 
investment growth.119 
Despite of the problems caused by the Tequila-Crisis for Mexico the decade of 
the 90s is characterized by a further integration of the country into the world 
economy and a continued liberalization of the foreign investment regime. 120 In 
the 90s Mexico negotiated the NAFT A and pursued various other bilateral free 
trade agreements with a variety of countries or regions. Mexico now 
participates in 13 free trade agreements (FTA's) and is currently engaged in 
negotiation with other partners. 121 
Figure 5.4 gives an overview over the multilateral and bilateral treaties Mexico 
signed recently. The large amount of bilateral agreements reflect the efforts of 
the Mexican administration to reduce the dependency of the national economy 
from the evolution of the US markets. Nevertheless NAFTA and the treaty with 
the EU are of particular importance to the Mexican economy given the large 
potential for further trade with and investment from these regions. 
115 See Sanchez et al (1993) p.102-104 and Lustig/Ros (1999). 
116 See OECD (1992) p.88-93. 
117 See OECD (1996a) p.20-25, Lustig/Ros (1999) p.34-39 and Ffrench-Davis (2000) p.195-
205. 
118 See Ffrench-Davis (2000) p.195-205. 
119 See Lederman et al. (2001 ). 
12° For an overview of the Mexican trade liberalization see OECD (1996a). 
121 See WTO (2003) p.63. 
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Figure 5.4: Mexican Bilateral and Multilateral Free Trade Agreements 
Source: Consulado General de Mexico, Hamburg, FTA stands for Free Trade Agreement while EA 
refers to Economic Agreements 
Although Mexico up to now showed an impressive success in the 
implementation of economic reforms during the 90s, there still remains an 
important agenda of reforms. Modernizing the education sector, reducing the 
reliance on oil-revenues, enhancing the efficiency of public spending and 
fighting poverty are just a few examples that may be given here.122 After 
having drawn a broad picture of the evolution of the Mexican economy during 
the last years the next paragraph is dedicated to the analysis of incoming FOi 
flows to Mexico and to the attitude towards foreign investors, as well as to 
developments in the national FOi legislation. 
5.2.2 The Evolution of Foreign Investment to Mexico 
5.2.2.1 The Mexican Foreign Investment Legislation 
5.2.2.1.1 The Evolution of the National FOi Legislation 
The policy of regulating FOi flows to Mexico can be traced back to the passing 
of the Mexican constitution in 1917 which already established restrictions and 
conditions on foreign acquisitions of land and concessions. Article 73 
empowers congress to encourage the promotion of Mexican investment and 
regulation of foreign investment. However, the legal foundation for most 
regulation of foreign investment activity were the articles 27 and 28 of the 
constitution. Article 27 has three important provisions that have impacted the 
regulation of foreign investment. First, it grants sovereignty over national 
resources which in fact abolishes foreign private property rights for all 
subsurface mineral and petrol deposits. Second, it implements the so-called 
Calvo clause to which foreigners wishing to own property or to engage in 
business in the country had to agree. With this agreement the investor limits 
his rights with respect to a contract or his property and the means available to 
him of enforcing those rights to the same as are accorded by Mexican law to 
its own citizens. All other means like the right to seek diplomatic intervention or 
122 See OECD (2000). 
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the help of an international claims tribunal are waived. The breaking of this 
agreement implied the expropriation of the investor's assets or the ending of 
the contract or license. 123 Third, article 27 defined the so-called restricted zone 
that forbid foreign ownership within a zone of 100 km along the borders and 50 
km along the shores. Article 28 identified strategic sectors of the economy that 
were reserved for the Mexican government and was the legal basis of many 
expropriations during the 20s and 30s with the most prominent example being 
the oil sector in 1938.124 
The articles of the 1917 constitution reflect the revolutionary principle of 
"Mexicanization" and explain the tendency of Mexican politics to restrict the 
influence of foreigners on the economy. This fear of exploitation in turn, is a 
national heritage that resulted from the excessive dominance of foreign 
investors during the time of the Porfiriato. These constitutional rules based on 
revolutionary principles supported a restrictive Mexican policy towards FOi that 
predominated until the middle of the 80s when the aftermath of the debt crisis 
marked the beginning of a liberalization of the FOi regime in Mexico.125 
In addition to these constitutional norms explicit legislation on FOi did not exist 
until the year 1944. Based on an executive decree from this year foreign 
investors had to obtain a permit issued by the Mexican Foreign Ministry for the 
acquisition of Mexican firms or other property. 126 In 1945 the Ministry issued an 
interim list of industries where a majority of Mexican capital would be required. 
Sectors mentioned on this list were transportation, radio broadcasting, motion 
pictures, publishing, advertising, fishing, and beverages.127 In 1947 a 
commission composed of several Mexican ministries formulated general 
norms for the application of the 1944 decree. The aim of the commission was 
to "maintain the right equilibrium between national and foreign capital in 
investments that are made in Mexico". Eventually, the commission decided 
that Mexican capital should participate with at least 51 % of total capital in any 
foreign investment although the application of this rule was subject to 
123 See Sandrino (1994), Wright (1971) and Vazquez Tercero (1971) p.111 . The Calvo 
clause gained importance on the international stage when in 1974 the United Nations 
passed several resolutions for the establishment of a new economic order. A key 
component was the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States intended to 
strengthen the independence of developing nations. One main principle of the charter 
was that every state has the right to regulate foreign investment including the activities of 
multinational corporations and the right to expropriate alien property upon the payment of 
adequate compensation. Currently there is a consensus that an expropriation is a 
legitimate act of national autonomy provided that public welfare is fostered and that a fair 
compensation is granted. See Gudofsky (2000). 
124 The nationalisation in particular hit British and US investors. See Sandrino (1994) and 
Wright (1971) p.61 -70. For a detailed analysis of the expropriation during the 20s and 30s 
see Gordon (1975). 
125 See Sandrino (1994). 
126 See Sandrino (1994). 
127 See Whiting (1992)p.71. 
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enormous discretion, that is, the Mexican government often granted 
exceptions. 128 
The strategy of import substitution led to an even more restrictive policy 
towards FOi during the 70s. FOi was limited in many im_gortant industries as 
steel , cement, glass, aluminium paper and fertilizers. 29 To facilitate the 
transfer of know-how and technology the government passed several laws that 
regulated the purchase of technology and licenses by Mexican and foreign 
firms. The law on inventions and trademarks that was passed in 1976 included 
restrictions on the use of international trademarks in Mexico.130 The "Law to 
Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment" passed in 
1973 reflects this general tendency. The law restricted FOi in product groups 
that were reserved for public Mexican investment which included petroleum 
and other hydrocarbons, basic petroleum products, radioactive and strategic 
materials, nuclear energy, electricity, railroads, telegraphic and radio 
communications as well as banking. Moreover, FOi was restricted in product 
groups reserved exclusively for Mexican public or private investment. Among 
these sectors were radio, television, agricultural activities, road, air and 
maritime transportation as well as forestry, gas distribution and financial 
intermediation. In addition the law defined product groups in which FOi was 
only allowed up to a specific share of the firm's capital. For instance in mining 
FOi was limited to a 49% share of the firm's total capital. For secondary 
petrochemicals and the fabrication of automobile components the maximum 
share was at a level of 40%. 
Although in abse·nce of a specific regulation foreign equity participation should 
not exceed 49% of total capital, the law contained a grandfather clause 
according to which foreign holdings that already existed prior to the effective 
date of the new law were allowed to continue to exist as long as the proportion 
of local and foreign capital remained unchanged. 131 Table 5.4 gives an 
overview of the restrictions of the 1973 FOi law.132 
Moreover, the law created two organizations to supervise and regulate FOi. 
The Comision Nacional de lnversiones Extranjeras (CNIE) was in charge of 
determining and regulating potential investment projects according to the 
national development strategy while the Registro Nacional de lnversiones 
Extranjeras was designed to provide statistical data about the operations of 
128 See Sanchez-Gamper (1989) and Pescador-Castaneda (1971). 
129 See Secretaria del trabajo y prevision social (1994) p.14. 
130 The most controversial part of the new law was an obligation to use international 
trademarks jointly with a trademark originally registered in Mexico. General Electric for 
example had to link its trademark with the partner of a Mexican joint venture: General 
Electric/Esamex. See Whiting (1992) p.108-136. Most of the laws that targeted 
technology transfer were revised when the Salinas administration prepared the joining of 
NAFTA and passed the Law for the Promotion and Protection of Industrial Property in 
1991 . 
131 See Whiting (1992) p.99. 
132 See paragraph 5.2.2.2 for an analysis of the law's effects on FDI flows to Mexico. 
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foreign companies in Mexico. Moreover, the CNIE had the power to pass 
regulation as to clarify the application of the law.133 
Table 5.4: Restrictions of the 1973 FDI Law 
Rutrlctlon Sector 
Foreign equity participation must not exceed 49% of total All sectors (if no other regulation has b-, established) 
capital 
Economic a:tivity is reserved for the slate Petroleum and other hydrocarbons 
Basic petroleum products 
Racfioa:tive and strategic materials 
Nuclea, energy 
Electricity 
Railroads 
Telegraphic and radio communications 
Batking 
Economic activity is reserved for Mexican citizens or the state Radio 
Source: Own Figure 
Television 
Agricultural a:tivities 
Road transport 
Air transport 
Matitime transport 
Forestry 
Gas distribution 
Financial intermediation 
Following the debt crisis Mexico embarked on a strategy of economic reform 
aiming at macroeconomic stability, privatization and liberalization. Part of the 
liberal reform program was opening the economy to foreign trade and 
investment. Nevertheless, the de la Madrid administration maintained the 1973 
law on FOi and only changed the approach as to how the law was to be 
interpreted and applied. In 1984 the CNIE issued new guidelines for FOi with 
the objective to encourage investment in high priority areas as heavy 
machinery, electronic equipment, high technology products and tourism.134 
The guidelines were complemented by a list of activities in which foreign 
participation could foster national development and the CNIE s~naled that it 
would even allow a foreign equity share of more than 50%. 1 These new 
guidelines mark a watershed for the evolution of Mexican foreign investment 
legislation. Following Mexico's apertura in 1985 the government further 
liberalized FOi by eliminating restrictions for petro-chemical investment and by 
engaging in a debt-equity swap program.136 
133 See Secretarfa del trabajo y prevision social (1994) p.15. 
134 See UNCTC (1992) p.13-15. 
135 See Peres-Nunes (1990a) p.41-46. One of the first multinational that took advantage of 
the liberalization was IBM that build a 100% owned production plant in Guadalajara in 
1986. However, the negotiations with the Mexican government to obtain the permission 
for the majority ownership took nearly two years. See Whiting (1992) p.194-210. 
136 See Munro (1995) and Peres-Nunes (1990a) . 
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Efforts to open Mexico to foreign trade and investment continued under the 
succeeding administration. The National Development Plan of Salinas de 
Gortari assigned a key role to foreign capital since FOi was expected to create 
new employment, to provide the country with financial resources, to provide 
modern technology and to advance the country's efforts to increase 
manufactured exports. 137 Consequently the Mexican government further 
liberalized the investment law of 1973. The most important changes to the 
1973 law were made in 1989 (Law for the Promotion of Foreign Direct 
Investment), 1993 (Law for Foreign Direct Investment), 1996 (Reform of the 
Law for Foreign Direct Investment) and 1998 (Amendment to the Law for 
Foreign Direct lnvestment).138 However, up to 1993 FOi was liberalized without 
changing the restrictive law of 1973 but by imposing liberal regulations for its 
application.139 The new investment law issued in 1993 already anticipated 
Mexico's joining of NAFT A in 1994 and consequently continued to promote a 
further opening of the Mexican economy .140 It was designed to "permit the 
opening of industries where foreign capital is desirable" and "to remove 
discretional administrative practices that led to uncertainties for investors". 141 
Although the NAFT A investment chapter defined many restrictions on FOi to 
Mexico, most of them were determined to be phased out in the future.142 
The basic framework of the current investment legislation in Mexico is still the 
Law for Foreign Investment of 1993. With the new law coming into effect the 
old law of 1973 and the decree of 1944 requiring the necessity for foreigners to 
obtain a permit by the government to acquire assets are repealed. 
Furthermore, Article 27 of the Constitution that established the Calvo clause 
and restricted private ownership of national resources was changed. 143 
Although as a principle access to the Mexican market is free, the current 
legislation defines various exceptions from this general rule. The oil industry as 
well as the market for petrochemicals and electricity are still reserved for the 
state and not open to FOi. For several other sectors like for example television 
and radio broadcasting as well as development banks the law only permits 
investment from Mexican citizens or corporations. Furthermore, the Mexican 
investment law defines sectors with specific regulations where investments up 
to a certain threshold of 10%, 25% or 49% of total capital are allowed. 144 For 
certain sectors like for example the construction and operation of airports the 
CNIE is in charge of controlling investment from abroad. Moreover, the 
commission establishes policy guidelines regarding foreign investment, 
137 See UNCTC (1992) p.7. 
138 See UNCTC (1992) and Peters (2000) for an overview over the legislative changes. 
139See Secretaria del trabajo y prevision social (1994) p.17-20. Munro (1995) states that 
regulating but not repealing the law was a strategy of Salinas de Gortari to avoid a battle 
in congress over liberalization. 
140 See Alexander (1995) for an overview of the 1993 Foreign Investment Act. 
141 See Secretaria del trabajo y prevision social (1994) p.21-22. 
142 See Rugman/Gestrin (1994). For a closer examination of the NAFTA Investment Chapter 
see paragraph 5.2.2.1.2. 
143 See Alexander (1995) p.77-79 
144 See Peters (2000). 
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determines its terms and conditions and establishes criteria for the application 
of the legal and regulatory provisions of the investment law. The CNIE is 
comprised of several ministers of government and a commitee of 
representatives that carry out daily functions. 145 Table 5.5 provides an 
overview of the current foreign investment legislation in Mexico. 
Table 5.5: FOi Legislation in Mexico 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (1993) 
1) Foreign investment may panicipate in ANY proportion in the social capital of MeXican societies (Ar1icle 4) excepting: 
I. Activities reserved for the State (Ar1icle 5) 
II. Activities reserved for Mexicans (Article 6) 
Ill. Activities that have a special regulation where specific percentages are determined (Article 7) 
IV. Activities that need a favorable resolution from the Commission to participate in a percentage higher than 49% (Article 8) 
2) Any acquisition of an interest in a Mexican corporation exceeding 49% of its capital stock requires a permission of the 
Commission, but only if lhe lotal value of the assets of such corporation is higher than an amount that is fixed annually by the 
Commission (Article 9) 
3) Neutral Investment (Article 18): 
Is a specially regulated investment, where foreign flows are not tal<en into account to determine the percentage of a foreign 
investment to a Mexican company. In the case of Fiduciary Institutions, it may be done through investment instruments which 
allow a moneta-y return for investors, but a limited right to vote in assemblies of the institutions. In other societies, neutral 
investment may be accounted for actions without the right to vote. 
REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (1996) 
1) Reforms to the specially regulated sectors are introduced: 
Article 7, Ill includes a complemented list of activities that may participate up to a percentage of 49% in Mexican companies, 
which replaces the one existing in 1993. 
In Article 8, the sectors which need a special permission from the commission in order to receive more than 49% FOi changes. 
2) Regulation of acquisition of real property and trust is e>ctended 
3) The foreign individuals and entities intending to acquire real estate outside of the restricted zone or to obtain concessions for 
the exploration and development of mines and waters anywhere within Mexico, shall previously submit before the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and obtain the corresponding permit from that Ministry. 
REGULATIONS TO THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (1998) 
In this regulation procedures for applying the Foreign Investment Law are staled: 
1) procedures needed to constitute societies, acquire permissions of neutral investment, register foreign investment and 
generally register as a society 
2) In lhe list of reserved activities, some exceptions are determined . 
3) Acquisition of real estate, exploitation of mines and national territorial waters, and trusts are further regulated 
Source: Own figure 
Investors who are willing to hold more than 49% of total shares of Mexican 
companies in these industrial sectors require a permission of this commission. 
As a general rule the law states that acquiring a majority stake (>49% of total 
capital) in a Mexican company requires a permission of the CNIE if the total 
145 See Alexander (1995) p.72-73 for an overview of the CNIE. 
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value of such a company exceeds an amount which the commission itself 
determines on an annual basis.146 
Table 5.6: Restrictions on FDI to Mexico 
Reotrlcllon 
Economic activity Is reserved for the state 
Economic a:tivity is reserved for Mexican citizens 
Secto, specific regulations 
Sector 
Petroleum and other hydrocarbons 
Basic petro-chemical products 
Electricity 
Radioactive and strategic materials 
Nuclear energy 
Emission of money 
Telegraphic and radio communications 
Control and supervision of airports 
National road transport 
Commerce of gasoline and petrol 
Radio and television broadcasting 
Credit unions 
Development banks 
International road transport (maximal foreign share of 49% of 
total capital) 
Cooperatives of production (10%) 
Satellite co,nmunication (49%) 
Automobile parts (49°/,) 
Construction (49%) 
Fishing (49%) 
Local and long distance telecom services ( 49%) 
Pension funds ( 49%) 
Water transport (49%) 
Production and distribution of explosives and sms (49%) 
Investment of more than 49% of total capital requires an Explo,ation of minerals 
authorization of the NCFI Shipping companies 
Source: Own Figure based on Peters (2000). 
Construction of pipelines fo, the transport of pelrol Oi~or gas-
seeking 
Services related to railways and ports operation 
Administration, construction and operation of airports 
Private educational services 
Legal services 
Currently there are no limitations for the repatriation of profits to home 
countries or other restrictions on balance of payment operations for foreign 
companies. Table 5.6 gives a short overview of the current sectoral restrictions 
for FOi in Mexico.147 
146 See Alexander (1995) p.69. In 1999 this asset value was 394 million peso, at that time 
about 40 million US$. See PRS Group (2000) p.23. 
147 A comprehensive overview of the current sector restrictions is given in table A.3 in Annex 
II. 
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Despite of liberalization and a further opening of the country, current legislation 
still leaves considerable power to the government for the control of FOi 
inflows. In particular the required permission of the CNIE for the acquisition of 
majority stakes leaves room for an influence of the government on foreign 
investment policy. In modifying the critical asset value which requires a 
permission of the CNIE the government possesses a powerful tool to influence 
amounts and structure of foreign investments to the country. To put it in other 
words, the government did not fully commit to a liberalization of FOi because it 
reserved considerable discretionary freedom to decide on a case to case 
basis. Although FOi to Mexico is highly welcome at the moment, the current 
legislation may also be applied in a more restrictive way if this general attitude 
changes in the future. This may be the case if the government is subject to 
high societal pressure as it was the case in 2003 when peasant organizations 
demanded a re-negotiation of the NAFTA regulations concerning agrarian 
products. 146 National FOi legislation however, is currently complemented by 
international law that will be reviewed in the next paragraph. 
5.2.2.1.2 Investment Legislation of NAFT A and other Bilateral 
Agreements 
In addition to national investment laws Mexico signed various multilateral and 
bilateral agreements which contain regulations on investment matters. 149 
Among them the most prominent are NAFT A and the free trade agreement 
with the EU. Therefore, the content of the investment chapters of these two 
treaties will be briefly reviewed here. The signing of NAFTA not only confirmed 
the further integration of Mexico into the system of international trade but also 
marked the beginning of a new approach towards foreign investors. Beside the 
liberalization of trade the signing parties agreed to significant disciplines of 
how nationals of other parties are to be treated on another party's territory. 
Enhanced legal certainty and better protection of foreign property are essential 
elements of this convention. In Mexican law international treaties may be 
signed by the president and have to be ratified by the senate of the republic. 
Once ratified and being consistent with the national constitution international 
treaties become a full part of the national legislation and are comparable to 
constitutional norms. 150 As a consequence the provisions of NAFTA may be 
seen as a measure that enhances credibility of the Mexican government 
because they tie its hands on the international level. Opportunistic government 
behavior which has a long tradition in Mexican policy towards foreign investors 
148 Rubio et al. (1994) highlight that articles 25 and 28 of the Mexican constitution still permit 
the regulation of every field of economic activity including the nationalization of so-called 
strategic industries implying that Mexican constitution would allow for a step backward in 
economic liberalization. This is of particular importance in Mexico as demanding 
restrictions on FOi is still a viable tool for gaining populist votes. In 1996 for example 
members of the left wing opposition party PRO and even conservatives demanded new 
legislative limits on FOi. In addition, all efforts to permit foreign investment in 
petrochemicals and petroleum have been denied by the government. See PRS Group 
(1999) p.A10. 
149 For an overview see Siqueiros (2001 ). 
150 See Castro (2000) and Carbonell y Sanchez (1994). 
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thus becomes less likely. If arbitrary government intervention occurs, investors 
have the possibili~ to put forward a claim to an international dispute 
settlement tribunal. 1 1 Therefore, NAFTA ensures an enhanced protection of 
foreign property rights and fosters legal certainty of foreign investors by 
creating an organization with decisional power in international investment 
disputes. 152 
Chapter 11, the NAFTA Investment Chapter, extends significant protection to 
Mexican, US and Canadian investors who own or control investments in the 
territory of another party. The NAFTA Investment Chapter covers a NAFTA 
party or state as well as all business entities which are constituted or 
organized under the laws of a NAFTA Party. Moreover, the provisions of the 
NAFTA Investment Chapter are not only valid for investors from NAFTA 
parties but also for those having substantial business activities in NAFTA 
states. This implies that for example European enterprises with considerable 
activities in the U.S. also enjoy enhanced legal protection. Furthermore, the 
treaty covers past, present and future investors extending the protection of 
NAFTA also to those investors that have already been present in a member 
country before the agreement was signed and to those that are in the process 
of making an investment. 153 
Since chapter 11 includes 39 articles and 4 annexes, table 5. 7 provides only 
an overview of the most important regulations of the NAFTA investment 
chapter. As a general rule signing parties are obliged by Article 1102 to treat 
NAFTA investors and their investments no less favorably than domestic 
investors. Article 1103 extends this general rule by stating that the signing 
parties have to treat investors from NAFTA states at least as favorable as 
other investments from third parties which is known as the most favored nation 
principle. Additionally NAFTA assures in Article 1105 that investors have to be 
treated "in accordance with international law including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security."154 
The imposition of performance requirements like domestic content, sourcing or 
trade balancing rules or technology transfer regulations is limited in Article 
1106. Moreover, all monetary transfers of investors to their home countries 
related to investments are guaranteed in article 1109 of the treaty. Article 111 0 
of the Investment Chapter provides for the protection of foreign investment 
against nationalization, expropriation and other measures that lead to a 
151 For an overview of the NAFTA dispute settlement process in investment matters see 
Siqueiros (2001 ). 
152 For an overview over the policy towards foreign investors see paragraph 5.2.2.2. The 
NAFT A Investment Chapter represents a major change of policy towards international 
investors because adherence to the Calvo clause is given up and Mexico accepts general 
principles of international law concerning the protection of foreign property. Moreover, 
Mexico may be hold accountable for its conduct through a binding dispute settlement 
mechanism that is described in greater detail in this paragraph. 
153 See Mcilroy (2002). 
154 This article reflects giving up adherence to the Calvo-clause. 
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"creeping expropriation" of investors. Confronted with the legacy of many 
expropriations of foreign property by Mexican administrations in the past this 
contractual safeguard is of particular importance for investors.155 According to 
general international law, a state is free to adopt measures of expropriation 
given the existence of a public interest, a due process and the payment of a 
fair compensation. 156 
Table 5.7: Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter 
Article 1102 
Article 1103 
Article 1105 
Article 1106 
Article 11 09 
Article 111 o 
Source: Own table 
Article Content 
NAFT A investors have to be treated like domestic 
investors 
Most-Favored-Nation Principle 
Investors have to be treated in accordance with 
international law 
The imposition of performance requirements is 
limited 
Guarantees all financial transfers that are related 
to an investment 
Protection against expropriation, nationalization 
and creeping expropriation 
Adhering to these general principles article 1110 states that investments of 
NAFT A members may not be expropriated except for a public purpose, in 
accordance with due process of law and upon the payment of a fair 
compensation. Although the precise definition of creeping expropriation 
remains unclear, the article extents the protection beyond the coverage of 
direct expropriations implying a total loss of assets. The difference between a 
direct expropriation and a creeping expropriation is, that, unlike in the case of 
the former, the latter does not result in a property owner relinquishing title to 
his property, that is, a creeping expropriation does not result in a formal 
dispossession of property by its owner. Instead, a creeping expropriation 
155 For a short overview over the expropriations in Mexico see paragraph 5.2.2.2. 
156 Also de-facto expropriations are covered by international law. An OECD draft for the 
protection of private property states: " .. . applied in such a way as to deprive ultimately the 
alien of the enjoyment or value of his property, without any specific act being identifiable 
as outright deprivation. As instances, may be quoted excessive or arbitrary taxation; 
prohibition of dividend distribution coupled with compulsory loans; impositions of 
administrators; prohibition of dismissal of staff; refusal of access to raw materials or of 
essential export or import licenses." Cited by Sacerdoti (2000) p.120. A general problem 
of identifying creeping expropriation is drawing the line between general and 
discriminatory regulation. Likewise the determination of a legitimate public interest is 
problematic. Due compensation should correspond to the value of the property taken, be 
paid speedily and in a currency which the owner can transfer from the expropriating state. 
Under general international law States do not have to compensate for losses suffered in 
case of war or civil disturbances. See Sacerdoti (2000) p.121-125 
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implies that governmental action reduces the benefits which an investor may 
receive from his property by diluting his property rights. 157 This, in turn, is of 
particular importance as in the past the actions of the Mexican government to 
harm foreign investors have been far more subtle than outright 
expropriations. 158 For the settlement of investment disputes the NAFTA treaty 
provides a system of international arbitration. Investors who are convinced that 
a member government has broken the commitments of NAFT A can put 
forward a claim to an international dispute settlement institution that will decide 
on the matter. Furthermore, the treaty, as most of the other agreements as 
well, includes a section devoted to the resolution of private commercial 
disputes among parties in the free trade zone. 159 
The negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement with the EU extends the level of 
NAFTA investor protection to European MNEs implying that European firms 
now face a level playing field for investments in Mexico. Besides the 
progressive and reciprocal liberalization of trade in goods, in conformity the 
agreement also sets up a consultation mechanism with respect to intellectual 
property matters. Like the NAFTA treaty, it further provides for a liberalization 
of investment and related payments and establishes a dispute settlement 
mechanism for the case of conflicts. 160 
Investment chapters of bilateral agreements are important instruments to 
enforce legal certainty and property rights of foreign investors. The massive 
increase of FOi flows to Mexico following the passing of the NAFT A 
investment chapter shows that foreign investors took advantage of the 
157 For a detailed description of the legal situation see Gudofsky (2000) p.257-286. 
158 See paragraph 5.2.2.2 for a few examples. A wide spread practice was for example to 
restrict the import of necessary inputs for foreign firms to force them out of business. In 
their final statement on the arbitration case Metalclad vs. Mexico where the US firm 
claimed a violation of the NAFTA treaty before the investment dispute settlement tribunal 
the judges argued: "Thus, expropriation under the NAFT A includes not only open, 
deliberate, and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure and/or formal 
or obligatory transfer of the title in favor of the host state, but also covert or incidental 
interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole 
or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be effected economic benefit of property 
even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State". Cited by Weiler (2001) 
p.694. 
159 See Sandrino (1994), Rugman/Gestrin (1994) and Siqueiros (2001). For legal details of 
the investment settlement procedure see Gudofsky (2000). For an overview of the 
Mexican experiences with the arbitration mechanism see Gonzalez de Cossio (2002). 
The up to now most prominent case of the investment dispute settlement process has 
been the case of the US waste disposal firm Metalclad. After acquiring a local waste 
disposal firm Metalclad was denied necessary permits for the operation of the facility. 
Later Metalclad was de-facto expropriated when the local governor declared the region of 
the facility an ecological reserve. The dispute settlement tribunal saw a violation of the 
NAFTA treaty and awarded 16.685 million dollars of indemnization to Metalclad. Mexico 
then initiated a suit before the revision court and part of the award was set aside. See 
Weiler (2001) and Gonzalez de Cossio (2002) who argues that challenging the award 
Mexico send a negative message to the international investment community. 
160 See Consulado General de Mexico (2001). 
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enhanced security of their investment projects. It further shows that the 
intensification of legal protection and the reduction of hazards for investors has 
proven an efficient strategy for Mexico to make it a more attractive destination 
for direct investment. In this respect the international agreements for the 
enforcement of investor rights have been an important step towards a better 
institutional framework for FDI in Mexico. 161 
"En vista de la experiencia de Mexico en materia de inversiones extranjeras en la epoca de 
Porfirio Diaz, cuando Mexico fue 1/amado madre de los extranjeros y madrastra de los Mexicanos, 
dados los sucesos dramdticos relativos al caso de la experiencia petrolera, y el fondo 
econ6mico colonial de Mexico, serfa en verdad sorprendente que la masa 
de fa poblaci6n mexicana no viera al capital extranjero con suspicacia y hostifidad" 162 
5.2.2.2 Mexican Foreign Investment Policy and Inflows of FOi to Mexico 
Basically all Latin American countries have a long tradition of skepticism 
towards the presence of foreign companies which has affected local foreign 
investment policies in many ways. 163 As the citation above demonstrates, also 
for the Mexican population foreign investors have long been a symbol for the 
economic exploitation of the country from abroad. Hence, past and present 
Mexican foreign investment policy can only be fully understood being aware of 
the historical development of foreign business in the country.164 Therefore, this 
paragraph briefly sketches the historical evolution of FDI flows to the country 
within the broader context of changing attitudes towards foreign investors in 
Mexico. 
Since the aftermath of Mexican independence was marked by a massive loss 
of foreign capital due to political instability, politicians of both of the two 
prevailing streams of political thought at that time, liberalism and conservatism, 
were convinced of the necessity to implement policies that would attract FDI to 
make ttp for the massive flight of capital during the post-independence 
years.16 In reaction to this policy France and Britain were the origins of the 
first modest FDI flows to Mexico which were mainly destinated to mining and 
161 The bilateral investment agreements are part of an international strategy of risk mitigation. 
See paragraph 5.4.2. 
162 Mosk (1951) cited by Pescador-Castaneda (1971) p.99. 
163 An early explanation of this scepticism is given by Wionczek (1966). 
164 See Vernon (1966a) who describes the Mexican dilemma with the following lines: 
"Confronted with a great flow of industrial investment coming principally from the United 
States, the reaction of a succession of Mexican administrations has been understandingly 
ambivalent. On the one hand, no president of Mexico could afford to embrace the 
presence of the foreign investor; on the other hand, this particular breed of investor was 
obviously being helpful to the Mexican economy in a number of different ways: in helping 
to tide over the short-term pressures on the Mexican balance of payments; in helping to 
meet the challenges of the import replacement program which Mexico so badly wished to 
achieve; and in bringing technology of an advanced kind into the Mexican economy." 
Vernon (1966a) p.112. In this context Root speaks of the necessity for host governments 
to balance economic benefits and political cost of FOi. See Root (1994) p.640-644. 
Fayerweather (1973) discusses how host country nationalism affects MNEs. 
165 See Camp (2003) p.33. 
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retail trade. 166 Despite of earlier efforts to promote FOi Mexico experienced the 
first wave of FOi flows under the government of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911) 
which for the first time ended the political instability of the post-independence 
years. Diaz and his economic advisors (cientificos) were convinced of the 
need to achieve higher economic growth through enhanced FOi from Europe 
and the United States. 167 Restored political stability and the liberal economic 
policy of the Diaz administration that largely neglected the interest of workers 
and farmers led to large inflows of foreign capital from those regions, in 
particular for infrastructure projects as railways and other transports or 
electricity. FOi however, was not limited to infrastructure projects but also went 
to mining, the construction of farms and to the oil sector. Although the 
available data is not fully reliable, it is estimated that in 1910 FOi represented 
a share of approximately 70% of total investment in Mexico. 168 Despite of the 
presence of European companies in Mexico the inflow of US capital dominated 
during the Porfiriato. 169 Much of the US capital went to the north of the country 
for example to the mines of Sonora and Chihuahua or the smelting industry 
dominated by Guggenheim interests as well as to the construction of 
railways.170 In 1911 total foreign investment amounted to 1. 7 billion US$ of 
which 650 million was from the US, 500 million from Britain and 450 million 
from France. The liberal policy during the Porfiriato eventually led to a massive 
concentration of national wealth in the hand of foreigners. It is estimated that 
by the end of the Diaz era foreign capital dominated every area of productive 
enterprise except for agriculture and the handicraft industries. 171 It is estimated 
that the participation of foreign capital in mining was 97.7%, in petroleum 
100%, in electricity 87.2%, in railroads 61.8%, in banking 76.7%, and in 
industry 85%. 172 Moreover, the agricultural policy of the government implied 
that substantial amounts of Mexican territory fell into foreign hands which 
should later turn out to be an important reason for upcoming antiforeignism 
during the revolution. 173 Even before the end of the Diaz rule there was 
evidence of a growing discontent both within and outside government with this 
foreign domination that culminated in expropriations in the railway sector and 
an attempt to limit foreign ownership in mining and the extraction of petrol .174 
Growing domination of foreign investors and a strict laissez-faire liberalism of 
the government finally provoked the outbreak of social unrest among the 
166 See Pescador-Castaneda (1971) p.69-73. The author neglects that in fact the Spanish 
conquest of the Aztec empire already marked the beginning of an integration into the 
international economy and flows of foreign investment. 
167 For an overview of the FOi policy of the Diaz administration see Wright (1971), Gordon 
(1975) or Pescador-Castaneda (1971). 
168 See Peters (2000) p.10. 
169 Among the European companies was Siemens that produced Electricity in the Valley of 
Mexico. British investment was concentrated in mining with many Mexican mine shares 
being listed on the London Stock Exchange. See Pescador-Castaneda (1971). 
170 See Pescador-Castaneda (1971) and Knight (2000) p.128. 
171 See Wright (1971) p.53-57. 
172 See Whiting (1992) p.60. 
173 See Wright (1971) p.53-57. It is estimated that in 1910 foreigners owned roughly one 
seventh of the land surface of Mexico. See Vernon (1963) p.50. 
174 See Wright (1971) p.60 and Vernon (1963) p.40. 
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Mexican citizens initiating the Mexican Revolution. It is argued that to a certain 
extent the revolution was a reaction to excessive foreign presence with MNEs 
being accused of "exploiting" the country and transferring excessive monopoly 
profits abroad. 175 
The revolution marked the end of the period of liberal policies towards foreign 
investors since the revolutionaries eagerly sought to enforce national 
sovereignty and to reduce foreign dependence of Mexico. The new Mexican 
constitution of 1917 embodied the main principles of this revolutionary 
movement and was the beginning of a period of more than 60 years of 
extensive foreign investment regulation by Mexican governments.176 Following 
the military phase of the revolution foreign investors were hesitant to risk much 
new capital in the country. The oil industry was the only sector where the value 
of foreign investment exceeded pre-revolution figures. The decline in FOi 
continued with the onset of the great depression. Besides the depressing 
impact of the world wide economic crisis a main reason for declining 
investment flows was the presidency of Cardenas who proclaimed a 
"Mexicanization" of the economy as policy goal. In reaction to the enormous 
influence that MNEs exerted in Mexico, in particular in the oil sector, the 
Cardenas administration was characterized by outright hostility towards foreign 
capital flows. This hostility culminated in the nationalizations of the late 30s 
which included major redistributions of private owned land, the railroad system 
and the oil industry leading to a further decrease in investor confidence. 177 
Between 1926 and 1940 most of the large multinational investments in 
agriculture were expropriated.178 In contrast to the preponderant rule of foreign 
investment under Diaz, during the Cardenas administration the share of 
foreign capital fell to approximately 15% of total investment. In 1940 total 
foreign investment reached an amount of under 500 million being only slightly 
more than one quarter of the level in 1920.179 Despite of the decline in total 
numbers FOi increased in the manufacturing sector with firms like Ford and 
General Motors establishing plants in Mexico during the 20s and 30s. 180 
Cardenas' successors Camacho and Aleman tried to improve the climate for 
foreign investment by settling the obligations, as for example the 
175 See Munro (1995) p. 121. Vernon argues that the economic policy of the Diaz rule deeply 
influenced later Mexican policy: "The stamp of Porfirian policy was so deep on Mexico's 
economy that the traces can still be glimpsed in the 1960s. The Porfirian policy regarding 
foreign capital, for instance, still provides part of the emotional backdrop against which 
foreign investors are judged today in Mexico's economy." Vernon (1963) p.39. 
176 See Sandrino (1994). 
177 See Pescador-Castaneda (1971) p.88-94. For a detailed analysis of the expropriation of 
the oil industry see Knight (1988). Vernon (1966a) argues that the nationalizations of the 
1930s reflect the public opinion of the time. Indeed Diego Rivera's mural in the 
presidential palace of Mexico City where greedy and debauched Wall Street millionaires 
are depicted confirms this argument. 
178 See Munro (1995) p.130. 
179 See Wright (1971) p.61-70. 
180 See Cardenas (2000b) p.181-182. 
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compensation of American Oil Companies, inherited from the previous 
government. During the war years FDI increased slowly with total forei~n 
investment rising from 450 million US$ in 1940 to 575 million US$ in 1946. 81 
In particular Aleman tried to attract foreign capital that was needed to promote 
economic development by convincing foreiijn investors, in particular from the 
US, that their capital was safe in Mexico. 82 In spite of the urgent need for 
investment in the electricity industry the government did not succeed in 
attracting investment of foreigners because they saw their assets endangered 
due to the in the long run unstable political environment in Mexico. 183 
Nevertheless, during the rule of Aleman FDI accelerated again reaching an 
amount of nearly 730 million US$ by 1952. Growing FOi inflows went hand in 
hand with a drastic change in the preferred target sectors of foreign investors 
whose main focus shifted from primary materials to manufacturing to take 
advantage of the growing domestic market. Whereas in 1940 the share of the 
traditional sectors like mining, public utilities and transportation accounted for 
90% of total FOi this value fell to only 41% in 1956. For the same time FOi in 
manufacturing rose from a share of below 1% in 1940 to a share of 46% in 
1956.184 The enormous increase in manufacturing FOi reflected the beginning 
protection of the domestic market initiating the strategy of import substitution. 
Faced with rising tariffs, MNEs that used to export to Mexico, established 
plants in the country to take advantage of the dynamic and protected Mexican 
market. 185 
Figure 5.5 depicts the evolution of FDI flows to the Mexican economy from 
1940 to 1970 clearly indicating the dynamic development of FOi during the late 
60s. 186 However already the upward swings of FOi during the 40 and 50s led 
to demands of Mexican industrialists represented by the industrial chambers 
Canacintra and Concamin for limiting FOi and fostered "mexicanization". 187 
The skeptical attitude towards FOi gained momentum during the sextenio of 
Lopez Mateos who limited foreign participation in certain industries and 
promoted the nationalization of the electric power industry by means of 
discriminatory regulation policy although the government was careful to avoid 
the public offending of foreign investors by offering a compensation. 188 
181 See Wright (1971) p.71-76. 
182 See Sanchez-Gamper (1989). 
183 See See Pescador-Castaneda (1971) p.97. Vernon argues that since the late 1930s new 
foreign investment in electricity was low due to continuous expropriation threats by the 
Mexican government. As a consequence dim-outs and failures grew common in Mexico. 
See Vernon (1966a) p.105-109. 
184 See Wright (1971) p.71-76 and Sanchez-Gamper (1989). For a detailed analysis of the 
structure of Mexican FOi see paragraph 5.1.2.3. 
185 See Cardenas (2000b) p.187-188. 
186 It has to be noted that the reliability of the older data on FOi to Mexico is questionable. 
Therefore, it has to interpreted carefully. However, the data set that has been used here 
was published by the Mexican central bank and is therefore the best available data set as 
most of the other consulted publications also rely on it. 
187 See Cardenas (2000b) p.192-193. 
188 See Whiting (1992) p.75. The nationalization was celebrated by the Mexican public with 
posters reading: Land-1917, Oil-1938, Electricity-1960". 
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Figure 5.5: FDI inflows to Mexico 1940-1970 (in Million US$) 
I• Fil (Mo 1.5$) I 
Source: Own figure using data from Sepulveda/Chumacero (1973). 
In 1961 the government continued its efforts to "mexicanizen by forbidding new 
mining concessions and limiting the duration of existing concessions of foreign 
investors. The policy to displace foreign investors also continued in other 
sectors of the economy. 189 Also foreign ownership of forestry and real estate 
was further restricted under the Lopez Mateos rule. 190 Despite the absence of 
legal restrictions on FOi the Mexican administration found other ways to limit 
foreign participation for example by withholding tax concessions or necessary 
import licenses. As a consequence of this policy and an general economic 
downturn foreign investment at the beginning of the 60s fell to levels below 
amounts in 1956. The decline of FDI flows provoked various governmental 
efforts to regain investor confidence and in the second half of the Lopez 
Mateos rule FOi flows rose again.191 Despite of these efforts, the share of FDI 
in total capital accumulation fell to 5% during the 60s. 192 
The new government of Diaz Ordaz proclaimed that FDI was welcome but that 
it should be preferably associated in a minority position. His term initiated with 
the lifting of restriction on incoming FOi flows in sectors as fertilizers, 
insecticides, basic chemicals and food products. 193 Due to this declarations 
and promising outlooks for the Mexican economy FOi flows accelerated during 
the second half of the 60s. Nevertheless, the Mexican government 
continuously promoted its goal of further "mexicanizing" the economy with the 
biggest example being the nationalization of the sulphur industry. Although the 
transaction consisted in a public bid for 66% of total capital of foreign 
enterprises, there is evidence that the Mexican government exerted pressure 
189 See Wright (1971) p.80-86. 
190 See Whiting (1992) p.75. 
191 See Wright (1971) p.80-86. 
192 See Cardenas (2000b) p.192-193. 
193 See Whiting (1992) p.76. 
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to achieve the nationalization of the US company. Moreover, the government 
limited the acquisition of Mexican firms and forbid foreign participation in 
Mexican financial institutions. The sulphur case and the other restrictions on 
FOi contributed to cooling investor enthusiasm of the previous years.194 In 
1965 a series of decrees forbid any foreign participation in the capital of 
Mexican banks, insurance companies, bonding companies and investment 
companies. 195 
During the 70s skeptical attitudes towards foreign investors grew which was 
reflected in the passing of a new investment law in 1973 that restricted foreign 
participation to 49% of total capital.196 This law was a reaction to the rapid 
growth of FOi in Mexico, a large part of which were acquisitions of Mexican 
firms by foreign companies. 197 Nevertheless capital inflows to Mexico did not 
totally loose momentum. Instead, the years preceding the debt crisis were 
marked by a massive upswing in FOi flows spurred by the pre-crisis boom of 
the Mexican economy. High domestic growth rates and the oil boom attracted 
foreign investors and by 1981 FOi reached a peak. 
Figure 5.6 and figure 5.7 depict the evolution of FOi flows to Mexico since 
1970 as yearly flows in constant US$ and as percentage of GDP. 
Figure 5.6: FDI Inflows to Mexico 1970-2000 (in Million US$ of 1995) 
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Source: Own figure using data from World Bank (2002b), World Development Indicators. 
Despite of the restrictive policy on FOi that culminated in the 1973 law, FOi 
experienced no important declines and showed an upward dynamic that, with 
a minor decline between 1976 and 1978, continued during the early 80s. The 
194 See Wright (1971) p.86-94 and Whiting (1992) p.77-79. 
195 See Whiting (1992) p.77. 
196 For an overview of the legislation of 1973 see paragraph 5.2.2.1. 1. 
197 Whiting describes in greater detail the positions of different Mexican interest groups 
towards a new legislation on FDI. See Whiting (1992) p.80-107. 
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decline during the 1976-78 period may not be solely attributed to the 1973 law 
since FDI also has been influenced by the global recession following the 1973-
74 oil crisis. Between 1978 and 1981 excellent growth prospects of the 
Mexican Economy that were bolstered by the discovery of large oil reserves 
implied an enormous stimulation of FDI flows and average flows doubled 
compared to the 1974-1977 period. 196 
Figure 5.7: FOi Inflows to Mexico as a percentage of GDP 1970-2000 
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Source: Own figure using data from Wor1d Bank (2002b), Wor1d Development Indicators. 
As the analysis of Mexican FOi data does not reflect a negative impact of the 
restrictive legislation of 1973 it is interesting to see if Mexico lost FOi relative to 
other host countries. Mexico's share in worldwide FOi is depicted in figure 5.8. 
Though it must be stressed that there is no way of knowing for sure what the 
level of FOi would have been without the passing of the legislation the analysis 
of Mexico's share in worldwide FOi does not confirm the hypothesis that 
Mexico lost FOi in relation to other countries. Instead, it may be argued that, 
since Mexico already passed restrictions on FDI in the years preceding the 
new law, the 1973 law was more a codification of yet existing rules than 
complete new legislation.199 In contrast figure 5.8 clearly mirrors the increase 
of FDI preceding the debt crisis. 
198 See Peres-Nunez (1990a). 
199 See Whiting (1992) p.90. 
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Figure 5.8: Mexico's Share in Worldwide FOi 1970-2000 
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Source: Own Figure with data from Wor1d Bank (2002b), Wor1d Development Indicators. 
Therefore, the new legislation only formalized more drastic actions by the 
Mexican government that had already been taken earlier when foreign equity 
participation was limited in many industries and foreign copper mining firms 
were nationalized during the late 60s and early 70s. 200 This governmental 
policy and the hostile rhetoric of president Echeverria against foreign 
corporations, that according to his view created "chains of dependency", 
already increased concerns of international investors before.201 Falling FOi 
flows in the period from 1969 to 1972 are a support for the hypothesis that the 
actions that preceded the passing of the law were more influential than the law 
itself.202 
The massive decline of FOi in the first half of the 80s is due to the outbreak of 
the Latin American debt crisis that began with Mexico's moratorium on 
international debt in 1982. Nevertheless, it also reflects the perception of 
industrialized countries that legal protection of FOi in developinfil countries in a 
time of such political and economic uncertainty was insufficient. 03 The value of 
FOi flowing to Mexico dropped from an annual average of 2.5 billion US$ in 
1980-1981 to 0.4 billion US$ in 1983-1985.204 The liberal reforms of the post-
crisis years were accompanied by a consecutive opening of the economy to 
FOi leading to growing inflows from the mid 80s on. However, it must be 
stressed that the extremely high inflows of FOi in 1986 and 1987 are biased by 
the introduction of a debt-equity swap program that permitted the swap of 
public debt against shares in public or private enterprises. Consequently, flows 
200 See Munro (1995). 
201 See Philip (1992) p.81. 
202 See Munro (1995). 
203 See Sandrino (1994). 
204 See OECD (1992). 
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in 1988 decreased heavily when the program was suspended in 1987.205 The 
implementation of the Brady plan to tackle the Latin American debt problem 
and a further liberalization of the investment law in 1989 accelerated FOi. 
During the 90s growing inflows continued as a consequence of growing 
stability, further liberalization of the investment regime but also due to the 
growing worldwide investment flows to developing countries. While worldwide 
FOi flows between 1985 and 1990 averaged 142 billion US$ annually the 
annual average for the years 1990 to 1998 was 336 billion.206 Mexico 
participated successfully in this upswing of FOi to developing countries. The 
joining of NAFTA in 1994 led to a further increase in FOi, reflecting higher 
investor certainty due to the protection of the NAFTA Investment Chapter and 
the access for investors to the US market. However, already the negotiations 
of NAFTA that were begun in 1991 and the new investment law of 1993 
stimulated FOi in Mexico as is depicted in figures 5.6 and 5.7.207 With the 
starting of NAFTA in 1994 FOi inflows to Mexico attained levels of around 3% 
of GDP, a level that with exception of 1987, a year that is biased by debt-
equity-swaps programs, has never been attained before. Mexico's stock of FOi 
rose from 37.1 billion US$ in 1990 to 81.5 billion US$ at the end of 1998 and 
average flows represented more than 15% of the country's gross fixed capital 
formation.206 In 1999 Mexico was the third important recipient of FOi in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 209 FOi inflows maintained a high level with a short 
decline in investment in 1995 and 1996, which may be attributed to the 
recession following the Tequila crisis. However already in 1997 FOi flows were 
superior to 1994 when the effect of the Asian crisis implied lower inflows in 
1998 until flows consolidated again in 1999 and 2000. For the next years the 
projections for FOi flows to Mexico seem positive. The further liberalization in 
the framework of NAFT A and the continuing efforts to enhance investor 
confidence point to a further growth of FOi in the future. 
To sum up, Mexico's policy towards foreign investment has undergone drastic 
changes during the last century. The liberal economic policy of the Porfiriato 
was followed by a occasionally aggressive nationalistic policy that limited and 
restricted FOi in Mexico. This nationalistic development policy has been 
pursued for many decades until the outbreak of the debt crisis highlighted the 
economic inefficiencies of this model. Despite the initial success, economic 
reforms and liberalization of FOi are relatively new phenomena in Mexican 
economic policy implying that societal resistance against this policy is still high. 
Growing electoral support for the left-wing PRO in the midterm election 2003 
205 See Peres-Nunez (1990a). Schinke estimates that from 1985 to 1989 on average 43% of 
FDI and Portfolio Investment in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico were financed by debt 
equity swaps. See Schinke (1993) p.97. 
206 See Ramirez (2002). 
207 The Bank of Mexico writes: "Direct investment into Mexico has increased substantially, 
owing to improved confidence, structural change, and the prospect of a North American 
Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Canada." Banco de Mexico (1993) p.8. 
208 See Ramirez (2002). 
209 See UNCTAD (2000). 
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and the resistance of "conservative" politicians inside the PRI , which promote 
a halt of liberal reforms may serve as a hint to demonstrate the existence of 
these societal forces. In presence of this revisionist forces in the Mexican 
society international lock-in mechanisms like NAFTA gain fundamental 
importance for the country.210 
5.2.2.3 The Structure and Geographical Origins of FOi to Mexico 
Traditionally FOi flows to Mexico have been largely concentrated in the 
primary sector and in particular extractive industries since for the Spanish the 
extraction of precious metals from the colonies of the New World was the main 
focus. This traditional pattern changed slightly when the government of Porfirio 
Diaz promoted the development of the national infrastructure and in particular 
the construction of railroads. Apart from railways FDI was largely concentrated 
in mining, the oil industry and other agricultural products whereas 
manufacturing and commerce only received a minor share.Figure 5.9 depicts 
the structure of FDI to Mexico in 1911, the last year of the Diaz rule. 211 
Figure 5.1 O depicts the geographical origins of FDI flows to Mexico for the 
same year. Due to the geographic proximity and the great economic an 
political influence the United States were the most important source of FDI 
being responsible for more than 40% of total FOi. The second rank was taken 
by British investors with a share of slightly more than 30% whose investments 
were largely concentrated in mining and the oil industry. French investors 
followed on the third place holding a share of 20%. 
Figure 5.9: Structure of Mexican FOi in 1911 
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Railroads 38% 
210 See paragraph 5.4.2 for an analysis of the effects of Mexico's internationalization strategy. 
211 It has to be noted that the reliability of the older data on FOi to Mexico is questionable. 
Therefore, it has to interpreted carefully. 
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While the geographical origin of foreign investment did not alter considerably 
and the dominant position of US FOi should prevail in the future, the sectoral 
distribution of FOi flows to Mexico experienced a considerable change. 
Figure 5.10: Geographical Origins of Mexican FOi in 1911 
Other6% 
France20% USA43% 
/ 
UK31% 
Source: Own figure based on data of Wright (1971) p.54. 
More and more foreign investors began to invest in the manufacturing sector 
while traditional strong sectors as for example mining experienced a sharp 
decline. There are many reasons for this continuous upgrading of the sectoral 
FOi distribution. First, since the railway sector and the petroleum industry were 
nationalized in the 1930s Mexican governments made enormous efforts to 
mexicanize "strategic" industries of the primary sector. Although already the 
constitution of 1917 stated that all subsoil wealth belonged to the Mexican 
people, it took several years before these sectors were totally in the hands of 
Mexicans. 
In the mining sector for example, laws that limited foreign ownership were not 
passed before the 1960s although over time the government ensured Mexican 
ownership in the primary sector and in other industries which were considered 
as strategic. Second, the growing domestic market protection induced tariff 
hopping FOi in the manufacturing sector since foreign firms that used to export 
manufacturing products to Mexico now transferred their production across the 
border to avoid tariffs and to benefit from the protected and fast growing 
domestic market. 
Figure 5.11 depicts the structure of cumulated incoming FOi to Mexico 
between 1940 and 1950. Compared to 1911 FOi in the industrial sector rose 
significantly to a share of 19%, which was nearly equivalent to FOi in the 
mining sector. At the same time the share of FOi in commerce experienced a 
fast growth. 
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Figure 5.11: Structure of Mexican FOi in 1940-1950 (cumulated flows) 
Other 1% 
/ 
Commerce 7% I Industry 19% 
Conslruction 1 % 
Electrlclty 26% 
Source: Own figure based on data by Sepulveda/Chumacero (1973) . 
These structural changes of FOi to Mexico endured during the 60s and 70s. 
As figure 5.12 shows for the period from 1960-1970, FOi in the industrial 
sector passed to an impressive share of 69% while FDI in commerce rose to 
levels of 17% of total incoming flows. On the other hand, mining that still made 
up for 22% between 1940 and 1950 passed to a share of 8% of total flows 
from 1960-1970. FDI in transport and communication passed from a level of 
22% to a share of below 1 % of cumulated inflows. 
Figure 5.12: Structure of Mexican FDI in 1960-1970 (cumulated flows) 
Transportation 1% Olher 4% 
Commerce 17% ~ \ 
Agriculture 1 % 
/ Mining 8% 
\ 
Industry 69% 
Source: Own figure based on data by Sepulveda/Chumacero (1973). 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
210 POLITICAL RISK AND FOi IN MEXICO 
The nationalization of the electricity sector implied a decline of FOi from a 
share of 26% for 1940-1950 to levels of below 1%. The share of FOi to 
construction remained constant at a low level. Therefore, between 1940 and 
1970 the fastest growing recipient sectors were commerce and the industrial 
sector while traditional sectors as mining, transport or communication were in 
constant decline. Although already low in 1950, the share of agricultural FOi 
further fell to levels of around 1%. 
During the 70s and 80s this general trend continued since the manufacturing 
sector continued to receive the lion share of incoming FOi. From the mid 70s 
to the end of the 80s the share of the industrial sector in total FOi reached 
75%. For the same period the share of the mining sector constantly declined 
from 6.3% in 1975 to 1.5% in 1989. Likewise the share of commerce declined 
from 11 .4% in 1975 to 7.1% in 1989. The share of FOi in agriculture constantly 
kept at a low level of under 1 %. The fastest growing sector for this period has 
been the service sector rising from a share of 7.0% in 1975 to 24.7% in 
1989. 212 Figure 5.13 showing the sectoral distribution of cumulated FOi for the 
time period 1994-1998 highlights that during the 90s the role of the 
manufacturing sector remained strong since its share of FOi was 62% with 
28% of it flowing to the maquila sector. 
Figure 5.13: Structure of Mexican FOi from 1994 -1998 (cumulated flows) 
01h« S«vices 9% 
Primwy Sector 1 % 
I Food, Beverages, Tobecco 16% / Chemlcals9% 
/ 
/ \ 
Chemical equipment 4% 
Commerce 12% 
8ectronic equipment 13% 
01h« manufactures 11% Motor vehicles 9% 
Source: CEPAL (2000) p. 102. 
212 See Ortiz (1994) p.168-171. 
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During the 90s the structure of FOi flows to Mexico has been affected by the 
continuing liberalization of the national FOi legislation. In particular the service 
sector in Mexico experienced a fast growth of incoming FOi flows. For the 
period 1994-1998 37% of total FOi went to the service sector with commerce, 
telecommunication and the financial sector being the most important recipient 
sectors. A great fraction of these FOi flows to the service sector consisted of 
international M&A transactions as many foreign investors entered the Mexican 
market bv purchasing blocks of shares in financial institutions or local retail 
chains.211 
Figure 5.14 illustrates the geographical origins of FOi flows to Mexico from 
1994-2002. Despite of considerable changes in the sectoral structure of FOi 
geographical origins of FOi only changed slowly as the lion share of FOi flows 
to Mexico still comes from the US making up for 63% of total FOi. Among 
European nations the share of British FOi declined considerably over time with 
the Netherlands and Spain now holding higher shares of FOi to Mexico. 
Figure 5.14: Geographical Origins of Mexican FOi 1994-2002 (cumulated 
flows) 
Japan3% 0th• 11"1, 
UK3% 
Germany3%~ -- I Spaln4"/4 -
/ 
Netherlands 9% 
\ 
Canada4% USA63% 
Source: Own figure based on data from Direcci6n General de lnversi6n Extranjera 
Analyzing the local distribution of FOi flows inside Mexico reveals that not all 
regions of the country equally profited from the dynamic evolution of FOi flows 
to Mexico. Table 5.8 indicates that the Federal District (Mexico City) received 
the lion share of incoming FOi with 60.8% of incoming flows for the period from 
1999 to 2002. If the State of Mexico is added, the share of the Federal District 
increases to 65.3% of total incoming FOi. Moreover, the nearby Puebla which 
is an important center of automobile production receives 2% of incoming FOi. 
For the rest of the country the structure of incoming FOi clearly mirrors the 
north-south divide of economic development in Mexico. While the northern 
213 See CEPAL (2000) p.101-105. 
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states Nuevo Leon, Baja California, Chihuahua, Tamaulipas and Sonora 
received shares of 9.2%, 5.7%, 4.4%, 2.5% and 1.4% respectively, southern 
states like Chiapas, Oaxaca, Michoacan or Campeche received 0.1 or less of 
total FOi. 
Table 5.8: Regional Distribution of FOi in Mexico (in thousands of US$) 
StetH 1999 2000 2001 2002 Accumulated Sh•• 
1999-2002 % 
FOi Total 12,856,062.6 15,484,403.8 25,334,517.0 9,696,385.2 63,371 ,368.6 100.0 
Aguascallanteo 68,152.4 59,991.7 86,268.8 8,032.0 222,444 .9 0.4 
Baja California 1,133,124.8 952,735.8 775,594.9 772,580.4 3,634,036.0 5.7 
Baja Callfornla Sur 87,340.3 54,609.8 64,928.6 97,033.4 303,912.1 0.5 
Campach• 3,035.7 11,353.2 -21 ,414.4 17,981 .1 10,955.6 0.0 
Coahulla 166,699.1 201,426.2 128,130.7 109,071 .2 605,327.2 1.0 
Collma 4,203.3 7,045.0 1,382.0 4,153.2 16,783.6 0.0 
Chlapas 3,326.8 2,209.5 -902.8 978.4 5,612.0 0.0 
Chihuahua 583,975.3 940,386.8 693,771 .0 585,155.0 2,803,288.1 4.4 
Dlslrlto Federal 5,915.599.1 7,582.778.4 19,478,996.7 5,525,381.3 38,502,755.5 60.8 
Durango 7,113.6 5,255.4 4.214 .6 80,571 .7 97,155.2 0.2 
Guanajuato 135,909.0 71 ,123.7 206,300.6 123,146.6 536,479.9 0.8 
Guerrero 34,228.7 10,203.0 11 ,039.7 6,552.9 62,024.2 0.1 
Hidalgo 747.8 4,731 .8 8,705.3 966.8 15,151.7 0.0 
Jallsco 526,638.0 1,028,372.1 257,996.4 129,916.4 1,942,922.9 3.1 
Estado de Mexico 1,369,628.2 426,952.9 687,617.1 368,669.1 2,852,867.4 4.5 
Michoacan 5,236.9 28,062.7 3,066.1 3,651 .5 40,017.2 0.1 
Morelos 145,997.2 44,922.5 3,114.1 123.5 194,157.3 0.3 
Nayarll 14,287.5 37,539.7 32,130.6 12,714.2 96,672.0 0.2 
Nuevole6n 1,317 ,145.7 2,017 ,144.6 1,562,063.6 918,416.7 5,814 ,770.6 9.2 
Oaxaca 691 .3 -1,739.9 -1,855.3 1,559.2 -1 ,344.8 0.0 
Puebla 132,021.3 546,510 .5 206,825.2 395,844.6 1,281 ,201.5 2.0 
Queretaro 135,337.1 156,910.3 140,622.8 44,721 .1 477,591.3 0.8 
Quintana Roo 91,641 .1 22,305.9 45,482.3 3,063.1 162,492.5 0,3 
Sen Luis Potosi 209,754 .8 276,449.8 166,776.8 3,119.8 656,101 .2 1.0 
Slnaloa 40,819.4 12,182.5 36,695.9 -1,127.1 88,570.7 0.1 
Sonora 186,974.3 385,122.7 161,836.3 146,585.6 880 ,518.9 1.4 
Tab•co 52,734.8 38,413.4 4,088.3 827.5 96,064.0 0.2 
Tamaulipu 460 ,701 .2 475,857.2 329,359.2 321 ,752.7 1,587,670.3 2.5 
Tlu:cala 43,859.4 4,421 .5 12,701 .6 127.8 61 ,110.3 0.1 
Veracruz -73,266.0 21,767.8 117,192.6 2,561.1 68,255.6 0.1 
Yucatan 41 ,303.8 47,205.9 126,272.3 6,962.2 221,744.2 0.3 
Zacetecu 11 ,100.6 12,151.6 5,515.4 5,292.0 34,059.6 0.1 
Source: Direcci6n General de Inversion Extranjera (2003). 
The only southern state with a considerable share of FOi is Jalisco with a 
share of 3.1 %, most probably related to the presence of the state oil company 
PEMEX in this federal state. These regional pattern of FOi implies that the 
capital and the 5 northern states account for 90.5 percent of total incoming FOi 
flows to Mexico. 
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It has been shown that Mexico has been constantly upgrading its locational 
specific advantages, inducing changes in the structure and motives for FOi 
although the debt crisis in 1982 and the financial turmoil in late 1994 implied a 
short break in this general transition of the FOi structure towards 
manufacturing and services.214 While in the beginning of the century FOi was 
largely natural-resource-seeking investment, the import substitution period was 
characterized by a dominant position of market seeking foreign investors 
avoiding high national tariffs and profiting from the protected domestic market. 
Access to the local market still seems to be the dominant motivation for FOi in 
financial services, telecommunication, retail trade and some industrial sectors 
as food, beverages and tobacco. Despite of these market-seeking 
investments, the more Mexico became integrated to the North-American 
market through the signing of NAFTA the more FOi changed to being led by 
efficiency seeking motives. In sectors as automotive, computer, electronics 
and the clothing industry the need to cut costs and potential opportunities for 
exports to the NAFT A market stimulated the location of productive investments 
in Mexico.215 Fostered by the continuous opening of the economy to foreign 
trade Mexico more and more became an export-platform for MNEs profiting of 
the cheap but comparably skilled labor in the country. For MNEs located 
outside the US in turn, NAFT A was an important motive for productive 
engagements in Mexico as it implied access to the large and dynamic US 
market. 
In general the empirical literature indicates positive implications of increasing 
FOi flows for the Mexican economy. Empirical work of RAMIREZ confirms the 
hypothesis that Mexico attracted FOi in sectors where international trade links 
are strong and potential positive spill-over effects associated with the transfer 
of technology and learning-by-doing are high. Consequently, he shows that 
FOi has a positive impact on labor productivity.216 Other empirical 
investigations likewise suggest that the presence of technological spillovers of 
FOi enhance economic efficiency in Mexico.217 To sum up, the changing 
structure of FOi in Mexico towards manufacturing and services suggests that 
Mexico profits from transfers of technology and managerial know how. As 
recent empirical research indicates the overall impact of FOi on Mexican 
economic performance seems to be positive. Problematic is the regional 
concentration of FOi around the capital and in the northern states which further 
increases the regional divide of economic development in Mexico. 
214 See Calderon/Mortimore/Peres (1995). 
215 See CEPAL (2000) p.101-105. 
216 See Ramirez (2000) and (2001 ). 
217 See Blomstrom/Persson (1983), Blomstrom/Wolff (1994) and Burger (1998). 
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5.3 Polltlcal Risk in Mexico 
5.3.1 Overview 
POLITICAL RISK AND FOi IN MEXICO 
The following paragraphs evaluate political risks for foreign investors in Mexico 
between the years 1984-2003 using the available risk data and analyzing the 
relevant literature. Although it would have been interesting to analyze the 
impact of political risk in different industrial sectors with different degrees of 
reversibility, these tests could not be performed due to the lack of reliable 
disaggregated data. 1 Due to the small size of the political risk data set 
methods of advanced time series analysis have not been considered a viable 
methodology for this empirical analysis. Instead, to show initial evidence for 
the influence of political risk indicators on FOi simple statistical correlations are 
reported in scatter plots. All numerical statistical results are depicted in table 
A.2 in Annex II. It is obvious that due to the lack of a reasonably sized data set 
and the resulting methodological deficiencies results have to be interpreted 
with caution.2 To facilitate the empirical analysis I use the three groups of 
political risk that have already been used for the empirical analysis in Chapter 
4. Paragraph 5.3.2 analyzes the evolution of macroeconomic risk factors in a 
similar fashion as orthodox country risk analysis would propose. Paragraph 
5.3.3 in turn, is dedicated to the analysis of risks that result from governmental 
behavior or the structure of national institutions. Eventually, paragraph 5.3.4 is 
dedicated to the analysis of politic risk that originate in societal characteristics 
of the host country. The last paragraph offers a general evaluation of the 
institutional environment for FOi in Mexico and an analysis of Mexico's risk 
mitigation strategy since the outbreak of the debt crisis. 
5.3.2 The Macroeconomic Environment 
It has been argued that the establishment and maintenance of a stable 
macroeconomic environment is one of the basic economic tasks of a national 
government and an important prerequisite for national economic 
development. 3 However, macroeconomic stability has been a problem in 
Mexico since the beginning of the time period that is analyzed here. In 1982 
Mexico's moratorium on its international debt initiated the outbreak of the Latin 
American debt crisis and left the country with nearly unacceptable business 
conditions for foreign investors.4 In the following years a central focus of 
national economic policy was to overcome the effects of the severe crisis that 
had affected the country. Nevertheless, it took the Mexican government nearly 
1 O years to overcome the effects of the economic crisis that hit the country 
during the early 80s. Following the stabilization policy that was implemented in 
the aftermath of the crisis the country entered into a severe recession and 
living standards fell drastically. During the early 90s Mexico successfully 
continued the economic reform process and macroeconomic stabilization, 
1 Furthennore, this test entails the difficulty to theoretically detennine the degree of 
reversibility of investment projects in different industrial sectors. 
2 Excluding 2003 the number of available observations is 19. 
3 See World Bank (1997) p.26-27. 
4 In 1986 BERi rated Mexico as a country with "unacceptable business conditions" for 
foreign-owned businesses. In this year Mexico's index scores were similar to those of 
Egypt, India, Iraq and Kenya. See Howell/Chaddick (1994) p.80-81 . 
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economic liberalization and debt rescheduling over time restored investor 
confidence. 
The most suitable indicator for measuring the evolution of macroeconomic 
country risk is the interest spread that is charged on a country's sovereign debt 
since spreads measure the difference between interests charged for sovereign 
debt of highly credible international debtors and emerging market countries. 
For taking the higher risk of default inherent to investments in government 
bonds of emerging markets investors are compensated by this risk premium. 
Figure 5.15: Mexican Interest Spreads on Sovereign Debt 1993-2000 
(in%) 
60 1 
50 
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10 
Own Figure using data of the Wol1d Bank (2002b). 
When investing in riskier assets, investors demand higher spreads in order to 
cover expected losses from default. Therefore, interest rate spreads are good 
indicators of country risk as they picture the expectations of international 
financial markets about the default risk of country bonds and other obligations 
of emerging market countries. Figure 5.15 shows the evolution of Mexican 
interest spreads over LIBOR during the 90s and highlights the near tripling of 
Mexican spreads during the financial crisis that hit the country in late 1994. 
Following the Tequila-Crisis however, Mexican spreads have been constantly 
declining. In 2000 and 2001 the three major rating agencies Moodys, Standard 
and Poors, and Fitch assigned Mexico an investment-grade rating on its long-
term foreign currency debt. Now being an attractive investment destination for 
a broader range of investors interest rates on public debt fell and country risk 
further decreased. Between September 1998 and March 2003 Mexico's score 
in the institutional investor country risk index rose from 45.4 points to 58.5 
points indicating a marked improvement in the country's fundamentals.5 In may 
2003 Mexican interest spreads reached the all time low of 233 basis points.6 
5 See Blazquez/Santiso (2003). 
6 See BBVA (2003). 
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Figure 5.16 illustrates the evolution of Mexican interest rate spreads over US 
treasury bonds from 1997 to 2003 indicating the important decline in spreads 
between 1999 and 2001 . 
Figure 5.16: Mexican Interest Rate Spreads over US-treasury bonds (in 
basis points) 
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Source: BBVA (2003), Latinfocus. 
Besides the inspection of hard data one may use pooled information about the 
macroeconomic situation given by political risk indicators that focus on 
macroeconomic risk. An indicator that pools the information of several sub-
indicators to a single measure of macroeconomic risk is the Economic Risk 
Rating developed by PRS Group. This measure is" a means of assessing a 
country's current economic strengths and weaknesses. In general, where 
strengths outweigh weaknesses, a country will show low risk and where 
weaknesses outweigh strengths, the economic risk will be high. To ensure 
comparability between countries, risk components are based on accepted 
ratios between the measured data within the national economic/financial 
structure, and then the ratios are compared, not the data. Risk points are 
assessed for each of the component factors of GDP per head of population, 
real annual GDP growth, annual inflation rate, budget balance as a percentage 
of GDP, and current account balance as a percentage of GDP. Risk ratings 
range from a high of 50 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk), though lowest 
de facto ratings are generally near 15". 7 
Figure 5.17 depicts the evolution of this risk indicator for the period from 1984 
to 2003. An inspection of the data indicates that the economic risk indicator 
shows an upward trend since the beginning of the economic reforms in the mid 
80s that is interrupted twice. The first time due to the recessive effects of the 
financial crisis in late 1994 and the second time in 1999. With exception of 
these two periods the economic risk rating mirrors the efforts of the national 
government to maintain macroeconomic stability. Despite of its obvious 
7 See PRS Group (2003). 
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success it took the national government a long time to see the results of its 
stabilization policies as Mexico needed 19 years for an increase of 10 index 
points. 
Figure 5.17: Economic Risk in Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) . 
Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
To assess the impact of the economic risk rating on the inflow of FDI the two 
scatter-plots in figure 5.18 depict the correlation between the economic risk 
indicator and FOi flows on the left as well as between the indicator and the 
FOi/GDP ratio on the right. The statistical correlation suggests a positive 
impact of lower economic risk on FOi flows as well as on the FOi/GDP ratio. 
Figure 5.18: Correlation between Economic Risk and FOi 
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Source: Own figure using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) and year1y data of 
the Wor1d Bank (2002b). 
Although lower risks pictured by the index coincide with higher FOi flows to 
Mexico, it has to be underlined that the correlation has to be interpreted with 
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caution due to the limited data sample. Since the economic risk indicator has 
not been available for all Latin American countries included in the panel 
analysis in Chapter 4 there is no additional empirical evidence about the 
influence of this indicator on FDI. Nevertheless these results give an indication 
that economic risk exerts an important influence on FDI which seems to 
confirm the relationship between the two variables that has been postulated 
theoretically. 
Another approach to assess macroeconomic risk is to measure a country's 
ability and willingness to fulfil its financial obligations. Again one could examine 
several macroeconomic indicators to analyze the current situation or pool 
relevant data in one single measure of financial risk. The Financial Risk 
Indicator of PRS Group is a "means of assessing a country's ability to pay its 
way by financing its official, commercial and trade debt obligations. To ensure 
comparability between countries, risk components are based on accepted 
ratios between the measured data within the national economic/financial 
structure, and then the ratios are compared, not the data. Risk points are 
assessed for each of the component factors of foreign debt as a percentage of 
GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services, 
current account as a percentage of exports of goods and services, net liquidity 
as months of import cover, and exchange rate stability. Risk ratings range from 
a high of 50 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk), though lowest de facto 
ratings are generally near 20". 8 
Figure 5.19: Financial Risk in Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003). 
Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
Due to the country's severe problems with external debt, in particular during 
the 80s, it seems highly probable that financial risk in Mexico influenced the 
8 See PRS Group (2003). Due to the sub-components of the indicator it is comparable to the 
macroeconomic risk indicator that has been used in Chapter 4. 
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decisions of foreign investors. The evolution of the financial risk indicator 
between 1984 and 2003 that is depicted in figure 5 .19 shows that following the 
debt crisis Mexico's financial risk rating reached highest possible de facto 
levels indicating that the country's moratorium on external debt and difficult 
negotiations about debt rescheduling obviously rendered financial risk of the 
country prohibitively high. 
However, after the process of debt rescheduling had been agreed on and 
efforts of stabilization showed first success Mexican financial risk experienced 
a steady upward movement reaching its summit in the mid 90s which reflects 
the successful implementation of macroeconomic stabilization policy by the 
Mexican government. The unstable development since the mid 90s however, 
illustrates the volatility of financial risk on the Mexican market. Although the 
financial crisis in 1994 and its aftermath affected the financial risk rating since 
the late 90s, financial risk has been maintained on a stable level. To analyze 
the impact of financial risk on FOi to Mexico the correlation of the index with 
FOi is reported in figure 5.20. The two scatter-plots illustrate the correlation 
between financial risk and FOi flows and the FOi/GDP ratio respectively. Both 
graphs indicate a positive relationship which implies that Mexican data 
confirms the hypothesis of a positive correlation that has been postulated 
before. 
Figure 5.20: Correlatlon between Financial Risk and FOi 
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Source: Own figure using yearty averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) and yearty data of 
the Wortd Bank (2002b). 
Again it has to be underlined that the small data set limits the viability of these 
findings. However, as additional empirical evidence from the panel analysis on 
the impact of the indicator is not available it may be cautiously concluded that 
financial risk has an impact on the decisions of foreign investors in Mexico. 
Since the same result holds for the economic risk rating the analysis of 
Mexican data leads to different results than the panel analysis in Chapter 4. 
While the results of the panel analysis did not permit to label macroeconomic 
risk factors as robust determinants of FOi, the empirical analysis of the 
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Mexican data suggests an influence of macroeconomic risk variables on FDI. 
These deviating results for the Mexican case may be due to the preponderant 
role of macroeconomic risk factors in Mexico during the 80s. That is to say, the 
severe imbalances that Mexico experienced during the "lost decade" may have 
been a major impediment to incoming investment flows. However, despite of 
severe macroeconomic problems in Mexico during the debt crisis also other 
Latin American countries suffered from macroeconomic distortions. Therefore, 
explaining the diverging results with characteristics of Mexico is not very 
convincing. Another possible explanation for the diverging results is the 
different indicators that were used. Although the construction of the indices 
and the sub-indicators are similar, it is possible that the two indicators differ. 
Whatever the reason for this results the analysis of this paragraph permits the 
conclusion that macroeconomic risk factors have been an influential 
determinant of FOi flows to Mexico. 
5.3.3 Mexican Institutions and Risk 
5.3.3.1 Government Stability, Political Constraints and Regime Type 
The analysis of the Mexican political system showed that for a long time power 
was largely concentrated in the hands of the executive branch of government. 
Although formally a democracy, the "meta-constitutional powers" of the 
president dominated every aspect of Mexican politics including economic 
policy. In turn, congress and the judiciary were found to be weak institutions 
without sufficient power to efficiently control the executive branch. In sum, the 
PRI dominance of Mexican politics reduced the checks and balances that are 
established in the constitution to not more than a mere theory.9 Although 
universal suffrage existed, elections were often fraudulent to ensure the victory 
of the PRI. Nevertheless, the assessment of regime type in Mexico is a difficult 
task because the political system is as MORRIS states "neither fully democratic 
nor blatantly authoritarian; public policies are neither wholly capitalistic nor 
decidedly socialistic; interest groups both mobilize and demobilize; and 
elections are neither honest nor completely fraudulent" .10 Although the 
institutional design laid down in the Mexican constitution is undoubtedly 
democratic, de-facto policy was characterized by dominant authoritarian-
corporatist patterns.11 Using the criteria that have been presented in paragraph 
3.1.3.1 for characterizing democratic systems Mexico before the presidency of 
Zedillo can hardly be labeled as democratic. The division of power was at best 
incomplete, press and media partly controlled and elections fraudulent. 
9 See Penner (1999). Moreno Ocampo (1993) argues that this is a common Latin American 
problem: "El obstaculo fundamental es nuestra pesada tradici6n de poder hegem6nico, que 
no desapareci6 junto con los gobiemos autoritarios. Los nuevos gobemantes ya no llegan 
al poder por golpes militares sino por el voto, pese a que luego pretenden ejercer el poder 
del modo irrestricto y discrecional con que actua un gobiemo de facto." Moreno Ocampo 
(1993) p.38 
10 Morris (1991) p.21. 
11 See Morris (1991) p.25. Elizondo writes: "Forrnalmente Mexico es una democracia: tiene 
elecciones peri6dicas, un sistema de partidos y un presidente y un congreso electos; sin 
embargo, aunque existe un pluralismo limitado, la sociedad estuvo administrada hasta 
hace muy poco de manera autoritario por el gobiemo y por el presidente, quien dirige el 
gobiemo." Elizondo (2001) p.73. 
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Although violent repression has not been systematically used and freedom of 
speech and political participation were not severely restricted, Mexico did not 
have the characteristics of a democratic political system.12 Consequently in an 
investigation on democracy in Latin America MAINWARING classifies Mexico as 
authoritarian from 1821 to 1988 and as semi-democratic from 1988 onwards.13 
This classification is confirmed by ratings of Freedom House. Since 1972, 
Freedom House has published an annual assessment of freedom by assigning 
each country and territory the status of "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free" as 
an average of political rights and civil liberty ratings. Those whose ratings 
average 1-2.5 are generally considered as "Free," those with ratings between 
3-5.5 as "Partly Free," and those with scores between 5.5-7 as "Not Free." For 
all periods between 1972 and 2000 Mexico has been rated as partly free which 
confirms the picture of an intermediate status that has been drawn above. 14 
Using the terminology of WINTROBE before the reforms enacted by Zedillo 
Mexico was a "timocracy" with comparatively low levels of repression but high 
loyalty due to the distribution of rents by the corporatist party system. 
However, with the strengthening of the opposition parties and electoral reforms 
in the second half of the 90s the country made a transition towards a true 
democratic system with fair elections as well as checks and balances for the 
executive branch. Although since the electoral victory of Fox in 2000 Mexico's 
Freedom House-rating has been upgraded to the status "free", the credibility 
enhancing effects of a functioning democracy which have been exposed in 
paragraph 3.1.3.2 are largely absent for the analyzed time period.15 In other 
words, the institutional environment for investors has not been characterized 
by a proper protection of basic constitutional rights and effective checks on the 
actions of the national executive that should be given by a functioning 
democratic system. 
A careful examination of the political system of Mexico has many implications 
for the analysis of political risks for MNEs. Following PRITZL one may 
distinguish three levels of institutional instability in a political system: regime 
instability, policy instability and arbitrary actions of government officials.16 The 
first object of study for political risk analysis is therefore the stability of the 
political system. It is straightforward to see that an unstable government may 
12 Guillermo O'Donnel called Mexico a "dictablanda" (soft dictatorship). Cited in Peeler (1998) 
p.119. Przeworski et al. argue that Mexico was not democratic because the opposition had 
no realistic chance to come to power. See Przeworski et al (2000) p.17. 
13 See Mainwaring (1999) p.7. In the same paper he argues that many democracies in Latin 
America are defect in the sense that minorities like indigenous or the rural population have 
formal citizenship rights but are frequently marginalized. Furthermore, countries in the 
region face the problem of weak democratic institutions and a limited rule of law. 
14 See Freedom House (2003). Mainwaring (1999) offers a critical discussion of the Freedom 
House Index. 
15 Mainwaring finds that for the Latin American countries democracy measured by the 
Freedom House Index weakly positively correlates with the level of per-capita income 
which is an initial indication for the potential wealth enhancing effects of democratic 
governance in the region. Interestingly this correlation is lower than in other regions of the 
wor1d. See Mainwaring (1999) . 
16 See Pritz! (1997) p.72-76. 
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imply risks to investors. Governments that only have a weak hold to power or 
that may be easily removed by other societal forces are a possible source of 
instability that may affect the economy as well as the returns of private 
investment projects. In the worst case political stability is undermined by 
revolutions, violent protests or upheavals. In less severe cases rapidly 
changing governments cannot guarantee a basic continuity of policy that 
produces a reliable framework for private economic activity. Radical policy 
swings induced by quickly changing governments produce a climate of 
discontinuity and instability that depresses private investment because 
governing institutions cannot give a credible commitment to protect private 
assets.17 
Unlike in many other Latin American countries in Mexico stability of 
government has not been a problem. 18 Since the political instabilities of the 
revolutionary period had been overcome the establishment of the one party 
government produced a stable political climate.19 The corporatist one party 
state which effectively channeled societal conflict by occasional repression 
and distribution of rents to system loyalists groduced a political system that did 
not suffer severe problems of instability. Since the presidential term of 
Cardenas (1934-1940) the political system of Mexico has not undergone 
periods where the volatility of governments was high.21 Unlike other Latin 
American countries Mexico neither experienced revolutions, coup d'etats or 
military governments. Even during the years of severe economic crisis the grip 
of the PRI to power has not been seriously menaced. 22 
Although it is obvious that the empirical measurement of government stability 
is not straightforward, I use an indicator that has been constructed by PRS 
Group. The index is a measure of the government's ability to stay in office and 
carry out its declared programs, depending upon such factors as type of 
governance, cohesion of government and governing parties, approach of an 
election, and command of the legislature. Figure 5.21 depicts the evolution of 
17 Empirical research has confirmed the link between political instability and expropriation. 
Between 1960 and 1979 40% of all expropriations followed revolutionary transformations 
of socioeconomic and political systems. See Kennedy (1991) p.21 . 
18 Rodriguez (2000) argues that political instability was an important impediment for growth in 
Latin America. 
19 See Philip (1992) p.1-17 and Semo (1996) p.107-109. 
20 See Peeler (1998) p.113-124. Whiting argues that Mexico's political system has a high 
degree of resilience which permitted the survival of the system despite of major changes in 
its environment and the society. See Whiting (1992) p.43-45. Langston (2002) argues that 
four central factors ensured regime stability in Mexico. The president's control of the 
succession process, the successive passing of the generation of revolutionary leaders, the 
combination of growth and a strong state and the restrictive electoral rules. See Langston 
(2002) p.72-74. 
21 Langston (2002) argues that the sharpest threats to the stability of the system came from 
internal splits inside the PRI. Hence, the ruptures of 1940, 1952 and 1988 when party 
dissidents challenged the official PRI candidate were the greatest threat to political stability 
in Mexico. See Langston (2002). 
22 The only exception were the events of 1988 when PRI candidate Salinas de Gortari was 
challenged by the PRI dissident Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. 
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government stability from 1984 to 2003. Despite of its comparative stability the 
inspection of the empirical data for Mexico suggests that there have been 
variations of government stability in the analyzed time period. 
Figure 5.21: Government Stablllty In Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
nonnalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
However, when the consequences of the debt crisis reduced government 
stability during the second half of the 80s recovery to old levels of stability was 
rapid. In the early 90s however, in particular following the dramatic political 
events of 1994, government stability dropped to all time lows. After the effects 
of the political and economic crisis had been overcome stability ratings 
accelerated again reaching a peak in the year 2000, which is unusual for 
election years. The change of presidency in 2000 and the difficult situation in 
congress afterwards reduced index values again to levels of the early 90s. 
To determine if government stability has an impact on FOi flows to Mexico I 
examine the correlation of the index and yearly FOi flows and FOi/GDP ratio 
respectively. The two scatter-plots in figure 5.22 depict the relationship 
between the government stability index and Mexican FOi data. The data does 
not permit a decisive conclusion about the impact of government stability on 
FOi although the statistical correlation between the two variables indicates a 
weak positive correlation. However, it has to be underlined that this result may 
be due to the lack of econometric sophistication that has been caused by the 
small sample of available data. 
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Figure 5.22: Correlation between Government Stability and FOi 
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Source: Own figure using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) and year1y data of 
the Wor1d Bank (2002b). 
Besides regime instability, other important sources for institutional instabilities 
are lacking policy stability and arbitrary actions of government officials. BILLET 
argues that a high degree of government intervention in the host country 
economy increases risks for MNEs as governments most likely want to 
regulate key corporate decisions once the investment is made. 23 The 
theoretical analysis in Chapter 3 identified political discretion and the absence 
of checks and balances as an important source of risk for current and potential 
investors since arbitrary changes of the status quo are more likely if 
constraining societal institutions are lacking.24 Thus, investors face a higher 
risk of opportunistic policy changes when governments are not subject to an 
efficient control of other societal institutions. In other words, unlimited 
governments do not succeed in giving credible commitments not to interfere in 
the investor's property rights. A detailed analysis of presidential politics in 
Mexico during the last years indeed reveals an abundance of anecdotal 
evidence that arbitrary presidential decisions repeatedly affected the Mexican 
economy.25 
Although the exact quantification of governmental constraints remains a 
difficult problem, I use POLCON to proxy checks and balances in national 
politics.26 Chapter 4 already offered econometric evidence on the effects of 
political constraints on FDI concluding that political constraints were no robust 
determinant of FDI for a sample of Latin American countries, although it turned 
23 See Billet (1991) p.37. In fact a survey of private sector senior managers shows that in 
Latin America more than 38% of the respondents spent more than 15% of their working 
time with negotiations with government officials compared to 10% in OECD countries. See 
World Bank (1997) p.43. 
2• See Pritz! (1997) p.73. 
25 See Philip (1992). 
26 See paragraph 3.3.5. 
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out to be robust as part of a governance indicator.27 Despite of these findings 
analyzing the influence of governmental discretion on FOi to Mexico is 
interesting. As already pointed out POLCON measures veto points in the 
political system corrected by current partisan powers in the legislative 
chambers. The indicator is normalized to a value between O and 1 where a 
level of O represents the theoretical case of an absolute absence of checks 
and balances while a value of 1 represents the theoretical case of a fully 
constrained executive. Although it has to be noted that the upper extreme 
value is not often observed, authoritarian regimes approach values around 
zero which indicates a massive concentration of power in the hand of the 
executive.28 Figure 5.23 depicts the evolution of this indicator for the period 
between 1960 and 2001 : 
Figure 5.23: Political Constraints in Mexico 1960-2001 
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Source: Own figure using year1y data from POLCON. 
The Mexican data shows that initially the level of checks and balances in the 
political system was extremely low which implies that the Mexican government 
ruled nearly unchecked by other societal institutions. For the early 60s the 
indicator attains levels that are only slightly higher than zero representing an 
absolutely unchecked government which is usually characteristic for personal 
dictatorships. In fact the level of political constraints in Mexico for that time is 
similar to that during the authoritarian rule of Diaz. Insofar the indicator is in 
line with the previous analysis of the political system that highlighted the meta-
constitutional powers of the Mexican president and the irrelevance of other 
governmental branches. Despite of cautious political reforms constraint levels 
remained low throughout the 70s and 80s implying that the executive branch 
could still implement policies without any effective control of other political 
branches. With the PRI loosing its grip on power, the level of constraints for 
27 See paragraph 4.2.4. 
28 For Castro's Cuba, Mexico under Porfirio Diaz, Spain under Franco and Chile under 
Pinochet index values score 0. 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
226 POLITICAL RISK AND FOi IN MEXICO 
the federal government was growing constantly. The first important upward 
move of the indicator occurred in 1988 when the PRI lost its constitutional 
majority.29 With higher presence in congress and a growing importance in the 
political process opposition parties successfully limited the discretionary 
freedom of the Mexican government. In other words, growing political 
constraints were caused by political reforms in Mexico. The process of 
democratization during the 90s resulted in a more limited government that 
faced higher levels of checks and balances and was more effectively 
constrained in its implementation of policy. The similar higher rankings of the 
PRS Group's democratic accountability ranking which is depicted in figure 5.24 
demonstrate that higher levels of democracy coincided with higher constraints 
for the executive. Currently the levels of political constraints in Mexico already 
roughly resemble average values of the USA. 
Figure 5.24: Democratic Accountability In Mexico 1984-2001 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
normalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
Having in mind the theoretical implication of strengthening political constraints 
this analysis indicates lower risks for MNEs of becoming victims of 
opportunistic government action since additional mechanisms of control make 
radical policy swings less likely. Nevertheless, there are two important 
additional arguments. First, it has to be stated that the POLCON indicator for 
Mexico is systematically upward-biased as the objectively derived indicator is 
not able to picture the characteristics of the Mexican political system. Since 
compared to the US system all governmental branches except for the 
executive are still weak, the objective derivation of the indicator does not 
properly picture the characteristic role of the Mexican presidency. The high bill 
success rates of president Zedillo who already faced an opposition majority in 
congress may serve to illustrate this point. In addition, the inability of the 
judiciary to act as a contra-weight to executive dominance shows that the level 
of checks and balances in Mexico is still considerably lower than in the US. 
29 For an overview of the political events see Nacif (2003) p.8. 
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The other important objection to the use of the indicator is the integration of 
Mexico into the world economy by signing free trade agreements and other 
multilateral treaties. Since these agreements imply obligations that limit 
governmental discretion by international law the sole focus on national 
institutions neglects checks and balances by international law which produces 
a systematic downward-bias of the indicator. 
Figure 5.25: Correlation between Political Constraints and FOi 
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Source: Own figure using yearly data of POLCON 2002 and the World Bank (2002b). 
Despite these limitations POLCON permits to calculate the statistical 
correlation between political constraints and FOi flows to Mexico. Although 
sophisticated econometric evidence is missing, the correlation in figure 5.25 
suggests a positive influence of political constraints on FOi to Mexico as higher 
level of constraints appear to coincide with higher inflows of FOi or higher 
FOi/GDP ratios. 
Given the positive correlation between growing constraints and higher values 
of democracy it will be analyzed if this results also holds for the index of 
democratic accountability. Figure 5.26 depicts the correlation between the 
values of democratic accountability and FOi to Mexico. The inspection of the 
two scatter-plots also suggest a positive correlation between democratic 
accountability and FOi flows and the FOi/GDP ratio respectively. Despite of 
the already mentioned difficulties in interpreting these results one may come to 
the conclusion that higher democratic accountability and political constraints 
go hand in hand with higher FOi flows and FOi/GDP ratios. Therefore, the 
correlation may be seen as a weak empirical indication for an impact of 
democratic accountability and political constraints on FOi flows to Mexico. 
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Figure 5.26: Correlation between Democratic Accountability and FOi 
2.8E+10 .05 
2.4E+10 
.04 
2.0E+10 
~ 1.6E+10 X .03 w 
!1 ::; 
1.2E+10 
v,' 
0 i5 .02 LL LL 
8.0E+09 
.01 
4.0E+09 • . . . 
0.0E+OO . . .00 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
DEMOC10 DEMOC10 
Source: Own figure using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group 2003 and yearly data of the 
World Bank (2002b). 
Another risk factor that traditionally has been influential in Latin American 
countries is the involvement of the military in political decisions. Military 
governments or military controlled governments can become a threat for 
investors because democratic reliability is severely diminished, basic citizen 
rights may be suspended and property be expropriated if an individual's 
political ideology does not coincide with the beliefs of the military government. 
Moreover, military governments can initiate politics that rather aim at ensuring 
power and redistribute wealth to members of the junta instead of promoting 
general societal welfare.30 To quantify the military's involvement in politics I 
use an indicator that has been provided by PRS group that measures the risk 
for foreign investors that their businesses will sooner or later be affected by 
military rule.31 In Mexico military involvement in politics has traditionally been 
more scarce than in other countries of the region. Moreover, unlike other 
countries in Latin America, since the end of the unstable revolutionary period 
Mexico has neither experienced a military coup or a military government. 32 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to analyze the potential impact of political 
30 Wintrobe (1998) writes " ... the military regimes in Latin America in the 1970s and 
elsewhere, whose most concrete and lasting achievement has been to increase military 
salaries and the military budget.· Wintrobe (1998) p.26. 
31 PRS Group writes: "Since the military is not elected, involvement, even at a peripheral 
level, diminishes democratic accountability. Military involvement might stem from an 
external or internal threat, be symptomatic of underlying difficulties, or be a full-scale 
military takeover. Over the long term, a system of military government will almost certainly 
diminish effective governmental functioning, become corrupt, and create an uneasy 
environment for foreign businesses." See PRS Group (2003). 
32 Langston (2002) argues that president Aleman (1946-52) made an important step to 
ensure civil primacy over the military by breaking with the habit to recruit politicians with 
revolutionary background from the military. Instead, he started to recruit university trained 
bureaucrats that were usually trained at the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma (UNAM). See 
Langston (2002) p. 
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involvement of the military on FDI and figure 5.27 depicts the evolution of this 
indicator for Mexico between 1984 and 2003. 
Figure 5.27: MIiitary In Polltlcs in Mexico 1984-2001 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
normalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
The inspection of the data suggest that indeed the degree of military 
involvement in Mexico has traditionally been low as ratings picture the lowest 
level of risk until 1994. After 1994 however, the risk of military involvement in 
political decision making has been considerably growing implying that in only 
nine years Mexico's rankings in military involvement dropped by 50%. Since in 
the late 90s and the first years of the new millenium military involvement in 
Mexican politics has been constantly growing, the rating may reflect the 
tendency of the Zedillo administration to assign many additional task to the 
military that have formerly been the responsibility of civilian institutions. 33 
There are many reasons for this development. First, the violent uprising in 
Chiapas entailed a more important role for military decision makers in politics. 
Second, the rising problems with drug trafficking in Mexico has been answered 
by higher military presence and involvement of the armed forces. 34 In addition, 
Zedillo also assigned military leaders to lead the demoralized and corrupt 
national police force.35 Third, migration problems at the northern and southern 
border imply a massive presence of the military in border regions. Therefore, 
the role of the military in Mexican political life seems to be growing unless 
these problems have been tackled. In spite of the growing influence of the 
military during the last years the army fulfilled its role without seeking to 
increase its political power as an institution. This implies that the Mexican 
tradition of civilian dominance over the military seems to be secure.36 
33 See PRS Group (2000) p.41-42. 
34 See Covarrubias Velasco (2000) and Alvarado/Davis (2001). 
35 Since then reports of human rights abuses have multiplied. See PRS Group (2000) p.41 . 
36 See Whiting (1992) p.48. and PRS Group (2000) p.41-42. 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
230 POLITICAL RISK AND FOi IN MEXICO 
Figure 5.28: Correlatlon between Military Involvement in Politics and FOi 
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Source: OWn figure using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group 2003 and year1y data of the 
World Bank (2002b). 
To analyze the potential impact of higher military involvement in Mexico on FDI 
figure 5.28 reports the correlation between military-in-politics and FDI as well 
as the FDI/GDP ratio. The Mexican data indicates an inverse relationship 
between the two variables suggesting that higher levels of military presence 
coincide with higher levels of FDI. If this counter-intuitive evidence is a product 
of the bias that arises due to the lack of reliable data or due to growing levels 
of public insecurity which cause a positive effect of higher military presence on 
investor security, is unclear. 
Summing up, I find weak empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the degree 
of government stability has a positive impact on FDI. At the same time the 
hypothesis that higher military involvement depresses FDI is rejected by the 
analysis of Mexican data. On the other hand this paragraph offers empirical 
evidence for a positive impact of democratic reliability and political constraints 
on FDI flows to Mexico. This is of particular interest, as not only the direct 
implications of unconstrained government and lacking democratic reliability for 
incoming FOi are important. Instead, lacking constraints and low levels of 
democratic accountability might as well have an impact on other institutional 
variables. For example, unlimited governmental discretion may be detrimental 
for a functioning rule of law since high levels of discretion and lack of control 
by other societal institutions make it unlikely that the government restricts itself 
by obeying to existing legislation. Moreover, as has been argued in the 
literature high levels of corruption are fostered by a political system that lacks 
functioning mechanism of control since lacking checks and balances facilitate 
the establishment of a system of institutionalized corruption that is harmful for 
foreign investors.37 
37 See Morris (1991). 
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"La movida para mis amigos, y la /ey para mis enemigos. - 38 
5.3.3.2 The Rule Of Law 
As argued before lacking rule of law may not only be caused by domestic 
legislation but also by inefficient institutions of law enforcement. The short 
analysis in paragraph 5.1.2.4 already highlighted that the judiciary and other 
institutions of law enforcement are not efficiently working in Mexico. Like in 
other Latin American countries this lacking rule-of-law-tradition is partially a 
heritage from Spanish colonialism. As laws and regulations were passed in 
Spain but had to be applied by local administrations in the New World legal 
norms were usually interpreted with high levels of discretion. This situation 
over time led to a lack of respect for the law which may be illustrated by the 
common Latin American S8Jings "obedezco, pero no cumplo" and "la ley se 
acata, pero no se cumple". In Mexico the divergences between de-jure and 
de-facto rules including constitutional norms imply that many national laws 
loose relevance because they are not properly enforced. Despite of judicial 
reform Mexico today is still characterized by an enormous discrepancy 
between de-jure norms and legal reality. 40 Non enforcement of the law 
however, fosters a societal culture where the respect of citizens for the law is 
constantly decreasing. That is, if the benefits of breaking the law are higher 
than the cost of doing so, individuals have a constant incentive for violations of 
the law.41 Furthermore, Mexican laws are inconsistent and sometimes even 
contradictory. The excessive legislation is often unclear and applied with high 
levels of discretionary freedom by the authorities. Access to the law is not 
equal in the sense that poor people often do not have the possibility to 
successfully enforce legal claims undermining the legal principle of equality 
before the law.42 
In criminal justice enforcement problems imply that criminals are seldom 
convicted which leads to a situation of continuous impunity. Furthermore, like 
in many other Latin American countries the national police, which is essential 
for the enforcement of the law, is perceived as inefficient, underpaid, poorly 
qualified, corrupt and not being respectful of basic citizen rights and liberties.43 
38 Latin American saying cited in Buscaglia/Oakolias/Ratliff (1995). 
39 See Pritz! (1997) p.64-80 and Peeler (1998) p.2~2. A Mexican observer writes: "It would 
be naive to think that the ghost of the old Spanish colonial state - with its enduring 
paternalism, corruption, bureaucracy, and extreme centralization - can be exorcised 
completely .. . The best effort would be a new legal system modeled frankly and 
unashamedly on the Anglo-Saxon pattern." Cited in Buscaglia/Dakolias/Ratliff (1995) p.2. 
40 See Rubio et al. (1994). 
41 See Ayala Espino (2002) p.137. 
42 The hourly salary of a qualified lawyer in Mexico equals the value of 21 to 42 daily 
minimum salaries. The services of public lawyers are of low quality and in general do not 
permit successful access to the law. Other cost that potential claimants have to bear are 
bribes, administrative fees and bails. See Rubio et al. (1994). This situation may be 
illustrated with the Mexican saying: "El c6digo civil se aplica a los ricos, y el codigo penal a 
los pobres." Cited in Rubio et al. (1994) p.18. This characteristic of many Latin American 
countries leads to a situation that Mario Vargas Llosa once called legal apartheid. Cited in 
Pritz! (1997) p.141 . 
43 See Fruhling Ehrlich (2001) and Sarre (2001). 
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In 1990 91.4% of the crimes that have been committed in the federal district 
remained unresolved.44 Informal vendors are active throughout the capital 
selling smuggled goods, pirated~roducts or other contraband without being 
harmed by local administrations. Moreover, the police often applies torture to 
coerce confessions and prisoners are detained without conviction in 
precarious social conditions due to an overcrowding of state prisons. 46 
In Mexico the second half of the 90s is characterized by a steady increase of 
crimes with a particular growth of robbery and theft. The growing crime rate 
went hand in hand with a growing number of complaints of Mexican citizens 
before the National Human Rights commission about lacking efficiency and 
human rights violations of the national police force. 47 Increased public 
insecurity and high levels of crime that go hand in hand with an inefficient 
national police force affect any type of commercial activity by simply increasing 
costs of doing business.48 In a survey conducted in 1999 in Mexico City 47% 
of the interviewed people stated that crime and public insecurity were the most 
important problems, well ahead of economic problems with a percentage of 
22% on the second rank.49 A fact that indicates growing public insecurity is the 
large number of private security firms that operate in Mexico to protect private 
44 See Rubio et al. (1994) p.94. 
45 See Gilespie/McBride (1996) p.46-48. 
46 In 1992 49% of Mexican prisoners were yet unsentenced and thus in preventive detention. 
In 1993 Mexican prisons were at 126% of capacity, in 2001 at 136 %. See Bekker/Patrick 
(1998) p.1-3 and INEGI (2003). Police violence and abuses of power are widespread in 
Latin America. See Bekker/Patrick (1998) p.5-9. 
47 Denounced crimes per day in Mexico City increased by 57% from 445 daily cases in 1994 
to 700 daily cases in 1997. Moreover, it has to be underlined that these figures are 
downward-biased because not all committed crimes are reported by the victims. 
Complaints about the police increased by 45 % from 1812 in 1995 to 2623 in 1997. See 
Alvarado/Davis (2001). According to a recent survey reported by PRS Group 90% of the 
crimes are not reported because citizens think they will receive no help or will even be 
harmed by a police force that protects criminals. See PRS Group (1999) p.D3. In 1983 a 
group of police was discovered operating a large ring of auto-theft and bank-robbery, in 
1989 the Mexico City office of the Federal Intelligence Directorate (ID) was accused of 
kidnapping, extortion, robbery, torture and homicide. During the 80s reports of police and 
military involvement in criminal activities grew common. The severe involvement of 
Mexican police and military in crime led one observer to the conclusion that "society has 
come to fear the police more than it fears the criminals". See Morris (1991) p. xvi. When 
the opposition party PRO took control of Mexico City's government, they discovered a 
pyramidal structure of institutionalized corruption in the Mexico City police department 
where lower levels were coerced to make payments to their superiors and promotion to 
midlevel positions required the payment of bribes. Therefore, members of the police force 
had to engage in various forms of illegal activities. See Garibaldi (2001) p.12-14. 
48 In a large scale firm survey conducted by Brunetti/Kisunko/Weder nearly 90% of the 
respondents from Latin America stated that crime and theft substantially increase their 
costs of doing business. Nearly 80% of all surveyed persons from Latin America did not 
feel confident that state authorities would protect their person and their property from 
criminal actions. According to the same survey businesspeople from Latin America ranked 
crime and theft as the third most important obstacle to business after corruption and an 
inadequate infrastructure supply. See Brunetti/Kisunko/Weder (1997) p.17-18 and 25. 
49 See Lopez Portillo Vargas (2001). 
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property and businesses as banks, malls or restaurants. 50 With around 2000 
kidnappings every year Mexico has the second highest kidnapping rate in 
Latin America after Colombia. Although kidnappers generally target wealthy 
Mexicans, executives of MNEs are also at risk.51 Only these few facts 
impressively highlight the problem of public security in particular in major 
Mexican cities, remote rural areas and border regions. Currently Mexico 
encounters a situation where high levels of crime, violence, low protection of 
individuals against arbitrary government actions and an unpredictable !udiciary 
severely endanger the rule of law and the governability of the country.5 
However, these inefficiencies of the legal system have more far reaching 
consequences for the Mexican economy than just augmenting the direct cost 
of private security and doing business.53 In private law the outright 
consequences of an inefficient judiciary are severe distortions for private 
business activities. The theoretical analysis of prerequisites for credible 
commitment revealed the crucial role of third party enforcement for complex 
economic transactions. Assuming that self interested private actors will only 
enter in welfare-enhancing economic activity if they are sure that they will reap 
the benefits from their engagement it was pointed out that it is necessary that 
agreements between individuals are enforceable. In other words, incomplete 
contracts, contractual hazards and potential opportunistic behavior of 
contracting counterparts require an efficient institution for conflict resolution. 
To lower the cost of wealth enhancing private transactions national institutions 
have to assure by coercive power that contracts between individuals are 
honored. Thus, economic theory suggests that the judiciary plays an important 
part in providing a suitable framework for private economic activity. 
Therefore, the poor performance of the Mexican judiciary severely limits the 
possibilities of economic actors to engage in welfare-enhancing transactions. 54 
As the enforcement of private contracts cannot be ensured by national 
institutions Mexican firms often limit their business activities to those contract 
partners that are well known as family and friends because if contracts with 
unknown partners were negotiated, the need to investigate the commercial 
reputation of the contractual partner would imply a considerable increase of 
transaction costs. Hence, the inefficiency of the legal sector implies an 
inefficiency of markets because potentially wealth-enhancing transactions are 
50 See Alvarado/Davis (2001). 
51 See PRS Group (2000) p.20. 
52 The Wor1d Bank refers to the combination of these factors as "lawlessness syndrome". See 
World Bank (1997) p.41. 
53 In a survey conducted by Brunetti/Kisunko/Weder over 70% of the surveyed firms from 
Latin American countries state that an unpredictable judiciary is a major problem for their 
business operations. See Brunetti/Kisunko/Weder (1997) p.19. 
s. Poor law enforcement is a common Latin American problem. In a regionwide survey of 
business court users 55% responded that they prefer to negotiate a partial settlement 
rather than adjudicate in the formal court system. See Buscaglia/Dakolias/Ratliff (1995) 
p.6. 
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not performed due to high levels of transactions costs. 55 In Mexico the 
resolution of private law conflicts is the task of the local and federal judiciary. 
However, the quality of the first local instances is that low that in a great 
number of cases the decisions of the local courts are overruled by federal 
tribunals.56 Further empirical evidence highlighting the inefficiency of Mexican 
jurisprudence is that US companies doing business with Mexican firms usually 
negotiate the responsibility of the US judiciary in the case of contractual 
conflicts.57 Although there recently has been progress in tackling the problem 
of severe judicial corruption, enormous trial lengths imply that private parties to 
a conflict try to negotiate private agreements to avoid lengthy court 
decisions.58 This incapacity of the Mexican judiciary to provide for credible 
enforcement of private contracts limits national commercial activities. At the 
same time it becomes an important obstacle for foreign investors since it is 
obvious that the situation of foreign firms that are doing business in Mexico 
does not differ from the one their national competitors face. One may even 
argue that foreign firm activity is more severely affected by the prevailing legal 
insecurity as foreign managers lack the necessary local information or 
personal ties to promote a quick resolution of legal conflicts between 
contracting parties. Impediments to foreign firms however, are not limited to 
private contracting as Mexican law neither offers effective protection against 
55 Thus, in the absence of an efficient third party enforcement individuals rely on social 
contract enforcement which is based on long-term personal relationships. See World Bank 
(1997) p.45. There are many examples for market inefficiencies in Mexico resulting from 
high transaction costs. The excessive legal protection of individuals renting apartments in 
Mexico City implies that landlords are extremely cautious to rent to strangers and most of 
the time do not rent at all explaining the insufficient offer on the market. The inefficient 
enforcement of the commercial code implies that legal suits against debtors take a long 
time and imply legal insecurity as well as high costs. This situation leads to many "private" 
solutions that avoid courts and at the same time limits the offer for credit contracts. See 
Rubio et al. (1994). 
56 In 1994 over 35% of local courts decisions have been revised by federal judges. Local 
judges are often not very well qualified, poorly paid and often subject to pressure from the 
local political elite. Nevertheless they are the first instances in commercial matters. 
Therefore, for improving the Mexican judiciary it is crucial augmenting the quality of the 
local courts. See Rubio et al. (1994) . 
57 See Holland (1999). 
58 In a survey about judicial corruption where a score of 10 represents a completely honest 
and a score of O a completely corrupt judiciary Mexico received a rating of 3.18. Canada in 
tum received 8.87, Chile 7.94, the US 7.79 and Colombia 3.44. See 
Buscaglia/Dakolias/Ratliff (1995) p.40. It usually takes up to 304 days to settle a simple 
commercial matter before Mexican tribunals. If the contractual partner disposes of 
"competent lawyers", commercial law suits may take up to 5 years. Additionally the low 
transparency of the system makes it hard to ex ante anticipate the legal outcome. In the 
case of financial contracts the fact that the opportunity costs of the trial length which the 
creditor has to bear are not adequately covered aggravates this problem. In most legal 
suits against the public administration there are no indemnifications for commercial losses 
that occurred due to administrative actions. This fact further increases the vulnerability of 
private citizens for illegal and arbitrary interventions by the government and contractual 
violations by business partners. See Rubio et al (1994) . The Mexican saying "Un mal 
areglo es mejor que un buen pleito" impressively highlights the effects of lacking legal 
certainty. 
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predatory governmental actions. Therefore, the negative impact of the 
inefficient judiciary extends to the relation between government and private 
investors. To put it in other words, if the judiciary is not able to protect property 
rights of private investors against arbitrary predatory interference by 
governmental authorities, potential risks for foreign investors are further 
growing.59 Summarizing it may be concluded that the high cost of contract 
enforcement as well as the low degree of legal security for investors are a 
potentially important disincentive for incoming FOi. 
It is straightforward to see that the exact quantification of political risk that is 
caused by lacking rule of law is hardly possible. Nevertheless, data provided 
by the PRS Group gives an impression of how rule of law in the Mexican 
society developed over time. The rule of law measure of PRS measures two 
characteristics of the rule of law where each of the sub-components has a 
weight of 50%. The "law" sub-component assesses the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system whereas the "order'' sub-component assesses 
the popular observance of the law. 
Figure 5.29 depicts the evolution of the rule of law rating from 1984 to 2003. 
Analyzing the PRS rating the judicial reforms enacted by the Zedillo were not 
particularly successful in providing higher rule of law in Mexico. 
Figure 5.29: Rule of Law Rating In Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
normalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
Likewise the reforms of the Fox administration do not seem to have produced 
measurable progress in rule of law in Mexico. It has been shown in the 
literature that usually the powerful interest groups in societies with lacking rule-
of-law show resistance to reforms as they are the ones that most profit from 
59 See paragraph 5.3.3.4 for the evaluation of property rights protection in Mexico. 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
236 POLITICAL RISK AND FOi IN MEXICO 
legal uncertainty and impunity.60 In addition, reforming the judiciary is a lengthy 
and costly process that is difficult to implement.61 Therefore, possible reasons 
for the lack of positive results is the resistance of mighty interest groups in the 
Mexican society that benefit from the existing status quo as well as the limited 
availability of financial resources for judicial reforms. 
To assess the influence of the rule of law indicator for FOi flows to Mexico 
figure 5.30 depicts the correlation of FOi and the PRS rule of law indicator. In 
contrast to the expected sign the correlation between the indicator and yearly 
FOi flows as well as the FOi/GDP ratio indicates a negative relationship 
between the two variables. 
Figure 5.30: Correlation between Rule of Law and FOi 
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Source: Own figure using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) and yearly data of 
the World Bank (2002b). Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February 
Therefore, the analysis of the Mexican data does not confirm the theoretically 
postulated positive relationship between rule of law and incoming FOi flows. 
Explanations for this counter-intuitive result are the small number of 
observations and the minor number of variations of the data over the available 
time period implying that the results have to be interpreted with caution. The 
interpretation that these results stem from methodological deficiencies seams 
reasonable since the empirical evidence drawn from the panel analysis in 
Chapter 4 indicates a significant influence of rule of law on FOi flows to Latin 
America. 
An important variable that is related to rule of law is the quality of the national 
bureaucracy since a reliable and competent public administration offers a 
favorable framework for private economic activity and fosters legal security 
and continuity in state business relations. Institutional strength and quality of 
the bureaucracy therefore are a shock absorber that tends to minimize 
revisions of policy when governments change. Typically, in low-risk countries, 
60 See Pritz! (1996) and Buscaglia/Dakolias/Ratliff (1995) . 
61 See Ayala Espino (2002) p.135. 
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the bureaucracy is somewhat autonomous from political pressure. In turn, low 
quality public administrations produce legal uncertainty and are an obstacle to 
forming a reliable framework for private economic activity. 
Figure 5.31 : Bureaucratic Quality in Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
normalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
Foreign investors in Mexico are often daunted by bureaucratic impediments as 
well as by a lack of clear regulations.62 Figure 5.31 depicts the indicator values 
of bureaucratic quality for the time period 1984-2003. While deteriorating 
temporarily during the mid 80s bureaucratic quality experienced a 
considerable upward swing during the mid 90, most likely as a result of the 
reforms enacted by the Zedillo administration. The change of government in 
2000 however, up to now did not result in a better rating for the public 
administration compared to the ratings of the mid 90s. 
Concerning the impact of bureaucratic quality on incoming FOi flows the 
scatter-plots in figure 5.32 show the correlation between the index values and 
total FOi flows as well as the FOi/GDP ratio. The inspection of the graphs 
suggests a positive impact of bureaucratic quality on FOi flows to Mexico with 
a more convincing evidence for the correlation between the index value and 
total incoming flows as depicted in the left graph of figure 5.32. Again it has to 
be stated that these results have to interpreted carefully as evidence from 
sophisticated econometric analysis is missing due to the lack of data. 
62 See PRS Group (2000) p.23. 
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Figure 5.32: Correlation between Bureaucratic Quality and FOi 
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the Wor1d Bank (2002b). 
However, as the results of the panel data analysis in Chapter 4 provides 
additional empirical evidence it is most likely that the depicted correlation for 
Mexican data is not spurious. Therefore, it may be plausibly argued that the 
quality of public administration is an influential factor for FOi flows to Mexico. 
Con dinero baila el perro ... 
Sin dinero uno baila como perro. 63 
5.3.2.3 Corruption 
An analysis of Mexico's history shows that political and administrative 
corruption have a long tradition in the country.64 Although several times 
leading intellectuals of the country publicly denounced the excessive corrupt 
practices of governments and public administrations, corruption is still an 
ubiquitous phenomenon in the modern Mexican society that may be found on 
63 Mexican saying cited by Morris ( 1991) p. 1. 
64 For an overview of the older literature see Lopez Presa et al. (1998). For more historical 
details on corruption in Mexico see the contributions in Lomnitz (2000). For Vernon 
corruption in Mexico is a heritage of colonial rule: "As long as the [colonial) law was so 
pervasive in its scope and so particularistic in its application, it was inevitable that corruption 
would exist. First of all, the pervasiveness of regulation meant that any operating business 
was at the mercy of the law. There was always some provision or other that constituted a 
threat, actual or potential, to the continued existence of a going business; so any business 
that hoped to stay afloat had to find some way of securing immunity from a hostile application 
of the regulations. . . . So bribery in one form or another was an unavoidable part of the 
system; .. . " Vernon (1963) p.30. For Daniel Cosio Villegas corruption originates in 
revolutionary times: "La deshonestidad administrativa de Mexico tiene sus causas ( .... ) ellas 
no quitan adarme a su monstuosidad social, ni mucho menos reducen en nada los funestos 
efectos politicos que ha tenido, pues ( .. .. ) ha sido la deshonestidad de los gobemantes 
revolucionarios, mas que ninguna otra cosa, la que ha rajado el tronco mismo de la 
Revoluci6n Mexicana." 
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all levels of societal activity.65 On low administrative levels the famous mordida 
(literally: bite) is paid to low rank officials (as policemen) to avoid the payment 
of fines as for example for the violation of traffic rules, to buy impunity in 
criminal justice, or to receive favorable treatment in public administration. 
However, corruption in Mexico is not restricted to lower societal levels but also 
widespread among high rank government officials including the president. 
Incentives for the corrupt misuse of public power are particularly high in 
Mexico as the principle of no re-election dilutes the responsibility of politicians. 
Office holders that are not restricted by the need to get re-elected and only 
have a limited time for the misuse of public power have a higher incentive to 
engage in corrupt transaction to ensure their personal benefits.66 Indeed there 
is evidence that corruption levels augment in the final year of a sexenio which 
is publicly referred to as the "Year of Hidalgo" while the influence of anti 
corruption campaigns is decreasing with the approaching end of the terrn. 67 
During the last years there have been several serious accusation of 
governmental corruption or personal enrichment of presidents and other high 
ranked government officials.68 Likewise other governmental organizations, the 
judiciary and the police force are accused of corrupt practices in office.69 In 
particular the public administration is characterized by severe problems of 
corruption. 70 
The long history of corruption in Mexico suggests that the public abuse of 
power in this country is no sporadic phenomenon that can be described by the 
existence of a few "bad apples". Instead, the long years of PRI dominance, the 
lack of controlling institutions like opposition parties or a free press and the 
importance of public posts as the most important way to make a career 
shaped a system where corruption was widespread.71 It was argued above 
that whenever public officials have wide discretion and little accountability 
incentives for corrupt behavior arise. In Mexico high discretionary freedom of 
politicians and public servants and lacking controls combined with a high level 
of governmental intervention in the economy produced a climate that was 
~he literature denouncing political corruption in Mexico is too large to cite it completely. 
Representative works are Elizondo (1987) and Moheno (1979) . 
66 See Pritz! (1997) p.147. 
67 See Morris (1991). A popular Mexican saying is: este es el ario de Hidalgo, chin-chin el 
que deje algo" ("this is the year of Hidalgo, he is a fool who leaves something") . Cited by 
Morris (1991) p.85. 
68 There have been several serious accusation of presidential corruption with the most 
prominent case being the rule of president Salinas whose private wealth is estimated 
around 400 Mio. US$. The private wealth of Mexico's ex-president Lopez Portillo (1976-
1982) is estimated to amount between 1 to 3 billion US$. It is estimated that president de 
la Madrid transferred between 10 and 20 million US$ outside the country in the last year of 
his sexenio. See Morris (1991). 
69 See Morris (1991) and Garibaldi (2001) p.12-14. 
70 See the examples in Lopez Presa et al. (1998). 
71 In 1977 a major Mexican newspaper commented the strengthening of opposition parties by 
Lopez Portillo with the words: "the political monopoly of the PRI has been a determining 
factor in corruption". Cited by Morris (1991) p.94. 
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conducive for extensive corruption. 72 Rather than being a rare societal event 
corruption in Mexico showed patterns which allow for the conclusion that 
corruption is instead deeply rooted and institutionalized.73 The high 
involvement of the state in the economy, excessive regulation and the 
inefficiencies in the public administration further stimulate levels of 
corruption.74 Indeed an empirical investigation of the patterns of corruption in 
Mexico concludes that 59.5% of discovered corruption cases involved 
extortion or fraud of government officials.75 The inefficiencies of the national 
judiciary that have been exposed in the previous paragraph imply that corrupt 
practices are often not properly sanctioned which further increases private 
incentives for the misuse of public power.76 In addition the partly controlled 
press could not efficiently fulfill its role of discovering and publicly denouncing 
corrupt practices and misuse of power by government officials.n 
In the Mexican literature on the matter it is often argued that high levels of 
corruption resulted from the need to stabilize the corporatist political system 
that has been exposed in paragraph 5.1 . This system that organized loyalty to 
government with stick and carrot experienced a crisis when the economic 
downturn during the 80s rendered the financing of corrupt practices more 
difficult.78 Moreover, high levels of political corruption slowly eroded the 
credibility and the legitimacy of Mexican political institutions. 79 Eventually the 
process of liberalization and democratization in Mexico reduced the potential 
for this kind of institutionalized corruption. The fight against high level political 
corruption has been initiated by the establishment of controlling organizations 
like the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and the strengthening of the national 
congress. Another important factor that helped limit excessive corporatist 
corruption is the growing independence of the electorate, the emergence of 
civil organizations, effective opposition parties and the growing role of public 
opinion that permit a better societal control of corrupt practices.80 To combat 
corruption in public administration several reforms were initiated to allow for a 
better persecution of corrupt government officials. Usually every incoming 
72 See Jain (2001) and World Bank (1997) p.102-109 who argue that high levels of 
discretionary authority lead to high levels of corruption. 
73 See Morris (1991). Pritzl claims that in many Latin American countries corruption has an 
institutionalized structure. See Pritzl (1996). 
74 See Rubio et al. (1994) p.31-34. 
75 See Morris (1991) p.56-64. 
76 In a recent study the World Bank finds a negative correlation between an index of 
corruption and an index measuring the predictability of the national judiciary. See World 
Bank (1997) p.104. 
77 The World Bank argues that exposure of corruption in the media is a viable tool for 
checking abuses of power. See World Bank (1997) p.108. 
78 See the overview in Lopez Presa et al. (1998). 
79 See Morris (1991) p.16-20. 
80 See Lopez Presa et al. (1998) and Morris (1991) p.115-137. As Morris states: "In sum, the 
Mexican state embarked on a series of reforms that envisage greater limitations on the 
power of the state, a greater reliance on the private sector, and greater political openness. 
Forces in society, in the meantime, pushed their own autonomy and demands with greater 
vigor than ever before. As an integral part of the political system, corruption is clearly 
affected by both the economic and political changes of the decade". Morris (1991) p.130. 
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administration promises to fight the high levels of political and administrative 
corruption and initiates anti corruption campaigns.81 However, measures to 
combat the sources of corruption in a preventive manner were scarce. 82 In the 
past the results of the anti-corruption campaigns have been at best limited and 
high levels of corruption persisted despite of the reforms that have been 
initiated.83 As MORRIS argues over time the composition of corruption changed 
from extortion and fraud to bribery of government officials and a growing 
importance of drug-trade related corruption which more severely endangers 
political stability.84 
The best method to assess national levels of corruption is the use of 
population surveys. When in 1986 Mexicans were asked how often it is 
necessary to pay a bribe when dealing with the government, 40.4% said 
always and another 38.3% indicated that it was required much of the time. 85 
More recent quantitative empirical evidence on corruption is offered by the 
"Encuesta Nacional de Corrupci6n y Buen Gobiemo" (ENCBG), a recent 
national survey on corruption realized by Transparency International. The 
survey registered 214 million acts of corruption in the use of public services 
during the year of the investigation. The average cost of a "mordida" for a 
Mexican household was 109.50 Mexican pesos (ca.10 US$) which implies a 
sum of 23.4 billions of pesos (2.34 billion US$) annually paid to the public 
sector in the form of bribes. This sum is equivalent to 0.4% of Mexican GDP 
and it is estimated that the total societal cost of corruption amounts to 15% of 
total annual tax income or 30 billion US$. The survey also reveals that the 
average Mexican household uses 6.9% of its personal income for the payment 
of bribes to the public sector for obtaining services. For poor households living 
on minimum salary this percentage goes up to 13.9% of total income. The 
survey found that on average, Mexicans pay bribes for 10.6 percent of the 
public services they receive. The services for which bribes are most frequently 
paid are related to cars: retrieving an impounded car required a bribe 57.2 
percent of the time; avoiding traffic tickets, 56 percent; and avoiding other 
traffic offenses, 54.5 percent. In the Federal District 80% of the surveyed 
people confessed having paid bribes to the local police for avoiding fines for 
traffic offenses.86 However, corruption also affects other levels of social and 
81 For an overview of anti-corruption campaigns see Morris (1991) p.83-101 . 
82 In 1983, as a part of his moral renovation campaign, the Penal Code has been refom,ed 
by the de la Madrid administration to allow for a more efficient persecution of corruption in 
the public administration. In the following years several controlling organizations, like in 
1994 the Secretary for Control and Administrative Development (SECODAM) and in 1995 
an auditing commission for fiscal matters, were created to ameliorate the supervision of 
the public administration. In 1995 a program for the modernization of the public 
administration was launched to ameliorate the efficiency and reduce corrupt practices. See 
Lopez Presa et al. (1998). However, de la Madrid refused to arrest high PRI officials on 
charges of corruption including ex-president Lopez Portillo who was likewise not put to 
trail . See Philip (1992) p.136-137. 
83 See Morris (1991) p.83-101. 
84 See Morris (2000). 
85 See Morris (1991) p.71 
86 See Transparency International (2001). 
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political life in Mexico. National programs to fight corruption in the Federal 
District discovered extensive corrupt practices in the granting of licenses, the 
supervision of businesses, the public control of environmental pollution, the 
issuing of driving licenses, the operation of the Mexico City Airport, the police 
force and the distribution of fuel by the state-controlled oil company PE MEX. 87 
According to a recent report by the national radio network, Radio Red, some 
Mexico City high school students even purchase their grades from teachers 
with the current rate for an A being 1 O US$. Empirical evidence on regional 
differences in corruption levels indicate that the Federal District and the State 
of Mexico show the highest levels of corruption. For the rest of the country the 
survey suggest a slight north-south bias with the northern states like 
Chihuahua, Sonora and Baja California showing lower levels of corrupt acts 
than their southern counterparts.88 
To quantify the extent of corrupt practices in Mexico over time figure 5.33 
shows the evolution of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) that has been 
developed by Transparency International. 89 
Figure 5.33: Corruption In Mexico 1980-2003 measured by the CPI 
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Source: Own figure using data by Transparency International (2003). 
The CPI ranks countries concerning the degree to which corruption is 
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. Index values vary 
between O (high corruption) and 1 O (low corruption). In the 2002 rating Mexico 
ranked on the 5th place with a score of 3.6 among 102 ranked countries. As a 
benchmark Finland on the first place has been rated with a score of 9. 7 for the 
same year. An inspection of the Mexican data reveals a continuous downward 
trend in the levels of perceived corruption since the middle of the 80s that has 
only been interrupted by a short decline of index values during the year 1997. 
87 See Lopez Presa et al. (1998) . 
88 See Transparency International (2001). 
89 For details of the methodology of the index see Lambsdorf (2002). 
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Since compared to the situation in the 80s perceived levels of political 
corruption are considerably lower in the 90s the CPI-Index suggests a success 
of the anti-corruption campaigns that have been initiated by the federal 
government. Among other OECD member countries however, Mexico still 
holds the penultimate position in the ranking only being surpassed by Turkey 
which indicates that the level of corruption in Mexico still by far surpasses 
average corruption ratings of industrialized countries. 
Another index to quantify the evolution of corruption in Mexico during the last 
years is the index of governmental corruption that has been constructed by 
PRS group. The difference between the latter indicator and the CPI is that it 
does not determine a country's level of corruption but the political risk involved 
in corruption, two factors that may differ considerably. Figure 5.34 depicts the 
evolution of the PRS index for the period from 1984 to 2003. Indeed the 
inspection of the data paints a completely different picture of corruption in 
Mexico. Since from 1984 to the mid 90s index values remain unchanged the 
data suggests a total failure of public anti corruption campaigns initiated during 
this period indicating that despite of reforms political risk due to corruption has 
not significantly diminished. The last years even show rising levels of political 
risk from corruption although the Fox government made the fight ~ainst 
corruption one of the most important points on its political agenda. The 
distinct empirical evidence about the extent of corruption offered by the PRS 
indicator and the CPI-index highlights the severe problems that are related to 
the empirical measurement of national corruption levels. 
Figure 5.34: The PRS Corruption Index in Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
normalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
90 This empirical finding is in line with the hypothesis that societal levels of corruption are not 
necessarily influenced by regime type. Nevertheless it has to be underlined that a better 
functioning democracy may limit corrupt practices by establishing better mechanisms of 
control. See Lopez Presa et al. (1998). Morris (2000) argues that corruption has changed 
from misuse of public power to drug related corruption. 
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To analyze the impact of political corruption on FOi I use the governmental 
corruption index that has been constructed by PRS Group which has been 
normalized to values between 1-10 where higher values represent less 
corruption.91 The scatter-plots in Figure 5.35 depicts the relationship between 
the corruption index and FOi flows to Mexico. 
Figure 5.35: Correlation between Corruption and FOi 
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Source: Own figure using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) and yeal1y data of 
the Wol1d Bank (2002b). 
Mexican data does not confirm the theoretical hypothesis of a negative 
correlation between corruption and FDI. Instead, the scatter-plots as well as 
the numerical statistical correlation indicate a counter-intuitive positive 
correlation implying that higher levels of corruption would attract higher FDI 
flows. These result are clearly at odds with empirical evidence of the panel 
analysis in Chapter 4 and other empirical research on this matter.92 Therefore, 
it is most likely that the counter-intuitive results for the Mexican case are due 
to the lack of econometric sophistication of the analysis or the small data 
sample. Given other empirical results and the qualitative empirical evidence on 
corruption in Mexico it is in turn most likely that foreign investors are, like their 
national counterparts, affected by corruption. Nevertheless, this analysis does 
not provide empirical evidence for the theoretical hypothesis postulating a 
negative correlation between corruption and FDI. 
5.3.2.4 Protection of Property Rights 
Economic theory argues that property rights protection is a necessary 
prerequisite for a functioning market economy since weak protection of 
91 The CPI index is not used here because the number of available data is considerably 
smaller. 
92 See Wei (2000) who uses corruption indices provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
ICRG, and Transparency International. His results indicate an important influence of 
corruption on FOi flows. As Wei also used data from PRS Group his findings also indicate 
that the counter-intuitive results for Mexican data are not biased by the use of the PRS 
corruption indicator. 
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property rights distorts incentives for private investment. Therefore, well 
defined and enforceable property rights are an important prerequisite for a 
favorable national investment climate. As the historical review of Mexican 
policy towards MNEs demonstrated, the protection of property rights in the 
country has long been feeble. 93 ELIZONDO argues that in contrast to the United 
States the constitutional protection of property rights in Mexico is weak since 
national interests (represented by the state) are valued higher than private 
interests, namely private property rights.94 In particular article 27 of the 
constitution may serve as a legal basis for dilutions of property rights as it 
permits exprorations for reasons of public utility and through 
indemnification. Although article 27 guarantees indemnification, in the past 
the inefficient judiciary only offered weak protection of individual constitutional 
rights. 
Furthermore, in line with these constitutional principles the expropriation law 
from 1936 gives the president the right to expropriate private property to 
achieve a more equitable income distribution. In addition a law from 1950 
permits an extensive regulation of prices by the executive branch. Based on 
these legal norms it takes nothing more than a simple signature of the 
president to expropriate private property. 96 Since in the past the Mexican 
government extensively used this capacity to expropriate foreign property 
MNEs are aware of potential problems caused by predatory intervention of the 
state. 
Although the risk of expropriation is hard to quantify, I use an indicator that has 
been constructed by PRS Group. Figure 5.36 depicts the evolution of this 
indicator that is available for the period 1982-1997. After the large scale 
nationalization of Mexican banks in 1982 expropriation risk showed a decline 
during the mid 80s until a liberal policy initiated a steady process of 
diminishing expropriation risks. Expropriation risk further declined with the 
initiation of the NAFT A negotiation process due to the fact that the treaty 
contained explicit regulation forbidding expropriations without due reasons or 
proper indemnification of affected parties which helped strengthen legal 
security for foreign investors in Mexico by recognizing common principles of 
international law. 
93 Elizondo (1999) argues that high degree of liquidity on Mexican financial mar11.ets and the 
preference for US dollars are signs of weak property rights and fears of inflation or 
devaluation. 
94 See Elizondo (2001). 
95 Article 27 states: ''The nation shall have at all times the right to impose on private property 
such modalities as the public interest dictates, and the right to regulate the use and 
exploitation of all natural resources susceptible to appropriation, in order to preserve and 
to effect an equitable distribution of the public wealth." English translation cited by Whiting 
(1992) p.243-244. Conflicts with Mexico over the implications of Article 27 for US investors 
led the US government to refusing the recognition of the Mexican government until 1923. 
See Whiting (1992) p.62. For a detailed discussion of Article 27 see Elizondo (2001) p.59-
72. 
96 See Elizondo (2001) p.54-83. 
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Figure 5.36: Expropriation Risk in Mexico 1982-1997 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using year1y data from PRS (1998) normalized to a 1-10 scale. 
In other words, the signing of NAFT A was an important step towards a better 
institutional framework for foreign investors because it widely extended the 
protection of foreign owned property in Mexico against acts of direct and 
creeping expropriation. 
For empirical evidence on the impact of expropriation risk on FOi in Mexico I 
calculated the statistical correlation of the index variables with FOi inflows and 
the FOi/GDP ratio respectively. The results are displayed in the two scatter-
plots in Figure 5.37. 
Figure 5.37: Correlation between Expropriation Risk and FDI 
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Source: Own figure using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group 2003 and yearly data of the 
Wor1d Bank (2002b). 
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An inspection of the Mexican data strongly suggests a positive impact of lower 
expropriation risk on FDI as both scatter-plots indicate a positive correlation. 
Moreover, additional empirical evidence for the panel of Latin American 
countries from Chapter 4 indicates that the reported correlation is not spurious 
as the risk indicator turns out to be positive, significant and robust.97 
It has already been argued that private property rights are not only affected by 
outright expropriations but also by more subtle policies that do not imply a total 
loss of the title to private assets but that nevertheless seriously reduce their 
value. To give only a few examples foreign property may be affected by 
discriminatory taxation, restriction of operations, excessive labor legislation 
and costs, repatriation restrictions as well as governmental breach of contract 
and so on. Although the variety of potentially influential variables that 
determine the risk of creeping expropriation make the concept hard to quantify, 
the Investment Profile indicator of PRS Group is a suitable proxy variable. This 
indicator is "a measure of the government's attitude toward inward investment 
as determined by four components: the risk to operations, taxation, 
repatriation, and labor costs".98 
Figure 5.38 which depicts the evolution of the investment profile in Mexico 
between 1984 and 2003 shows that in the aftermath of the Mexican debt crisis 
the investment profile of the Mexican economy was continuously declining. 
Figure 5.38: Investment Profile in Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
nonnalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
The process of liberalizing and opening the economy however that begun 
thereafter entailed a steady improvement of the investment profile which 
97 The governance indicators GOVI and GOVII that contain the subindicator "Expropriation 
Risk" were found to be robust determinants of FOi. See Table 4.4 and 4.5 in Chapter 4. 
98 See PRS Group (2003). 
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reached its peak during the early 90s. Political turmoil and the financial crisis in 
1994 implied a short fall of investment profile which thereafter shows a steady 
upward trend that is peaking in 2003. It has to be stressed that the signing of 
NAFT A considerably influenced the investment profile of Mexico in various 
ways. First, as already pointed out NAFT A property rights protection also 
covers actions of creeping expropriations. Although legal enforceability and 
security are still limited by difficulties to provide for clear evidence of acts of 
creeping expropriation by host governments, NAFT A clearly strengthens legal 
certainty of foreign investors. Second, NAFTA forbids transfer restriction on 
foreigners and the imposition of performance requirements which could both 
considerably dilute foreign property rights. Despite of these guarantees figure 
5.38 shows that the amelioration of the investment profile did not start until 
1995. However, the period when NAFTA came into effect was a period of 
crisis for the Mexican political system as well as for the economy. Therefore, 
the missing empirical evidence that NAFT A strengthened the investment 
profile in Mexico may be due to the fact that the amelioration of legal certainty 
may have been statistically outweighed and overcompensated by the 
deterioration of other sub-parts of the indicator. 
To assess the influence of the investment profile on FOi to Mexico figure 5.39 
depicts the correlation between the indicator and incoming FOi as well as the 
FOi/GDP ratio. 
Figure 5.39: Correlation between Investment Profile and FDI 
2.BE+10-...-------------. 
2.4E+10 
2.0E+10 
i:;'.i 1.6E+10 
~I 
0 1.2E+10 
u. 
8.0E+09 
4.0E+09 
0.0E+OO • • 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
INVPR10 
.05-r---------~ 
.04 
~ .03 
!1 . ·. . _____;.------: .· . . 
j? .02 ----------
.01 
.. 
. 00+-~~-~~-....--.----l 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
INVPR10 
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World Bank (2002b). 
The two scatter-plots permit the careful conclusion that investment profile has 
a positive impact on FOi in Mexico although the evidence for the FOi/GDP 
ratio is less striking. However, it is hard to decide if the empirical results suffer 
from the small data set bias as additional evidence from the panel analysis in 
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Chapter 4 is missing for this indicator.99 Although the conclusion of this 
paragraph necessarily has to be careful, the empirical evidence from Mexican 
data suggests a positive impact of lower expropriation and creeping 
expropriation risk on FOi flows to Mexico. 
5.3.4 Societal Factors of Risk 
5.3.4.1 Overview 
The following paragraphs are dedicated to analyzing the impact of societal 
political risk variables on FOi flows to Mexico. For the analysis I use the simple 
theoretical framework based on the concept of social capital that has been 
described in paragraph 3.1 .2.4. evaluating the impact of socioeconomic 
variables on transaction costs and private investment incentives. All numerical 
statistical results are depicted in table A.2 in Annex II while the following 
paragraphs simply show scatter-plots illustrating the correlation. Although it 
has to be underlined that the interpretation of results has to be careful due to 
the lack of reliable data, the analysis indicates the impact of a given variable 
on FOi flows to Mexico. The following chapter starts with the evaluation of 
societal tensions due to religion, ethnic provenience or other internal factors. 
5.3.4.2 Ethnic, Religious and other Internal Conflicts 
Despite of many other problems, since the revolution Mexico did not 
experience greater societal instabilities or even political turmoil. With the 
exception of left wing guerrilla activity and student protests during the late 60s 
and early 70s that have been violently repressed by the government Mexico 
neither experienced violent manifestations of social unrest.100 Instead, the well-
established corporatist PRI rule ensured a degree of societal stability that is 
unusual for a Latin American country. As a legacy of the Spanish colonial rule 
the vast majority of the country is roman-catholic. The dominating ethnical 
group are the "mestizos", descendants of Spanish and indigenous people. 
Despite of these facts contemporary Mexico is still characterized by a vast 
ethnic, social and economic heterogeneity holding enormous potential for 
future conflict. In the south and the southeast of Mexico live large proportions 
of indigenous people, who largely only speak pre-hispanic languages and 
often live in poor economic conditions or poverty. 101 The economic reforms in 
the agrarian sector during the 80s and 90s that dismantled the old system of 
subsidies and transfers hardly hit rural small scale producers of coffee, maize 
and other crops. 102 In 1994 economic difficulties and problems of racial 
discrimination of ethnic minorities provoked an armed uprising in the southern 
federal state of Chiapas by the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberaci6n Nacional 
99 An empirical analysis of this indicator could not be performed because it was not available 
for all countries in the sample. 
100 See Philip (1992) for an analysis of the student movement and the guerilla groups. 
Mainwaring underlines that most of the left wing groups were never serious contenders 
for power. See Mainwaring (1999). 
101 See Otero (1996) p.3. Nine million of the eleven million indigenous people living in Mexico 
are considered as extremely poor. See PRS Group (2000) p.13. 
102 See Harvey (1996) p.191-199. For a detailed analysis of the agrarian reform see Gates 
(1996). 
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(EZLN). Although one central focus of the EZLN is the strengthening of 
minority rights, it is hard to decide if the uprising was essentially motivated by 
ethnic reasons or rather by the poor economic situation and extreme poverty in 
the south of Mexico as well as by a rejection of the liberal reforms 
implemented by the Mexican government.103 Although actively promoting the 
strengthening of indigenous rights and basic autonomy for these groups, the 
zapatista movement is not characterized by exclusionary nationalism or 
secessionist motives.104 A second group of rebels, the Popular Revolutionary 
Army (EPR) emerged in Oaxaca and Guerrero indicating that the problem of 
societal unrest is no longer limited to the state of Chiapas.105 
To quantify political risk that originate in ethnical or religious differences I use 
indicators that are provided by PRS Group. The ethnic tension indicator is "a 
measure of the degree of tension attributable to racial, national, or language 
divisions". Lower ratings (higher risk) are given to those countries where 
tensions are high because the opposing ethnic groups are intolerant and 
unwilling to compromise with the government. 106 Classifying the EZLN in this 
manner is difficult as talks between the rebel leaders and the central 
government were initiated shortly after the conflict and are still underway. 
However, even if the national government initiated a constitutional amendment 
that guaranteed autonomy and the protection of indigenous rights in 1998, the 
negotiations have been difficult and were occasionally interrupted by large 
scale protest or even violent acts.107 
Figure 5.40 depicts the evolution of the ethnic tensions indicator in Mexico 
between 1984 and 2003. As evidenced by the data levels of ethnic tensions 
remained unchanged at a low level during the 80s and 90s. Ratings began to 
deteriorate when the new government of president Fox did not manage to 
reach an agreement with the EZLN.108 Despite of this problem and the 
deterioration of the rating it has to be underlined that the economic 
implications of the problems in Chiapas and in other southern states are only 
of minor importance for MNEs since foreign investors, whose installations are 
not situated in those regions are hardly affected by these local instabilities. 109 
103 The fact that ethnic origin and economic conditions are often correlated suggests that 
both factors are relevant for the uprising. On the motives of the Chiapas rebellion see 
Rabasa/Arias (2002) and Lopez y Rivas (2002). 
104 See Harvey (2001). 
105 The EPR engaged in several violent attacks in the period from 1996-1999. See PRS 
Group (2000) p.44. 
106 See PRS Group (2003). 
107 See Rabasa/Arias (2002). In December of 1997 45 Chiapas Indians were killed in the 
village Acteal by paramilitary forces apparently linked to the armed forces and the PRI. In 
the aftermath of the killings Zedillo replaced his interior minister and the governor of 
Chiapas resigned. See PRS Group (2000) p.39. In 1998 eight Zapatistas were killed in a 
firefight with the army. See PRS Group (1999) p.811 . 
108 For the reasons of the deterioration of the peace talks see Lopez y Rivas (2002). 
109 FOi in Chiapas and other southern states is scarce due to the economic backwardness of 
the region. See table 5.8 in paragraph 5.1.2.3. 
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Figure 5.40: Ethnic Tensions in Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
normalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
However, since poor economic conditions of the indigenous population in rural 
areas are a problem that is not limited to the state of Chiapas, future conflicts 
may also arise in other poor and remote rural areas of the country as for 
example in Guerrero, Puebla, Oaxaca or Tamaulipas.110 Despite of possible 
risks in the future the correlation between the ethnic tensions rating and the 
inflows of FOi and the FOi/GDP ratio respectively show no indication of a 
positive relationship between the two variables.111 
The same result holds for an analysis of the influence of religious tensions on 
FOi. As already pointed out religious beliefs are homogenous in Mexico and 
dominated by the roman catholic confession. 112 Furthermore, the revolutionary 
heritage of Mexico implies that education and public life were not dominated 
by religious convictions implying that the potential risk of violent social conflicts 
due to religious divisions is limited. For the quantification of the variable I use 
an indicator that is provided by PRS group. This indicator is "a measure of 
religious tensions arising from the domination of society and/or governance by 
a single religious group, or a desire to dominate, in a way that replaces civil 
law by religious law, excludes other religions from the political/social 
processes, suppresses religious freedom or expressions of religious identity. 
The risks involved range from inexperienced people imposing inappropriate 
policies to civil dissent or civil war.113 
110 See Lopez y Rivas (2002). 
111 As the relationship between the two variables was of no major importance the scatter-plot 
will not be displayed here. For the results of the statistical correlation see Appendix II . 
112 According to PRS Group (2000) 89% of Mexico's population is Roman Catholic and 6% 
protestant. 
113 See PRS Group (2003). 
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Figure 5.41: Rellgious Tensions in Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
normalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
The development of the rating which is depicted in figure 5.41 suggest that 
religious tensions have not been an influential risk factor in Mexico since for all 
the years prior to the 2000 rating the country attained the lowest possible level 
of risk. That is, the measure indicates the absence of political risks resulting 
out of religious conflicts. 
Another suitable measure for the assessment of internal political conflicts is 
the indicator "Internal Conflict" that has been developed by PRS Group. 
Instead of focusing on societal risks that result from ethnic or religious tensions 
this indicator is "a measure of political violence and its actual or potential 
impact on governance, taking into consideration such factors as whether 
threats exist, whether they have political objective considerin~ the size and 
strength of support, and the geographic nature of the conflict" .11 
Figure 5.42 depicts the evolution of this indicator between 1984 and 2003. The 
high indicator values suggest only a minor risk position for foreign investors. 
Nevertheless, the political difficulties of the late 80s and the mid 90s are 
clearly mirrored by the deteriorating development of the indicator values during 
this periods although risks originating in internal conflicts still remain on a 
moderate level. Despite of the severe economic crisis during the 80s public 
demonstrations caused little civil strife. 
The severest problems of violence usually were related to drug trafficking. 
Between 1989 and 1995 reported terrorist attacks totaled 93 including 31 
assassinations, 12 kidnappings and 22 bombings.115 Between 1991 and 1997 
Mexico registered 297 cases of terrorist attacks including 85 assassination, 54 
114 See PRS Group (2003). 
115 See PRS Group (1995). 
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kidnappings and 22 bombings. During 1996 Mexico City experienced more 
than 3000 protest marches and 1997 a large protest of teachers paralyzed the 
City. Despite of these events most serious violence remained largely confined 
to the Chiapas region and was not directed against foreign businesses.116 
Figure 5.42: Internal Conflict in Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
nonnalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
Despite of the Zapatista conflict and growing societal resistance to 
liberalization policies and the opening of the economy, internal risk seems not 
to be among the most important risk factors for foreign investors. 
Figure 5.43: Correlatlon between Internal Conflict and FOi 
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World Bank (2002b). 
116 An exception was the kidnapping of a leading Japanese businessman in 1996 that spread 
fear among foreign executives. See PRS Group (1999) p.D2. 
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Figure 5.43 depicts the correlation between internal conflict and FOi flows and 
the FOi/GDP ratio respectively. The initial hypothesis that postulated a minor 
role of internal conflict for foreign investment decisions is confirmed by the 
inspection of the data which does not indicate a positive correlation between 
the measure of internal conflict and the inflows of FOi to Mexico. The analysis 
of internal conflicts confirms the general result that measures of societal 
conflict do not seem to be influential variables for FOi inflows to Mexico. This 
result is in line with the results of the panel analysis in Chapter 4 that likewise 
did not find a robust influence of societal risk variables on FOi inflows to Latin 
American countries.117 
This additional empirical evidence concerning the impact of societal risk 
variables on FOi flows does not suggests that the results for the Mexican case 
are simply biased by the small data sample. One may therefore conclude that 
indicators of societal risk do not have a major impact on FOi flows to Mexico 
and that although reforms in this field may be socially desirable they are hardly 
an improvement of the institutional environment for foreign investors. Even the 
major upheavals and conflicts in Mexico, as the uprising in Chiapas, do not 
imply elevate risks for foreign companies as these conflicts are restricted to 
remote rural areas whereas foreign investors are usually concentrated in 
urban areas. In spite of these findings, it has to be underlined that these risks 
may become more influential in the future, if the government does not succeed 
in resolving these societal conflicts. 
5.3.4.3 Governmental Legitimacy in Mexico 
The importance of regime legitimacy for transaction costs has been underlined 
in Chapter 3, where it was argued that regimes with low levels of legitimacy 
may cause the risk of future civil strife when discontent of the population is 
growing over time.118 Despite of its theoretical importance the empirical 
measurement of regime legitimacy is not straightforward. One approach is to 
assess the degree of confidence that people have in national institutions as 
low levels of legitimacy should coincide with low confidence and vice versa. 
The description of the current political system in Mexico already showed that 
the level of trust and confidence that Mexicans have in political institutions is 
rather low. Therefore, using societal level of confidence in governmental 
institutions as a proxy for regime legitimacy implies low ratings for the Mexican 
government. 
Other important social strains in Mexico during the late 80s and the 90s are 
the rapidly increasing population, an inequitable income distribution, vast 
regional differences in development, as well as crime and corruption.119 High 
population growth in Mexico is an important potential source of societal conflict 
since between 1967 and 1996 the Mexican population doubled leading to one 
million new workers every year entering the labor market without great 
117 See Table 4.3 in Chapter 4. 
118 See World Bank (2003). 
119 Problems of crime and public insecurity have already been discussed in paragraph 5.3.3.2. 
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chances to get a proper job.120 Moreover, the liberal reforms of the 80s 
considerably lowered living standards that have been kept up artificially by 
high consumptive government spending. The decade witnessed a particular 
massive decline in real wages which nearly fell by 30% during the 80s which is 
shown in figure 5.44. 
Figure 5.44: Real Wages In Mexico 1980-1990 (1981=1) 
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Source: Own figure with data from Krllmer (1995). 
In addition, a wave of bankruptcies hit those smaller companies which could 
not compete with the intensified competition of foreign companies. The 1994-
95 financial crisis increased hardships as the economy passed into recession 
and many workers have been laid off.121 As an immediate consequence of the 
crisis real wages fell by 25% in 1995.122 In particular the southern states of Mexico 
have lagged export-oriented northern states have profited from the integration 
with the US.123 
An empirical indicator of societal satisfaction containing these variables has 
been provided by PRS Group. The indicator Socioeconomic Conditions is an 
"estimate of the general public's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
government's economic policies, covering a broad spectrum of factors ranging 
from infant mortality and medical provision to housing and interest rates. 
Different weights are applied in different societies, depending upon the relative 
political impact."124 Hence, the indicator measures how the socioeconomic 
situation in a given country influences the satisfaction of the people with 
government policy. Although a proxy variable, it is reasonable to argue that 
low levels of public satisfaction with governmental institutions coincide with low 
levels of regime legitimacy and vice versa. 
120 See PRS Group (2000) p.14-15. 
121 In 1995 Mexican GDP fell by 6.2%. 
122 See PRS Group (1999) p.G3. 
123 Life Expectancy is 20 years higher in the North than in the South. Per capita consumption 
and average wages are five times higher in the North. See PRS Group (2000) p.15. 
124 See PRS Group (2003). 
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An inspection of the Mexican data shows that the indicator for socioeconomic 
conditions largely coincides with the evolution of the economic situation. This 
direct correlation between national economic performance and socioeconomic 
conditions stems from the fact that social benefits as unemployment insurance 
or public welfare are scarce in Mexico which implies that economic cycles 
have a direct effect on living standards of the population. As figure 5.45 
indicates the socioeconomic situation ameliorates during the late 80s after the 
most serious effects of the debt crisis have been overcome. 
Figure 5.45: Socioeconomic Conditions in Mexico 1984-2003 
I-socioeconomic Conditions 10 I 
Source: Own figure and calculations using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) 
normalized to a 1-10 scale. Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
Between the late 80s and the financial crisis in 1994 conditions kept stable. 
Following the financial crisis of 1994 and the resulting recession 
socioeconomic conditions quickly deteriorated reaching again the low levels of 
the post debt crisis years. As late as in 2000 the indicator shows the first signs 
of recovery reaching again mid 90s levels. 
To analyze the impact of socioeconomic conditions on FOi flows to Mexico the 
two scatter-plots in figure 5.46 show the correlation between the indicator and 
FOi flows and the FOi/GDP ratio respectively. An inspection of the data does 
not reveal a clear pattern that would indicate the positive relationship between 
the two variables that would have been theoretically expected. As further 
empirical evidence from the panel analysis in Chapter 4 is not available for this 
indicator the analysis of the data does not permit a clear cut conclusion about 
the influence of regime legitimacy proxied by the socioeconomic conditions 
variable. One of the two depicted correlations rather suggest the counter-
intuitive result that worsening socioeconomic conditions imply higher levels of 
FOi. 
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Figure 5.46: Correlation between Socioeconomic Conditions and FOi 
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Source: own figure using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) and yearly data of 
the World Bank (2002b). 
Although it has to be underlined that this result may also be due to the size of 
the available data set, it has to be concluded that the empirical analysis of 
Mexican data does not permit the conclusion that societal risk factors have an 
influence on incoming FOi. This empirical evidence is supported by the results 
of the panel analysis in Chapter 4 that could not identify a robust relationship 
between societal indicators of risk and FOi inflows to Latin American countries. 
The joint findings of the two empirical studies suggest that the influence of 
variables that determine the level of societal transaction cost is not as 
important as the influence of governance related variables. The following 
paragraphs analyze the impact of aggregate political risk indicators on FOi 
flows to Mexico. 
5.3.5 Aggregate Political Risk in Mexico 
After reviewing the sub-indices of political risk this paragraph is dedicated to 
the analysis of aggregate political risk levels in Mexico. To do so three different 
aggregate risk indicators will be used and the evidence of preceding 
paragraphs will be briefly summarized. Up to now the empirical evidence 
highlights the importance of macroeconomic and governance related risk 
factors for FOi to Mexico. Economic and financial risk as well as democratic 
reliability, political constraints, expropriation risk and bureaucratic quality 
showed a positive correlation with incoming FOi. Other theoretically influential 
variables as the rule of law and corruption however, showed no evidence of a 
positive correlation contradicting the empirical evidence from Chapter 4. 
Despite of these findings it is most likely that these risk factors are 
nevertheless of particular importance in Mexico as evidenced by the study of 
qualitative empirical evidence on Mexico.125 
125 See the literature on corruption and rule of law that is cited in the paragraphs 5.3.3.2 and 
5.3.3.3. 
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At the same time the empirical evidence on the influence of societal risk 
factors suggested that these variables play a minor role in determining 
Mexican FOi since religious, ethnic or other societal tensions did not turn out 
to be of major importance for FOi flows. Even the most severe societal 
instability in Mexico, the Chiapas conflict, does not seem to be a menace for 
foreign asset holders. Likewise this study did not find a positive correlation 
between socioeconomic conditions and FOi. Nevertheless, it has to be 
underlined that social conflicts in Mexico, although locally restricted at the 
moment, are a potential risk that may gain importance in the near future. High 
levels of poverty, violation of human rights and high distributive inequality in 
Mexico are all potential reasons for serious societal conflicts. This future threat 
is even more important as the process of political reform and democratization 
in Mexico weakens the power of the central government to violently repress 
social tensions. 
In addition to these findings this paragraph assesses if aggregate political risk 
variables have an influence on FOi flows to Mexico. For this analysis three 
different aggregate risk indicators will be used. The first indicator that will be 
examined in this context is the Opacity Index that has been calculated by PWC 
for the year 2001. This Index that is based on global surveys of company 
officials, bankers, equity analysts, and in-country PWC consultants provides 
an estimate of the adverse effects of opacity on the cost and availability of 
capital in 35 countries. Opacity is defined as "the lack of clear, accurate, 
formal, easily discernible, and widely accepted practices". The Global Opacity 
Index offers a composite "O-Factor" ranking for each country, based on 
opacity data in the following five areas: 
1) Corruption in government and the bureaucracy 
2) Laws governing contracts or property rights 
3) Economic policies (fiscal, monetary, and tax-related) 
4) Accounting standards 
5) Business regulations 
Together, these create the acronym CLEAR (Corruption, Legal, Economic, 
Accounting, Regulatory). Opacity in any of these areas will raise the cost of 
doing business as well as curtail the availability of funds. Two unique 
measures result from the Index: the O-Factor, and rankings as well as 
measurements of the risk premium that is attributable to opacity when 
countries borrow through sovereign bond issuances in international or 
domestic capital markets. These multiple measures help demonstrate real-
world costs associated with opacity where the O-Factor is the score of a 
country based on survey responses. High numbers indicate a h~h degree of 
opacity and low numbers indicate a low degree of opacity.1 Due to its 
characteristics the opacity index is suitable as a proxy variable for aggregate 
political risk and may be used to calculate the amounts of foregone FDI flows 
due to opacity. Table 5.9 summarizes the results for Mexico. Opacity in the 
country has been estimated at a score of 48 with the benchmark score being 
126 See PWC (2001a), PWC (2001b). 
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13 in Singapore. The index values of the sulrcategories illustrate that in 
particular legal certainty, economic policy and the regulatory environment are 
weak in Mexico, a result that with the exception of the economic policy 
environment is in line with the preceding analysis of political risk in Mexico. 
The tax equivalent shows the effect of opacity when it is interpreted as if it 
imposes a hidden tax on private corporations. The index score of 15 for 
Mexico indicates that the effects of opacity in the country are equivalent to 
levying an additional 15-percent corporate income tax. 
T bl 5 9 Eff a e ects o fO . M pac1ty in exico 
0- C L E A R Tax- Risk Deterred Deterred Deterred Deterred 
Factor Equivalent Premium FOi(% FDl(Mio FOi(% FDl(Mio 
(%) (Basis Lower US$ Point est.) $) Point 
Points) Bound) Lower Est. 
Bound) 
48 42 58 17 29 12 11% 308 13 6477 70 8114 
Source: PWC (2001a). PWC (2001b) 
The Risk Premium indicates the increased cost of borrowing faced by 
countries due to opacity, expressed in basis points (100 basis points = one 
percentage point) since on average, countries with higher opacity tend to have 
to pay higher interest rates on issued debt. The score of 308 for Mexico 
indicates that the country needs to pay international investors an extra 3,08 
percent on sovereign debt due to opacity. The columns Deterred Investment 
show how incoming FOi flows would respond if the country managed to reduce 
its current level of opacity to that of the benchmark, that is, to the level of the 
average of the 4 countries with the lowest ratings. The results for Mexico show 
that the country could increase its inward FOi by 53 to 70% if it could reduce 
its opacity to the level of the benchmark group. In dollar terms this would 
represent an amount between 6477 to 8554 Mio. US$. Considering the scores 
of the sulrcategories, in particular improvements in the fields of legal certainty, 
national economic policy and the regulatory environment show enormous 
potential of attracting higher inward FOi. 127 Unfortunately lacking data does not 
permit to analyze the evolution of the Opacity Index over time. 
The aggregate political risk indicator that has been constructed by PRS Group 
is "a means of assessing the political stability of a country on a comparable 
basis with other countries by assessing risk points for each of the component 
factors of government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, 
internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in 
politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and 
bureaucracy quality. Risk ratings range from a high of 100 (least risk) to a low 
of o (highest risk) , though lowest de facto ratings generally range in the 30s 
and 40s."128 This indicators thus pools the information of the various sub-
127 See PWC (2001b). 
128 See PRS Group (2003). 
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indicators and thereby constructs an overall measure of aggregate political risk 
in Mexico. 
Figure 5.47 shows the evolution of this aggregate risk indicator for the time 
period 1984-2003. 
Figure 5.47 Political Risk In Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003). 
Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
Again the mid 80s are marked by a serious deterioration of the risk index. 
Since the beginning of the economic and political reform period in the mid 80s 
however, the risk index shows a steadily growing pattern reaching its summit 
in the mid 90s indicating a success of the reforms implemented by the 
Mexican government. Following the financial crisis of 1994 the aggregate risk 
rating fell again showing a slow pace of recovery afterwards that with small 
variations extends to the present time. 
To test for the statistical correlation of aggregate political risk and FOi figure 
5.48 depicts two scatter-plots illustrating the correlation between political risk 
and yearly FOi inflows as well as the FOi/GDP ratio. The patterns of the 
scatter-plots and the statistical correlation between the two variables indicate a 
weak positive influence of aggregate political risk on FOi flows to Mexico. 
However, as additional empirical evidence from the panel analysis in Chapter 
4 is missing these findings have to be interpreted with caution. The weak 
correlation is surprising as several sub-indicators of the aggregate political risk 
index turned out to be positively correlated with FOi inflows. A possible 
explanation for the weaker correlation of the aggregate risk index is that the 
index also contains societal risk variables that were not found to be positively 
correlated with FOi and produce a bias. 
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Figure 5.48: Correlation between Political Risk and FOi 
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Source: Own figure using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) and year1y data of 
the World Bank (2002b). Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February 
Another PRS measure of aggregate risk is the so-called composite index that 
is constructed by using a weighted average of economic, financial and political 
risk.129 Higher values of the index indicate lower risk and vice versa. Ratings 
range from ~100 with values in the interval 0-49.5 characterizing a high risk 
environment and index values from 80-100 representing countries of low risk. 
Figure 5.49 shows the development of the indicator for the period 1984-2003. 
Similar to the aggregate political risk index the composite risk index reaches its 
all time low in the mid 80s reflecting the economic downturn of Latin American 
countries following the debt crisis. 
Figure 5.49: Composite Risk in Mexico 1984-2003 
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Source: Own figure and calculations using year1y averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003). 
Index values for 2003 are calculated using data for January and February. 
129 The exact formula for calculating the index is 0.5 (Political Risk + Financial Risk + 
Economic Risk). 
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After the implementation of liberal economic reforms the composite risk index 
experienced a long upward movement with the first decreases following the 
financial crisis in 1994. After the Tequila-crisis however, the index shows a 
rapid recovery and is since then oscillating around pre-crisis levels. Since an 
important subpart of the risk index focuses on macroeconomic risks this 
empirical observation is in line with theoretical considerations and highlights 
that the period of economic reform is accompanied by an important 
amelioration of composite risk. 
To analyze the effects of composite risk on the inflows of FOi to Mexico figure 
5.50 depicts the correlation between the risk index and FOi as well as the 
FOi/GOP ratio which suggest a positive influence of lower composite risk on 
FOi inflows and the FOi/GDP ratio. 
Figure 5.50: Correlation between Composite Risk and FDI 
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Source: own figure using yearly averages of monthly data by PRS Group (2003) and yearly data of 
the World Bank (2002b). 
Again there is no further econometric evidence from the panel analysis in 
Chapter 4 that could remove doubts concerning the small sample bias of the 
presented results implying that these findings have to be interpreted carefully. 
However, given the important role of economic and financial risk for the 
calculation of the index it is hardly surprising to see a positive correlation as 
the two sub-indices also showed a positive correlation with FOi flows to the 
country. 
Summing up, one can conclude that both composite and political risk are 
positively correlated with inflows of FOi to the country suggesting a positive 
impact of lower risk ratings on Mexican FOi. In addition simulations based on 
the Opacitiy-lndex suggest that political risk is an important obstacle for 
incoming FOi. 
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5.4 Risk Mitigation Strategies in Mexico 
5.4.1 National Risk Mitigation Strategies 
5.4.1.1 Investment Enhancement by Incentives 
263 
Since the outbreak of the debt crisis Mexico initiated a process of political and 
economic reform to restore its attractiveness for FOi . In Chapter 3 the 
establishment of investment incentives has been identified as a theoretical 
possibility to compensate international investors for high levels of political or 
country risk. It was argued that although the establishment of investment 
incentives may in the short run be a successful measure to attract foreign 
investors it is doubtful that it is the most efficient strategy since the granting of 
incentives is costly for host governments. 130 
Although since the mid 80s Mexico eagerly tried to attract FOi , the government 
never engaged in large programs of investment incentives.131 This has been 
part of the general Mexican economic strategy not to accord foreign investors 
any more favorable treatment than their domestic counterparts. 132 Exceptions 
from this general practice of risk mitigation without the granting of incentives 
are governmental programs to foster the establishment of businesses that are 
located outside the metropolitan areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara and 
Monterrey. Some industries enjoyed tax incentives when they were considered 
to foster employment levels or to fulfill other beneficial societal tasks. 
Moreover, some of the state governments granted incentives to attract new 
industries in form of reduced prices for land or reductions in property taxes. 
However, there are no tax incentives that are specifically designed to attract 
FOi. The most extensive programs of incentives under the Mexican 
development plan are those that are provided to stimulate the exports of 
manufactured goods. But again also in export promotion programs there are 
no special measures that exclusively benefit foreign investors. 133 
The absence of large scale incentives programs may in part be explained by 
Mexico's attractiveness for FOi due to strong fundamentals. Mexico offers a 
large domestic market, a rich and diverse resource endowment, an urbanized, 
educated workforce and a developed infrastructure.134 These advantages and 
liberal reforms of the outworn economic development strategy made 
international investors aware of the investment opportunities in Mexico. The 
successive liberalization of the foreign investment law and the opening of the 
economy to foreign trade implied a further growing attractiveness of Mexico as 
a destination for FOi. Comparatively low labor costs and the geographic 
proximity to the large US markets have all been contributing factors that 
rendered Mexico an attractive destination for FOi. The integration of the 
130 See paragraph 3.4.2.1. 
131 See OECD (2000). The big exception is the Maquiladora-program which grants several 
incentives to firms as for example exemptions from import duties. 
132 See PWC (1991). 
133 See PWC (1991). 
134 Whiting (1992) considers that these factors create an important advantage for Mexico's 
attractiveness for foreign investors if compared to other developing countries in the region 
and elsewhere. See Whiting (1992) p.27-30. 
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country into the North American market with the signing of NAFT A enforced 
Mexico's attractiveness to MNEs without the granting of special incentives 
programs. It is important to stress that the establishment of a large scale 
investment incentive program would not have tackled the main obstacles for 
FOi in Mexico. As pointed out in this chapter a major problem in Mexico was 
lacking credibility and efficiency of various governmental institutions, lacking 
rule of law and widespread political corruption. Investment incentives however, 
are no longer proper instrument to attract foreign investors when a minimum 
credibility of the national government is missing. This is essentially due to the 
fact that investors cannot be sure that promised incentives are really granted 
afterwards and that established contracts are honored in the long run . A 
lacking rule of law and inefficiency of the domestic judiciary aggravate this 
problem as MNEs do not have access to a credible organization of conflict 
resolution. Therefore, it seems reasonable that Mexico chose another strategy 
of risk mitigation without extensively relying on the potentially positive effects 
of investment incentives. The next paragraph discusses the Mexican strategy 
to foster international investments by reforms of the domestic institutional 
structure. 
5.4.1.2 The Beauty Contest 
Despite of the economic and political reforms in Mexico during the last years 
the previous chapters still identified impediments for a favorable investment 
climate in Mexico. Nevertheless, it is evident that Mexico made enormous 
progress in the amelioration of its domestic investment climate during the 
period 1982 to 2003. As already discussed in Chapter 3, the strategy of 
establishing domestic reforms to attract foreign capital is theoretically efficient 
but faces many problems of efficient implementation. The so called domestic 
"beauty contest" basically consists of reforming national institutions that have 
been turned out to be an impediment for private economic activity. Mexico's 
efforts in this field have been high and were not solely concentrated in the 
economic sphere but also consisted in promoting the process of political 
opening and democratization. Important political determinants of investment 
that have been identified in the previous paragraphs have been missing 
constraints on the executive branch, expropriation risk and bureaucratic 
quality. Although the empirical evidence for other potentially influential 
variables has not been convincing, other empirical findings and qualitative 
assessments suggested that also corruption and the rule of law are important 
institutional determinants of FOi flows. 
Political constraints and democratic reliability of the government increased 
during the last years due to political reforms and democratization. The downfall 
of the one party state dominated by the PRI and the limitation of Mexican 
presidentialism by a better functioning system of opposition parties diminished 
the discretionary freedom of the Mexican government to freely conduct 
national policy. Although far from being complete, judicial reform and the 
strengthening of the legislative branch implied a better control of governmental 
decisions that ensured a higher degree of political continuity. At the same time 
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abuses of public power and political corruption are more difficult to flourish in a 
political environment that establishes better mechanisms of control and 
societal checks and balances. A higher degree of rule of law permits creating 
an atmosphere of higher legal certainty and transparency that is favorable for 
private investments. 
In economic policy the establishment of a stable macroeconomic environment 
and continued efforts to liberalize helped create a favorable investment climate 
in Mexico. Compared to the desastrous macroeconomic environment after the 
debt crisis Mexico achieved important goals by promoting fiscal discipline, 
limiting inflation and fostering international trade. Despite of its social 
consequences macroeconomic stabilization policy in Mexico has been a 
success story as evidenced by falling risk spreads on sovereign debt. Although 
the financial crisis in 1994 that was followed by a severe recession was a 
reminder of macroeconomic volatility and instability in the country, Mexico's 
bonds were rated as investment grade at the beginning of the new millennium. 
Summing up, Mexico's efforts and results in the amelioration of national 
institutions and the maintenance of macroeconomic stability have been 
enormous. Nevertheless liberal economic policies are still rejected by a large 
part of the population and by leftist parties explaining the need to lock-in 
domestic policy reform. To do so, Mexico accompanied its domestic reform 
efforts with a strategy of international risk mitigation by signing various 
international agreements to promote the integration of the country into the 
world economy. 
5.4.2 The International Risk Mitigation Strategy 
As already pointed out above the idea of international risk mitigation strategies 
is integrating the country into a framework of international law and thereby 
limiting potential risks for foreign investors by increased international 
credibility. Although the objectives of Mexican foreign policy changed 
considerably during the 20th century, its scope has always been limited by the 
need to ensure the external capital flows on which the country depended.135 
After the outbreak of the debt crisis international credibility of Mexico reached 
an all time low and economic crisis affected the country more severely than 
ever before. For that reason Mexico's foreign policy of the post-debt-crisis 
years and in particular of the de la Madrid ~ovemment is to a large extent 
dominated by economic goals and limitations. 36 WHITING even argues that the 
internationalization of the world economy and the outbreak of the Latin 
American debt crisis were the most important international constraints for the 
Mexican government that promoted the enactment of liberal economic reforms 
while avoiding a fallback to the economic nationalism of the pre-crisis years. 137 
The de la Madrid administration managed to gain the support of international 
actors and to tackle the immense economic problems by reforming public 
135 See Heredia (2000). 
136 See Rico (2000) p.119-176. 
137 See Whiting (1992). 
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finances, liberalizing international trade and promoting macroeconomic 
stability. To lock-in these reforms against societal pressure and to gain further 
international credibility Mexico joined GA TT in 1985 which has been the first 
important step of Mexico's international risk mitigation strategy. 
De la Madrids successor Salinas continued on the path of economic reform 
and liberalization. During his administration the strategy of regaining 
international credibility that made it possible to attract FOi and technology has 
been the driving force behind the conduct of foreign policy. Salinas sexenio 
was thus characterized by an "economization" of foreign policy which 
culminated in the signing of NAFT A Foreign policy and the presentation of 
Mexico on the international stage were means of demonstrating the capacity of 
Mexico to continue on the path of economic reform, to attract foreign investors, 
and to integrate the country into the world economy.138 
To reach these objectives Mexico embarked on a strategy of an intensification 
and diversification of its international relations. Internationalization was 
realized on the multilateral level as well as on the bilateral level by various 
international agreements and memberships in free trade agreements. Despite 
various integration projects in Latin America and other regions of the world the 
major ambition of the Salinas administration was to achieve a deeper 
economic integration with the North American market and in particular with the 
USA. Moreover, Salinas sought to promote Mexico's integration with other 
developed nations by signing an cooperation agreement with the European 
Union in 1991 and joining CECO in 1994.139 Since then Mexico signed various 
bilateral free trade agreements or bilateral investment treaties designed to 
increase the reciprocal protection of international investors.140 
All these international agreements and treaties implied obligations for the 
Mexican government concerning the implemented economic policy as well as 
the reform of the political system. Besides adhering to basic investor 
protection, joining CECO also meant accepting and domestically promoting the 
values and principles of this organization as the protection of human rights, 
plural democracy and the establishment of a market economy.141 Following the 
dramatic events in 1994 Mexico was subject to severe international criticisms 
for the lack of democracy, inequality, poverty and injustice with the most 
important criticism coming from sources inside the US that opposed the 
signing of NAFT A. Although Mexico initiated various efforts to evade the 
demands of international organizations, together with national efforts 
international pressure helped sustaining the process of political and economic 
reform. Thus, international obligations did not only help to lock-in reforms but 
were also in part responsible for further efforts of the Mexican government. 
138 See Heredia (2000) and Castro Rea et al. (1999). 
139 See Castro Rea et al. (1999). 
140 See Siqueiros (2001). 
141 For an overview of the FOi related rules of OECD see Fernandez (2002) p.269. 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
POLITICAL RISK AND FOi iN MEXICO 267 
All Free Trade Agreements that have been signed by Mexico include 
investment chapters. These chapters contain provisions concerning the 
national treatment of international investors, on expropriation and 
compensation, on investment related transfers and on dispute settlement 
mechanisms.142 However, the deepest credibility enhancing consequences for 
Mexican politics resulted out of the signing of NAFTA, in particular if one 
focuses on the credibility effects for international investors. Although NAFT A's 
explicit focus is on trade barrier reduction, the agreement had a powerful 
impact on decisions to locate production. 143 The treaty intensified the ties 
between Mexico and the North American market and contained many 
regulations that helped enhancing investor confidence. Given the 
preponderant role of US investment in Mexico it held enormous potential for 
the stimulation of further FOi flows. As already pointed out the reduction of 
trade barriers, the further opening of the economy for international investment 
and the higher legal security and protection of foreign investors were a major 
step towards a better institutional environment for foreign investors.144 Even 
before NAFTA came into effect the mere possibility of such an agreement 
stimulated FOi flows to the country.145 The empirical evidence for the positive 
effects of NAFTA on FOi inflows is overwhelming. After NAFTA negotiations 
were announced in 1990 FOi flows to Mexico already showed an important 
upward trend between 1991 and 1993.146 After coming into effect in 1994 FOi 
flows to Mexico nearly tripled and sustained these high levels during the 90s 
despite of the detrimental impact of the financial crisis in late 1994. Likewise 
the FOi/GDP ratio reached new heights after the signing of the agreement by 
temporarily rising from around 1 % in the pre-NAFT A-years to levels around 
3% during the late 90s.147 
But the effects of NAFT A also extend to the future since the treaty makes 
national policy reversals more costly. NAFTA is an instrument through which 
Mexican governments will be bound to their commitments and a political tool 
that increases investor confidence by locking in reforms and immunizing 
142 An Investment Chapter is also part of the negotiations of the Free Trade of the Americas 
(FTTA). See Fernandez (2002) p.268-272 
143 Peres (1990) argues that FOi promotion was a central motivation for the Mexican 
administration to negotiate NAFTA. See Peres-Nunez (1990b). 
144The Bank of Mexico writes: "The NAFT A removes significant investment barriers, ensures 
basic protection for NAFT A investors, and provides a mechanism for the settlement of 
disputes between NAFTA investors and NAFTA countries. The NAFTA requires each 
country to provide non-discriminatory treatment to investors and investments from other 
countries. Thus, each country will accord NAFTA investors "national treatment'' (treatment 
no less favorable than that accorded to its own investors), as well as "most favored nation 
treatment" (treatment no less favorable that it accords to investors from other countries)." 
Banco de Mexico (1994) p.192. 
145 Oman speaks of an announcement effect. See Oman (2000) p.104. 
146 See paragraph 5.2.2.2. 
147 In an analysis of the stimulating effects of NAFTA for FOi to the Mexican market 
Graham/Wada find that better investor protection and the access to the North American 
market were the most influential factors. See Graham/Wada (2000) p.786-789. 
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national politicians against populist pressure.148 At the time of writing the lock-
in-mechanism has turned out to be a success. Despite of extensive public 
pressure during the last years that has been particularly severe in the agrarian 
sector, up to now NAFTA contents have not been altered or renegotiated . 
Moreover, the Mexican experience with the dispute settlement mechanism 
highlights that the arbitrating body defended the principle ideas of the 
agreement to protect foreign investors.149 In addition NAFTA was in part 
responsible for the lower country risk rating and lower interest rate spreads for 
Mexican sovereign debt. The fact that Mexico has recently been assigned an 
investment grade ~ international rating agencies was also related to the 
signing of the FT A. 1 
The success of the NAFTA investment chapter as a tool for fostering FDI flows 
even made it a raw model for other trade and investment negotiations, for 
example with the European Union. Therefore, it is to be expected that lower 
risk levels for European investors will likewise result in higher levels of FOi to 
Mexico by European companies. However, up to now there has been no 
substantial rise in the amount of European FOi to Mexico since the Free Trade 
Agreement between the two parties has been signed. 151 Thus, empirical 
148 See World Bank (1997) p.101, Munro (1995), Ramirez (2001) and Ramirez (2002). Perez-
Nunez argues that limiting the discretionary freedom of future Mexican governments to 
enhance investor confidence was one of the explicit goals of the Salinas administration. 
See Perez-Nunez (1990b). Grosse writes: .This logic (increased foreign investment] has 
to do with the increased confidence that investors feel now that Mexico is tightly tied to 
the US market and the US policy framework. Investors are anticipating a much more 
stable and transparent policy framework for MNEs to deal with, thus encouraging them to 
include Mexico as a "safe" location for globally integrated production and distribution." 
Grosse (2003) p.664. The need for a lock in mechanism for economic reforms is 
demonstrated by the electoral success of PRI dissidents from the left wing Coniente 
Oemocratico in 1988. These politicians that should later found the left-center party PRO 
essentially wanted to revise "neo-liberal" economic reforms. See Langston (2002) p.74-
79. After the Salinas administration a new wave of economic nationalism emerged led by 
PRI conservatives and members of the PRO. Part of the PR O's program is also a revision 
of NAFTA itself. Theses forces are also responsible for the failure of the Zedillo 
government's efforts to privatize and open the electricity sector for foreign participation. 
Probably the greatest resistance against free market reforms came from the EZLN which 
launched their upheaval in Chiapas on 1 January 1994 exactly the date when NAFTA 
came into effect. See PRS Group (2000). However, as the PRS Group's political risk 
report for 1999 argues that even if the PRO were to participate in government, it could not 
fully nullify trade and investment liberalization, as certain commitments given in the 
NAFTA treaty are irreversible. See PRS Group (1999) p.E4. 
149 See Gonzalez de Cossio (2002) who reviews the Mexican experiences with the arbitration 
mechanism. The most prominent example of arbitration was the case of the US firm 
Metalclad that was awarded a compensation because necessary licenses for production 
have not been granted by the Mexican authorities. 
150 Blazquez/Santiso write: "The FTA (Nafta) served as a credibility anchor since it was 
perceived by the financial markets as a mechanism that could reduce adverse selection 
and eliminate a potential problem of time-inconsistency with respect to the Mexican 
reform process." Blazquez/Santiso (2003). 
151 See Secreteria de Economfa (2002). 
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evidence for the credibility enhancing effects of the European Free Trade 
Agreement is still missing. 
Nevertheless the signing of NAFT A impressively illustrates the important role 
of international risk mitigation in the economic strategy of Mexico. While the 
results of domestic institutional reforms, except for the maintenance of 
macroeconomic stability, are still moderate, international integration 
succeeded in attracting immense FOi flows in short time. In addition Mexico's 
integration strategy placed the economy back on a growth path and diminished 
the probability of major economic shocks in the future.152 This empirical 
evidence leads to the conclusion that Mexico's international risk mitigation 
strategy played an important role in regaining international investor confidence 
and in defending liberal economic reforms against populist domestic pressure. 
Nevertheless, most Mexican NAFTA critics tend to neglect these important 
dynamic effects of regional integration with the Northern American market. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The empirical investigation of political risk and the institutional environment for 
foreign investors revealed that the impact of political risk variables on FOi 
varies considerably with the sources of risk. In accordance with the empirical 
results of the panel analysis in Chapter 4 this chapter showed that the most 
influential political risk variables are those that are closely related to 
governmental action or the political system of Mexico. In particular 
expropriation risk, political constraints, bureaucratic quality and democratic 
reliability showed the theoretically expected positive correlation with incoming 
FOi. In contrast to the results of Chapter 4 I find that macroeconomic risk 
factors are influential political risk variables in Mexico since an index of 
macroeconomic stability has been found to be positively correlated with FOi 
flows to the country. The same holds for an indicator of financial risk that 
measures the government's ability to fulfill its financial obligations from official, 
commercial and trade obligations. Variables that measured socioeconomic 
phenomena in turn, did not indicate high risks or did not turn out to be 
correlated with FOi which is in line with the empirical results of the panel 
analysis in Chapter 4 that likewise finds a minor importance of societal risk 
factors as determinants of FOi flows. An index of aggregate political risk turned 
out to be weakly correlated with FOi while an indicator of composite political 
risk, that additionally comprises economic and financial risk showed a stronger 
positive correlation. Furthermore, the Opacity-Index permits an evaluation of 
deterred FOi due to political risk that indicates that FOi flows to Mexico could 
be increased by up to 70% when political risk in the form of opacity could be 
diminished to risk levels of a benchmark group. Summing up, despite of 
methodological deficiencies due to missing data the empirical evidence 
152 The successful integration of Mexico with the US economy led other Latin American 
Nations to seeking closer ties with the US. Ecuador recently adopted the US dollar as 
official currency linking itself to US monetary policy. Chile has been seeking to join 
NAFTA and now negotiated a bilateral treaty with the US. Members of the Caribbean 
Common market and the Central American Common market likewise have been pursuing 
efforts to link themselves with the US. See Grosse (2003) p.664 -666. 
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suggests a strong impact of government related risk factors and 
macroeconomic risk indicators. Faced with the dramatically high risk ratings as 
a consequence of the Latin American debt crisis Mexico embarked on a mixed 
strategy of risk mitigation based on domestic institutional reform and 
international risk mitigation via regional integration. It is argued that the signing 
of NAFT A played a crucial role for the increased investor confidence by 
improving market access, increasing investor protection, locking in domestic 
reforms and "importing" credibility from the northern neighbors. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 5.1 offers an analysis of the current political system of Mexico and its 
implications for the economy of the country which is restricted to those 
characteristics that are assumed to be influential for the investment decisions 
of foreign investors. It argues that the Mexican political system of the past was 
characterized by high levels of political discretion for the executive branch and 
low levels of checks and balances. A weak congress and national judiciary 
implied that the executive was not adequately controlled and individual 
constitutional guarantees were hard to enforce. Despite of reforms the national 
media remained partially controlled which further reduced the possibility to 
effectively control the government. Moreover, it is argued that the process of 
political reform and democratization only slowly changed this patterns of 
governance in Mexico. 
Paragraph 5.2 presents some stylized facts of Mexican economic history and 
analyzes the historical development of the presence of foreign companies in 
Mexico. It is argued that Mexico has a long interventionist and nationalist 
tradition in its policy towards foreign investment that in part stems from the 
domination of foreign capital in the years preceding the revolution. With the 
example of NAFT A the chapter briefly describes the increased property rights 
protection and legal certainty that international treaties offer for foreigners 
willing to invest in the country. Furthermore, it describes the evolution of the 
structure of FOi flows to Mexico showing that the country succeeded in 
constantly upgrading incoming FOi from natural resource exploration to 
manufacturing and services. 
Paragraph 5.3 is dedicated to the analysis of potential political risk factors and 
their impact on FOi to Mexico. The chapter analyzes the impact of 
macroeconomic risk factors, governance related risk factors and societal risk 
factors. Since more sophisticated econometric methods could not be applied 
due to data limitations, instead qualitative assessments and statistical 
correlations are used to evaluate the influence of political risk on FOi. I find 
that governance related risk factors have an important influence on FOi to 
Mexico, while the role of societal risk factors seems limited. In contrast to the 
findings in Chapter 4 however, also macroeconomic risk factors have turned 
out to be positively correlated with FOi flows to Mexico. With the exception of 
the influence of macroeconomic risk factors the results are in line with the 
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results of the panel analysis in Chapter 4 which likewise indicate an important 
impact of governance related risk variables. 
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6 Conclusion and Outlook 
This volume analyzed the influence of political risks and the institutional 
environment on the investment decisions of foreign investors in Latin American 
countries. The results shed some light on the initial questions of how political 
risk influences the investment decisions of MNEs and what are the sources of 
political risk. The theoretical analysis in Chapter 2 presents a macroeconomic 
and a microeconomic model of investment to analyze investment behavior 
under uncertainty. Both models permit to derive the result that higher degrees 
of uncertainty have a depressing impact on investment spending, if 
investments are assumed to be irreversible. By extending these basic results 
to FOi decisions the theoretical models suggest that higher uncertainty 
resulting from political events should depress investment flows and that 
increasing political risk in countries is, all other things equal, expected to result 
in lower inflows of FOi. 
To facilitate the analysis the author used a simple theoretical framework that 
allows for the study of the impact of institutional factors on FOi flows to Latin 
American countries and to Mexico. The empirical impact of different risk 
factors is assessed by examining a panel of Latin American countries for the 
time period from 1982 to 1997 and a case study on Mexico for the years 1982-
2003. The results of the empirical analysis confirm the central hypothesis of 
this work that political risk has an important influence on FOi flows to Latin 
America, although empirical results vary largely with different risk indicators. In 
the panel analysis aggregate measures of political risk did not turn out to have 
a robust impact on incoming FOi to Latin American countries. The same result 
holds for classical indices of country risk based on hard macroeconomic data 
for the assessment of country risk. Likewise I find that societal risk variables 
are not robust determinants of incoming FOi to Latin American countries. In 
turn, governance related risk factors were found to be significant and robust 
determinants of FOi . 
While macroeconomic risk variables do not turn out to be of importance for FOi 
in the panel analysis for Latin American countries, the case study on Mexico 
suggests the opposite. The results concerning other risk factors are more 
straightforward to interpret since also in the case study on Mexico societal risk 
factors were not found to be influential determinants of incoming FOi. 
Governance-related risk factors showed a positive correlation with FOi 
indicating that they are influential for FOi flows to Mexico. 
These results are in line with the author's hypothesis that societal political risk 
factors are not of major importance for FOi flows to Latin America. The 
empirical results suggest that societal characteristics as religious or ethnic 
tensions, socioeconomic conditions or internal conflicts are not influential 
determinants of FOi. Despite of the obvious societal need to solve these 
problems, social reforms are no viable way to promote FOi. These findings 
suggest that the insignificance of aggregate political risk variables for FOi 
flows that has been found in many older empirical studies stems from the fact 
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that most risk indices contain a fraction of societal risk components with a 
large weight. Many of the indicators that have been used in earlier research 
even show a societal conflict bias that does not adequately mirror the current 
political and socioeconomic situation of Latin American countries. Therefore, 
the failure of many studies to find a significant relationship between political 
risk and FOi rather stems from methodological deficiencies than from the lack 
of relationship between the two variables. 
In contrast, it is hardly surprising that the most significant and robust 
determinants of FOi are variables that measure political risk originating from 
governmental action or failure. The results of this work impressively highlight 
the importance of good, transparent and rules based governance in Latin 
America as a prerequisite for the attraction of more FOi. While the reforms of 
the 80s and 90s were partly successful in implementing an economic order 
based on the market and political systems that are now more open and 
democratic than ever before, a second generation of reforms that ameliorate 
the institutional environment for business activities in Latin America is still on 
the way. Although officially democratic, many countries still have 
characteristics of authoritarian rule and weak national institutions that often 
hinder a proper functioning of markets and that distort private investment 
incentives. The qualitative analysis of the Mexican case impressively highlights 
how inefficiencies in government, public administration, judiciary and high 
levels of corruption may create an unfavorable investment climate despite of 
strong fundamentals as macroeconomic stability, a large domestic market, low 
wages and easy access to the US market. It also underlines the difficulties of 
overcoming ideological resistance against foreign capital, which has a long 
tradition in post-revolutionary Mexico and in nearly all other Latin American 
countries. Thus, besides a further economic liberalization, Mexico, and surely 
most of the other Latin American countries as well, need an institutional reform 
that increases the quality of national institutions and permits to attract more 
FOi. 
The study of the Mexican case additionally highlighted that although 
institutional reforms were initiated the results only materialize slowly which 
requires a short term strategy to complement domestic institutional reforms. It 
was shown that Mexic<;> successfully chose a strategy of multilateral and 
bilateral economic integration to mitigate high political risks. Interpreted in this 
way integration efforts as the membership in NAFTA not only have the static 
effects that are described in the theory of regional integration. Instead, 
integration is a valuable tool for locking in reforms against populist pressure 
and gaining credibility on the international stage. Furthermore integration 
efforts were crucial to improve the legal certainty of investors and the 
protection of property rights against predatory government interventions which 
have a long tradition in Mexican economic policy. The impressive increase of 
FOi to Mexico following its membership in NAFTA highlights the importance of 
this credibility effect for the Mexican economy. 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 275 
While reaping the short-term credibility effects stemming from international 
economic integration Mexico simultaneously embarked on a strategy of 
national institutional reform. The case study shows that the internal process of 
political reform and democratization is interwoven with the project of economic 
liberalization. The growing importance of opposition parties and growing 
citizen participation had important implications for the institutional environment 
of doing business in Mexico. Better control and higher checks and balances in 
the Mexican political system reduce the potential for the abuse of public power 
and the scope of nepotism that dominated in Mexico during the PRI 
governance. Reform of the judiciary allows for better contract enforcement and 
bureaucratic reform permits a more efficient provision of basic public services. 
A freer press and more societal controls will limit the blatantly high levels of 
corruption. Although still on a low level, the protection of individual citizens and 
businessmen against arbitrary and predatory government intervention 
increased. Hence, the dismantling of the semi-authoritarian PRI government 
did not only have political consequences but also positively influenced the 
business environment and investment incentives of national and international 
investors. Therefore, it may be argued that in Mexico the processes of 
democratization, institutional and economic reform are interdependent in the 
sense that progresses in either of these policy fields also have positive side 
effects on the other processes. 
Despite of these initial successes, as theory predicts, the process of 
institutional reform is lengthy and results take a long time to materialize. For 
Mexico and other Latin American countries the results of this analysis highlight 
the importance of an institutional reform that allows for better governance and 
public administration. Second generation reforms that aim at strengthening the 
institutional environment would allow for completely reaping the benefits from 
better functioning markets while simultaneously attracting more foreign capital. 
Thus, Mexico as well as other Latin American countries, have to continue the 
process of reform by focusing on the amelioration of national institutions that 
permit a better functioning of markets. However, recent events in Latin 
America are not provoking a particularly optimistic outlook for the years to 
come. The serious economic and political crisis in Argentina, the populist 
Chavez regime in Venezuela, civil strife in Bolivia and the stagnating process 
of political reform in Mexico due to the deadlock in government indicate that 
still important societal resistance has to be overcome to successfully 
implement institutional reforms. 
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Annex I 
A: Formula for the transfer of hard macroeconomic data to a 1-10 scale 
(based on the Methodology used by World Economic Forum (2002) 1 
9 x (CountryValue - SampleMinimum) + 1 
( SampleMaximum - SampleMinimum) 
B: Table A.1: Variables Used for the Panel Analysis 
Group Variable Full Name Description Type 
Dep. FDIT Total net FDI Net inflows of investment to Continuous 
acquire a lasting management values 
interest (10 percent or more of 
voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other 
than that of the investor 
Dep FDIS Total net FDI Same as FDIT but divided by Continuous 
divided by GDP GDP values 
Dep. FDIP Total net FDI Same as FDIT but divided by Continuous 
divided by Populaoon Size values 
population size 
X OPEN Openness Sum of exports and imports Continuous 
divided by GDP values 
X TELE Telephone lines Number of telephone lines per ! Continuous 
I 
1000 people 1 values 
I AGRISK Aggregate Risk Aggregate Political Risk, Discrete Values 
constructed by aggregating 
MACRO I, GOVII, SOCII 
I BUDG Budget Deficit Public Budget deficits as Continuous 
percentage of GDP, used for values 
the construction of MACRO! 
I 
1 See Wortd Economic Forum (2002) p.48-51 . 
Source Expected 
Sign 
World Bank: 
World 
Development 
Indicators 2002 
Wo,ld Bank: 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
2002, Own 
calculations 
World Bank: 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
2002, Own 
calculations 
World Bank: Positive 
World 
Development 
Indicators 2002 
World Bank: Positive 
World 
Development 
Indicators 2002 
Positive 
World Bank : Negative 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
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I BURE Quality of High scores indicate an Discrete values ICRG IRIS3 Positive 
Bureaucracy established mechanism for ranging from 0- Dataset 
recruitment and training, 6, with 6 
autonomy from political implying the 
pressure, and strength and best value (high 
experdse lo govern wilhoul quality) 
drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government 
services when governments 
change 
' BURE10 Quality of Same as BURE ranging from 0- ICRG IRIS3 Positive 
Bureaucracy 10, wilh 10 Dataset 
implying the 
best value (high 
quality) 
' CORRU Corruption in Lower scores indicate that high Discrete, ICRG IRIS3 Positive 
Government government officials are likely values ranging Datasel 
to demand special payments" from 0-6, with 6 
and that "illegal payments are implying the 
generally expected throughout best value 
lower levels of government" in (lower 
lhe form of "bribes connected corruption) 
with import and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax 
assessment. police protection, 
or loans 
I CORRU10 Corruption in Same as CORR Same as ICRGIRIS3 Positive 
Government CORRUbut Dataset 
values reaching 
from0-10 
I CURR Current Current Account Deficit as Continuous World Bank: Negative 
Account Deficit percentage of GDP World 
Development 
Indicators 
I ETHN Ethnic Measures the degree of tension Discrete, ICRGIRIS3 Positive 
Tensions within a country attributable to values ranging Dataset 
racial, nationality, or language from 0-6, with 6 
divisions. Lower ratings are implying lhe 
given to countries where racial best value (low 
and nationality tensions are ethnic tensions) 
high because opposing groups 
are intolerant and unwilling to 
compromise. Higher ratings 
are given to countries where 
tensions are minimal, even 
though such differences may 
still exist. 
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I ETHN10 Ethnic Same as ETHN Discrete, ICRG IRIS 3 Positive 
Tensions values ranging Dataset 
from 0-10, with 
10 implying the 
best value (low 
ethnic tensions) 
I EXPR Expropriation This variables evaluates the Discrete, ICRG IRIS 3 Positive 
Risk risk "outright confiscation and values ranging Dataset 
forced nationalization" of from 0-10, with 
property. Lower ratings Hare 10 implying the 
given lo countries where best value 
expropriation of FD/ is likely (lowest risk of 
expropriation) 
I GOVI Governance I Measures political risk resulting Discrete, ICRG IRIS 3 Positive 
out of government behavior, values ranging Dataset, Own 
constructed by aggregating from 0-10, with calculations 
EXPR, REPU, CORRU10 and 10 implying the 
BURE10 best value 
(lowest risk of 
harm to 
investor by 
national 
government) 
I GOVII Governance II Measures political risk resulting Discrete, ICRG IRIS 3 Positive 
out of government behavior, values ranging Dataset, 
constructed by aggregating from 0-10, with POLCON, Own 
EXPR, REPU, CORRU10 and 10 implying the calculations 
BURE10 and POLIII best value 
(lowest risk of 
hcf'm to 
I investor by 
national 
government) 
I INF Inflation Rate Yearly inflation rate as Continuous World Bank, Negative 
measured by the consumer values in World 
price index, used for the percentages Development 
construction of MACRO/ In die at ors 200 2 
I ISPRE Interest Rate Spread over LIBOR (London Continuous World Bank, Negabve 
Spread Interbank Offer Rate) is the values in Global 
interest rate charged by banks percentage Development 
on loans to prime customers Finance 2002 
minus LIBOR, used for the 
construction of MAC ROI 
I MACROI Macro Measures political risk resulting Discrete V mues World Bank, Positive 
Economic out of the Macroeconomic between 1-10 Global 
Environment Environment, constructed by with one being Development 
aggregating INF, ISPRE, the lowest Finance, W Ofld 
BUDG,RESDEB, SHORT (risky macro- Development 
I 
economic Indicators 
environment) 2002, own 
calcu lations 
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I POLCIII POLCON Measures the degree to which Continuous Henisz (2002), Positive 
Indicator governmental discretion is values between Henisz (2000). 
subject to external constraints 0-1 with 1 
signifying 
maximal 
constraints 
I POLCV POLCON Same as POLCIII but includes Continuous Henisz (2002), Positive 
Indicator two additional veto points (the values between Henisz (2000). 
judiciary and sub_federal 0-1 with 1 
entities) signifying 
maximal 
constraints 
I REPU Repudiation of Addresses the possibility that Discrete values ICRGIRIS3 Positive 
government foreign businesses, contractors. from 0-10 with Dataset 
contracts and consultants face the risk of lower scores 
a modification in a contract signifying a 
taking the form of a repudiation, greater 
postponement, or scaling likelihood that a 
down" due to "an income drop, country will 
budget cutbacks, indigenization modify or 
pressure, a change in repudiate a 
government, or a change in contract with a 
government economic and foreign 
social priorities. business 
I RESDEB Reserves debt Ratio of international reserves Continuous World Bank, Positive 
ratio and total external debt, used for values Global 
the construction of MACRO! Development 
Finance 2002 
I RULE Rule of law reflects the degree to which the Discrete values ICRG IRIS3 Positive 
Tradition citizens of a country are willing from 0-6 with Dataset 
lo accept the established lower scores 
institutions to make and signifying a 
implement laws and adjudicate weak rule of 
disputes. Higher scores law tradition in 
indicate: sound political the society 
institutions, a strong court 
system, and provisions for an 
orderly succession of power. 
Lower scores indicate a 
tradition of depending on 
physical force or illegal means 
to settle claims. New leaders 
may be less likely to accept the 
obligations of the previous 
regime. 
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I RULE10 Rule of Law Same as RULE Discrete values ICRG IRIS 3 Posilive 
Tradition from 0-10 with Dataset, own 
lower scores calculations 
signifying a 
weak rule of 
law tradition in 
the society 
I SHORT Fraction of Fraction of short term external Continuous World Bank: Negative 
ShortTerm debt in total extern al debt, used World 
Debt in Total for the cor,struction of MACRO I Development 
Debt Indicators 
I SOCII Societal Risk I Measures political risk resulting Discrete values ICRG IRIS 3 Positive 
in government behavior, from 0-1 O with Dataset, own 
constructed by aggregating lower scores calculations 
RULE10, ETH10. referring to 
higher societal 
risks 
z BART Bauiers to Measure of trade barriers, Continuous World Bank, Positive 
Trade proxied by taxes on Values World 
international trade including Development 
import duties, export duties, Indicators 2002 
profits of export or import 
monopolies, exchange profits, 
and exchange taxes as a 
percentage of current 
government revenue 
z EXCH Exchange Rate Exchange Rate of Local Continuous International Negative 
currency with US Dollar Values Financial 
Statistics (IMF) 
z GROW Economic Yearly growth rates of GDP Continuous World Bank, Positive 
Growth Rate values in World 
percentages Development 
Indicators 
z TAXP Taxes on Measures a country 's tax Continuous World Bank, Negative 
profits burden proxied by taxes on values in World 
income, profits, and capital percentages Development 
gains are levied on wages, Indicators 
salaries, tips, fees, 
commissions and other 
compensation for labor 
services; interest, dividends, 
rent, and royalties; capital gains 
and losses: and profits of 
businesses, estates, and trusts 
as a percentage of current 
revenue 
Source: Own table 
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Annex II 
Table A.2: Correlation of Political Risk Indicators with FOi Flows to 
Mexico 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
RI SK IN0 1CATOR FDIT (FLOWS) FDIS (FOi/GDP RATIO) 
ECRISK50 
COEFFICIENT 1.37E+09"' 0.001655"" 
P~VALUE (0.0000) (0.0045) 
R' 0.721117 0.385625 
FINRISK50 
COEFFICIENT 4.77E+08" 0.000720' 
P-VALUE (0.0327) (0.0531) 
R' 0.241399 0.202709 
GOVSTAB 10 
COEFFIClEl'lT 2.06E+09' 0.001007 
P-VALUE (0.0695) (0.6059) 
R' 0.180838 0.015993 
POLCIII02 
COEFFICIENT 4.02E+10'" 0.075638"' 
P-VALUE (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R' 0.782131 0.637421 
DEMOC10 
COEFFICIENT 3.18E•09"" 0.004467'" 
P-VALUE (0.0000) (0.0004) 
R' 0.724987 0.528631 
MIU10 
COEFFICIENT -2.62E+09"' -0.003246'" 
P-VALCJE (0.0000) (0.0045) 
R' 0.682934 0.387018 
LAW10 
COEFFICIENT -5.67E+09'" -0. 00 7232"" 
P-VALuE (0.0002) (0 .0094) 
R' 0.560018 0.335473 
BUREll10 
COEFFICIENT 3.22E+09'" 0.003624" 
P-VALUE (0.0001) (0.0222) 
R' 0.583158 0.271433 
CORRUll10 
COEFFICIENT -1.88E+09 -0.002464 
P-VALUE (0.4697) (0.5674) 
R' 0.031163 0.019620 
EXPR 
COEFFICIENT 1.82E+09'" 0.003675'" 
P-VALUE (0.0001) (0 .0068) 
R' 0.664380 0.418304 
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Table A.2: Continued 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
RISK INDICATOR FDIT (FLOWS) FDIS (FOi/GDP RATIO) 
INVPR10 
COEFFICIENT 2. 77E+o9••• 0.001989 ... 
P-VALUE (0.0021) (0.2321) 
R2 0.434773 0.082834 
ETHNll10 
COEFFICIENT -3.22E+09 .. -0.002776 
P-VALUE (0.0239) (0.2648) 
R2 0.265740 0.072555 
REUG10 
COEFFICIENT -8.22E+09• .. -0.007858 .. 
P-VALUE (0.0005) (0.0753) 
R' 0.518070 0.174367 
INT10 
COEFFICIENT -1 .63E+09 0.000180 
P-VALUE (0.3669) (0.9524) 
R' 0.048123 0.000216 
SOCEC10 
COEFFICIENT 4.02E+08 -0.000650 
P-VALUE (0.7433) (0.7480) 
R' 0.006478 0.006236 
POLRISK100 
COEFFICIENT 1.02E+09 0.000716 
P-VALUE (0.0310) .. (0.3861) 
R' 0.245421 0.044477 
COMP100 
COEFFICIENT 7.13E+08 0.000875 
P-VALUE (00017)° .. (0.0298) .. 
R' 0.447646 0.248496 
Source: Own table, p-values are in parentheses, *estimator significant at the 10% level, **estimator 
significant at the 5% level, ***estimator significant at the 1% level. 
Jörg Stosberg - 978-3-631-75364-4
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:53:22AM
via free access
Table A.3: Restrictions on FOi in Mexico: .----- -
RESTRICTIONS ON fOREION INVESTMENT IN MEXICO 
REsERveoAcr1V1r1e:s FOR THE STATE (ARTICLE 5) 
I. Petroleum and other hydrocarbons : 
II. Basic petrochemicals ; 
Ill. Electricity: 
IV. Generation of nuclear energy; 
V. Radioactive minerals ; 
Vl. Repealed by an Order published in the Official 
Gazette of the Federation on June 7, 1995. 
VU. Telegraph; 
VIII. Radiotelegraphy: 
IX. Po.st.al service ; 
X. Repealed by an Order published in the Official 
Gazette of the Federation on May 12, 1995. 
XI. Sank note issuing; 
XII. Minling of coins; 
XIII. Control. supervision and surveillance or ports, 
airports and heliports ; and 
XN . Others as expressly provided by applicable legal 
provisions . 
ACTIVITIES RESERVED TO MEXICANS OR MEXICAN 
COMPANIES WITH FOREIGNERS E,ll;CLUSION CLAUSE: 
{AIHlCLE6) 
Domestic land transportation for passengers, tourism 
and freight, not including messenger or courier 
services; 
II. Gasoline retail sales and distribution of liquefied 
petroleum gas; 
Ill . Radio broadcasting services and other radio and 
television services, other than cable television; 
IV. Credit unioM ; 
V. Development banking institutions , under the terms 
of the law governing the matter; and 
VJ. Rendering of professional and technical services set 
forth expressly by applicable legal provisions . 
---· - ___________ _, __ 
ACTIVITIES ANO ACQUISITIONS UNDER SPECIFIC REGULATIONS 
(ARTICLE 7) 
I. Up to 10% in: 
Cooperative companies for production: 
II. Up to 25% in: 
a) Domestic air transportation; 
b) Air taxi transportation; and 
c) Specialized air transportation; 
Ill. Up to 49% in: 
a) Repealed by an Order published in the Official Gazette 
of the Federation on January 19. 1999 . 
b) Repealed by an Order published in the Official Gazette 
of the Federation on January 19. 1999. 
c) Repealed by an Order published in the Official Gazette 
of the Federation on January 19, 1999. 
d) Repealed by an Order published in the Official Gazette 
of the Federation on January 19, 1999. 
e) Insurance companies. 
f) Bonding companies. 
g) Currency exchange houses ; 
h) Bonded warehouses; 
i) Financial leasing companies ; 
j) Factoring companies; 
k) Limited scope financial institutions ; 
I) Companies to whk:h artK:le 12 Sis of the Securities 
Market Law refers : 
m) Repealed by an Order published in the Official Gazette 
of the Federation on June 4, 2001; 
n) Repealed by an Order published in the Official Gazette 
of the Federation on June 4, 2001; 
c) Retirement funds management companies; 
p) Manufacture and commercialization of explosives, 
firearms, cartridges . ammunitions and fireworks , net 
including acquisition and use of explosives for industrial 
and extraction activities nor the preparation of explosive 
compounds for use in said activities; 
q) Printing and publication of newspapers for circulation 
solely throughout Mexico; 
r) Series 'T' shares in companies owning agricullural, 
ranching, and forestry lands; 
s) Fresh water. coastal, and exclusive economic zone 
fishing not including fisheries; 
t) Integral port administration; 
u) Port pitot services for inland navigation under the terms 
of the law governing the matter: 
,ipping companies engaged in commercial exploitation of 
ships for inland and coastal navigation, excluding tourism 
cruises and exploitation of marine dredges and devices for 
port construction . conservation and operation; w) Supply 
offuel and lubricants for ships, airplanes, and railway 
equJ.p_ment. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES REOUJRJNG A FAVORABLE 
RESOLUTION BY THE CNI TO PARTICIPATE IN A 
PERCENU.m: HIGHER THAN 49% (ARTICLE 8) 
Port services in order to aUow ships to conduct 
inland navigation operation, such as towing, mooring 
and barging. 
II. Shipping companies engaged in the exploitation of 
ships solely for high•seas traffic; 
Ill. Concessionaire or permissionaire companies of 
air fields for public service; 
IV. Private education services of pre-school, 
elementary, middle school, high school , college or 
any combination : 
V . Legal services; 
VI. Credit information companies; 
VII. Securities rating institutions; 
VIII. Insurance agents; 
IX. Cellular telephony; 
X . Construction of pipelines for the transportation of 
petroleum and products derived therefrom; 
XI. Drilling of petroleum and gas wells; and 
XII. Construction, operation and exploitation of 
general railways, and public services of railway 
transportation . 
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